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Cities in South Asia
Globalisation has long historical roots in South Asia, but economic liberalisation 
has led to uniquely rapid urban growth in the region during the past decade. This 
book brings together a multidisciplinary collection of chapters on contemporary 
and historical themes explaining this recent explosive growth and the transfor-
mations ongoing in the cities of this region.
 The chapters in this volume attempt to shed light on the historical roots of 
these cities and the traditions that are increasingly placed under strain by mod-
ernity, as well as exploring the lived experience of a new generation of city 
dwellers and their indelible impact on those who live at the city’s margins. The 
book discusses how, previously, cities such as Mumbai grew by accumulating a 
vast hinterland of slum dwellers who depressed wages and supplied cheap labour 
to the city’s industrial economy. However, it goes on to show that the new 
growth of cities such as Bangalore, Hyderabad and Madras in south India, or 
Delhi and Calcutta in the north of India, is more capital- intensive, export- driven 
and oriented towards the information technology and service sectors. The book 
explains that these cities have attracted a new elite of young, educated workers 
with money to spend and an outlook on life that is often a complex mix of 
modern ideas and conservative tradition. It goes on to cover topics such as the 
politics of town planning, consumer culture and the struggles among multiple 
identities in the city. By tracing the genealogies of cities, it gives a useful insight 
into the historical conditioning that determines how cities negotiate new changes 
and influences.
 There will soon be more megacities in South Asia than anywhere else in the 
world, and this book provides an in- depth analysis of this growth. It will be of 
interest to students and scholars of South Asian History, Politics and Anthropol-
ogy, as well as those working in the fields of urbanisation and globalisation.
Crispin Bates is Professor of Modern and Contemporary South Asian History at 
the University of Edinburgh, UK.
Minoru Mio is the Director of the Centre for Contemporary India Area Studies 
at the National Museum of Ethnology in Osaka, Japan.
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The city in South Asia
Crispin Bates
Globalisation has deep historical roots in South Asia, but economic liberalisation 
has led to uniquely rapid urban growth during the past decade, and this urgently 
requires scholarly attention. Previously, cities such as Mumbai (Bombay) grew 
by accumulating a vast hinterland of slum dwellers who depressed wages and 
supplied cheap labour to the city’s industrial economy. However, the new 
growth of cities such as Bengaluru (Bangalore), Hyderabad and Chennai 
(Madras) in the south of India, or Delhi and Kolkata (Calcutta) in the north is 
more capital- intensive, export- driven and oriented towards the information tech-
nology and service sectors (Ahmed 1991, Heitzman 2004). These cities have 
attracted a new elite of young, educated workers with money to spend and an 
outlook on life that is often a complex conflation of vibrantly modern ideas and 
conservative tradition (Baviskar & Ray 2011, Brosius 2010). They have also 
attracted a large inward migration of less skilled workers from outlying districts 
in order to service the needs of the new urban middle classes.
 To understand the drastic changes currently taking place in cities in South 
Asia, it is necessary to look at the historical development of social, cultural and 
political lives within cities. Over centuries South Asian cities have experienced 
various and sometimes contradicting forms of urban transformation, from 
Islamic urbanism to colonial and modernist urban planning (see Cheema 2007, 
Kalia 1999, Patel 2005, Sengupta 2007, Nair 2005, to mention a few). Migration 
from villages to cities and overseas has also characterised the lives of South 
Asians for generations (Bates 2001, Verkaaik 2004). Tracing the genealogies of 
cities will give a useful insight into the historical conditioning that determines 
how cities negotiate new changes and influences.
 The importance of the new style of urban growth to government finances 
means that the middle classes associated with it now dominate political and eco-
nomic decision- making across the subcontinent to an extent that is vastly dispro-
portionate to their numbers. The physical geography of South Asian cities is also 
being transformed (Ashraf 1989, Hosagrahar 2005). Problems of congestion, 
combined with the improvement of mobile telecommunications, have led to a 
reverse process of decentralisation in many cities, with businesses and offices re- 
locating to suburbs and satellite towns. Such towns have thus been transformed 
from dormitories into centres of employment. The new class of single, mobile IT 
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workers who have re- located to growth centres across India bring with them new 
ideas about how to live, and this sometimes creates conflict with the ideals of 
local communities (Upadhya & Vasavi 2008). These tensions have led working- 
class communities to organise themselves into conservative and patriotic associ-
ations to resist the tide of social change, and have sometimes even resulted in 
violence, as in the city of Ahmedabad in 2002 (Shani 2007, Breman 2004, 
Hussein 1990, Roy 2003, Tarlo 2003).
 Cities have always simultaneously been a source of cultural and social aspira-
tion and invoked a sense of fear (Hansen and Verkaaik 2009, Nandy 2007, 
Srivastava 2007), and the growing influx of capital into cities has further magni-
fied this complex imaginative repertoire. A proliferation of programmes on mul-
tiple TV channels has enabled the creation of new religious sects with massive 
followings almost overnight; once- forgotten religious festivals have been 
revived, and undemanding ‘lifestyle’ gurus and new forms of yoga are increas-
ingly in vogue. These developments are challenging and changing traditional 
conceptions of religion and of the relationship between religious authority and 
society as a whole. Above all, a new ideal of ‘subaltern citizenship’ (Pandey 
2010, Chatterjee 2004) has emerged within cities, through which the middle and 
working classes have sought to empower themselves with the aid of legal NGOs 
and charitable organisations. Battles are being fought over planning, the environ-
ment and the utilisation of urban space (Kaviraj 1997, Neve & Donner 2006, 
Verkaaik 2009, Ruet & Tawa Lama- Rewal 2009, Anjaria & Macfarlane 2011). 
Collectively, these developments have profound economic and political implica-
tions for the management of the modern city in South Asia, which are of crucial 
concern to national and international development agencies, as well as business 
enterprises seeking to invest in the burgeoning South Asian urban environment.
 The chapters in this volume attempt to shed light on the cities of South Asia in 
the present day from differing disciplinary perspectives. They also present, 
uniquely and for the first time, the work of East Asian (Japanese) scholars within 
this field and the products of some of the very latest scholarship within western 
academia. They are the result of multiple workshops held in Japan from 2006 to 
2010 under the Grants- in-Aid for Scientific Research programme of JSPS (‘A cul-
tural anthropological study of the commercialisation and transformation of urban 
space in South Asia’) which culminated in an international conference held at the 
National Museum of Ethnology in Osaka in July 2010. By bringing these original 
perspectives on the city in South Asia within the same frame, the conference 
organisers and editors of this volume hope to achieve an alignment that may help 
to establish the city in South Asia as an empirical field of study in its own right, 
rather than merely the object of competing disciplinary perspectives.
Part I: ideologies of city making – the formation of the 
Indian city
In Chapter 2, Junichi Fukao considers the cities of South Asia from an archae-
ological perspective. He claims that the main focus should be on the material 
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aspects of cities. Based on the criteria set out by Gordon Childe and other 
archaeologists, he has formulated benchmarks by which to distinguish a city 
from a village from the viewpoint of material evidence: settlement size, isolation 
from the surrounding area, monumental public architecture, town planning, 
extensive use of goods not in daily use and site hierarchy. There is a hiatus of 
more than 1,000 years between the ‘first urbanisation’ in the Indus civilisation 
and the ‘second urbanisation’ of early historic cities in north India, and there is 
little archaeological data available in the case of the early historic cities in south 
India. However, Fukao argues that a close examination of related pottery can 
show possible links and continuities between cities in these three categories.
 In the following chapter, Nobuhiro Ota discusses legendary accounts of the 
foundation of Vijayanagara city, the capital of the Vijayanagara state, from the 
middle of the fourteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth century, and 
the role within such histories of a Hindu saint named Vidyāranya. An analysis of 
the available accounts demonstrates that Vijayanagara city was unique among 
south Indian ‘Hindu’ capitals not only in its spatial expanse and form, as already 
noted by existing studies, but also because it played a significant role in the cre-
ation of dynastic power in symbolic and representational terms. The last section 
of the chapter deals with the historical context in which these legends were 
created and received. Ota concludes that the story of the founding of Vijayana-
gara city under the auspices of a ‘Hindu’ saint seems to have been conceived 
within the framework of south Indian cultural traditions, but that it is possible to 
detect within it an echo of the political norms of the ‘Islamicate’ world that 
engulfed south India during the Vijayanagara period.
 The contemporary relevance of these chapters lies in the collective memory 
of South Asians and the archaeological legacies that surround them. Even today, 
the echoes of these ancient city structures are still visible in the layout and imag-
ining of many cities, and they provide a mythology and practice of city culture 
from the remote past that helps to normalise urban living for South Asians in the 
present day.
Part II: politics of town planning – colonial and postcolonial
In this section, Partho Datta considers the Scottish town planner Patrick Geddes, 
who came to India in 1914 and for the subsequent decade was engaged princip-
ally in writing town- planning reports for local municipalities and princely 
patrons. His report on Barrabazar, Calcutta’s indigenous business district, written 
in 1919, was exceptional for its attempts to grapple with one of India’s largest 
colonial cities. Geddes had to enter into a ‘dialogue’ with official planners, not 
only because the scale of the problem in Calcutta called for a more innovative 
approach, but because opposition to his ideas was more entrenched there.
 Datta contextualises Geddes within currents of thought concerning town plan-
ning in early twentieth- century India. The worldwide plague epidemic (1896) 
resulted in urban policies that set stringent rules for the relationship between 
bodies and urban spaces. Implementing these were autonomous ‘Improvement’ 
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Trusts, which followed the precedent of demolition and rebuilding set by Hauss-
mann in Paris (c.1850–70). Geddes adopted a more cautious approach that would 
help preserve the historic core of Calcutta. His survey revealed that this tradi-
tional district had a functional and economic raison d’être and could indeed be 
modernised. Geddes’s plan and survey challenged orientalist notions about the 
moribund nature of Indian towns that seemed beyond the pale of urban reform.
 Moving from the colonial period to 1950s Pakistan, Markus Daechsel’s con-
tribution addresses the question of how a new national identity could be repres-
ented in urban space. Just like the makers of Vijayanagara several centuries 
before, policy makers were faced with the task of creating new urban centres 
that reflected a programmatic religious vision. This problem was particularly 
acute in Karachi, a city structurally and symbolically ill- equipped to serve as the 
new capital of a Muslim nation. Early attempts to create an ambitious new city-
scape that was simultaneously Muslim, modern and democratic failed, and soon 
the debate shifted away from city planning to the more restrictive field of monu-
mental architecture. Several modernist architects from Europe and Japan were 
invited to propose designs for important buildings of state, but their proposals 
were without exception rejected by senior bureaucrats who could not agree what 
a proper Islamic style for Pakistan should look like. After General Ayub Khan’s 
coup d’état of 1958, the problem of religious representation in the city was 
approached from a bolder and more ‘developmentalist’ perspective. The Greek 
planner Constantinos Doxiadis was tasked to solve the Karachi problem with 
two geographically separate projects: the Korangi satellite town close to Karachi 
itself, and more spectacularly, the newly created capital city of Islamabad in the 
north of West Pakistan. For Doxiadis, both urban sites could be made distinc-
tively Islamic by taking care to provide for all the perceivable needs of a Muslim 
population. But this ‘developmentalist’ Islamic urbanism, too, was quickly 
rejected by both the state and the ordinary residents of these new cities, leaving 
the original question of how to represent Islam in urban space not only unre-
solved, but in fact unresolvable.
 Moving from the heavy- handed planning of new cities in Pakistan to the re- 
construction of already well established communities in India, in Chapter 6 
Roma Chatterji discusses the changing representations of slum dwellers in slums 
such as Dharavi in Mumbai through the lens of slum redevelopment projects. 
From an initial perception as illegal encroachers on public land, they are increas-
ingly being viewed as local- level entrepreneurs. The role of the state has also 
been re- fashioned in the process. However, these changes cannot be thought of 
in terms of a linear trajectory. Instead, legality is a process with its own dynamic, 
and attempts to redraw the line between legal and illegal residents of a territory 
are constantly shifting.
 Issues of territoriality are also addressed in the research of Solomon Ben-
jamin, who examines in Chapter 7 how globalisation shapes the spaces of city 
contestations over territory and infrastructure in complex ways. He argues that a 
critical understanding of such contestations comes from looking at cities beyond 
the plan and seeing them as spaces constituted by everyday practices shaped 
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around multiple logics by the complexity of ‘on the ground’ politics. Such an 
analytical frame is very different from the assumption of the inevitability of a 
homogenised terrain that is commonly held across ideological perspectives on 
globalised cities. Bangalore, having been famed for IT since the late 1990s, and 
with the social and political tensions that resulted from this, forms a useful 
example with which to illustrate the shift in conceptual approach.
 Like other Indian and ‘southern’ cities, Bangalore has its fair share of glo-
balised infrastructure: ‘gated’ housing, office complexes clad in glass and 
granite, and large infrastructure projects such as expressways, metro rails and an 
international airport. Since 1998, an IT- dominated ‘civil society’ has been par-
ticularly vocal in envisioning the corporate- led future of the city along this path. 
Such visibility provides an example for others in India to look to as an illustra-
tion of corporate- led urban governance. But this narrative of ‘good governance’-
oriented urban reforms also homogenises the rest of the city into a non- planned 
‘slum’ and results in select parts of the central market areas being sanitised into 
a heritage precinct. In such a narrative, those who are not part of the IT industry, 
especially the poorer groups, remain marginalised, unruly, illiterate victims of a 
corrupt politics.
 At first glance, Partha Chatterjee’s ‘Civil and Political Society’ seems an 
attractive resource for understanding such tensions in Bangalore and elsewhere 
in urban India (Chatterjee 2004, 2008). Such a categorisation, however, over-
looks how the city actually works on the ground, where elite groups mobilize 
court cases, surveys and categories of Master Planning to homogenise diverse 
logics in constructing new ‘public space management’ to create ‘occupancies’ in 
their favour. A reverse of this situation is witnessed in resettlement housing, 
where poorer groups claim anthills as sacred territory. This is, of course, part of 
their belief, but also helps build up occupancy claims that counter governmental-
ities mobilising the ‘grid’ and ‘survey’. Benjamin calls for careful ethnography 
to enable more subtle understandings of the production of contested political 
space. These spaces are necessarily fluid and shaped by complicated relation-
ships, and operate beyond notions of ‘resistance’ or in oppositional frame to ‘the 
plan’. Thus, city politics can be understood as ‘stealth like’ and points to a vast 
city that is undisciplined by ‘the plan and policy’ to contest the rules imposed by 
centralised political party politics. This approach contrasts several recent studies 
of cities in the postcolonial south that adopt the frame of ‘The Plan’ to then view 
its outgrowth as a contamination – either as a ‘victor’ against or ‘victim’ of harsh 
modernism. Benjamin suggests that we look to the construction of space from 
Massey (2005), and draw from Singerman’s (1995) work on Cairo to highlight 
the notion of quiet politics. Rather than considering institutional realms through 
the lens of the nation state, he instead locates them within Santos’s (2004) con-
ception of legal and institutional pluralism. The city in these conceptions oper-
ates as a series of heterogeneous and contested spaces constructed around 
complex land claims.
 Benjamin’s argument, along with the other chapters in this section, points 
towards a research agenda that attempts to conceptualise the South Asian city 
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from beyond ‘the plan’ within the narrow confines of western theory. Instead we 
are encouraged to look at the possibilities opened up via everyday practices 
across place and time, within which there are constantly changing interactions 
among different elements within urban society and between the local populace, 
local state and global trading networks.
Part III: the city as an arena for struggles among multiple 
identities
In this section, Sandeep Banerjee and Subho Basu discuss the establishment of 
British crown rule in India in the late nineteenth century, when Delhi gained a 
new symbolic status. At this time Delhi was seen as the capital of precolonial 
India by Indian elites, as well as the colonial ruling class. Although Calcutta 
remained the centre of British power and flourished as a hub for the men, mater-
ials and resources of empire both within India and outside, it lacked the historic 
authenticity of Delhi among the colonial elite and Indian literati. This sensitivity 
to the past and present of the two cities betrayed a deep sense of alienation. To 
many Hindu neo- nationalist Bengali elites, Delhi symbolised ‘Muslim tyranny’ 
and lost Hindu glory. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Bengali writers 
celebrated Calcutta for its modernity. Yet as the long nineteenth century reached 
its closing decades, such celebrations seemed to be increasingly undermined by 
a sense of diminishing agency within the city. This chapter argues that during 
the late nineteenth century, as the tendency to imagine and visualise the colonial 
state space as the future nation space of India grew, this sense of alienation gave 
rise to an implicit yearning to restore Delhi to its position of glory within the 
putative Indian nation. The ruins of Delhi thus became a symbol for the nation 
among the bourgeois elite of Calcutta, the capital of British India, who aspired to 
restore the lost glory of India. By excavating the narratives of Bengali travellers, 
this chapter establishes how the city of Delhi became a metaphor for a ruined 
nation and charts the emergent geopolitical awareness of the imperial space of 
India as a site for the production of an imagined nation.
 Moving from nation to region, the chapter contributed by Riho Isaka exam-
ines the way in which Bombay State was reorganised on a linguistic basis fol-
lowing Indian independence, and the influence of this process on the social and 
political situation in the city of Bombay. Although the Indian government con-
ducted a large- scale reorganisation of states based on linguistic differences in 
1956, it was not until 1960 that Bombay State was divided into two linguistic 
states, Maharashtra and Gujarat. This delay was mainly a result of conflicting 
opinions concerning the position of Bombay city, namely whether it should be 
included in Maharashtra, if the state were to be created. While there had been a 
demand among the Marathi elite for the creation of Maharashtra with Bombay as 
its capital, there was strong opposition to this idea, mainly from the Gujarati 
elite. They argued that Bombay was a multilingual city and was connected his-
torically, economically and socially with both Marathi- speaking and Gujarati- 
speaking regions. While repeatedly rejecting the idea of including Bombay 
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within Maharashtra, the Indian government suggested alternative solutions, 
which caused serious political tensions. Riho Isaka’s chapter examines in detail 
various ideas of the city presented in this process and shows how the notion of 
Bombay as a place primarily for Marathi speakers gained significant influence in 
the late 1950s. This development not only resulted in the birth of Maharashtra in 
its present form, but also had an important effect on politics in Bombay after 
1960, encouraging the rise of the politics of regional chauvinism (and of the Shiv 
Sena in particular). The chapter thus considers the implications of the creation of 
linguistic states for the development of contemporary cities in India.
 In Chapter 10, Tetsuya Nakatani discusses how in the urban environment of 
Delhi the neighbourhood has been formed and influenced by the urbanisation 
and redevelopment of urban spaces, using the case study of Chittaranjan Park, 
formerly known as the ‘East Pakistan Displaced Persons’ Colony’, in New 
Delhi. New Delhi has many displaced persons’ colonies for migrants from West 
Pakistan, and since independence these have expanded the urban areas of Delhi 
and helped to form the modern conurbation. The first part of this chapter deals 
with the annual Hindu festival of Durga Puja in Chittaranjan Park. Durga Puja 
was first organised in 1970, when the development work of the colony was still 
ongoing and the number of residential plots was small. Since then, while the 
number of Durga Pujas in the colony has increased and the festival has become 
largely commercialised, some residents have begun to separately perform new 
neighbourhood pujas which have a more homely and personal touch. The various 
organisational changes within the Durga Puja festival demonstrate that once the 
expansion of an urban neighbourhood exceeds a certain size, it tends to dissolve 
and re- shape itself into an appropriate scale for social living. The second part of 
the chapter deals with urbanisation and its influence on the ethnic composition of 
Chittaranjan Park. Rapid urbanisation in Delhi and the redevelopment of two 
squatters markets in the colony during the past decade have changed the ethnic 
composition of Chittaranjan Park, once again challenging the identity of the 
local community.
 Finally in this section, Parvis Ghassem- Fachandi explores a strange contra-
diction that haunts the urban experience of Ahmedabad, a city strongly divided 
along class and communal lines. The city’s Sabarmati river is traversed by seven 
modern bridges, which, instead of being a solution to the problem of separation, 
have assumed its very form. In ordinary life, as well as during extraordinary 
events, residents of the city use these bridges not only to span space and gain 
access to the other half of the city, but also to escape and confine, project and 
expiate, and even to remain hidden in plain sight. This chapter describes experi-
ences of separation in Ahmedabad and how these experiences are expressed in 
reference to its bridges. In other words, urban structures intended to overcome 
physical space and represent the modern promise of connectivity have instead 
become embodiments of division.
 Collectively these chapters demonstrate how the spatial reconfiguration of 
urban spaces affects understandings of community and identity. However, they 
further suggest that the location of that community within wider political and 
8  C. Bates
social communities, whether that be of the city as a whole, the region or the 
state, can profoundly alter the way in which urban identities are lived and 
conceived.
Part IV: lived cities – views of cities from the ground
In the first chapter of Part IV, Yoko Taguchi discusses how 1990s economic lib-
eralisation gave rise to a new type of civil society movement led by the urban 
middle class. By invoking citizens’ ‘civic sense’, middle- class activists strive to 
eliminate ‘filth’ from public space and to create a ‘world- class’ city. However, 
these movements have been criticised for aspiring to progress at the expense of 
poor and marginal groups. The chapter offers a new perspective on these contro-
versial movements by focusing not on the politics of middle- class activism, but 
the forms and aesthetics of one particular ‘clean- up’ campaign: ‘Fight the Filth’, 
which was organised by the Mumbai Mirror. By investigating the forms and aes-
thetics of civic activism, Taguchi considers what it means to be a responsible 
citizen in the context of the competing demands placed upon the urban middle 
class within the public culture of contemporary Mumbai.
 In Chapter 13, Minoru Mio writes about spirit cults in Udaipur, Rajasthan. In 
the old town of Udaipur, an ancient capital city of a Rajput kingdom in south- 
eastern Rajasthan, spirit possession cults, centred on the recently revived spirits of 
Rajput warriors and/or lords who fought on the battlefield hundreds of years ago, 
have rapidly become popular. These cults function as new communities for their 
followers, and for the citizens of Udaipur have become a basis for the reconstruc-
tion of the locality. At the same time, they show features that deviate significantly 
from the typical characteristics of such cults seen elsewhere. After describing the 
recent social changes in Udaipur and the features of these cults, this chapter aims 
to consider how such apparently old- fashioned cults can be the basis for locality 
reconstruction in a contemporary Indian city. The cults have developed in a place 
where local cities, loaded with the unique memories and traditional meanings of an 
old capital city, have been incorporated into the space of the modern nation state. 
The followers of these cults both resist and negotiate with the forces of nation 
building and globalisation by participating in the religious practice of cults that 
recollect the memory of past Rajput warriors and lords.
 In the following chapter, Mizuho Matsuo discusses the role of religious prac-
tices among the urban middle classes in contemporary India by focusing on 
Narayan Nagbali, a funeral and ancestor rite performed at Trimbakeshwar in 
Maharashtra, western India. Narayan Nagbali is believed to solve family issues 
such as childlessness, the lack of a male child and domestic conflicts caused by 
the curse of restless ancestors or the sin of killing a cobra (nāg). Although it 
takes three days to complete the entire ritual, and various procedures are 
required, it is becoming popular with the urban middle classes, who visit Trim-
bakeshwar to perform Narayan Nagbali.
 Economic liberalisation in India in the 1990s brought rapid economic pro-
gress and the expansion of the Indian middle classes. Arising from this are two 
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different phenomena concerning the religious practices of the middle classes that 
have attracted the attention of scholars. One is the growing Hindu nationalism 
among the lower and middle classes and their involvement in the movement to 
construct ‘India’ as a nation consisting solely of Hindus. The other is the increas-
ing popularity of charismatic modern gurus with spiritual healing powers. By 
attaching themselves to a certain guru, middle- class devotees can construct an 
identity as a modern Indian. By contrast, however, Narayan Nagbali seems to 
involve rather traditional and orthodox religious practices which have been per-
formed since Vedic times. Why is the performance of such ancestral rites neces-
sary for the middle classes, and what kind of social role do they play? Through a 
detailed examination of the Narayan Nagbali ritual and the people who gather at 
Trimbakeshwar, this chapter reveals that the performance of this ritual helps to 
make the category of family visible. It also assists in the reconstruction of the 
locality and, as with the spirit cults of Udaipur, reflects the social transforma-
tions and uncertainties surrounding the lives of the urban middle classes in India.
Part V: subaltern practices and discourses in urban 
situations
In the first chapter of this section, Anindita Ghosh considers Calcutta in the late 
nineteenth century and its relationship with singing and street songs at a time 
when the material infrastructure of the city was changing beyond recognition, 
with tramways and gaslights, parks and avenues and unprecedented levels of 
commercialisation within daily life. Interestingly, the city in contemporary imag-
ination was also seen increasingly as a site of moral corruption, sin and ruin. Yet 
rather little is known of the responses of the city’s more humble inhabitants – 
migrant workers, boatmen, songsters and an army of clerks – to these tumultu-
ous developments. What was the reaction of these people to the changing world 
around them? Contemporary songs, some of which were later captured in print, 
provide entry- points into the psyche of Calcutta’s lower social orders. They 
show how these groups reflected upon and engaged with these changes through 
participation in and the patronage of street songs, which became an immensely 
popular part of contemporary urban culture. This chapter thus explores the inter-
stices between largely pre- modern, pastoral and deeply indigenous sensibilities 
on the one hand, and the onset of a rushed modernity and urbanity in nineteenth- 
century Calcutta on the other, as well as their wider significance for the newly 
emergent public sphere within the city.
 In Chapter 16, Ajay Gandhi focuses on Indian migrant labourers who work in 
the wholesale markets and construction mandis of Delhi’s old city. These Hindu 
and Muslim labourers work intermittently as jobs arrive and are mostly away 
from their families and kinship networks in India’s northern states. This chapter 
provides an examination of the Indian street as a constitutive space for the urban 
underclass. Gandhi addresses the plasticity of street activities, the ways in which 
the street opens up into different sensory possibilities and threats, and finally the 
ways in which the street is a conduit to elsewhere – a broader public culture that 
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is vernacular and fragmentary. The chapter discusses issues such as ‘time- pass’, 
intoxication and gratification, and the ways in which the everyday eating, watch-
ing and waiting of workers hovers over notions of habit, addiction and indul-
gence, and their myriad moral and social consequences.
 What is the lived experience of people dwelling in the city? How do the city’s 
inhabitants experience the city, and how do they regard their everyday lives? 
How do they view human relationships in the city, particularly in comparison 
with those in the village? Mineo Takada answers these questions with regard to 
Muslims belonging to the lower strata of society in Chittagong, Bangladesh in 
Chapter 17. Employing the methodology of oral history, the chapter attempts to 
give voice to the residents of Chittagong through a presentation of their personal 
narratives. These stories reveal unexpected experiences, such as the harsh real-
ities of everyday life in rural areas, children running away from home, and teen-
agers existing on the street, along with other aspects, both positive and negative, 
of city life. A hidden connection between street children who have run away 
from home and city residents in the lower strata also becomes apparent. With the 
facts of their lives as a background, their impressions of human relationships, 
ambivalent views on city life and on the city itself are explored in the conclusion 
of this chapter.
 These insights into street life in Chittagong, the Old City in Delhi, and histor-
ical examples of popular culture in Kolkata, reveal a thriving counter- culture 
within urban life, according to which ordinary people imagine their lives in the 
city in ways that contrast markedly with those of the middle classes, the town 
planners and the city’s economic and social elite. The city from this perspective 
is a space of contestation: poor residents, labourers and migrant workers are seen 
not as mere passive victims but as groups and individuals actively competing for 
opportunities on the margins of thriving urban centres, negotiating their hopes 
and despair, and securing a sense of freedom through the tactics of cultural 
creativity.
Part VI: consumer culture in contemporary South Asian 
cities
In this chapter Izumi Morimoto discusses Nepali tourism, which has been devel-
oping since the middle of the twentieth century. Tourist industries such as hotels 
and restaurants have accumulated in Kathmandu, which has also been changing 
rapidly in the context of modernisation and globalisation. In Kathmandu, the 
greatest change is in the touristic space of Thamel. This space has come to repre-
sent the image of Shangri- La imagined in the west. When the number of tourists 
decreased at the end of the twentieth century as a result of the volatile political 
situation, the new Nepali middle class began to visit Thamel in order to explore 
and enjoy the exotic side of Nepalese culture as seen by westerners. At the same 
time, local Nepali people re- created their own culture as a consumer product. 
For example, foreign tourists enjoy ethnic Nepali food cooked with ketchup and 
with very little chilli, while the demand from Nepali people has created many 
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local Nepali food restaurants where local foods are prepared with plenty of chilli. 
Initially, the tourist space of Thamel was created by demand from foreign tour-
ists, but recent changes have transformed this space into a centre of consumption 
for the enjoyment of the Nepali middle classes as well.
 Consumption in the form of dining out thus helps to define the middle classes 
in urban Nepal; it is a phenomenon that has arisen in other major cities in South 
Asia in recent years, notably in Kolkata, where ‘dining out’ has become an 
entirely novel part of middle- class culture. However, consumption can be 
equally important as a site for the regulation of urban society and spaces of 
social interaction. In the final chapter of The City in South Asia, Aya Ikegame 
and Crispin Bates explore the drinking culture of Bangalore and the way this has 
become a focus for novel forms of social control in reaction to the burgeoning 
sociality of middle- and working- class drinkers.
 Over the last decade, Bangalore has enjoyed such names as the IT City, 
Techno- Hub and Pub City, leaving its old names, the Garden City and ‘the 
Haven of Pensioners’, far behind. Bangalore is unusual in that it is one of the 
few cities in India where a woman can openly drink in public and still feel safe. 
In Church Street, immediately behind the city’s landmark M.G. Road, many 
young female office workers thus enjoy a lunchtime beer with their colleagues. 
At the same time, Bangalore and Karnataka’s second city, Mangalore, has wit-
nessed several violent incidents carried out in the name of moral policing in 
recent years. Women going to pubs wearing jeans and sleeveless shirts have 
been targeted and assaulted in public by gangs of Hindu nationalists.
 Drinking in India has always been a very contentious issue. Christian mis-
sionaries encouraged a policy of temperance, while the army in cantonment 
cities such as Bangalore fortified its troops with copious quantities of spirits. 
Giving up drinking was considered to be one of the ways in which the lower 
castes could claim higher status in the varna hierarchy. Gandhi added to this 
‘Sanskritising’ behaviour a sense of patriotism, as alcohol was a major source of 
income for the colonial state. Unfortunately, the excise duty on alcohol remained 
an extremely important source of income for post- independence state govern-
ments (accounting for more than 20 per cent of tax revenues in most states). 
Inheriting as it did both the nationalist (or Gandhian) moral agenda and the fin-
ancial structures of the colonial era, the postcolonial state had to play a seem-
ingly contradictory role.
 Some states tried to introduce a total prohibition on alcohol sales, but most of 
them failed to continue this, with the exception of Gujarat. However, it need not 
be contradictory to both adopt a moral stance and ensure that financial demands 
are met. It all hinges on controlling people’s moral and bodily practices. 
Southern states have now banned the sale of arrack, a typical working- class 
drink, on the grounds of health and family welfare, while encouraging the sale of 
Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL), a more middle- class drink, which happens 
to be centrally distributed. This is a clear example of how the state has endeav-
oured to exercise moral authority over predominantly urban populations while 
controlling and collecting excise revenues more efficiently. Earlier, toddy liquor 
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was banned for similar reasons. This chapter demonstrates the changing and 
diversifying nature of drinking cultures in Bangalore and explores the ways in 
which the postcolonial state has endeavoured to control the way people drink, 
and the spatial and social re- orientations of the city that have resulted.
The post- orientalist South Asian urban space
According to Max Weber, the city in South Asia was never properly developed 
as an institution. It lacked a central economic, symbolic and political role. It 
never developed a mature middle class nor the concomitant civil society customs 
and practices. However, the chapters in this volume prove this to be an overtly 
orientalist point of view that is far removed from reality. Even in ancient times, 
the city played a powerful symbolic, political role within segmented Hindu state 
systems. In the colonial era, the paradigms of urban development were generally 
quite different from those found in Europe. Nevertheless, urban centres grew in 
response to the demands of administration and international trade. Lively debates 
ensued about the development and organisation of cities, and the fundamentals 
of civil society were established through a series of collaborations between indi-
genous and colonial elites. Small towns and cities grew, while some, such as 
Kolkata (the largest city in the world at the end of the nineteenth century), 
became major conurbations. Yet despite the rapidity of economic and social 
change, the old ties of language, ethnicity and belief persisted. Within the urban 
environment, new communities asserted themselves and reconfigured urban 
spaces to suit their interests. A subaltern public culture was articulated to match 
that of the colonial and civic elites, and old and familiar spiritual practices were 
revived and reinvented.
 In more recent times, in cities such as Chandigarh and Islamabad, govern-
ments have sought to replan and redesign the city in sovereign exercises of state 
power in order to fulfil the expectations of an imagined modernity. In cities such 
as Bangalore, the government has even attempted to interfere with and control 
the drinking and social habits of the populance. Yet, to a greater or lesser extent, 
these attempts at direction and control have failed. They have been overwhelmed 
by the complexity of social arrangements and assertions of popular agency. Con-
trary to the arguments of Weber, this does not represent an absence of civil 
society, but a conflicted public culture in which powerful and organised com-
munities and interests pull against each other. The city in South Asia is not dis-
ordered, but highly competitive, and in being so reveals a dynamism and 
creativity that is startlingly different from European examples, but which cannot 
be overlooked. It is this creative, burgeoning and contested urban space that this 
volume attempts to explore, arguing for the validity of the South Asian city as an 
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Part I
Ideologies of city making
The formation of the Indian city

2 Cities in India
An archaeological perspective
Junichi Fukao
This chapter looks at cities in India from an archaeological perspective, taking 
their material aspects as a focal point. Drawing on the work of Gordon Childe 
and other archaeologists, in the first section a set of criteria is outlined by which 
a settlement may be defined as a city; these include the extensiveness of the site, 
its clear physical demarcation from the surrounding area, the existence of 
monumental architecture for a public purpose and evidence of the existence of 
specialised craft industries, etc. The chapter goes on to discuss several sites in 
light of these criteria, beginning with cities in proto- historic India in the first 
period of urbanisation and moving on to examine settlements in the second 
period of urbanisation – over 1,000 years later – in early historic north India and 
in southern India, where the second period of urbanisation occurred later still. 
The closing section of this chapter comments briefly on the possibility of a 
connected cultural development process in India using the evidence provided by 
black and red ware, a type of pottery.
 What in archaeological terms constitutes a city? Archaeology is the study of 
human cultures based on material evidence, and thus when cities are viewed 
from an archaeological perspective their material aspects form the main focal 
point. Gordon Childe, one of the world’s most influential archaeologists, listed 
ten criteria for a settlement to qualify as a city, and these are still referred to 
today as a classic example of the ‘definition’ of a city (Childe 1950). As a result 
of the stress he placed on the ideological aspects of urbanisation, Childe’s 
criteria are somewhat complex and may appear to be a mixed bag of multifaceted 
features. Childe coined the term ‘Urban Revolution’ and claimed that it was the 
second critical and revolutionary turning point in the history of mankind, after 
the ‘Neolithic Revolution’. He remains highly influential, and many other 
archaeologists, including Shaffer (1993) and Allchin (1995), have formulated 
their idea of the city based on Childe’s criteria. In this chapter the criteria put 
forward by Childe and other archaeologists are elaborated upon and summarised 
into several materially discernible elements to be used as benchmarks in 
distinguishing between a city and a village in the examination of archaeological 
sites.
 Before beginning the main body of this chapter, an important point must be 
made regarding the significance of focusing on material evidence alone. With 
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the rise of religious fundamentalism, studies of Indian history have often been 
exploited in order to justify particular political or religious ideologies, such as 
the idea of indigenous Aryans, alleged medieval Islamic vandalism, claims of a 
possible link between Dravidian people and Indus valley civilisation and many 
others. In this context, in order to circumvent this kind of controversy, it is 
strategically important to confine the analysis of Indian cities that will occur here 
to material culture. The following are the proposed observable elements for the 
identification of a settlement as a city from the viewpoint of material culture:
1 The extensiveness of the site and/or estimated high population density, 
which reflects the overwhelming size of the settlement compared with other 
sites.
2 Clear demarcation of the site from the surrounding area with a wall and/or a 
moat, from which the existence of an isolated centre of power may be 
inferred.
3 Monumental architecture for some public purpose, the construction of which 
would have required the collective labour of non- food producing groups.
4 Well- arranged town planning from which, again, the existence of a 
controlling power supervising the overall city could be inferred.
5 An abundance of excavated artefacts not in daily use, or luxury goods which 
would be the result of the development of craft specialisation, or which 
would have been obtained from extensive trade activity from distant places.
6 A hierarchical relationship of archaeological sites, from which the relationship 
between cities and their hinterland could be inferred.
It is important to note that the above- mentioned six elements need not be 
considered as rigid indices for a city; some cities may fulfil all the criteria, and 
others may meet only some of them. In the following section cities in proto- 
historic and early historic India will be examined in the light of the above 
benchmarks.
The first urbanisation in proto- historic India
It is a well- known fact that cities appeared for the first time in Indian history in the 
Indus civilisation, which flourished in the Indus River plain and the surrounding 
area from about 2600 bCe to 1900 bCe. Two outstanding urban settlements in the 
Indus civilisation are Harappa (Meadow 1991, Kenoyer & Meadow 2001, Kenoyer 
2008) and Mohenjo- daro (Kenoyer 2008, 2009). Both of these settlements lie in 
present- day Pakistan: Harappa is situated in the present Sahiwal Division, Punjab; 
and Mohenjo- daro is in the present Larkana Division, Sindh.
 Regarding the size of the settlements, the structural remains from the Indus 
period in Mohenjo- daro cover more than 83 ha, and it is estimated that the total 
habitation area would have extended to around 250 ha. Harappa is reported to 
have covered an area of 76 ha; however, it is possible that it extended to almost 
150 ha when the discovery of habitational deposits outside the major mounds is 
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taken into account. Although there are some other sites with a total area 
exceeding 100 ha – including Lakhmirwala, in the present- day Jind district of 
Haryana, India, which is an unexcavated site estimated to cover nearly 225 ha 
(Chakrabarti 1997) – it is certain that relative to other archaeological sites in that 
area, Harappa and Mohenjo- daro are of outstanding size.
 Most of the major Indus cities have a fortification wall to demarcate the urban 
settlement, separating it from the surrounding area. At Harappa, the western 
mound of the site, which is named Mound AB and comprises one of the major 
parts of the settlement, is demarcated by a massive fortification wall, made 
mainly of mud and mud bricks with a revetment of burnt bricks. It is roughly a 
parallelogram in shape, and measures nearly 400 m north–south and 200 m east–
west. Judging from the available data, the average height of the fortification 
would have been around 5 m. Recently, part of a mud- brick wall has been found 
along the southern edge of two other adjoining mounds, called Mound E and 
Mound ET. Although it is not so clearly discernible as the one at Harappa, a 
mud- brick wall has also been found at Mohenjo- daro. Many of the smaller Indus 
sites have a similar fortification wall that encloses an urban settlement. 
Kalibangan (Thapar 1975), situated in Hanumangarh district, Rajasthan, India, 
consists of two habitation mounds, both of which have a separate mud- brick wall 
forming an approximate parallelogram. The wall running along the smaller 
western mound measures about 130 m east–west and 260 m north–south. On the 
other hand, the east–west width of the wall of the other, bigger mound is about 
239 m, although its north–south length is unclear. With an area of approximately 
7 ha, the Indus port town of Lothal (Rao 1979), Ahmedabad district, Gujarat, 
India, is also a small site, but it too has a mud- brick enclosure, measuring 280 m 
by 225 m. A middle- scale Indus site, Dholavira, the area of which is 52 ha 
(Kondo & Koiso 2000) and which lies in Kachchh district, Gujarat, India, also 
has a perimeter wall of almost rectangular shape, which encloses an area that 
measures roughly 755 m long and 685 m wide. The enclosing wall of Dholavira 
is peculiar in the sense that it is constructed from stones.
 Inside the fortification of a settlement, large- scale structures can be found that 
were probably used for some public purpose. The so- called ‘Great Bath’ – a 
huge watertank made of burnt bricks – at Mohenjo- daro is certainly one of the 
most impressive structures in the Indus period. The tank itself measures 
approximately 12 m north–south and 7 m east–west, and has a maximum depth 
of 2.4 m. Just to the west of the ‘Great Bath’, a series of mud- brick platforms 
have been revealed which extend to an area of about 46 m east–west and 27 m 
north–south. It is popularly known as the ‘granary’, but its real function is as yet 
unknown. A similar type of ‘granary’ made of mud bricks has also been found at 
Harappa and measures 45 m north–south and 45 m east–west. A further 
warehouse has been found at Lothal, a settlement that is also famous for a burnt 
brick structure that is considered to be the ‘dockyard’. Other notable structures 
include a mud- brick structure at Kalibangan, which was assumed by the 
excavators to be a ‘fire- altar’, and the multiple masonry water tanks that 
surround the settlement at Dholavira.
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 The layout of many of the Indus sites is somewhat similar in that the 
settlements consist of a so- called ‘citadel’ mound and a ‘lower town’. The 
‘citadel’ area usually contains some public structures, and the ‘lower town’ tends 
to be more of a private residential nature. Harappa and Mohenjo- daro are typical 
examples of this town planning. At Harappa, Mound AB is designated as the 
‘citadel’, and Mound E and Mound ET, just south- east of Mound AB, are 
designated as the ‘lower town’. At Mohenjo- daro, the western mound containing 
the ‘Great Bath’ and ‘granary’ is taken to be the ‘citadel’, and the eastern mound 
is the ‘lower town’. Among the smaller sites, Kalibangan closely follows the 
double- mound layout of Mohenjo- daro and Harappa. The western smaller 
mound of Kalibangan is the ‘citadel’, and the bigger eastern mound is called the 
‘lower town’.
 Not all Indus sites are laid out in this way, with a ‘citadel’ and ‘lower town’; 
some Indus sites in the Gujarat region show a different layout. For example, 
Lothal has a single enclosure wall, and inside the enclosure there is a clear 
distinction between the ‘acropolis’, which is stood on a mud platform, and the 
‘lower town’, which is situated at a lower elevation. In Dholavira, also in 
Gujarat, the site is surrounded by nested rectangular masonry walls, and the 
innermost wall serves to demarcate the ‘bailey’ from the ‘middle town’ and 
‘lower town’. In the interior of the city long, straight streets are visible, 
intersecting one another. In the ‘lower town’ of Mohenjo- daro, Street 1 probably 
runs along the western part of the mound for more than 700 m. The ‘lower town’ 
of Kalibangan shows grid- like road planning, and the well- laid drainage systems 
found in Mohenjo- daro, Harappa and other sites would also seem to attest to a 
public centre of power in the city. It should be noted that the standardisation of 
town planning is not seen only in the town layout, but also in the standard size 
and weight of bricks.
 In the Indus civilisation, the development of craft industries can be seen in 
many respects; for example, evidence can be found of copper metallurgy and a 
pottery industry, among others. This can be taken to signify the growth of non- 
food-producing social groups in the Indus period that were able to support the 
city. In particular, ornamental beads made of faience and semi- precious stones 
such as carnelian and agate were actively manufactured. At Lothal and Mohenjo-
 daro, a bead- making workshop was found in a habitation mound. Famous Indus 
seals made of steatite or terracotta, with various designs and Indus scripts, have 
been found and are also examples of advanced craft technology.
 As has been shown earlier in this chapter, Mohenjo- daro and Harappa are 
surely outstanding sites in the Indus civilisation from the viewpoints of both size 
and the quality and abundance of excavated architecture and artefacts. After 
them come the middle- scale sites, such as Kalibangan and Dholavira, which are 
around 20–50 ha in size. There are also many smaller sites, such as Lothal. This 
kind of site hierarchy demonstrates the existence of a stratified relationship 
among Indus settlements, which is to say the distinction between city, town and 
village (Koiso 1998). On the whole, Indus cities were equipped with several of 
the features that characterise urban settlement.
An archaeological perspective  21
The second urbanisation in early historic north India
As a result of such presumed causes as extraordinary environmental changes in 
climate and/or river routes and the stagnation of trade activity, the Indus 
civilisation declined around 1900 bCe, and thus the cities that were dependent on 
the Indus civilisation also went into decline. There was an interval of more than 
1,000 years before cities appeared in the Indian subcontinent again, in the 
Gangetic Valley in about 600 bCe.
 One of the oldest urban sites to have been excavated in the Ganga Valley is 
Kausambi (Sharma 1969) in the district of the same name, in Uttar Pradesh 
(hereafter UP). At Kausambi, the area enclosed by the massive rampart probably 
covers around 160 ha. Another site, Maheth (Sinha 1967, Aboshi et al. 1999), 
situated in Sravasti district, UP, is believed to be Sravasti, the ancient capital of 
manajanapada Kosala, and covers an area of about 160 ha. The settlement at 
Rajgir (Ghosh 1951), in Nalanda district, Bihar, was referred to as Rajagrha, the 
old capital of Magadha. The old fort of Rajgir extends to about 200 ha in area. 
Most of the cities in early historic north India extend around 200 ha or so, with 
the exception of Pataliputra, which is estimated to have an area of around 
1200 ha (Erdosy 1988).
 One of the remarkable features of early historic cities in north India is a 
rampart wall encircling the entire urban space. The shape of the rampart varies 
from site to site; unlike the Indus cities, it is mostly irregular in design, and 
principally depends upon the geographical conditions of the location of the city. 
Kausambi has a rampart wall made of mud, with a revetment of burnt bricks, 
along with a moat. Its average height is about 10.7 m, with watchtowers reaching 
21–23 m high; this structure is noteworthy, as burnt brick revetments are not 
widely seen in the early historic period. At Maheth, there is a mud fortification 
which is about 5 km long and 18 m high; its shape is similar to a crescent form in 
design. The old fort of Rajgir is made of stones, and has inner and outer walls.
 As for the monumental public architecture, at Kausambi a massive stone 
structure – measuring 320 m by 180 m – inside the fortification is believed to 
have been a ‘palace complex’. Just south- west of Maheth is situated the site of 
Saheth, which has been identified as the famous Buddhist monument of Jetavana 
Vihara, referenced in Buddhist literature.
 As regards the other criteria for categorising a settlement as a city, since there 
are very few sites that have been extensively excavated, the internal structure of 
the city in early historic north India is not fully known. At Bhita (Mashall 1912), 
in Allahabad district, UP, two streets and house planning were revealed by 
excavations, and this basic town layout seems to have been retained until the 
later period. With regards to craft industries in early historic north India, 
Northern Black Polished Ware (hereafter NBP) was a characteristic form of 
pottery (Roy 1986). Finely manufactured pottery of NBP was widely distributed 
as a luxury good as far as south India. Iron implements were also extensively 
used in this period, and technology was remarkably developed. Studying the 
settlement patterns of early historic north Indian cities, Erdosy pointed out the 
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stratified relationship of archaeological sites according to their size, which could 
reflect the difference in the function of those sites (Erdosy 1988).
Urbanisation in early historic south India
From the available archaeological data, it is assumed that urbanisation in 
the southern part of India began in around the third century bCe. However, the 
details of this change have not yet been studied in depth, since most of the 
excavations have so far not been carried out to a satisfactory extent. At present, 
inferences about south Indian cities have to be drawn from the meagre data 
obtained from casual excavation work. As for the area of the settlement of 
south Indian cities, again only limited information is available, since no 
extensive excavations have yet been carried out. In some cases it is possible to 
estimate the extension of the settlement from the fortified area. Dharanikota 
(‘Excavation at Dharanikota, District Guntur’, 1965, 1967, 1969), just 1 km 
from the famous Buddhist stupa site Amaravati, in Guntur district, Andhra 
Pradesh (hereafter AP), has a square rampart wall which covers an area of 
about 35 ha. In Sannati (Sundara 1988), Gulbarga district, Karnataka, the area 
of the settlement encompasses about 200 ha. From the available evidence, it 
appears that the areas of south Indian urban settlements were generally not as 
large as those in north India.
 Not many early south Indian sites have been found to be within a fortification 
wall, and for those that have, the shape of the wall seems to vary from site to 
site. To name a few, at Dharanikota the settlement is visibly enclosed by a square 
rampart wall; Sannati has a brick wall of 4 m width and 2–3 m height; and at 
Satanikota (Ghosh 1986), Kurnool district, AP, a fortification wall made of mud 
with a partial burnt brick revetment surrounds the settlement, along with a moat. 
Further south, in the present- day Tamilnadu, no early historic sites have been 
found to have such a fortification. At Arikamedu (Wheeler et al. 1946, Begley et 
al. 1996), a famous port site near Pondicherry, some sections of a brick wall 
have been found in the northern part of the site.
 Some of the most striking architectural remains in urban sites in the coastal 
region of south India are wharves. At Kaverippunpattinam (Soundara Rajan 
1994), Nagapattinam district, Tamilnadu, a brick platform measuring nearly 
18 m by 7.6 m was found and is believed to be a wharf. Also, in Dharanikota it is 
possible to see the renovation process of the structure from a wooden wharf to a 
brick structure. Other impressive remains include Buddhist monuments, the 
construction of which was very prevalent in the Andhra region during the early 
historical period. The Amaravati Maha Stupa is very well known, and the 
remains of a stupa have also been found in Sannati. A brick- built Buddhist 
monastery has also been discovered at Kaverippunpattinam.
 Concerning the other criteria for cities, the available archaeological data 
generally reveals very little about the town planning of early south Indian cities. 
However, at Arikamedu, structural remains seem to show alignment in cardinal 
directions, and at Nagarjunakonda (Subrahmanyam 1975), Nalgonda district, 
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AP, part of the layout of the streets and houses is visible, although it belongs to a 
slightly later date.
 Finely manufactured deluxe pottery, NBP – demonstrating the existence of non- 
food-producing industries – was found from the early phase of south Indian urban 
sites like Dharanikota, and as far south as Korkai (‘Excavation at Korkai, district 
Tirunelveli’, 1971) and Alagankulam (Kasinathan et al. 1992), both in Tamilnadu. 
Besides NBP, there were a variety of finely made pottery items brought to this area 
as a result of extensive trade activities. Roman pottery such as Arretine ware and 
Mediterranean amphorae have been found profusely at Arikamedu and other eastern 
coastal sites. Further, rouletted ware, a type of pottery made for export purposes, is 
widely available in eastern coastal sites such as Arikamedu, showing that such 
trades did indeed serve to support the settlement. Also, the semi- precious stone and 
glass- bead industries continued to flourish in this period, and Arikamedu was one 
of the active production centres for those beads. Last, with regards to inter- site 
relationships, it is important to mention that large- and small- scale sites were found 
that were intended as trade ports, strategically located in the eastern coastal area 
in south India. These included the likes of Arikamedu, Kaverippunpattinam, 
Dharanikota and Alagankulam (Fukao 2004).
Urbanisation and proto- and early historic India
So far this chapter has examined cities in the Indus period and in early historic 
north and south India. There is a considerable time gap between the first 
urbanisation of the Indus civilisation and the second urbanisation of early 
historic north India. Further, there is both a geographical and a chronological 
gap between early historic south Indian cities and north Indian ones. However, if 
a close study of archaeological finds from those three periods is conducted, it 
might be possible to say that there is a possibility that the cities in those three 
periods would have had connections to each other (Figures 2.1–2.4).
 It is possible to gather some evidence of a connected cultural development 
process in India through the presence of a certain kind of pottery throughout 
India. Black and red ware (hereafter BRW) is a characteristic pottery in which 
the inner wall and the upper portion of the outer wall of the piece are black, and 
the remaining portion of the outer wall is red. It is finely made ware with a 
Figure 2.1  Pre-urban, megalithic period BRW from Kodumanal, Tamilnadu (source: 
Fukao 2001).
Figure 2.2  Pre-urban, megalithic period BRW from Vallam, Tamilnadu (source: Sub-
barayalu 1984).
Figure 2.3  Pre-urban BRW from Sonpur, Bihar (source: Sinha & Verma 1977).
Figure 2.4  Painted grey ware from Hastinapura (source: Roy 1986).
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special polish treatment on its surface. BRW first appeared in India in the 
Indus civilisation in Gujarat regions such as Lothal. After the decline of the 
Indus civilisation, BRW developed in south- eastern Rajasthan, with white 
painted designs. It is noteworthy that BRW is a characteristic pottery in the 
pre- iron, pre- urban Ganga region in north India. On the other hand, BRW 
became the most profusely used pottery in south Indian pre- urban, megalithic 
culture (Fukao 2001). Moreover, some close similarities in pottery types can 
be discerned between pre- urban north and south India. For example, the 
pottery type of a shallow bowl/dish with sharp carination is a typical BRW 
shape found in megalithic south India (Figures 2.1 and 2.2), and the same kind 
of pottery in BRW or other varieties of pottery can be seen in pre- urban north 
Indian sites (Figure 2.3) (Fukao 2005). In north India, this kind of pottery 
seems to have been handed down to the urban period with some evolutions 
(Figure 2.4). From the facts mentioned above, it could be inferred that the 
urbanisation process in India would not have been a separate process in proto- 
historic and early historic north and south India, but rather that there would 
have been a dynamic cultural development process involving the whole of 
India.
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3 Who built ‘the city of victory’?
Representation of a ‘Hindu’ capital in 
an ‘Islamicate’ world
Nobuhiro Ota
This chapter discusses legendary accounts of the foundation of Vijayanagara – 
the capital of the Vijayanagara state from the middle of the fourteenth century 
to the middle of the sixteenth century – and the role played by a Hindu saint 
named Vidyāraṇya. Analysis of these accounts will show that Vijayanagara 
was unique among south Indian ‘Hindu’ capitals not only in its spatial expanse 
and form, as shown in past studies, but also in that it played a significant part 
in the build- up of dynastic power in symbolic and representational terms. The 
last section deals with the historical context in which those legends were 
created and received. The story of the founding of Vijayanagara under the aus-
pices of a ‘Hindu’ saint seems to have been conceived within the framework 
of the cultural tradition of south India, but in it can be detected an echo of the 
political norms of the ‘Islamicate’ world that engulfed south India during the 
Vijayanagara period.
Capital cities in south Indian history
It has often been noted in south Indian historiography that the Vijayanagara 
state, which was founded in the fourteenth century (c. ce 1336), took on unique 
characteristics which had not been present in any antecedent south Indian dynas-
ties. For example, Nilakanta Sastri wrote that ‘Vijayanagara was perhaps the 
nearest approach to a war- state ever made by a Hindu kingdom; and its political 
organization was dominated by its military needs’ (Sastri 1975: 307). Although 
the validity of such characterisation still requires verification, as far as capital 
cities are concerned a huge difference between the Vijayanagara state and other 
south Indian dynasties is apparent.
 In scale, Vijayanagara (present- day Haṃpi in the Ballari district of Karnataka 
State) surpassed any preceding south Indian capital city; its area, surrounded by 
several rows of walls, was unprecedentedly extensive. Palaces, administrative 
offices, military facilities and temples enshrining the tutelary gods of the royal 
family were tightly packed in the central part of the city, surrounded by inner 
rows of city walls.1 This concentration of government facilities is another unique 
characteristic of Vijayanagara. Traditional capitals in south India, such as Palai-
yarai in the Chola State, are composed of several settlements and characterised 
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by the loosely structured organisation of space, which can be properly called a 
‘city complex’ (Champakalakshmi 1996: 331–371).
 Another important point regarding the history of capital cities in south India 
is that capitals in the pre- Vijayanagara states were not necessarily the absolute 
centres of their respective states; it was not unusual to transfer a capital during 
the pre- Vijayanagara period. It is sometimes difficult to locate former capital 
cities because of the lack or insufficiency of available information in con-
temporary records, which mostly consist of inscriptions. This could be inter-
preted as an indication that the political and cultural significance attached to 
capitals of the pre- Vijayanagara states, at least by those who left behind con-
temporary documents about them, was not as great as is often imagined. For 
example, the Rashtrakutas, who ruled the vast area around the north of Karna-
taka for about two centuries from the middle of the eighth century, fixed their 
capital in Manyaketa in the middle of the ninth century, but it is not possible to 
say with certainty where their capital(s) was before that (cf. Ishikawa 2002). In 
the case of the cholas, reigning over the vast area around the Tamil region from 
the late ninth century to the late thirteenth century, there was more than one city 
that functioned as a centre of dynastic power. It is usual to couple the city of 
Tanjavur with the cholas, but throughout their existence their capital, in the 
sense of an administrative centre or seat of the royal family, was actually in Pal-
aiyarai. Chidambaram, a major religious city built around a temple of the god 
Nataraja, the tutelary of the Chola royal family, functioned as a religious and 
ceremonial centre which the kings visited relatively often. In the early eleventh 
century Tanjavur emerged as a new ceremonial city, with the construction of the 
gigantic Rājarājēśvara (Bṛhadīśvara) temple by King Rājarāja I, but the palace in 
which the chola kings resided during their visits to the temple was constructed 
at Vallam, seven miles from Tanjavur (Champakalakshmi 1996: 331–371, 
424–441). Thus, in a way, the Cholas did not have a capital in the sense of a 
supreme and absolute centre of the state.
 Taking account of the above- mentioned features of capital cities in early 
medieval or medieval south India, it appears that there was a stage of historical 
development in south India in which moving kings or courts often functioned as 
the centre of states. In other words, capital cities were frequently shifted or kings 
travelled, as occasion required, to visit various centres scattered around the 
states, and it was during the Vijayanagara period that this stage actually ended. 
Vijayanagara continued to be the absolute, literally immovable capital of the 
state from its foundation to its plunder and destruction following the military 
defeat at Rakkasagi Taṃgaḍagi in ce 1565. Without the fixing or stabilisation of 
the capital, it would have been impossible for Vijayanagara to grow to such an 
unprecedentedly enormous size.
The foundation legend of Vijayanagara
The first capital of the Vijayanagara state, Vijayanagara (literally meaning ‘the 
city of victory’), is sometimes called Vidyānagara (literally meaning ‘the city of 
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wisdom’) in inscriptions and other texts. Why and how this alternative name or 
notation came into existence is generally explained through legendary accounts 
of the state’s foundation. Many versions and redactions of the accounts have 
come down through various media, and rather wide differences in their content 
can be observed. However, most accounts agree that when Harihara I, the first 
Vijayanagara king, and his brother, Bukka, founded the state, a Hindu saint 
named Vidyāraṇya (literally meaning ‘the forest of wisdom’) played a significant 
role. As will be shown, what he actually does varies from one version to another, 
but in most he is supposed to have been deeply involved in the construction of a 
city which would become the centre of the newly established state. This city has 
come to be known as Vijayanagara, and its alternative name, Vidyānagara, is 
derived from the name of the saint whose involvement was crucial to its 
construction.
 Since modern historical studies on the Vijayanagara state began at the start of 
the last century, there has been a lot of argument about the reliability of legen-
dary accounts of Vidyāraṇya’s involvement in its foundation. In the 1920s and 
1930s, some founding fathers of the Vijayanagara historiography expressed their 
respective views. Heras, in his Beginnings of Vijayanagara History (1929), 
asserted the fictitiousness of the Vidyāraṇya legends (Kulke 1985: 122–123); 
this negative view of the historical authenticity of the legends was shared by 
Saletore (1934: 1: 83–112). On the other hand, both Venkataramanayya and Sri-
kantaya argued in their books, published in 1933 and 1938, respectively, that 
even though the whole content of the accounts could not be said to be authentic, 
Vidyāraṇya did indeed make a definite contribution to the foundation of the 
Vijayanagara state (Venkata Ramanayya 1933, Srikantaya 1938).
 Vidyāraṇya served as the pontiff of the famous Śṛṃgēri monastery (maṭha), 
which was supposedly established by Śaṃkara, the champion of the Advaita 
philosophy. He has been widely acknowledged for his voluminous writings on 
philosophy and related sciences, and there is abundant literature focusing on his 
life, works and contributions to the development of the Advaita philosophy.2 
However, in spite of a continuing interest in his work, scholars have not yet 
reached a consensus on the important question of which works should be attrib-
uted to him.
 In 1985 Kulke advanced a balanced argument, based mainly on the secondary 
literature, concerning the controversial points of Vidyāraṇya’s life and works. 
According to him, Vidyāraṇya did not appear as the highest- level religious author-
ity until Harihara II, of the second generation of the first (Sangama) dynasty, 
ascended the throne of Vijayanagara in ce 1377, and so far no valid contemporary 
documents have been able to corroborate the claim that he played a major political 
role during the founding period of the Vijayanagara state (Kulke 1985). Further-
more, Kulke examined the history of the Śṛṃgēri maṭha, which Vidyāraṇya served 
as the pontiff, and arrived at the conclusion that the origin of the maṭha could not 
date further back than the time of Vidyāraṇya himself or his preceptor, Vidyātīrtha, 
who was almost contemporary with Harihara I (Kulke 1985: 134–136). Kulke’s 
argument is generally well balanced, and his conclusions are convincing. It seems 
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clear that legendary accounts of Vidyāraṇya are indeed full of fictions that blatantly 
oppose the historical facts.3 However, Kulke and other scholars stressing the ficti-
tiousness of the legends have failed to ask an important question: what significance 
the legendary accounts had for those who wrote them down and transmitted them to 
later generations, or why the fictitious story of Vidyāraṇya building a city was fab-
ricated and incorporated into the collective memory of the Vijayanagara state.
 Connected to this question is Wagoner’s analysis of a legendary account of 
Vidyāraṇya and his role in constructing the city of Vijayanagara given in the 
Rāyavācakamu, a Telugu work from the late sixteenth or early seventeenth 
century, which Wagoner himself translated into English. Wagoner points out that, 
compared with the ‘standard version’ of the legend in the so- called Vidyāraṇya 
Kālajñāna manuscripts, the redaction of the Rāyavācakamu is characterised by its 
‘emphasis on the “magical” nature of the city and on Vidyāraṇya’s pivotal role in 
its founding’. The city of Vijayanagara is ‘a talisman that bestows protection on 
its “bearer” [i.e. a Vijayanagara king]’, and such a magical talisman, granted to a 
dynasty by its tutelary divinity, is a sort of cliché in the literary genre of ‘dynastic 
chronicle’ in south India, which concerns stories of a dynasty’s rise to power 
(Wagoner 1993: 41). For example, in the Pratāparudracaritramu, a Telugu work 
from the early sixteenth century which chronicles the dynastic history of the 
Kakatiya state, the sword and shield are said to have been gifted to the dynasty’s 
founder, Madhava Varman, by a goddess and to have made him and his descend-
ants unassailable and able to rule for a long time. Vijayanagara is, according to 
Wagoner’s interpretation, a ‘perfect counterpart’ to Madhava Varman’s divine 
sword and shield (Wagoner 1993: 43–44).
 Wagoner’s reading of the legend is clear- eyed and penetrating, but it raises a 
few questions. First, the sword and shield, talismans of the Kakatiya dynasty, 
were given to its founder by a goddess, while Vijayanagara was built by 
Vidyāraṇya for the sake of the first Vijayanagara king, with the blessings of gods 
and sages. Given this difference in the character of the talisman- givers, it appears 
one- sided to emphasise the similarities between the two talismans. What does it 
mean that a talisman is not given directly from a divine source to the dynasty’s 
founder, but through the mediation of a saint? Second, in the case of the Vijay-
angara kingship, why did the talisman take the form of a city and not something 
else? Was the talisman a city for any particular reason? These questions are 
explored in the final section of this chapter. This section ends with an outline of 
Harihara’s personal history before his enthronement, which is sketched in some 
versions of the legendary account of the founding of the Vijayanagara state. The 
exact content differs between the versions, but the following outline is common 
to most (Wagoner 2000: 305–307).
Harihara and his brothers once served the ruler of Warangal. They were 
arrested by an invading army of the Delhi Sultanate, but on one occasion the 
Sultan came to know their honesty and released them. Shortly afterwards 
they were dispatched with the army of the Sultan to sweep away the anti- 
Sultanate forces in south India. They lost in the first encounter with King 
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Baḷḷāla, but recovered to defeat him after meeting Vidyāraṇya and finally 
established their own dynasty.
Warangal, located in the middle of present- day Andhra Pradesh, was the capital 
city of the Kakatiya state until the Tughluq army destroyed it in ce 1323. King 
‘Baḷḷāla’, who allegedly was eventually defeated by Harihara, is reminiscent of 
the Hoysalas who ruled the southern part of present- day Karnataka before the 
Vijayanagara state. Many of the Hoysala kings named themselves Baḷḷāla, 
including the last king, Baḷḷāla IV (c.1342–1346).
 In twentieth- century Vijayanagara historiography, a common story is that the 
brothers once apostatised to Islam but later reconverted to ‘Hinduism’ at the hand 
of Vidyāraṇya. This story is thought to be an amalgamation of the traditional 
account mentioned above and fragmental and obscure accounts of certain apostates 
in fourteenth- century south India seen in several books belonging to the Islamic 
tradition of historiography (Wagoner 2000: 301–304). Drawing attention to the 
significance of something ‘Islamicate’ in the construction of the authority of the 
Vijayanagara kingship, Wagoner insists that the traditional narrative of the brothers 
and the Sultan ‘must be understood as a political foundation myth, an ideological 
attempt to represent the authority of the Vijayanagara state as deriving directly 
from that of the Sultanate [emphasis in the original]’ (Wagoner 2000: 304).
 The story of the brothers’ arrest by the Sultan is told in several versions of the 
foundation myth.4 However, there are also many versions and redactions that do 
not carry it. For example, the redaction of the Rāyavācakamu carries a detailed 
story of how Vijayanagara city was constructed but describes neither what the 
brothers did before establishing the dynasty nor the relation between them and 
Vidyāraṇya. The theme of the brothers’ arrest is absent from the versions of 
Kannada texts examined in the next section. If the lives of the brothers prior to 
the founding of the state are referred to in these texts, it is their politically and 
economically powerless condition that is emphasised. Thus, the general body of 
‘empowerment narratives’ (Wagoner 1993: 41) of the Vijayanagara kingship is 
composed of rather different versions and redactions. How and why such diver-
sification has occurred may be an important topic for future research.5
Vidyāraṇya as the founder of the kingdom and the city
In this section a few redactions of the foundation myth of the Vijayanagara state 
in Kannada texts are explored and compared with similar foundation myths of 
other south Indian dynasties. First, the Kamalāpurada Kaiphiyattu (Kaifiyat of 
Kamalāpura), one of the so- called ‘Mackenzie Manuscripts’, will be examined 
to see how the life of Vidyāraṇya and the foundation of the Vijayanagara state 
are narrated. The Kannada word kaiphiyattu – meaning a statement or report – 
borrowed from the Persian and transliterated as kaifiyat in english is used espe-
cially in the context of historical research as a general term for manuscripts and 
documents of indigenous languages collected by the British during the colonising 
period of south India. Most, though not all, kaifiyats are written by hereditary 
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 officials of villages or administrative units just above villages, and their main 
contents are local history. The Kamalāpurada Kaiphiyattu is one such kaifiyat 
and was written in the early nineteenth century by Dēsāyi, a hereditary official of 
a supra- village administrative unit. Kamalāpura is a village near present- day 
Haṃpi and located in the erstwhile metropolitan area of Vijayanagara. The latter 
life of Vidyāraṇya is narrated in the text as follows (Kalaburgi 1994: 430–432).
In Honnāvara, at the foot of the Western Ghats, a Brahmin named Mādhava 
Bhaṭṭa lived in extreme hardship because of poverty. One day, he acqui-
esced to the wish of his wife and went to Śrīśaila [in the present- day 
Kurnool District of Andhra Pradesh State] to perform penance in a temple 
enshrining a goddess named Brahmāṃbike in order to alleviate their 
poverty. However, the goddess told him that he could not escape from 
poverty in the present life. Mādhava Bhaṭṭa proceeded to the temple of the 
goddess Kamalā, located near the sanctuary (kṣētra) of Paṃpā [a place 
remembered in connection with the namesake goddess, supposed to be in 
present- day Haṃpi] and performed penance there. But again he was told by 
the goddess that poverty would never leave him. Despairing of having his 
wish fulfilled, he got initiated to become an ascetic named Vidyāraṇya. 
After some time, in the Śaka year 1188 of Parābhava [corresponding to 
ce 1266–67], the goddess revealed herself in front of him, and by her grace 
he got great treasure. He then visited the sanctuary of Paṃpā and wrote 
Vidyāraṇya Bhāṣya [a commentary]]. After visiting Kāśi in order to ask the 
sage Vyāsa a few questions that had arisen in his mind during his writing, 
he used the treasure given by the goddess to establish a village, Kamalāpura, 
and build a city named Vidyānagara. He ruled the city for 26 years, but in 
the Śaka year 1258 of Dhātu, at the seventh day of the bright half of the 
month Vaiśākha [corresponding to 18 April in ce 1336] he came to realise 
that a man’s body would not exist for ever. He recalled a cowherd named 
Bukka who used to bring him milk when he performed penance in the 
temple of the goddess and solemnly invested him with the lordship of Vijay-
anagara city and the title of ‘Bukka Mahārāya’. After completing the appro-
priate procedures, Vidyāraṇya departed for the other world.
Because of the obscurity of the text and defects in it, it is not clear which 
goddess eventually gave Vidyāraṇya the treasures, but from the context it is pre-
sumed that Kamalā did.6
 Another version of the foundation myth can be found in the Keḷadi Nṛpa 
Vijaya (The Victory of Keladi Kings). The work was written probably in the late 
eighteenth century by Liṃgaṇṇa, an ex- official of the erstwhile Keladi Nayakas. 
The Nayakas ruled the vast area of the Western Ghats and the Arabic coast for 
about two centuries up to ce 1763. Their history is narrated chronologically in 
the work and the following foundation myth of the Vijayanagara state appears 
episodically in its opening part, as the Vijayanagara kings were overlords of the 
ancestors of the Nayakas (Śāma Śāstri 1973: 15–17).
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At the side of the Kṛṣṇādēvī river [possibly meaning the Kṛṣṇā river], 
Mādhava Bhaṭṭa was leading the life of a householder. One day he visited 
the sanctuary of Paṃpā in the Kuntala region [one of the traditional regions 
 mentioned in Puranic literature, vaguely designating the middle part of 
present- day Karnataka State] and recited a spell to get wealth. Then the 
goddess revealed herself to tell him that he could enjoy prosperity only in 
the next life, not in the present one. Hearing that, he decided to renounce 
the world. He was initiated into the life of an ascetic by the hand of 
Vidyāśaṃkara, a disciple of Śaṃkarācārya, and named himself 
Vidyāraṇya. After some time, a goddess appeared to him in a dream and 
said: ‘This country is filled with Jains and Kirātas [savage hunters] and 
people have no control over their own desire and are doing whatever they 
want. You must build a city in this country and establish a kingdom to 
promote virtue and punish vice’. Shortly after that, poor Kṣatriya brothers 
named Harihara and Bukka, led by a voice in a dream, came to the home of 
Vidyāraṇya. He gave them the order (kaṭṭaleyaṃ) to rule a kingdom ‘as 
devotees (bhaktarāgi)’ of the ‘lord (kartaṃ) Virūpākṣa’ [one of the forms of 
Śiva; a temple enshrining him stands in the sanctuary of Paṃpā and the 
goddess Paṃpā is supposed to be his spouse]. Furthermore, he gave Hari-
hara the name Harihara Rāya and had him build a city named Vijayanagara. 
The auspicious time for the ceremony to celebrate its completion was fixed 
by Vidyāraṇya; however, it did not start exactly at the fixed time because of 
the sound of a conch blown by a Dāsa [literally meaning a slave, but in this 
context it probably designates a non- Brahmin mendicant devoted to Viṣṇu]. 
Seeing that, Vidyāraṇya predicted: ‘This city will come under the rule of 
Muslims (turuṣka) after some years.’ In the Śaka 1258 [corresponding to 
ce 1336–37], he enthroned (paṭṭamaṃ kaṭṭi) Harihara Rāya on the jewelled 
lion throne in Vidyānagarī [a variant of Vidyānagara].
 Another, much more condensed, version of the foundation myth is seen in a 
copy of a copperplate record originally issued in ce 1652. It had been preserved 
in the family of a Brahmin resident of Vidyāraṇyapura, located near the 
Śṛṃgēri maṭha that Vidyāraṇya once served as a pontiff. In the vicinity of 
Śṛṃgēri there were many villages (agrahāras) donated to Brahmins affiliated 
with the maṭha, and one of them was Vidyāraṇyapura, named after Vidyāraṇya. 
The copperplate record concerned was written in both Sanskrit and Kannada 
and recorded that Saccidānanda Bhāratī Svāmi, the then pontiff of the maṭha, 
distributed among Brahmins shares in the property of Vidyāraṇyapura, which 
was re- established as an agrahāra by one of the Keladi Nayakas. The follow-
ing account is based on the Kannada part, but almost the same content is 
repeated in the Sanskrit part (Epigraphia Carnataica 1886–1965: 6: 196 
(Sg11)).
Formerly, Vidyāraṇya Śrīpāda, who was the teacher (gurugaḷu) of our line 
[i.e. the Śṛṃgēri maṭha] and the author of the Vēda Bhāṣya, had, out of 
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mercy to the world (lōkānugrahārthavāgi), founded Vidyānagara using the 
power obtained from the god Virūpākṣa by virtue of his penance 
(tapōbaladiṃda). Then he, for the protection of cows, gods and Brahmins, 
put Harihara Mahārāya on the lion throne (siṃhāsanadalli) and performed 
the anointing ceremony (paṭṭābhiṣēka) at his coronation.
 So far three versions of the legendary account describing the role played by 
Vidyāraṇya in the foundation of the Vijayanagara state have been examined. The 
details vary, but they all concur on two points. First, the first Vijayanagara king 
was given the kingship and enthroned by Vidyāraṇya. Second, the capital of the 
state was built by, or at the direction of, Vidyāraṇya.7 In an account of his 
travels, Buchanan, who conducted an extensive research tour in south India in 
1800–1 immediately after the British defeated Tippoo Sultan of Mysore and 
established their colonial hegemony there, gave a detailed account of the content 
of a book titled Ráya Paditti (‘traditions of kings’), written by one ‘Ramuppa 
Varmica’, a resident of Kundapura in the present- day Dakshina Kannada district 
of Karnakata. According to Buchanan, ‘Srí Vidyáranya Mahá Swámí’ is noted 
here too as both ‘the founder of Vijaya- nagara city’ and ‘the crowner of Hari- 
hara Ráya’ (Buchanan 1807: 3: 118).
 Many south Indian states had narratives of dynastic empowerment that tried 
to account for and establish the legitimacy of the foundation of the dynasties 
principally through invoking the divine protection and blessing supposedly given 
to the dynastic founders. Arguably one characteristic of the Vijayanagara 
foundation myth as a narrative of dynastic empowerment is the significance 
given to the role of the saint who acted as an intermediary between divinity and 
the dynasty founders. Wagoner, analysing the Rāyavācakamu version, stressed 
that Vidyāraṇya was represented merely as ‘a passive instrument of fate’ in the 
text. However, the versions and redactions in the Kannada texts treated so far 
have given another representation of Vidyāraṇya: he played a crucial role as an 
intermediary agent who passed the divine supra- natural power on to the newly 
founded dynasty. The term ‘a passive instrument’ can be more appropriately 
applied to the roles of Harihara and Bukka. They are represented as common 
cowherds or poor Kṣatriyas before, by the grace of Vidyāraṇya, suddenly emerg-
ing from such unenviable circumstances to be enthroned.
 In the tradition of narratives of dynastic empowerment in south India, 
Vidyāraṇya is not an exceptional, unparalleled character. We sometimes come 
across saints acting, as he did, as crucial intermediaries for dynasties other than 
Vijayanagara. When the foundation myth of Vijayanagara is compared with 
these other empowerment narratives featuring intermediary saints, another of its 
characteristics becomes clear, namely the important position occupied by the 
theme of the city and its building. Let us explore a foundation myth of 
the Gangas, who ruled the southern part of karnataka for a few centuries until 
the end of the tenth century. The empowerment of the Ganga dynasty and the 
role of a Jain saint named Siṃhanandi are recounted as follows in an inscription 
from ce 1222 (Epigraphia Carnatica 1972–: 13: 14 (Sh 14)).
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Mādhava and his brother Daḍiga escaped their father’s kingdom when it 
was besieged by the enemy. On their way to the south, they happened to 
meet Siṃhanandi, a Jain ascetic, at Ganga- Hērūru. Siṃhanandi, knowing 
the circumstances of the brothers, caused the goddess Padmāvati to appear, 
obtained a boon, and gave them a sword (khaḷgamuṃ) and the whole 
kingdom (samastarājyaman). When Mādhava broke a stone pillar with a 
stroke of the sword, Siṃhanandi realised his power, put on his head a crown 
(paṭṭaman) of the petals of karṇnikāra (probably designating a drumstick 
tree in this context) which he had made himself, and endowed him with 
numerous attendants, elephants and horses, along with a peacock fan 
(kuṃcaman) as the signal flag (kētanam).
 The story of Mādhava being endowed with the kingship by Siṃhanandi 
cannot be found in inscriptions of the original Gangas, who were overthrown by 
the Cholas at the end of the tenth century (Saletore 1938: 9). The story appeared 
only in literary works after the twelfth century and from about ce 1100 in the 
inscriptions of a subordinate chiefly family who claimed to be descended from 
the original Gangas and ruled the Shimoga region under the Western Chalukyas 
(Nagarajaiah 1999: 4). The above- mentioned inscription was issued by these 
later Gangas. When the legend of Mādhava and Siṃhanandi started to circulate 
in the twelfth century, most of southern Karnataka was ruled by the Hoysalas. 
Their empowerment narrative also has a Jain ascetic playing an important role. 
The story goes as follows, in an inscription of ce 1173 (Epigraphia Carnatica 
1972–: 10: 26 (Ak 23)).
One day, Saḷa of the Yadu clan met a great ascetic. The ascetic, seeing Saḷa 
bow deferentially to him, thought of giving him the whole kingdom 
(sāṃmrājyamaṃ māḷpen) and started to perform suitable worship to bring 
into subjection the goddess Vāsantikā of Śaśakapura [also known as 
Soseyūru, tentatively identified with present- day Aṃgaḍi in the 
Cikkamagaḷūru District of Karnataka State]. When the goddess sprang forth 
in the form of a tiger in order to break the worship, the ascetic exclaimed, 
‘You hit, Saḷa (nīm poy Saḷa).’ Accordingly, Saḷa struck it with a cane 
(betta). Hence the name Poysaḷa was acquired by the Yadu kings and the 
tiger and cane (seḷe) became their crest (cihnam).
 Here, the dynastic name ‘Hoysaḷa’ is explained through the episode in which 
the dynastic founder Saḷa was told to hit (poy) the tiger by the ascetic. The 
earliest record containing this explanatory episode is said to be a copperplate 
record from ce 1117. There are other versions of the legend of the founder Saḷa 
in inscriptions in which the details are different from the above account. The 
name of the ascetic is not specified in many variants of the legend, but in some 
his name is given as Sudatta (Coelho 1950: 12–17).
 The empowerment narratives of the Gangas and Hoysalas share with the 
foundation myth of the Vijayanagara state the basic storyline that a dynastic 
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founder becomes empowered by the favour of a saint.8 Some further common 
elements are discernable between them, such as wandering brothers and the 
grace of goddesses. However, a difference should also be noted, that is, the 
object that is made a symbol of dynastic power, in other words, what is given to 
the founder by the saint as a marker of power. Mādhava of the Gangas is 
described as receiving a sword, a crown of petals, a peacock fan, attendants, ele-
phants and horses from the saint Siṃhanandi. In the case of the Hoysalas, a cane 
and the dynastic name ‘Hoysala’ itself function as symbols of power handed 
over by the saint. A city is not included among the symbols of power in the 
instances of these two dynasties, but the city of Vijayanagara, along with the title 
of Rāya, function as emblems of the power given to the first Vijayanagara king 
by Vidyāraṇya. What sets the Vijayanagara story apart from similar legends of 
dynastic empowerment through the favour of saints is the theme of a city as a 
symbol of power.
Saints, kingship and capitals in the ‘Islamicate’ world
Among the general body of the foundation myth of the Vijayanagara state that 
has been handed down through various media, differences in details can be seen 
from one version to another, some of which are significant. In one group of ver-
sions, the relationship of the dynastic founder with the Sultan of Delhi is high-
lighted and occupies a crucial position in the empowerment process (Wagoner 
2000). However, in another group of versions, including those of the Kannada 
texts dealt with earlier, the story centres almost totally on Vidyāraṇya, who, 
using the wealth he was favoured with or following the direction of the divinity, 
caused Vijayanagara to be built, and enthroned the person of his choice there. In 
these versions, the dynastic founder’s relationship with the Sultan is completely 
omitted, and he appears to be nothing more than a ‘passive instrument’ who is 
just a cowherd (in the Kamalāpurada Kaiphiyattu) or a poor Kṣatriya (in the 
Keḷadi Nṛpa Vijaya) before being selected by Vidyāraṇya for coronation. It 
seems that this group of versions centring on a ‘Hindu’ saint being favoured by 
the ‘Hindu’ divinity seeks to construct the talismanic and sacred power of Vijay-
anagara exclusively within the framework of Hinduism.
 It should be noted here that in the historiography of south India the rise of 
the Vijayanagara state has sometimes been represented as an expression of 
Hindu resistance to the advancement of Muslim powers.9 It is indeed true that 
contemporary inscriptions contain phrases and representations that project the 
Vijayanagara kings as champions of ‘Hindu’ culture or as restorers of the 
social order disturbed by Muslim advancement. Among the titles used by 
members of the royal family, there are some which allude to their attempt to 
promote Vedic practice, such as ‘Vedamārgasthāpanatatparaḥ’, that is, ‘a 
person devoted to establishing Veda tradition’ (Epigraphia Indica 1892–: 8: 
301) and ‘Vaidikamārgasthāpanācāryaḥ’, or ‘a savant establishing Vedic tradi-
tion’ (Epigraphia Indica 1892–: 3: 122).10 A copperplate record from ce 1391 
reads that, having killed the Turks (turuṣka) and reinstated the gods who had 
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been removed, Mādhava Maṃtri, a servant of Harihara II, restored the 
‘Dharma’, which had been ‘destroyed by fierce flames of the wicked [asajjana
śikhijvāloughadagdhān]’ (Epigraphia Indica 1892–: 21: 20 (No. 4)).
 Recent studies shed light on another aspect of the Vijayanagara kingship. 
According to them, the Vijayanagara kings developed close contacts with the 
surrounding Muslim regimes in the subcontinent and beyond, and actively 
assimilated their culture. For example, the title of Hindūrāyasuratāṇa, literally 
meaning ‘the Sultan among the Hindu or Indian kings’, was used by the Vijay-
anagara kings. This indicates their attempt to articulate their own political status 
through the Islamic idiom of suratāṇa, a corrupt notation of sultān. Also, in the 
Vijayanagara court sharpened caps and loose gowns, respectively called kulāyis 
and kabāyis, were adopted from West Asia (Wagoner 1996). The palace build-
ings in Vijayanagara city clearly showed the influence of the contemporary 
Deccan Sultanates (Michell 1992). Furthermore, the administrative and military 
systems of the Vijayanagara state bore characteristics and elements that were 
common in the contemporary Muslim regimes in South and West Asia, but had 
not been found in prior south Indian states. For instance, a fair- sized cavalry was 
thrown into a battle by the Vijayanagara kings, with war horses imported from 
Arabian countries for that purpose, and a substantial number of Muslims were 
mobilised as soldiers. Some of them came to occupy high positions in the 
politico- military structure of the state, and mosques were constructed not far 
from the centre of the capital city (Stein 1989: 29). As already noted, certain ver-
sions of the foundation myth of the Vijayanagara state claim that Harihara I was 
dispatched by the Sultan of Delhi to pacify South India, and Wagoner interpreted 
this myth as ‘an ideological attempt to represent the authority of the Vijayana-
gara state as deriving directly from that of the Sultanate [original emphasis]’.
 These recent studies show that there were close exchanges between the Vijay-
anagara state and its Islamic neighbours and that the Vijayanagara kings endeav-
oured to cultivate self- images of rulers that would be judged as respectable or 
decent by the standards of the surrounding Islamic world. If the legends of 
Vidyāraṇya and Vijayanagara are to be fully understood, they should be placed in 
the historical context of the Islamic world standard penetrating through the Vijay-
anagara state. Indeed, saints conferring kingship are familiar figures in the indi-
genous tradition of ‘empowerment narratives’ in south India, but such figures also 
appear in the Islamic world engulfing south India during the Vijayanagara period.
 According to studies by Digby on the Indo- Muslim regimes contemporary to 
the Vijayanagara state, Muslim saints of Sufism (ṣūfī shaykhs) were believed to 
possess spiritual jurisdiction (wilāyat) over a specific territory and were thus able 
to not only influence political events and material destiny there but also bestow 
kingship upon individuals they encountered (Digby 1986, 1990). Eaton (1992: 
14), elaborating the relationships between Sufi saints and rulers in Indo- Muslim 
history, wrote:11
It was widely believed that . . . temporal rulers had only been entrusted with 
a sort of temporary lease of power through the grace of Muslim saints who 
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were considered to be especially well- endowed with baraka, or the grace of 
God. Since such saints possessed a special nearness to God, it was they who 
wielded legitimate authority on earth, even if sultans possessed effective 
power. Therefore in Indo- Muslim history we often come across Ṣūfīs pre-
dicting who would attain political office, and for how long they would hold 
it. Indeed, given the feeling that such holy men possessed a greater legiti-
macy as God’s representatives on earth than princes or kings, such predic-
tions were often understood as appointments.
 It is obvious that the function of Sufi saints delineated by Digby and Eaton 
has similar or common features to that of Vidyāraṇya in the Vijayanagara foun-
dational legend. Both Sufi saints and Vidyāraṇya are endowed with transcendent 
power by favour of the divinity and able to appoint secular rulers as a result of 
that power. It should be remembered here that in some versions of the legend – 
including that of the Keḷadi Nṛpa Vijaya – Vidyāraṇya predicts the future 
destruction of the city and the kingdom. This is reminiscent of the prophecies of 
Sufi saints about the duration of the regimes they themselves empowered.
 A saint who was first favoured by the divinity and then favoured secular power 
himself was not an exceptional figure in the Islamic world around the Vijayana-
gara state. Such blessed and blessing saints are present, standing behind many 
Muslim regimes in the form of shaykhs. Secular rulers sought empowering saintly 
figures in order to authenticate their own power and consolidate their own posi-
tions in this world. As the Vijayanagara state emerged at the fringe of this expand-
ing Islamic world and grew into one of the major powers, the real or historical 
Vidyāraṇya was transformed into a legendary figure who carried out a function 
similar to that of Sufi saints in Muslim regimes. The birth and spread of the 
Vidyāraṇya legend may have involved, besides the obvious self- assertion of his 
successors at Śṛṃgēri, two intertwined practices of imagination and representation. 
One is representational manoeuvres on the part of the Vijayanagara kings, con-
scious of the Islamic world standard, to erect a figure of religious authority who 
could be relied on as a source of their own power. The other is the political think-
ing or imagination among the general public, presuming that a tutelary saint stands 
behind every major political power like the Vijayanagara state.
 For the purpose of finding the similarities and parallels between Sufi saints 
and Vidyāraṇya in terms of representation, there is another feature of the relation 
of Sufi saints with secular powers in the political culture of Indo- Muslim regimes 
that cannot be overlooked. This is the importance of cities as channels through 
which the supra- natural or spiritual sovereignty of Sufi saints is transformed into 
or linked to secular sovereignty. For example, Firuzabad was built by Firuz Shah 
(r.1397–1422) of the Bahmanis on the spot where a saint named Khalifatu’r 
Rahman was supposed to have resided. Firuz Shah was eager to make a spiritual 
supporter of this saint, whose shrine (dargāh) complex was constructed contem-
poraneously with the city of Firuzabad (Michell 1993: 186). Delhi can be cited 
as another, more famous example. Through Delhi, which was both the capital of 
the Sultanates and the residence of the Sufi saint whose dargāh was built there 
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after his demise, the wellbeing and fortunes of the Delhi Sultanates were identi-
fied with the great Shaikh Nizam al- Din, a Chishti Sufi (Digby 1986). Fatahpur 
Sikri, the well- known capital of Akbar, the third Mughal emperor, is another 
good example, albeit one belonging to a later period than that of the Vijayana-
gara state. Akbar selected a site for his new imperial capital at Sikri, a village 
that was the residence of Sheikh Selim, a Chishti Sufi, whom Akbar frequently 
visited (Streusand 1989: 89–94, Richards 1978: 290–291). In Indo- Muslim pol-
itics, the city was ‘a firm political statement and symbol of the new order’ (Rich-
ards 1978: 290).
 This chapter has shown that what sets the Vidyāraṇya legend apart from 
similar narratives explaining the foundation of south Indian dynasties is the 
representation of the capital city as a symbol of power gifted by saintly figures. 
Only when this representation is posited against the background of the con-
temporary Indo- Muslim political culture does it become possible to understand 
its significance. The Vidyāraṇya legend seems to have been conceived within the 
framework of the ‘Hindu’ or indigenous tradition of south India, its leader, 
Vidyāraṇya, as a pontiff of a monastery, representing the orthodoxy of Hindu-
ism. Yet, an echo of Islamic political norms is discernable in its representation 
of the capital city as a symbol of power gifted by Vidyāraṇya; according to these 
norms, capital cities are statements of political power and function as connecting 
links between the temporal and supra- natural powers.
 An echo of Islamic political culture can also be detected in the account by 
Nuniz of ‘a very grand temple’ in Vijayanagara city. Nuniz, a Portuguese visitor 
to the city in the early sixteenth century, wrote down the following story of its 
construction. When the first Vijayanagara king (‘Dehoráo’) went on a hunt, he 
happened to see the strange incident of a hare rushing at a hound. Following the 
advice of ‘a hermit’, he built a city on the spot of that incident and gave it the 
name ‘Vydiajuna’ after the hermit (Sewell 1900: 299–300). This hermit can be 
safely identified with Vidyāraṇya, and ‘Vydiajuna’ may be a corrupt notation of 
Vidyāraṇya or Vidyānagara. Up to this point, the story is very similar to other 
versions such as one in the Vidyāraṇya Kālajñāna manuscript (Wagoner 1993: 
168), but Nuniz’s account continues further. After the hermit died, the king built 
‘a very grand temple in honour of him’, and ever since, when the successive 
kings ascended the throne, ‘[they] have, in honour of the hermit, to enter this 
house [the temple] before they enter their own; and they offer many prayers in 
it’ (Sewell 1900: 300). Here, the authority of the kings is explicitly identified 
with that of the saintly figure. Parallels can easily be found between dargāhs of 
Sufi saints in and around Islamic capital cities and the ‘temple’ that is said to 
have been built in honour of Vidyaranya and visited by the Vijayanagara kings 
before their coronation. No definite answer can be found with regards to what 
this ‘temple’ was, or whether it was really built. However, what is important as 
regards the purpose of this chapter is the fact that such a narrative of a city and a 
saint was told, communicated and recorded. It is a product of the encounter 
between south Indian indigenous tradition and the political culture of the expand-
ing Islamic world.
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 eaton noted that the Vijayanagara state was, in terms of political norms, cul-
tural values and aesthetic tastes, integrated into a world system that can be prop-
erly called ‘Islamicate’ as opposed to ‘Islamic’, in the sense that the cultural 
standards, not the religion, of the Muslim community had the predominating 
influence on non- Muslims. Then again, he insisted that the Vijayanagara state 
claimed its own legitimacy by drawing on ‘the sacred power of a fixed religious 
site’ embodied by the goddess, and this contrasted strongly with its Islamic 
neighbour, the Bahmani kingdom, which recruited and patronised Sufi saints, 
who were ‘highly mobile’ (Eaton 2000). The foregoing discussion in this chapter 
indicates that such a contrast between ‘fixed’ Hindu and ‘mobile’ Islam should 
not be overestimated. One of the religious or spiritual powers behind the Vijay-
anagara kingship was the saint Vidyāraṇya, who was also mobile.12
 As already stated, the Vijayanagara state has been sometimes represented as a 
bulwark of the ‘Hindus’ against the advance of Muslim powers. The emphasis of 
its foundation myth on the role of a Hindu saint may have nurtured and main-
tained that representation, but the other side must also be taken into account. The 
myth itself is a remarkable testimony that the Vijayanagara state was a com-
ponent of the ‘Islamicate’ political world extending around the Indian Ocean 
where, although the Muslim regimes enjoyed dominance over non- Muslim ones, 
religious identities such as ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ in their strict senses had little 
significance. In that world, whether Islamic or not, the capital cities of states 
played a culturally and symbolically significant role as institutional links con-
necting political powers to saintly representatives of the divinity.13
Notes
 1 Great progress has been made in research on Vijayanagara in the last quarter of a 
century. Three large- scale archaeological projects have been conducted in and around 
Haṃpi, the former Vijayanagara, by the Directorate for Archaeology and Museums of 
the Karnataka State Government and an international team of scholars since the 
1980s. For a general outline of these projects and the bibliography of their publica-
tions, see Fritz et al. (2006). On the spatial organisation of the central part of the city 
especially, see Fritz (1986).
 2 For instance, see Rama Rao (1930, 1931, 1934), Sarma (1932), Krishnamoorty 
(1971), Ramakrishna Rao (1973); Mallappa (1974); Kripacharyulu (1986); Ranganath 
(1996); Slaje (1998); Fort (1999, 2000).
 3 Desai and his co- authors maintained in their general history of Karnataka, published 
in 1970, that narratives of Vidyāraṇya’s involvement in the foundation of the Vijay-
anagara state were later fictions (Desai 1970: 326–328). Hanumantha Rao also 
emphasised the fictitious and ideological character of the Vidyāraṇya legends (Hanu-
mantha 1986: 161). The negative view about the factuality of Vidyāraṇya’s direct 
involvement in the foundation was also expressed in a voluminous history of Karna-
taka in Kannada published at the end of the last century (Ṣēk Ali 1997: 3:16–18, 20).
 4 In some versions, including those with the motif of the arrest by the Sultan, the 
brothers were described as having once served the rulers of Warangal as generals or 
guards. Some scholars, especially those of Telugu origin, getting a clue from such 
descriptions, asserted that they came from Andhra and had a heated argument with 
those who claimed that the brothers were natives of Karnataka, in the heady atmo-
sphere of regionalism before and after independence (cf. Stein 1989: 5–7).
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 5 According to the study by Aparna, the earliest inscription referring to Vidyānagara 
that can be safely judged ‘authentic’ in the sense of not being a forgery or a fake is 
dated ce 1392 (Aparṇa 2010: 394). Vidyāraṇya appeared in contemporary inscriptions 
only after almost 20 years had passed since the foundation of the city and the state, 
which was presumed in the legendary accounts to have occurred in ce 1336. One 
factor in the rise and spread of the legends anachronistically making Vidyāraṇya the 
city founder may be the rivalry between the Śṛṃgēri maṭha and the Kāṃcī maṭha, 
both of which claimed to inherit the tradition of Śaṃkara in South India, and espe-
cially the attempt of the former to assert its own superiority in relation to the latter. 
This issue is beyond the scope of this chapter.
 6 The Śrīśaila Dēvālaya Kaiphiyattu (Srisailam Temple Kaifiyat) reads that ‘Vidyāraṇya 
Śaṃkara Bhārati Svāmi’ built a city using wealth obtained by the grace of the goddess 
Brahmāṃbikā of Srisailam and gave the kingship to Harihara Rāya after he himself 
ruled the city for some years (Sitapahi 1981: 8, Sītāpati 1982: 12). It is interesting that 
the goddess Brahmāṃbikā, who declined to carry out Vidyaranya’s wish in the 
Kamalāpurada Kaiphiyatu, bestowed her favour on him here.
 7 I have been able to confirm that among the published Kannada kaiphiyattus edited by 
Kalaburgi, besides the Kamalāpurada Kaiphiyattu, six kaiphiyattus mention or allude to 
Vidyāraṇya’s involvement in the foundation of the Vijayanagara state. Two out of the 
six kaiphiyattus (the Mallūru Sāsivehaḷḷi Śīme Kaiphiyattu and the Vasudhāre Grāmada 
Kaiphiyatu) talk only about his grace bestowed on the state or the kings and do not refer 
to his constructing a city (Kalaburgi 1994: 100, 118). The remaining four (the Haḷebīḍa 
Kaiphiyattu, the Hoḷehonnūru Kaiphiyattu, the Kaiphiyatu Kurugōḍu, Tālūke Baḷḷāri 
and the Tālūku Kaṃpali Kaiphiyattu) refer to the construction (Kalaburgi 1994: 184, 
217, 449, 493–494).
 8 Another example from outside south India can be cited. In thirteenth- century Mewar, 
the story of the empowerment of the Guhilas was passed around, according to which 
Bappā, the dynastic founder, obtained lordship over Mewar thanks to the grace of 
Hārītarāśi, an ascetic of the Pāśupata sect of Śaivism (Sinha Kapur 2002: 207, 215).
 9 For example, see Krishnaswami Aiyangar (1921: xii, 184). cf. Stein (1989: 4–6).
10 An inscription of ce 1410 reads: ‘Brave Harihara [the second] having a body of unpar-
alleled beauty rescued the Vedas and the earth without turning into a fish or a boar’ 
(Kannada University Epigraphical Series 1998: 3: 58 (Haṃpi 69)). Needless to say, 
this passage is based on the episodes of the avatāras of Viṣṇu, who in avatāra of a 
fish (matya) saved the Vedas immersed underwater and in avatāra of a boar (varāha) 
rescued the earth.
11 For a more recent discussion on the topic of the relationship between Sufi saints and 
Muslim rulers, see Green (2004).
12 In the versions of the legend mentioned in this chapter, Vidyāraṇya is depicted as 
having been often on the move, visiting Srisailam, Kasi and Kashmir.
13 The Vidyāraṇya legends, along with other legendary accounts of dynastic progenitors 
being blessed by ascetics or saints, will certainly provide valuable materials for the 
old debate about the nature of relations between the ‘political’ and the ‘religious’ 
domains in traditional India. The legends may be interpreted as indicating the signifi-
cance of religious authorities (of world- renouncing ascetics, not of Brahmans on the 
top of the caste hierarchy) to political legitimacy, which has tended to be played down 
in recent studies. But an easy generalisation must not be deduced from the case of 
Vijayanagara kingship discussed here. It should also be noted that the way in which 
those two domains were linked was informed by several competing principles, even 
within one particular polity (cf. Peabody 2003). See, for historical studies touching on 
the relations between ruling powers and Hindu ascetics or sects led by them, Appa-
durai (1977), Burghart (1978), Wolters (1979), Bouillier (1991), Sinha (1993).
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Part II
Politics of town planning
Colonial and postcolonial

4 Patrick Geddes and the 
metropolis
Partho Datta
The beginnings of modern planning and Patrick Geddes
With the decision to shift the capital of colonial India from Calcutta to Delhi in 
1911, urban planning became a prominent area of debate and discussion in plan-
ning societies and journals throughout the western world. Because of this 
project, other urban centres in colonial India – willingly or not – came under the 
radar of urban planners, and the discourse of modern planning expanded to 
accommodate many Indian towns and cities.
 The colonies had always attracted and provided opportunities for all kinds of 
technical experts from Britain. Consequently a whole band of architects, engi-
neers and town planners (their work usually overlapped) were to make a name 
for themselves throughout the British empire by laying down a common thread 
of concerns and attitudes towards urban problems in the colonies. In the words 
of historian R.K. Home, town planning became part of the ‘currency of progres-
sive paternalistic ideas circulating in the British Empire in the 20th century’ 
(Home 1990: 27). Examples include E.P. Richards, who worked in Calcutta and 
Singapore, A.E. Mirams in Bombay and Uganda, Herbert Baker in Delhi and 
Johannesburg, and Patrick Geddes all over India and in Colombo and Palestine. 
Western planning models, indeed the western experience of urbanisation, was 
seen by some of these planners as the only available model for modernisation. It 
was because of these itinerant individuals that western urbanism was extended to 
the colonies and in some cases gained a new lease of life. The work of Geddes is 
particularly important because he represented a considered and very articulate 
dissent from this conventional planning wisdom.
 By the early twentieth century colonial metropolises presented a picture of 
great urban squalor which needed urgent attention. The rapid growth of factory- 
based industry (particularly in Bombay and Calcutta) had given a fillip to migra-
tion into the cities, and the concomitant problems of overcrowding and lack of 
sanitation became particularly acute during epidemics such as the plague (1896). 
The colonial governments were particularly concerned with shielding canton-
ments and towns with significant European populations from disease, and 
responded by intervening decisively in built- up areas, demolishing old buildings 
and slums, quarantining the sick and setting up vigilance operations to discipline 
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and regulate the population. Thus modern planning in India had its roots in 
nineteenth- century pandemics.1 One outcome of this was that the relationship 
between bodies and spaces came to be intensely investigated and the manage-
ment of spaces in the city became an important part of urban policy.
 In the first few decades of the twentieth century, the town planning movement 
gathered momentum with the emergence of the professional town planner, the 
publication of journals and the proliferation of professional associations, pres-
sure groups and lobbyists for town planning. In India the marriage of extant 
urban policy to town planning ideas soon took concrete form with the setting up 
of Improvement Trusts after the plague, most prominently in Bombay (1898) 
and Calcutta (1911), as well as in numerous other cities in later decades. The 
importance of these Trusts lay in the normative standards for ‘improvement’ that 
they developed. Planning, as Christian Topalov has perceptively pointed out, had 
a larger reformist agenda: changing cities meant changing people, and this in 
turn meant changing society itself (Topalov 1990).
 By and large, in the hands of bureaucratic practitioners ‘improvement’ was 
often procrustean in nature. One objective was sanitising public places in the 
city, but with epidemics showing no signs of abatement, the colonial state for-
cibly entered the Indian home, making a bid to set sanitary standards for 
private and domestic spaces too. Not surprisingly, the sanitary reach and goals 
of the state often clashed with communitarian norms: sanitation and hygiene 
did not dovetail easily with traditional Indian notions of purity and pollution. 
Regulation of domestic practices thus remained a contentious issue, and the 
populace refused to follow modern sanitary standards in daily life or practise 
them in public spaces. In colonial India, the initiatives of the state in this 
sphere were complicated by its alien status, its inherent racism and class 
inhibitions. Even Indian nationalists who supported planning as a progressive 
move were quick to point out that the colonial state openly favoured European 
neighbourhoods at the cost of Indian localities. With the people reluctant to 
assent, spatial planning and restructuring in the city took on the character of 
violent coercion. Commercial and business imperatives often justified these 
measures as inevitable, which in effect meant unleashing class violence on the 
poor living in slums. The slum populace was easy to attack since they were 
squatters with no legal title to land and at the mercy of unscrupulous landlords. 
Colonial town planners, irrespective of needs, mechanically implemented the 
Haussmannian model of restructuring, which meant cutting broad swathes of 
roads, usually rectilinears and diagonals, on the face of the city for efficient 
traffic circulation. The influence of nineteenth- century English sanitary and 
bye- law regulations also played a decisive part.
 Not all practitioners of town planning were mechanical and unthinking in 
their approach. Haussmann’s model of city improvement provoked contrary 
views. His work was criticised by contemporaries such as Camillo Sitte (1889), 
whose championing of non- geometric forms challenged mechanical conceptions 
of design and the tyranny of the straight line (Goodfriend 1982; Schroske 1981), 
and by Ebenezer Howard (1898), whose garden cities brought into question the 
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very usefulness of sustaining expanding conglomerations with improved utili-
ties. Similarly, the influential architect Raymond Unwin (early 1900s; he had 
previously designed Hampstead Garden Suburb in London) campaigned against 
the mechanical implementation of bye- law streets (Evenson 1979: 22–23, 265, 
1989: 124). These thinkers were responsible for pointing out the perils of 
unabashed industrialism. In India, too, there were rumblings of discontent with 
official policy. J.M. Linton Bogle, who wrote a pioneering book on town plan-
ning, made an implicit criticism of colonialism and how political power deter-
mined space when he wrote the following, about Allahabad: ‘is there any good 
reason why the occupants of Civil Lines should have enormous compounds of 
six to eight bighas – far more than they want – while the houses in the city are 
packed together like sheep in a pen?’ (Linton Bogle 1929: 8).
 Similarly, another contemporary planner, H.V. Lanchester, wrote retrospec-
tively on the problems of ‘cutting straight roads through the more congested 
areas, regardless of the groupings of those displaced’ (Lanchester 1942: 119).2
Geddes’s method: some details
Patrick Geddes’s work threw some of these dilemmas of modern planning into 
sharp relief in a more sustained manner. Invited to work first in India by the 
Governor of Madras, Lord Pentland, Geddes stayed on as a freelance advisor 
and planner for princely states and other municipal authorities. His work was 
backed by numerous town planning reports, almost 40 according to one estimate, 
which he wrote and published between 1918 and 1924 (Meller 1990). Geddes 
was appalled at the indifferent and unthinking drives to demolish large parts of 
the historic core of Indian cities and was quick to appreciate the varied urban 
and civic traditions of pre- modern India. He had long been convinced that capi-
talist modernisation had brought sea- changes, but had been unable to efface vital 
cultural symbols.3 Geddes’s only major book, Cities in Evolution (1915) – a 
theoretical statement on cities, published before he came to India – argued that 
the post- railway age had obscured and hidden the ‘grand design’ of cities in the 
past (Geddes 1915: 16).
 Geddes’s approach is generally seen as ‘culturally informed’ (Goodfriend 
1979). This meant that he was sensitive and empathetic to extant civic culture. 
He was impressed with the functional character of Indian building traditions, the 
adaptation to weather, the use of local materials, the multiple uses of public 
spaces and the small- grain character of street life. He argued that these practices 
were sensitive to the ecology of the regions and therefore needed to be recovered 
and reinstated (Guha 2001).4 However, unlike in the west, none of these prac-
tices had been theorised in the academy, nor were they sanctified by modern 
movements for conservation. Geddes was sympathetic to Indian nationalism and 
hoped that Indian leaders and thinkers, with their rejection of mechanical 
western ideas, would play a vital role in encouraging his efforts. In an early, 
celebrated essay, which he published in The Modern Review hoping to catch the 
attention of Indian nationalists, he advised:
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For present purposes, our problem, as students of cities and their planning, 
is to get beyond architectural studies, as commonly understood. What we 
need are interpretations, sociological and civic, i.e. on the one hand in terms 
of the social life and psychology from which buildings of each type arise, 
and of the movements these express; and on the other of the main types of 
City Development which are their fullest concrete expression, and which 
react in their turn, on the mental world of their inhabitants.
(Geddes 1919b: 213)
 Like many people of his generation, Geddes was a practising evolutionist. He 
was appalled that the Industrial Revolution had unleashed economic forces 
without taking cognisance of the biological circumstances of human beings, and 
in this he was truly prophetic, anticipating modern environmentalism by many 
decades. He wanted to apply evolutionary theory to society but realised that 
since evolution was not always progressive, the vast potential created by the 
evolutionary pattern had to be consciously seized (Meller 1980).5 Modern town 
planning with its grand schemes and industrial technology exuded a utopian 
flavour and was unusually dismissive of the past. Only upon painstaking unrav-
elling of the social pattern of the community, Geddes argued, could the plans for 
a future be drawn. He was willing to be a utopian if the future was also premised 
on an understanding of the past; Geddes wrote that the quest for utopian endeav-
ours should begin right in the city itself and the way to connect the past and the 
present was through the observation and recording of local heritage which had 
persisted, with local advantages, through generations. Only then would ‘historic 
appreciation and utopian anticipation . . . be increasingly united to bring forth 
fruit in civic aspiration and endeavour’ (Hollins 1908: 6). This approach was 
markedly different from that of his contemporary, Ebenezer Howard, who envis-
aged ‘Garden Cities’ on an empty plain where no contingencies existed (Fishman 
1977: 6). In contrast, Geddes’s utopia was no escape from the harsh realities of 
urban squalor.
 Geddes invented what he called the ‘the diagnostic or civic survey’ to aid 
the process of recovery. This survey method, which Geddes patented, gave 
him an enviable ‘feel’ for the organic form of the city. However, this was not 
an intuitive response but based on an idiosyncratic reading of the history, mor-
phology, economy and cultural traditions of the city, which he put forward in 
his book, in his town planning reports and in his famous travelling exhibitions 
which showcased this approach graphically. In one of his Indian reports, 
Geddes warned that the enthusiastic designer who put pen to paper without 
survey:
exceeds too readily the scale of his surroundings and over- reaches also the 
requirements of the town. The result has been that, in too many cities, 
imposing new streets have been laid out without survey of their surrounding 
quarter and constructed without reference to local needs or potentialities.
(Tyrwhitt 1947: 24)6
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To tackle the dross and decay of urban settlements, Geddes added the compli-
mentary ‘conservative surgery’ to his civic survey. This was a way in which 
maximum improvement could be achieved with minimum demolition and dis-
ruption. He explained:
the method of Conservative Surgery . . . first it shows that the new streets 
prove not to be really required since, by simply enlarging the existing lanes, 
ample communications already exist; secondly that, with the addition of 
some vacant lots and the removal of a few of the most dilapidated and insan-
itary houses, these lanes can be greatly improved and every house brought 
within reach of fresh air as well as of material sanitation – a point on which 
the more pretentious method constantly fails, as is evident on every plan.
(Tyrwhitt 1947: 41)
 Geddes wanted to preserve and extend traditional spaces that were integral to 
the community, neighbourhood and family. Courtyards, rooftops, thresholds, 
pavements, small shrines, and parks were well integrated in his plans. He knew 
that these places were vital to the privacy and sociability of women who other-
wise faced many customary restrictions, and for this reason he was a champion 
of ‘purdah gardens’.7 Similarly, if the tulsi plant symbolised the nurturing power 
of women then it had to become the symbol of the thriving Hindu home. The 
chabutra (platforms outside houses) also had to be saved since they were vital to 
neighbourliness and a sense of community. For ideas such as these Geddes was 
dismissed as a conservative, and he in his turn was contemptuous of radicals 
who wanted to have no truck with tradition. Geddes was in fact far from being a 
traditionalist, as his championing of working- class housing and sensitivity to the 
exclusion of lower castes in his many reports demonstrate.8 Geddes’s belief in 
communitarian civic norms was firmly rooted in modernist ideas of health, 
beauty and sanitation.9
 For planning historians of colonial India, Geddes is important because his 
work throws up larger questions. Douglas Goodfriend, in his re- evaluation, has 
written that Geddes critiqued the ‘unconsidered importation of any Western 
planning practices into (the) different cultural milieu’ (Goodfriend 1979: 344) of 
India. On this theme the planning historian Anthony King has a written a percep-
tive and pioneering essay (King 1980). For one, importing planning models from 
the west meant measuring indigenous society by standards set elsewhere, for 
example with regards to overcrowding and sanitation. Such plans also ran the 
risk of being imposed on a people with totally different needs. Also looming 
large was the question of social and financial costs, since large planning projects 
called for huge investments and displacement hit citizens very hard. Even more 
tellingly, these imposed plans never questioned power relations in the colonial 
city. Racist distinctions like black/white were taken for granted and maintained 
(King 1980: 210). Geddes’s critique of colonial planning anticipated many of 
these concerns. His work also demonstrated that the norms of Euclidean geome-
try (the rectilinears, the diagonals, etc.) used by planners in the plans were 
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dubious since they represented all space uniformly. The biggest casualty in this 
method was the labouring poor: being low down in the social hierarchy meant 
that they were unlikely to find representation in the plans and would therefore 
become victims of cartographic silence.
Barrabazar: fantasies of demolition
Barrabazar (literally ‘Big Bazaar’) was central Calcutta’s most congested and 
most important business district. It had developed into East India’s centre for 
wholesale and retail trade in the hands of Marwaris, who had settled in this area 
in significant numbers by the end of the nineteenth century. Barrabazar was 
an important indication that Calcutta’s economy, despite appearances, was 
dependent on trade rather than manufacturing (Beverly 1881: 22, 46). One early 
account from the 1840s gives an orientalist hue to this bustling mart:
Few Europeans, I believe, have ever taken the trouble of exploring the 
inmost recesses of the Babel- like regions of the Burra Bazar. . . . Here above 
and below, may be seen the jewels of Golconda and Bundelkhand, the 
shawls of Cashmere, the broad cloths of England, silks of Moorshedabad 
and Benares, muslins of Dacca, calicoes, ginghams, chintzes, brocade of 
Persia, spicery and myrrh and frankincense from Ceylon, the Spice Islands 
and Arabia, shells from the eastern coast and straits, iron ware and cutlery in 
abundance, as well from Europe as Monghyr, coffee, drugs, dried fruits, and 
sweetmeats from Arabia and Turkey, cows tails from Thibet, and ivory from 
Ceylon. A great portion of these and other such articles, are either sold or 
brought by natives of the countries from whence they are obtained, who 
together with visitors, travellers and beggars, form a diversified group of 
Persians, Arabs, Jews, Marwarrees, Armenians, Cashmeerees, Malabars, 
Goorkhas, Afghans, Seiks, Turks, Parsees, Chinese, Burmese and Bengalis.
(Smith 1849)
Another European account from 1900 declared that:
one of the most wonderful sights in Calcutta is the Burra Bazar, yet how 
few Europeans . . . ever visit it! . . . The houses are all very high, many rising 
to more than four storeys. They are built of stone or brick and, as a rule, are 
ornamented within and without, with rough but not unpleasing coloured 
frescoes. Some have balconies of wonderfully carved wood.
(Quoted in Evenson 1989: 130)
Barrabazar or Ward VII was the area behind Writers’ Buildings (the seat of gov-
ernment) and Lalbazar (the police headquarters) up to Cotton Street in the north; 
it was bounded by the river on the west and Lower Chitpur Road on the east. 
This area was diverse and included shops, godowns, residential buildings and 
bustis (slums), though commercialisation had lent the whole ward a distinctive 
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character. Overbuilt with narrow streets, which made it mysterious and impenet-
rable to government agencies, its insanitation worried administrators because of 
its close proximity to the centre of government. Things were compounded by the 
high value of land in this area, which rivalled that of commercial London. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, official views swung from the romantic (see 
the quote above) to the denunciatory; the latter harboured fantasies of razing this 
commercial hub to the ground, removing what was seen as an important locus of 
disease in the city. By restoring order in this ward, the government planners 
wanted to create a kind of buffer between Indian neighbourhoods to the north 
and British ones in the south. The dilemma and prevarication of sanitary policy 
in Barrabazar seemed to have been resolved when the search began for a suitable 
site for the proposed Central Railway Station. European engineers, doctors and 
bureaucrats in the city wanted the Central Station to replace this historic core. In 
1899, when doctors Clemow and Hossack were asked to prepare a report on the 
area following the plague scare, they too recommended demolition (Clemow & 
Hossack 1899). Throughout the nineteenth century the railway was seen as the 
purveyor of sanitation, and it was thought that its benefits far outweighed any 
disruption caused to communities (Kellett 1969: 2, Wohl 1977: 39). Needless to 
say, the question of social and financial costs took second place to fantasies of 
order and control. Perhaps the enormous cost of demolition and rebuilding was a 
deterrent to the government, but the railway station was never built in Barraba-
zar – it was instead built across the river in Howrah in 1906 – and the area 
escaped this dreadful fate. However, concern with regards to Barrabazar did not 
diminish in the official mind.
The Geddes report of Barrabazar
Despite Geddes being present in India, two of the most desirable planning com-
missions slipped through his hands. First, New Delhi had already been given to 
Lutyens (and Baker). Geddes was no architect and had an idiosyncratic reputa-
tion among planners, and it did not help that he had criticised the New Delhi 
plan (Meller 1990: 236; Mumford 1966: 11), and perhaps it was for this reason 
that he was never accommodated, even in an advisory role. Acolytes of Geddes, 
such as the architect and planner H.V. Lanchester, also failed to get a slice of the 
Delhi pie. Second, the autonomous Calcutta Improvement Trust (CIT) was set 
up in 1911; it was a major project to restructure the city, but Geddes failed to get 
in even here. His private papers reveal that he tried to get a place as an advisor 
through his friend, the scientist Jagadis Bose, who unsuccessfully put in a word 
to the Indian minister in government, Surendranath Bannerjee.10 Clearly Geddes 
was keen to secure a big project, and he had made the appropriate noises before 
leaving England, even going so far as to praise the published plan of the CIT as 
a ‘stately volume’ in his Cities in Evolution (1915) (Meller 1990: 231, fn 37).
 Eventually Geddes was asked to submit his views on one ward in the city – 
Barrabazar – by the rival Calcutta Municipality, who were resentful of the Trust 
having encroached on their territory. The Municipality had been deliberately 
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kept at a distance by the Trust because the latter saw popular representation as a 
liability. This was Geddes’s first proper commission in a colonial metropolis; his 
previous reports had been on smaller towns or princely capitals, none of which 
faced problems on the scale of Bombay or Calcutta. Planning models also valor-
ised the big city, for example the restructuring of Paris (by Haussmann, 
c.1850–1870) and Chicago (plan by Burnham and Bennett, 1909). Clearly 
Geddes had to reconcile his cautious and piecemeal approach to the larger 
scale.11 In Calcutta he had to confront two major opposing strains in modern 
planning. First, the close association of business needs with urban planning; the 
proliferation of capital had always meant the restructuring of spaces. Second was 
the bane of modern planning – how to rehouse the displaced working classes 
without provoking class conflict.
 Haussmann’s plan was the official inspiration for restructuring Calcutta, and 
E.P. Richards – who put together the blueprint for the CIT – acknowledged his 
debt to this planning model (Richards 1914). Haussmann achieved his emphasis 
on imposing a new functional order on the city with an eye to the efficient circu-
lation of goods and services through the connection of economic nodes such as 
docks and railway stations, and the creation of voids for ‘respiration’ (boule-
vards, parks) (Smith 1980: 101, Choay 1970: 15–16). Richards’s plan for CIT 
(he offered several alternative proposals) shows a similar logic: a Calcutta criss-
crossed with rectilinears and diagonals that reduced the city into manageable 
blocks for commerce and the trades. Commenting generally on the carving up of 
space in the modern city, Lewis Mumford (Geddes’s principal disciple)12 wrote 
that such a move signified the rapid turnover of real estate in capitalism, a ‘con-
vertibility’ and ‘replaceability’ of space for ‘possible traffic, possible commer-
cial opportunity, possible conversion from residence into more exclusive 
business use’ (Mumford 1961: 427, 438). Schemes such as the one pursued by 
Richards thus implicitly acknowledged the importance of private investors in the 
property market in Calcutta.
 Geddes had to contend with Richards’s plan as well as several others already 
in place. Clemow and Hossack’s report (1899) has been mentioned above, and 
the CIT commissioned another up- to-date report on insanitary wards from Dr 
Crake (Crake 1911). Geddes also had to take as his benchmark the plans that the 
CIT had made specifically for Barrabazar. Albert de Bois Shrosbree, the chief 
valuer, had prepared such a report in 1916 and found that the ‘fundamental evil’ 
in Barrabazar was overbuilding. The tone of his recommendations was more 
cautious than the 1899 report, and he suggested various solutions, common to 
which was the demolition and partial rebuilding of insanitary areas and the wid-
ening and construction of streets throughout the area. Shrosbree urged that the 
matter could not be delayed as the cost of improvement would rise prohibitively 
(de Bois Shrosbree 1916: 5, 14). In intent at least, it was no different from the 
earlier reports. In an early testimony to the CIT, the Marwari Traders’ Associ-
ation had proactively supported such proposals and had recommended more 
through roads and the clearance of slums to facilitate commercialisation (CIT 
Annual Report, 1912–13 1913: 27–28). To sum up, the logic of these plans 
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 indicated that the ‘allocation’ of streets, sewers and railway lines seemed the 
only way to order the city (Boyer 1983, 1994: 288). It was at this juncture that 
Geddes was asked to give his opinion, and he submitted his plan in 1919.
 Geddes began his investigations by conducting, literally, a house- to-house 
survey. He knew there were no short- cuts, as only through painstaking investiga-
tions would he be able to get an accurate picture of the problems of Barrabazar 
and also expand his conclusions for a wider comparative perspective with the 
city as a whole (Geddes 1919a: 27–28). He knew that extant plans followed ‘the 
conventional aesthetics of the rigorously straight line of the older Paris–Berlin–
American school’ (Geddes 1919a: 5), but Geddes saw no reason why a costly 
monotony should be the target of planning, when local traditions offered a 
cheaper and more aesthetic result (Geddes 1919a: 5). Even though he was 
dealing with only one district of Calcutta, he effectively managed to critique the 
normative standards that the CIT had set up for itself. Geddes’s report was cate-
gorical that there was more to Barrabazar than just large blocks of insanitary and 
overcrowded property. Barrabazar, he pointed out, had a distinct architectural 
and urban form of its own, and it would reduce the trauma of demolition if this 
character was allowed to survive, provided some changes were made. Geddes 
found that Barrabazar encompassed two distinctly different areas. Big business 
was situated in the south and the west, and it was here that abatement of traffic 
congestion and general improvement was most needed. He had alternative plans 
for the fully fledged development of this business area. He found that the north 
and east were primarily residential, and Geddes saw it as his job to try to pre-
serve this character – to save housing stock and minimise the dislocation of resi-
dents. He also felt that the argument of the Trust that the business quarters would 
inevitably ‘spill’ into the residential was unconvincing (Geddes 1919a: 6).
 Geddes also observed that the movement of goods and traffic occurred prin-
cipally across the city from west to east and vice- versa, and much less along the 
river (north–south) or on roads parallel to it. This was borne out by the organic 
growth of the city after the nineteenth century, which clearly shows a majority of 
the city’s roads take a west to east alignment (Gupta 1993: 35). Instead, the Trust 
was planning north–south cuts, in total disregard of the needs of local trades. 
The logic here was dictated by the British mercantile establishments, which were 
placed along the river (still a major channel for transport) and which disregarded 
Indian businesses further inland. Geddes also noticed that in the business areas 
the existing godowns were basically domestic buildings adapted for commercial 
use – and thus actually afforded less storage space. The courtyards became dirty 
from constant use, and the dust raised contributed to the unhealthiness of the 
living quarters in the upper storeys. Most of the houses also had a narrow front-
age but great depth, and the space behind these houses had been overrun by the 
haphazard growth of stables and irregular housing for domestic servants and the 
working population (Geddes 1919a: 6–7, 10–11, 13).
 Geddes’s recommendations for Barrabazar basically fell within three broad 
parameters. First, he insisted that street alignment be developed along the west–
east axis, following the natural movement of goods and traffic, and not north–south 
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as the CIT was planning. Second, while making a plea to retain the residential 
character of the north- east, he was keen to see the west of Barrabazar develop 
into a modern business district. Third, even when he realised that demolition of 
insanitary property could not be avoided, he wanted to rebuild, keeping tradi-
tional urban forms in mind so that the character of the district would remain 
intact.
 Geddes was convinced that Barrabazar should be set up as a modern business 
district and nothing less. He wanted to develop the business locality along the 
west because of its proximity to the river and shipping. For this purpose, he 
recommended that the Mint (1831) be shifted out, but typically for Geddes he 
urged the re- use of the ancient structure as a public school for children in the 
area. Geddes was aware that large plots of land in Calcutta were controlled by 
the government (the largest landowner in the city), and his suggestion was in 
fact a gesture towards a more creative and public use of such land, which at that 
time was blocked by moribund structures. The grouping of business interests in 
different quarters represented an ‘old world survival’, which Geddes argued 
gave Barrabazar a familiar character of its own. Far from condemning this tradi-
tional grouping of business, Geddes wanted to retain it. At the same time he 
urged the adoption of modern American and German methods of goods handling 
in Calcutta. He envisaged a vast ‘Produce Exchange’ next to the railway lines of 
an associated goods depot, where goods would be lifted vertically from wagons 
to warehouses with great economy of handling. The upper storey of this building 
was to house offices, and there would even be a roof garden for relaxation and 
business meetings. He wanted old residential houses being used as godowns to 
be rebuilt as modern warehouses, with offices and shops on the upper floors, 
connected with ramps. Footbridges over lanes would be built to decongest the 
narrow lanes. Barrabazar thus re- planned and concentrated would relieve the 
congestion from other parts and make available once again building stock for 
much- needed housing (Geddes 1919a: 16, 18–19).
 Geddes’s penchant for conservation did not mean that he doubted the need 
for more lanes and streets through Barrabazar. Business sense also suggested 
that instead of widening existing streets as the CIT was planning to do, it was 
more reasonable to open new thoroughfares through the back lots of the houses, 
which Geddes had shown to consist of run- down property. Thus at one stroke, 
new frontages would be opened up cheaply, lines for sanitation would be easier 
to provide and the local business traffic would also remain undisturbed. He sug-
gested three alternative west–east routes and condemned the north–south system 
because ‘its origin appears to lie more in drawing- office routine than in City 
Survey’ (Geddes 1919a: 8, 11). All CIT plans were made with the future needs 
of motorised transport in mind, yet according to Geddes the pressing need of the 
hour was to improve pedestrian circulation within Barrabazar, since the evidence 
of mass circulation by foot was only too evident, as was the continuous use of 
human portage and hand- driven vehicles. On the value of preserving and extend-
ing lanes, he was particularly eloquent. Arguing that people like short- cuts, he 
wrote that ‘a lane after all is a pavement without a road beside it, and some 
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people value its quietness; while its narrow width and shade give coolness also’ 
(Geddes 1919a: 12).
 Geddes’s plans in fact show a gradation of roads – lanes for pedestrians, 
streets for heavier mixed traffic and large roads for intra- city communication. 
The logic behind such a move was to avoid clogging up a single large avenue, 
overburdened with humans, animals and vehicles, reducing mobility to crawling 
level. A simple separation of traffic functions would enable both speed for vehi-
cles and faster mobility for commerce. Such a move would also help preserve 
existing channels of circulation rather than condemn them unequivocally.
 Despite his caution, Geddes was practical enough to realise that some demoli-
tion would always be necessary. He knew that sanitary problems had become 
acute in Barrabazar and needed urgent attention, and thus Dr Crake’s survey 
won his sympathy. ‘As a life- long cobbler of old buildings and also with more 
respect than most for the courtyard type of house I take a less severe view than 
his’, he wrote, ‘but in a general way I am compelled to confirm and support his 
criticism. His figures are well worth consulting’ (Geddes 1919a: 22). Geddes’s 
plans to rebuild demolished areas included innovatively designed four- storey 
blocks of houses, which followed the traditional use of space closely. The lower 
two storeys would be used for business purposes, while the upper two would be 
laid out like the traditional Indian courtyard home and house residents. By 
raising the residential quarters to the top floors, Geddes hoped to avoid the dirt 
and dust of lower floors. The warehouses built below would be on modern lines, 
with enough provision for light and air (Geddes 1919a: 14). In these plans for 
the newly built four- storey houses, Geddes envisaged some displacement. But it 
would be balanced, he hoped, by creating adequate and in most cases better 
places to stay (Geddes 1919a: 15, 19, 33). In some blocks only a few insanitary 
houses would be removed, and the space created would be converted into small 
open areas and parks, providing relief to local residents. Knowing that the cre-
ation of space for gardens would prove very expensive in a high- value site such 
as Barrabazar, he urged again for the conversion of roofs into small gardens. For 
women who were reluctant to step out because of a lack of recreational space 
outside, he suggested earmarking small parks as exclusive ‘purdah gardens’ 
(Geddes 1919a: 20–22).
 Writing just after the First World War, Geddes was sensitive to the fact that 
large- scale demolitions would lead to business losses and the dislocation of the 
labouring poor. He was no doubt aware of the rumblings of discontent among 
the working classes in Calcutta and its outskirts that had broken out after the 
war.13 Geddes realised that it was vital for those workers dependent on casual 
work to live close to their place of employment. In sharp contrast to Richards, he 
argued that the poor would not be able to travel from the suburbs to the city, a 
luxury that only the upper classes could afford since only they had the means 
and time to commute long distances daily.
 Preserving and investing in existing housing stock was paramount for Geddes. 
Too often, he urged, buildings were judged on superficial grounds, ‘so that dirty 
whitewash, broken plaster, and bad smell are enough to evoke a cry for demolition; 
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for these only need easy cleansing and brightening, and economical repair’ 
(Geddes 1919a: 33). He well understood the value that Indians placed on family 
homes. Far from deriding this attachment as old- fashioned conservatism that 
impeded progress, he was keen to turn it into an effective plea for their repair 
and sanitation. He knew that for British planners in the CIT, the notion of a 
family home was an alien concept. ‘Family homes’ in the west belonged to the 
aristocracy, and the majority of people in cities lived in tenements and flats. He 
suggested that in its own way, the Calcutta Municipality could take the ‘pater-
nal’ step of granting loans to citizens for repairing their houses. Geddes felt that 
the investment in housing was too strictly seen through the prism of financial 
gains and losses in the market; he wanted the governing classes to invest in 
housing, so that socially at least they could expect returns in the form of a satis-
fied and prosperous working class (Geddes 1919a: 29–30, 34). Implicit in this 
was an argument challenging Engels’s famous study on the condition of the 
English working classes. Engels had almost suggested that the worsening 
housing conditions would further radicalise the workers and that the goal of 
socialist revolution was to ‘occupy’ the houses of the propertied. Geddes argued 
against such a view; the elites according to him lived in upper- class super- slums. 
A far more genuine revolution would be to set new norms for more humane and 
communal forms of living space (Mumford 1961: 464–465).14
 Geddes’s ideas, unusual for their time, met with scepticism and were resisted 
even before his report was published. Shrosbree, the chief valuer, whose report on 
Barrabazar is referred to above, was critical of Geddes’s attempts at solving the 
problem of ‘nuisance corners’ by erecting small temples in their place. Shrosbree 
predicted that this would freeze in perpetuity areas that needed reconstruction work 
(de Bois Shrosbree 1916: 6). Shrosbree’s criticism showcased why Geddes’s ideas 
were mistrusted. According to official planners, epidemics and overcrowding 
needed solutions on a war footing, whereas Geddes seemed not only insufficiently 
interventionist, but also far too sympathetic to the community. Geddes was, 
however, accustomed to such attacks. To the Calcutta Corporation’s charge that 
his scheme for small, open spaces between houses would come to nothing since 
they would rapidly become repositories for dumping refuse (Report on the Muni-
cipal Administration of Calcutta, 1919–20 1920: 18), he had effective answers. 
Geddes argued that ‘neutral’ issues like that of garbage actually hid a deep- seated 
antipathy for common people. To the British administrators, Indians were inher-
ently filthy and prone to desecrating public places; to Geddes the problem was the 
very opposite. Rubbish accumulated, he wrote, when neither the municipality nor 
the local landlord made adequate arrangements for carting it away. Besides, plant-
ing a few trees would indeed maintain the sanctity of these small areas between 
houses and encourage people to keep them clean (Geddes 1919a: 32). In other 
words, open spaces that were integrated into community life had more chance of 
surviving than parks, the sanitary ‘voids’ that modern planners tended to prefer, 
premised on the negative concept of a space that was just to be left empty. Con-
sequently, constant policing of such spaces had become necessary, threatening to 
overturn the very notion of a park made for the people.
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 Helen Meller, in her important revaluation of Geddes’s Barrabazar report, has 
shown that he was often a victim of his own propaganda and was totally unre-
sponsive to any point of view other than his own (Meller 1990: 283). He was 
also prone to repeating his ideas irrespective of the context; some of his pet 
schemes, such as ‘purdah gardens’, resurfaced in all his reports. For all his 
enthusiasm, Geddes was perhaps too sanguine about the rejuvenating effects of 
modern business organisation in Barrabazar. He misunderstood the constraints at 
work in a colonial economy and failed to understand the mercantilist nature of 
industry in Calcutta, which, eager to do business on the cheap, was unlikely to 
support his long- term plans for a modern refurbished Barrabazar. A modern 
produce exchange with the latest mechanical goods- handling facilities meant the 
redundancy of casual labour. In Chicago, John Fairfield has pointed out that such 
a scheme was also proposed by Bennett, with an eye to quelling labour militancy 
(Fairfield 1993: 121). One wonders if Geddes was aware of the implications of 
some of his schemes for Calcutta, which had an overwhelming presence of 
unskilled labour. Helen Rosenau has written that Geddes lacked architectural 
vision; she comments: ‘The form of the image seems to have eluded Geddes’ 
(Rosenau 1974: 150). But this view misrepresents Geddes and is not based on 
any serious engagement with the full range of his published reports. The ques-
tion of form in cities is often reduced to the profile of monumental buildings and 
is a hangover from architectural history. The assumption is that since Geddes 
had little to offer in terms of the palpable built environment, his ideas were 
therefore not relevant or that he had failed. Perhaps more pertinent is Franēoise 
Choay’s comment that:
Patrick Geddes evolved the survey method at the beginning of the 20th 
century. But while the method acted as a corrective for urbanism by respect-
ing the complexity of reality and rejecting the apriori, it was nevertheless 
used by Geddes within the context of a cultural system of values and it 
remained dependent on the creative intervention of a planner. Consequently 
it did not fundamentally alter the course of critical planning.
(Choay 1970: 109)
However, the far- reaching implications of Geddes’s work have eluded these 
critics. Lewis Mumford has written that Geddes rejected the ‘cult of the 
state’, and central to his thought was not the planner but the citizen (Tyrwhitt 
1947: 12).
 The Barrabazar report shows that Geddes was willing to enter into a strategic 
dialogue with official planning. However, those who professed sympathy with 
his plans in official circles often rejected his schemes on the grounds that they 
were idealistic in nature. Anticipating such a ploy, Geddes wrote in his Barraba-
zar report that:
every worker who ventures upon the application of science, beyond the tra-
ditional mechanical level on which the ‘practical man’ prides himself, is 
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taken by him for ‘an idealist’ – a term which often conveniently dispenses 
him from hearing what the idealist has to say.
(Geddes 1919a: 35)
 Over the years, as Geddes’s reputation for dissent grew, his India reports 
attracted a motley group of planners. In the 1920s and 1930s, the library of the 
CIT became a ‘Mecca’ for young British planners who were keen to consult the 
complete set of Indian reports that were kept there (Meller 1990: 203).15
 Geddes’s hopes of attracting Indian nationalists also failed. While the sci-
entist Jagadis Bose, whose biography Geddes wrote, Ananda Coomaraswamy 
and Rabindranath Tagore became his friends and supporters, they did not 
respond to his ideas on urbanism; the only exception was the academic Radha 
Kamal Mukherjee. Others, such as Bipin Chandra Pal, were dazzled by the pro-
spect of an Indian metropolis founded on modern European models, despite their 
strident anti- colonialism. The response of Indian nationalists to alternative 
models of urbanism was therefore quite ambivalent at best.
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Notes
 1 This needs to be qualified. The 1857 uprising provoked a major crackdown on cities 
by the British. Delhi and Lucknow had to be re- occupied and were extensively 
restructured in order to control recalcitrant populations. For some historians, military 
occupation initiated modern town planning in India. See Gupta 1981; Oldenburg, 
1984.
 2 Lanchester worked in India and published a plan on Madras (Lanchester 1918).
 3 I owe this insight to the late Professor Satyesh Chakrabarty, Calcutta.
 4 Sekhar Krishnan made available to me a typescript of this unpublished talk.
 5 See also, Guha 1992.
 6 This is an important anthology of extracts from his Indian reports.
 7 Here it was C.M. Villiers- Stuart’s Gardens of the Great Mughals, which had a great 
influence on Geddes (Meller 1990: 219).
 8 Most famously in his report on Indore city. See Geddes 1918.
 9 Geddes did not homogenise the community, nor did he romanticise it as a per-
petual bulwark against the state. Planning for Geddes was a creative way to raise 
the standards of civic life in general. For a view of how modern sanitation adjudic-
ates and destroys communities, see Chakrabarty (1991), but also see Kumar’s 
(1997) riposte.
10 Patrick Geddes, papers, University of Edinburgh, Ms 10576.
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11 Ram Guha has raised the question of whether Geddes’s penchant for the ‘middle or 
human scale’ proved to be a limitation. See Guha 2001.
12 Though he rebelled against his mentor, Lewis Mumford (1966). For the Geddessian 
approach to the American city as exemplified in Mumford’s life- work see the excel-
lent account by Guha (1991).
13 For details see, Datta 1993.
14 According to Mumford, Geddes described the downward movement of building and 
housing in the modern city as: ‘Slum, semi- slum and super slum, to this has come the 
Evolution of Cities.’
15 For another sympathetic reading of Geddes’s Barrabazar Report, see Beattie (2004). 
Grateful thanks to lndrani Chatterjee who drew my attention to this essay.
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5 Islam and development in urban 
space
Planning ‘official’ Karachi in the 
1950s1
Markus Daechsel
The gain of independence in 1947 brought with it both the need and the oppor-
tunity to ‘build’ Pakistan as a postcolonial country. This not only meant nation 
building in the abstract sense, but also raised the challenge of how the new state 
could inscribe itself – ideologically and structurally – in the urban environments 
of major cities like Lahore, Karachi, Dhaka, and eventually Islamabad. Urban 
planning and housing policy were both new and obvious priorities for policy 
makers in the 1950s: the impact of partition had made many of the large cities of 
Pakistanis ungovernable, and this required urgent administrative interference 
that went beyond the much more limited practices of colonial urban planning. 
Moreover, as the successor state to British India that did not inherit the symbolic 
and infrastructural assets of a historic capital city, Pakistan also had to face the 
challenge of creating a new urban focal point that would express the significance 
of national liberation. Also, the international context was favourable to an age of 
city building. The experience of the Second World War had brought urban 
reconstruction to the forefront of international development discourse, with new 
bodies such as the United Nations and the Colombo Plan actively encouraging 
comprehensive state intervention to control rapid urbanisation. International 
entrepreneurs and architects operating in ‘developing’ countries around the 
world looked to Pakistan in search of projects and business opportunities, among 
them greats such as Michel Ecochard and Le Corbusier, or Doxiadis Associates, 
the future creators of Islamabad.2
 Like other countries seeking their place in the new post- Second World War 
order, it was essential for Pakistan to make use of the new opportunities offered 
by ‘development’. Although the worldview of the leading Pakistani bureaucrats, 
military men and politicians of the era was not always entirely aligned with all 
aspects of the new global discourse, they nevertheless understood its importance 
for creating new political alliances, not least with the United States of America. 
‘Development’ was in many ways the ideological glue that cemented the ever- 
closer strategic relationship between Washington and the Pakistani establish-
ment, which culminated in open support for Ayub Khan’s military regime at the 
very end of the decade (see Jalal 1990, Kux, 2001: chs 3 and 4). But ‘develop-
ment’ – especially when it came to its expression in symbolically significant pro-
jects of urban reconstruction – was by no means easily reconcilable with the 
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ideological requirements of Pakistan’s official identity. At the most basic level, 
‘development’ was a universalising discourse, a way of making sense of the 
world by using a range of categories and concepts that applied anywhere from 
Latin America to Africa and South- East Asia. As a nation state that had to fight 
harder than most to establish its right of being ‘separate’, Pakistan could not 
afford to slot into the world as just another example of ‘underdevelopment’, not 
least because such a position erased any essential difference between itself and 
its defining ‘other’ and next- door neighbour, India.
 At the very heart of establishing difference was, naturally, the matter of reli-
gion: Pakistan’s character as a state for Muslims, or even, as some would have 
it, as an ‘Islamic state’ was at stake.3 This chapter discusses how this identity 
requirement could be brought together with ‘development’ as far as city plan-
ning and architecture were concerned. The international consultants then operat-
ing in Pakistan occupied an uneasy position on the frontline between the two 
contradictory ideological pulls. While they were indispensable by virtue of their 
expertise and for the prestige they brought to Pakistan, they were without excep-
tion not of Muslim background, and as such always open to suspicions and chal-
lenges from all sorts of official and self- appointed spokesmen of religious 
rectitude in Pakistan. It did not help that there was a good deal of debate within 
the country itself over how exactly Islam could or should be represented in urban 
space. Being unable to find any consensus among themselves, Pakistani policy 
makers were sometimes only too happy to reframe the debate as a simplistic 
binary, one that pitted a non- Muslim foreigner against a now magically united 
front of committed nationalists. As this chapter will show, this often occurred at 
the expense of the actual projects in question, which either never got finished or 
remained aesthetically unsatisfactory.
 The Karachi of this chapter is an ‘official’ Karachi, a series of ‘national’ ven-
tures rather than the living and breathing locality with its rich local landscape 
and distinctive politics that the city also was at the time. The conclusions pro-
posed here about how Islam and development came together – or rather failed to 
come together – in urban space pertain to Pakistan as a whole. Almost as soon as 
the port city was designated as the new capital in 1947, there were discussions 
between foreign consultants and architects and local power holders over finding 
the right mixture of religion and modernity, of Islam and development, that 
would speak to the nation. The reference frame for where and how an appropri-
ate representation of Pakistan’s dual aspirations in city space should be achieved 
shifted over time: it could be the city of Karachi as a whole, a designated ‘federal 
capital area’ within it or in the near vicinity, or an even more confined cluster of 
official buildings and monuments. The geographic focus (but importantly not the 
substance of the debate) was re- directed to an entirely new location when Ayub 
Khan announced the Islamabad project shortly after his 1958 military takeover. 
But Karachi’s significance for the encounter between religion and development 
was by no means over. Parallel to Islamabad, the generals also instituted the 
enormously ambitious Korangi project, a new satellite town for hundreds of 
thousands of destitute partition refugees, separated from the old capital by 
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several miles of wasteland. Representing a unique opportunity to construct an 
entire city for exemplary Pakistani citizens, this was once again an occasion on 
which issues of religious identity and development were contested between 
foreign experts, local residents, generals and bureaucrats.
Islam and modernity for a capital city
Nowhere was the need to express ‘Islam’ and ‘modernity’ in a cityscape more 
pressing than in the first city of government, Karachi, which after all had to serve 
as a representative space for the nation as a whole. The city had few existing 
buildings that could produce such a representation organically or on the spot. 
Unlike in Lahore or Dhaka, or Delhi across the border, there were no direct rem-
nants of the times when Muslims had last run a powerful state in South Asia, no 
imperial mosques and no Mughal palaces and forts. In fact, leaving aside some 
Sufi shrines of local significance and historic Islamic ruins some distance away, 
there was no building or part of the city that represented any particular associ-
ation of Muslims and state sovereignty at all. Karachi had been largely a colonial 
creation. Its modernity was not in doubt; there were several commercial build-
ings, hotels, residencies and, with the new Sindh Assembly building of 1941, 
even a major public structure, all of which represented the latest stylistic innova-
tions of colonial art deco. Yet this was in no sense an Islamic modernity; above 
all else it represented the political supremacy of an outside power over a cosmo-
politan population, of which Muslims formed only one and by no means the 
most affluent or influential part.4
 Unsurprisingly, the new Pakistani state elite perceived Karachi’s deficit in 
terms of ideological significance very early on. Alongside the city’s ungoverna-
bility in times of rapid population transfer, this was one of the main issues that 
the first postcolonial Karachi ‘master plan’ of 1949 was intended to resolve. It 
had been commissioned in the aftermath of partition to a conglomerate of Euro-
pean consultants called Merz Rendel Vatten Pakistan (MRVP).5 The circum-
stances of this commission were highly revealing of the haphazard manner in 
which development matters were handled by the Pakistani leadership. Only one 
of the partner firms involved in MRVP – a Swedish company called Vattenbyg-
gnadsbryan – had some limited prior experience in urban planning in the Soviet 
Union, the Baltic countries and Scandinavia, but nowhere in the Muslim world. 
At any rate, the main reason they were hired had nothing to do with this par-
ticular qualification (or lack thereof ); MRVP came to draw up the Karachi Plan 
because they were appointed as monopoly engineering consultants to the Gov-
ernment of Pakistan who advised on everything from hydro- electric power gen-
eration to railways, harbours and airports. Urban planning was the last and least 
important of the conglomerate’s responsibilities, scarcely an afterthought in the 
eyes of the Pakistani bureaucrats who made the appointment.6
 The lack of familiarity with Pakistan among the MRVP planners was obvious 
in the vagueness of many of the provisions of the first Karachi ‘Master Plan’, be 
it with regards to zoning control, transport or housing. They had neither the time 
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nor the necessary data to conduct anything more than a cursory survey of the 
city and effectively drafted the document in less than a year. Nevertheless, it is 
clear from the very first page of the plan that they appreciated their patron’s 
ideological needs; indeed the ‘identity’ aspect of the plan is so thickly applied 
throughout that one might conclude it was actually being used to mask the plan’s 
less convincing technical suggestions. The very first image a reader encountered 
when opening the published version of the plan was a view through a distinctly 
‘Islamic’ arch towards a monumental mosque in the middle of a large square; 
next to it was a quotation from Surah 14 (‘Ibrahim’) of the Holy Qur’an, which 
represents a foundational moment of the Islamic prophecy, affirming God’s 
promise of protection to his community and inserting it into the larger story of 
similar promises to Abraham and Moses. This is where the new Pakistan was 
positioned – as a form of reenactment of the very creation of Islam itself.
 Hot on the heels of ‘religion’ followed ‘modernity’. The very next page 
presents the reader with a picture of Pakistani children and a programmatic 
statement:
Pakistan stands at the entrance to its life as a free and independent nation. 
Economic, cultural and political conditions will differ markedly from those 
of the past. These new conditions must constitute the background for plan-
ning the capital of Pakistan. . . . Faithful to the Islamic tradition, Pakistan 
will remain a democratic state. The country will be open to international 
intercourse in all fields, economic, cultural and political, while at the same 
time asserting its own individuality and that of Islam.
(Merz Rendel Vatten (Pakistan) et al. 1951: 1)
 The task ahead was to achieve a new ‘Islamic tradition blended with inter-
national culture’ while avoiding ‘spiritual and ideological errors’ (Merz Rendel 
Vatten (Pakistan) et al. 1951: 2). This warning already indicated a sense of 
potential problems ahead. How could a country be open to all ‘international 
intercourse’ and assert its ‘own individuality and that of Islam [emphasis 
added]’? (The conjunction ‘and’ introduces further complications here, as it 
seems to suggest that Islam was not in fact all there was to Pakistani identity, 
and that there were additional, not strictly religious needs to be considered as 
well.) There was no obvious way to bring Islam and modernity together, but 
getting it right was nevertheless necessary to safeguard Pakistan’s identity as a 
state (the ‘ideological’) as well as the individual wellbeing of its people (the 
‘spiritual’). But despite such difficulties there were ample grounds for optimism. 
The document continued:
The standard of living in western countries some centuries ago was prob-
ably not unlike that which now obtains in the Indo- Pakistan subcontinent. 
However, the progress which required several hundreds of years in the West 
can probably be achieved in a considerably shorter time in Pakistan if the 
lessons from other parts of the world are assimilated and skilfully applied. It 
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has therefore been assumed in the Master Plan, that, by the beginning of the 
next century, the standard of living of the population will, in the main, have 
reached the present level of that in Europe.
(Merz Rendel Vatten (Pakistan) et al. 1951: 3)
Leaving aside that this point has now come and gone without satisfying such 
high hopes, what did the new Karachi, as imagined in the late 1940s, actually 
look like? The heart of the city was to be a giant central square – ostensibly 
based on Islamic precedents like the Maidan- i Shah (now Maidan- i Imam) in 
Isfahan, but in fact immediately evocative of Soviet city centres – where all the 
main institutions of the new state, the Parliament, the Secretariat, a National 
Library and Museum, the Karachi University, the national Central Mosque and 
the tomb of Muhammad Ali Jinnah were to be concentrated. The stated aim was 
to create a monumental but democratic public space where people of all walks of 
life would mingle and creatively work out ‘ideological tension’. Mass housing 
was to be provided in high- rise flats located close to the monumental square to 
encourage widespread participation in civic activity. Community facilities were 
to be provided on the assumption of residential clusters containing 5,000 inhabit-
ants each, which ideally should be located close enough to places of employment 
to allow residents to walk to work; and to add a little glamour to the entire set- up 
there was also to be a ‘Riviera of the East’ along Karachi’s beaches and water-
front (Merz Rendel Vatten (Pakistan) et al. 1951: 4–9).
 The plan did not reflect only the desire to create a new capital city that 
expressed Pakistan’s ideology for the benefit of its own population and a world-
wide audience; cityscapes of this kind were also agents of social change in their 
own right. Quoting the research of the American planner and urban historian 
E.A. Gutkind, the plan distinguished between ‘family group’, ‘mosque group’ 
and ‘bazaar group’ as the main building blocks of the urban fabric of the Islamic 
city (appropriately illustrated with a picture of the holiest of holy sites of Islam, 
the Kaʿba in Mecca, on the opposite page) (Merz Rendel Vatten (Pakistan) et al. 
1951: 31–35). This stable and beneficial constellation was in danger of being 
disturbed by the impact of industrialisation, a potential ill- effect that any new 
planning would have to address, not necessarily by preventing it, but by channel-
ling it in a positive direction:
This breaking away from the local group must be regarded as undesirable, 
but it need not necessarily be repeated in Pakistan. . . . Pakistan may now 
create a community which need not suffer from the growing pains of indus-
trialization. [. . .] the culture of Pakistan is a sociable and unitary culture, it 
may be possible for the local urban group to instil into the life of the indi-
vidual a stability and a spirit of community.
(Merz Rendel Vatten (Pakistan) et al. 1951: 36)
Despite their copious references to religious tradition, the MRVP representatives 
could not hide the fact that deep down they were ardent modernisers rather than 
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conservatives. They asserted in the planning document that while the Muslim 
cities of the past were built for ‘feudal’ rulers, the Muslim city of the future had 
to help create democratic communities of individuals:
In a democratic community it is the duty of the town planner to balance the 
form to be given to the different elements of which a city is composed, so 
that they, together, form a whole, rich in contrasts, full of excitement, varied 
and interesting. A city must express both the requirements and wishes of the 
individual and those of the social groups; it must provide for and emphasize 
the peaceful life in a residential area, the productive co- operation in the 
place of employment, the swarming life in the bazaar, the ‘joie de vivre’ in 
the community centre and the ideological tension in the large meeting 
places.
(Merz Rendel Vatten (Pakistan) et al. 1951: 44)
A few pages later, it was again emphasised that the urban layout of a capital city 
had to be specifically designed to facilitate
mass- contact with the people without which the sense of community cannot 
survive. Great open squares and boulevards are planned; where the people 
may gather for public assemblies, Idd [sic] prayers and parades. Small quiet 
parks and open- air cafes will be the setting for everyday private discussions 
and exchange of ideas. As a background for the whole picture the Mosques 
and public buildings will, by their disposition and architectural character, be 
a visual manifestation of the fundamental common ideal.
(Merz Rendel Vatten (Pakistan) et al. 1951: 80–81)
The free flow of such a democratic spirit was precisely what the emergent military 
bureaucratic oligarchy that usurped power at the central- government level after the 
1951 assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat wanted to avoid – in particular, the 
presence of large groups of university students close to the main organs of power 
proposed in the plan. This, at least, has been the most widely quoted reason in the 
secondary literature for why the MRVP proposal was never officially endorsed 
(Hasan 1999: 25–26), although it was published and haunted the office shelves of 
Karachi city planners and property developers as some sort of ghost document for 
the rest of the decade. It is not entirely satisfactory as a full explanation, however. 
If the fate of the plan is followed through the documents of the Pakistan cabinet 
office, a more basic incompatibility becomes apparent.
 Most sections of the bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry of Finance, never 
entirely appreciated what a city master plan actually was and repeatedly delayed 
the project on grounds of insufficient ‘costings’. Pakistani bureaucrats thought 
about the future shape of the capital in strikingly different ways from what was 
proposed by MRVP. What they expected to see was a replication of the British 
New Delhi project, a bifurcated combination of ‘old’ existing Karachi as a 
 bustling city of commerce and a yet- to-be constructed ‘New Karachi’ as a serene 
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space of government, with little contact and confluence between the two.7 As the 
Finance Ministry insisted, the building of a new city from scratch – as opposed to 
the planning of an existing one – would indeed have to be carefully ‘costed’, and 
in the early 1950s was simply unaffordable for Pakistan. This effectively ruled out 
the possibility of tackling the question of how to represent Pakistan’s new identity 
through urban planning. It could not be, as some of the foreign consultants had 
proposed, the city layout and its impact on social life that made Karachi simultan-
eously modern and Islamic. Instead, solutions had to be found in the more limited 
and less expensive field of the architectural style of individual buildings. The quest 
for Karachi’s future shifted from capital to capitol, from a whole city – or at least 
governmental district – to an assemblage of iconic buildings that represented the 
state and its aspirations in a more limited and compact form.
‘Beyond domes, arches and minarets’
The first ambition was to have at least a new secretariat building and parliament 
– the core elements of a capitol – ready by the time of the first general elections, 
scheduled for 1954 (although not actually held until 1970). An international 
search for suitable architects was started at the same time as the MRVP master 
plan disappeared in the quicksand of ministerial interventions. By 1951, only 
one serious submission had been received. It was from Jose Maria Muguruza 
Otaño, a highly conservative – if not reactionary – architect from Spain, whose 
better- known older brother Pedro had designed the most infamous of all of Gen-
eralissimo Franco’s architectural projects, the monument in the ‘Valley of the 
Fallen’ (Valle de los Caìdos), which to this day triggers outrage and disgust from 
the descendants of Franco’s republican victims.8 For some unknown reason, the 
Pakistanis believed Muguruza to be particularly adept at creating a modernist/
Islamic synthesis. His designs were eventually rejected, largely at the behest of 
Pakistani professional architects such as the modernist Mehdi Ali Mirza, then 
working for the Ministry of Health and Works. Mirza himself thought Muguru-
za’s plans ‘mediocre’ with ‘elevations of buildings very poor and unimaginative, 
and too domestic in scale’,9 while his superior, the Ministerial Secretary G. 
Mueenuddin attacked Muguruza’s engagement with Pakistani identity from an 
altogether more culturalist angle:
the essential and undefinable spirit of Islamic architecture is not contained 
in domes, arches or minarets and [. . .] that spirit has not been caught in the 
designs under consideration. The arches and domes provided in the plan do 
not belong to any well marked period of Islamic architecture in this subcon-
tinent and clash with the rest of the design. [The minaret] adorned with a 
cone derived from Mecca . . . does not conform to any style known in this 
country [and] looks back not forward.10
Mueenuddin’s intervention summed up the key questions that still haunt Paki-
stani architects today, and also addressed basic fissures in official Pakistani state 
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ideology: how historically, and by implication geographically rooted, could a 
new Pakistani architectural style be? To what extent was the creation of Pakistan 
a turning away from its subcontinental legacy, and if it was, where could altern-
ative inspirations for what it meant to be Muslim be derived? Faced with a lack 
of immediate alternatives to Muguruza’s proposal, the Cabinet capitulated in the 
face of such questions and advocated, certainly more out of despair than by 
design, a radical break between local religious tradition and a transnational mod-
ernist future:
It was better to give up the idea of introducing Islamic features and to have 
strictly modern architecture. The latter would be cheaper and quicker. 
Besides, we could not improve upon what had been produced in the Islamic 
period with the result that we would get only second rate buildings from the 
architectural point of view.11
 In short, if ‘Islamic’ could not be adequately defined to be easily representa-
ble, then ‘modernity’ could at least, and that was what the state should endorse. 
This spirit was not shared universally among the bureaucrats that mattered, 
however. The cabinet records on the reconstruction of the capital contain a 
revealing note by Lalshah Bokhari, a member of the Pakistani legation to Syria, 
who wrote to cabinet secretary Aziz Ahmed in 1955 that he was ‘greatly struck 
by [the] artistic design of Syrian Parliament House’ which to his eyes appeared 
to be both modern and ‘exclusively Islamic’.12 In a similar spirit, it was soon 
decided to try yet another foreign architect with ‘experience of designing modern 
buildings but giving them an Islamic touch’.13 This time it was the German- born 
K. Heinz, who had designed the United Provinces Assembly building in 
Lucknow before partition – a particularly ornate example of late colonial archi-
tecture. He was interviewed by a cabinet subcommittee soon afterwards and 
offered what he saw as a trans- historical and non- territorial – and consequently 
next- to-meaningless – definition of Islamic architecture:
[The] Islamic concept consisted of clean lines, a geometrical pattern, an 
orderliness in detail and a perfection in proportion so that the various parts 
of a building were in an exact mathematical relation to its centre which is 
usually a courtyard.
The assembled ministers and bureaucrats felt that this was the right approach but 
that Heinz was not famous enough to be entrusted with a major commission.14 
He eventually got to design the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi, which 
to the Pakistani architectural establishment (and to Z.A. Bhutto) turned out to be 
so embarrassingly ugly that its huge domes would be better covered by giant 
cardboard boxes (Khwaja 1998: 60–61).
 At around the same time the future creator of Islamabad, Constantinos Doxi-
adis, from Greece, made his first attempt at involvement in the capital city 
project. He had come to Pakistan in 1954 to advise the Planning Board on the 
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drafting of the First Five Year Plan, and was looking for potential follow- on projects 
for the time after this first task was completed.15 Demonstrating the new importance 
of development and development funding, Doxiadis approached the then Prime 
Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali in 1955 and proposed that Ford Foundation 
funding could be used to finance at least the planning of a ‘New Karachi’.16 As it 
happens, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali had been in charge of the Finance Ministry 
earlier in his career, and was directly responsible for shelving the MRVP plan on 
financial grounds. Doxiadis’s intervention apparently overcame some of Chaudhry’s 
concerns, as the capital city project was once again opened to another round of inter-
national bids, underwritten by Ford. While Doxiadis had hoped that he, as a previous 
Ford Foundation beneficiary, would naturally be in an advantageous position to 
secure the project, he was in fact ignored by the Pakistani bureaucrats in charge, 
who set their sights much higher. Their preferred bid was a cooperation between 
Michel Ecochard, a Frenchman with prior experience in Pakistan itself and a reputa-
tion for dealing sensitively with Muslim architecture in a modern setting, and the 
high priest of twentieth- century modernism, Le Corbusier himself. The other names 
on the shortlist were equally impressive: Luckmann- Pereira from the United States, 
Raglan- Squire from the UK, and even the creators of Brasilia, Niemeyer and 
Costa.17 For a brief moment it seemed the pendulum had once again swung to the 
opposite end of the artistic spectrum, to a complete endorsement of international 
modernism. But after Chaudhry’s resignation and another round of revolving- door 
cabinet reshuffles, it never came to pass. Unlike Heinz and Muguruza, who were at 
least able to present concrete plans to the Pakistani leadership, none of the short-
listed greats were even invited to Karachi to propose actual designs.
 Meanwhile, a much more public debate about national architecture in Karachi 
demonstrated just how far such proposals had strayed from conservative mass 
taste. The project in question was a mausoleum (mazar) for Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah, which is the only national monument from the old Karachi Federal 
Capital project that was actually built (Khwaja 1998: 63–66). In order to secure 
an internationally outstanding piece of architecture, bureaucrats under strong 
influence from professional architects decided to assemble a jury of foreign 
luminaries and then to invite bids from around the world. The process produced 
a clear winner – a highly modernist design with a hyperbolic paraboloid at its 
centre, proposed by the British company Raglan Squire, but conceived by the 
aforementioned Pakistani architect Mehdi Ali Mirza. The proposal immediately 
attracted a barrage of criticism in the letter pages of Dawn and other newspapers, 
accusing the architects of being out of touch with popular opinion and being un- 
Islamic. Eventually, Jinnah’s surviving sister (and later unsuccessful presidential 
candidate) Fatima was drawn into the debate and, by power of her personal 
authority and closeness to the Qaid- e Azam, vetoed Mirza’s proposal. Instead, 
the Bombay architect Yahya Merchant was invited to draw up the design that 
was eventually built, as he had allegedly been involved in building the Jinnah 
residence in Bombay in the 1930s. His combination of a dome and arches with a 
general late- colonial flavour clearly satisfied middle- class taste better than an 
Islamicate version of international modernism.
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The context: Islam and middle- class housing
The selection of men like Heinz and Muguruza, and the subsequent mazar con-
troversy, were indicative of where the gravity of taste among leading sections of 
the Pakistani elite lay at the time; conservative solutions were preferred, and 
echoes from the colonial period were not considered particularly problematic as 
long as they could be hidden behind some international glamour. Apart from 
some generalities, it was far from clear what made a new architecture ‘Islamic’, 
and apart from an almost compulsive need to have this aspect present in some 
form or other, there were no firm preferences. Significantly, it was only when it 
came to official buildings of state that the question of how to represent an 
Islamic modernity in architecture really excited tempers. As far as the domestic 
architecture of the affluent and moderately affluent ‘middle classes’ was con-
cerned, there was even less of a break between the colonial and postcolonial, and 
usually not even any particular preoccupation with a particular ‘Pakistani’ 
aesthetic.
 The prevailing tastes were particularly visible in the new middle- class suburbs 
that sprang up in most cities following partition. Many moderately well- to-do 
residents of these spaces simply designed their own houses without reference to 
any trained architect at all. When asked about the shape of their first home after 
independence in Gulberg – a suburb in the Punjab capital of Lahore – an 
informant from a typical middle- class family picked up a sheet of paper and 
drew a single- storey bungalow shielded by a perimeter wall, with a veranda at 
the back and three rooms. This is how she had herself drawn up a plan for the 
house back in the 1950s, without much attention to style beyond climatic and 
practical issues, and confident that local builders usually knew what to do. 
Further, the simple plan could be easily extended when the prices for cement and 
other building materials became less exorbitant than they had been for much of 
the 1940s and 1950s. The representation of any self- conscious ideology or iden-
tity was certainly not a main consideration, even if the woman and her family 
had been politically active and committed Pakistani nationalists.18
 An ever- present reference point for home- made structures of this kind was 
colonial government housing, which constituted a whole catalogue of standard 
designs that were carefully calibrated according to a civil servant’s status and 
income, but in all other respects remained unconcerned with representing any 
cultural or religious inheritance. For a different source of inspiration, one could 
look at booklets provided by Pakistan’s largest cement producer, Dalmia, which 
remained Indian- owned until well into the 1960s – a striking anomaly – and 
which imported these booklets from across the border.19 They principally con-
tained scarcely updated versions of the kind of colonial art deco that had been 
used across the subcontinent for decades; and as designs produced in India, they 
were unlikely to provide much inspiration for a self- consciously Pakistani archi-
tectural style.20
 The better- off new residents of such suburbs did sometimes involve archi-
tects. A few patronised the leading figures among Pakistan’s first generation of 
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academically trained architects, men like Mazhar ul- Islam in Dhaka and Mehdi 
Ali Mirza in Karachi, who certainly attempted to make a statement about their 
nation’s relationship with modernity. However, they only ever built houses for a 
small number of very rich clients. The industrialist Syed Babar Ali (who in the 
1950s acted as C.A. Doxiadis’s local partner) had a residence designed by Mirza, 
for instance, which remains an iconic example of Pakistani modernism today. 
Mazhar ul- Islam, meanwhile, was given a relatively free hand to build as he 
liked in East Pakistan, in his own estimation because the Karachi government, in 
its obtuse arrogance towards anything Bengali, did not believe that matters of 
Islamic identity mattered very much there.21 As far as West Pakistani establish-
ment taste was concerned, however, other figures must be examined to get a 
sense of prevailing tastes.
 A good indication was the work of Chishti Brothers, the only commercially 
successful firm of architects in Lahore and the only one that had been run by 
Muslims prior to partition.22 It did not matter that the two main partners, Moinud-
din Chishti and Naqi Raza Chishti, were in fact not architects with academic 
qualifications at all, but draughtsmen who had, after an aborted career as furni-
ture designers, been trained (and risen to senior positions) on the New Delhi 
project under Baker and Lutyens. The brothers soon became trendsetters of new 
suburban housing. Their designs attempted to mark a conscious shift from the 
colonial styles of the nineteenth century, but like so many others they could 
express a ‘post- colonial’ identity only through the more or less wholesale 
adaptation of 1930s metropolitan art deco. Curved fronts, pillars and some dis-
crete elements of sculpted decorations soon became the norm for most of their 
designs. Although Moinuddin Chishti at some point in the late 1950s published a 
booklet entitled Homes of the Day for the Punjab Religious Book Society, it is 
hard to detect much reference to specifically Islamic building traditions in the 
pre- eminent Chishti Brothers style. This did not mean they did not care about 
such matters in different contexts, however. Moinuddin Chishti later raised his 
voice against Doxiadis and other foreign architects involved in the Islamabad 
project because he felt that, as non- Muslims, they did not have the ability to ade-
quately express Pakistan’s religious sensibility.23 But when forced to address the 
question of how a Pakistani identity could be translated into architecture himself 
– after winning a commission to design the new Dacca High Court in the 1960s 
(present Supreme Court of Bangladesh) – Moinuddin Chishti had to fall back on 
his New Delhi experience. His solution of an Islamic- modernist synthesis com-
bining domes and colonnades appears as a throwback to the likes of Heinz and 
Muguruza.
Korangi: city of Muslims – city of development
Having for a few years been overshadowed by other issues – such as the fate of 
Pakistan’s first constitution, the rapid degeneration of its economy and the dis-
integration of parliamentary authority – the capital city debate was dramatically 
revived by General Ayub Khan’s 1959 decision to appoint a Federal Capital 
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Commission with the authority to reconsider both the location and shape of the 
seat of government from scratch.24 Following colonial- era convictions about the 
need to keep administration as far away as possible from all other aspects of 
national life, the commission rubber- stamped one of Ayub’s own ideas, already 
mooted earlier in the decade: the need to relocate the new capital city to a site 
close to Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi in the north of the country.25 
The formation of ‘Islamabad’ – as the new city came to be known – lies outside 
the purview of this chapter, but a few observations, elaborated in greater detail 
elsewhere (Daechsel 2012),26 are useful for the larger argument.
 In important respects, the overall story of development and identity in Islama-
bad resembled what had happened in Karachi in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
As before, a foreign consultant, the aforementioned Constantinos Doxiadis, was 
hired to plan a city, and leaving aside several important differences, his vision 
resembled the ill- fated Merz Rendel Vatten proposals for Karachi in its funda-
mental aim: it sought to create a space that was both Muslim and modern by 
virtue of the way it was planned. While much in the older Karachi plan had been 
grand but insubstantial, Doxiadis had much more time to think through the iden-
tity content of his proposals, and in working on ‘virgin’ territory, also much 
greater chances to realise his vision. Islamabad was built largely according to his 
provisions. But as had been the case in Karachi, the Pakistani establishment was 
not really interested in any attempt to represent a possible fusion of Islam and 
modernity, of religion and development, in the way a city as a whole was 
designed. As in the days of Heinz and Muguruza, bureaucrats continued to 
believe that it was architectural style rather than city planning where such ques-
tions were to be resolved; and as before, they were unable to agree what exactly 
this kind of stylistic fusion should entail. While Doxiadis himself was increas-
ingly sidelined from the Islamabad project, a host of foreign star architects, from 
Walter Gropius and Kenzo Tange to Louis Kahn and Arne Jacobsen, were 
invited to enter competitions for landmark buildings, only to stand publicly 
accused of not being properly ‘Islamic’ for one reason or another. Many chose to 
quit at this point, while others had to enter into often unworkable compromise 
solutions (Khwaja 1998: 109–131, Mumtaz 1999).
 The decision to shift the capital was taken in tandem with the commission of 
a parallel, and in many ways no less ambitious project in Karachi itself: the 
Korangi Pilot project, intended to resolve the ongoing housing crisis for poor 
refugees from India who continued to pour into Pakistan even a decade after par-
tition. Korangi is significant in this argument for two reasons: first, it was not 
just an urban rehabilitation project, but one invested with symbolic significance. 
Nationalist discourse had made the muhajirs – Urdu- speaking migrants from 
Northern and Central India – into a particularly politically significant category of 
people. They had left the territory of their neighbouring arch- enemy because of 
ongoing persecution and discrimination, and come to Pakistan to settle and be 
protected. Building an entire city for their benefit was not simply a way of 
dealing with irregular construction and urban degeneration in Karachi, it was 
also an act that symbolised what Pakistan as a national project was all about. 
76  M. Daechsel
Second, Korangi was to a greater extent than the older ‘New Karachi’ proposals, 
or even Islamabad, a city of development. It was funded by the combined efforts 
of the Ford Foundation and the newly established USAID, and closely watched 
by the international development community. The designer behind the project 
was once again Doxiadis, self- consciously an urbanist of development and 
closely connected to pro- western development functionaries, who was hired spe-
cifically to lend an international developmental credibility to Ayub’s newly 
installed regime (Daechsel 2013: 93).
 The history of the project has been described in detail elsewhere, but a broad 
outline is useful for the purpose of this chapter (Ansari 2005, Daechsel 2011b: 
131–157). Korangi was announced in late autumn 1958, only a few weeks after 
the military takeover itself, and heralded as the most concentrated effort to solve 
the problem of uncontrolled urban growth that Pakistan had ever seen. Fifteen 
thousand new housing units were to be constructed within six months; in the first 
instance for slum dwellers, who were to be resettled from existing refugee camps 
and kacha- abadis in the city centre. In the long run, the establishment of a 
socially inclusive and self- sufficient township for half a million inhabitants was 
envisioned, complete with urban facilities and an adjacent industrial zone. In an 
effort that has since passed into the mythology of military efficiency, the Minis-
try for Reconstruction and Refugee Rehabilitation under General Azam Khan 
kept its promise: the first 15,000 housing units were in fact completed one month 
ahead of schedule, and by December 1959 the first residents were allotted their 
new homes with a great deal of official propaganda. Despite its great visible 
impact – a sea of nicely ordered rows of low- cost houses stretching to the 
horizon – the shortcomings of the project soon became obvious. Houses had 
been constructed very quickly, while all other aspects of the project lagged far 
behind; in the first instance, there was no proper road connection with Karachi 
itself and very little public transport. Employment opportunities were meagre as 
the industrial zone only began to develop several years after the bulk of the 
inhabitants had already been settled, thus leaving many of the new inhabitants 
jobless or with substantially increased costs of commuting. Furthermore, there 
was no storm- water drainage, only a rudimentary water supply, and no electri-
city. Even while the housing stock itself continued to be showcased, it became 
clear that Korangi would never work as the satellite town it was planned to be. 
Having never been particularly enthusiastic about the project beyond the initial 
phase, the regime decided to stop further funding for it in 1964, placing the 
blame for failure on the foreign consultants who had planned and executed it.
 Although it was almost certainly only a secondary consideration in giving 
him the Korangi job as far as the Pakistani regime was concerned (those close 
connections with pro- development circles in Washington mattered most), Doxi-
adis himself attached great importance to cultural sensitivity in his planning 
designs. As a commercial development consultant, he had to showcase a distinc-
tive global profile that would set him apart from contemporaries such as Le Cor-
busier, who were often accused of being too expensive and not paying due 
regard to local climatic or cultural requirements (Bromley 2003: 316–340), 
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points that were directly taken up by Doxiadis in his critical assessment of the 
Chandigarh project, for instance.27 In contrast, Korangi (and later also ‘Islama-
bad’) was to be a city built with the specific needs of Pakistani Muslims in mind. 
Throughout his work and in line with own trademark doctrine of ‘Ekistics’, Dox-
iadis spent considerable time on historical and cultural research, and on travel-
ling the countries he was meant to serve. Over his years in Pakistan before 1958 
he had produced a corpus of writings and photographic documentation address-
ing the character of Pakistani folk architecture, its difference from both colonial 
and ‘Hindu’ architecture, and the distinct needs of regional Muslim identities.28 
However, a much more substantial contribution to his understanding of ‘Muslim 
needs’ came from outside South Asia. Doxiadis Associates had also gained a 
bonanza of large commissions in Iraq, then still under the Hashemite monarchy 
eager to control an increasingly hostile population with the help of compre-
hensive urban reconstruction. In consultation with Egyptian architect and cham-
pion of vernacular styles Hasan Fathy, Doxiadis had built up a veritable archive 
of the cultural and physical living environment in the country, covering in depth 
the development of local building norms since ancient antiquity and the differ-
ence between various local styles. The objective was to be able to synthesise a 
comprehensive blueprint for new Muslim urban communities from this material 
which could then be mass- produced with prefabricated parts, and despite their 
cheapness and artificiality, provide a culturally satisfying life to their inhabitants 
(Pyla 2007: 28–39).
 Doxiadis’s Korangi plan was meant to be a showcase for mass housing in 
Muslim environments in general: when he designed the modest one- and two- 
room houses for erstwhile slum dwellers, Doxiadis made constant reference to 
the needs of privacy, gender separation and sanitary norms. He added asbestos 
wind- catchers to the roofs in order to harness the Karachi sea breeze for cooling 
and to acknowledge a stylistic element that he had seen both in Sindh and Iraq 
and therefore understood as characteristically Muslim. Houses were to be 
grouped together around small and enclosed gossip squares to simulate the life 
of the muhallah and enable women to interact in a semi- private space. Muhal-
lahs were to be clustered around small civic centres where there would be a 
covered market area, a mosque, schools and – another Muslim characteristic that 
he had closely observed and much commented on in his Iraq material – a tea or 
coffee house where men could gather after work and discuss politics. In making 
a virtue of his inability to deliver more extensive sanitary facilities in each home, 
there was also to be a communal bath, which in Doxiadis’s eyes again repres-
ented an established institution of Islamic communal life.29
 To Doxiadis there was actually no contradiction between Islam and develop-
ment once Islam itself had been made intelligible as a set of sociological indic-
ators that resembled other parts of development discourse. Islam to the expert 
was not about personal belief, or even about collective solidarity, but about 
objectively definable and quantifiable ‘needs’. Just as planners would have to 
account for particularities of local terrain and climate, they would also have to 
accommodate religious ‘variables’ in their work. Doxiadis’s ‘developmental’ 
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Islam was in essence ‘flat’. It was ahistorical in the sense that although its 
genesis over time could be easily reconstructed, no further changes were 
expected within the time frame for which planning was made; and it was apoliti-
cal, in the sense that these religious ‘needs’ simply existed and required to be 
satisfied but were not seen as embedded in a complex and dynamic field of social 
conflict and power.
 As it happened, this developmental Islam satisfied neither Korangi’s Pakistani 
sponsors nor the first residents of the township. Ayub’s regime had no problem 
with a language based on social needs as depoliticised descriptors of underdevel-
opment requiring a technocratic solution as such, but they did not see this language 
as the appropriate place to make statements about the nation’s religious distinctive-
ness and ambition. Unsurprisingly, Doxiadis’s religious prescriptions were not 
emphasised in public propaganda material about Korangi, and apart from some 
minor episodes of half- hearted engagement with his way of understanding religion, 
did not agitate the official mindset. If anything, some bureaucrats found Doxiadis’s 
attempts to preserve tradition in living space at best patronising and backward- 
looking, and at worst positively misguided (Daechsel 2011a). The residents of 
Korangi similarly rejected many aspects of Doxiadis’s blueprint for a synthetic 
Muslim urban community, sometimes out of sheer economic necessity and some-
times because their own experiences in living communities set different cultural 
requirements. The biggest casualties in the Korangi plan were the public and semi- 
public spaces that Doxiadis had so carefully designed. Even several years after the 
new township was settled, most of the shops in the central market areas proved 
impossible to allot, while restaurants and smaller commercial concerns began to 
thrive in backstreets and residential properties. The proposed civic centres 
remained desolate and underused, while smaller public spaces in the mohallahs 
themselves were either encroached upon by neighbouring houses or filled with 
unauthorised religious structures (Daechsel 2011a).
 Particularly illustrative of the clash of a synthetic and lived urban community 
was the issue of mosques. Doxiadis and Fathy had tried to establish on the basis 
of statistical calculations what the basic requirements of mosque space were, 
much in the same way as they calculated the width of roads or the number of 
shops in the market place.30 These calculations produced an, on its own terms, 
perfectly reasonable provision to build one mosque for every mohalla cluster, for 
which space was then provided in the master plan and building designs drawn 
up. The residents of Korangi, in contrast, began almost immediately to claim 
open spaces elsewhere as open prayer grounds, then began to collect money 
from the local community and sometimes from notables in the city and soon 
erected unauthorised mosque structures, often in much closer proximity to each 
other than the plan provided. This led to heated disputes not only between local 
residents and the representatives of DA or the Karachi Development Authority 
responsible for the execution of the master plan, but also to sectarian clashes 
between different groups of residents. Sunnis tried to have the unauthorised 
structures erected by Shiʿas pulled down on grounds of illegality or noise pollu-
tion, and vice versa (Daechsel 2011a). The precedent of legalising unauthorised 
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mosques, through which the local authorities tried to calm the situation, was 
often translated into a language of competitive community entitlement, which 
quickly drew in ‘community leaders’ from a range of religious factions.31
 The battle over mosques quickly translated into some form of surrogate reli-
gious politics – ironically the only form of politics that could somewhat legiti-
mately be carried out under the straightjacket of military rule – which was later 
fused with economic grievances in a series of violent attacks and rent strikes.32 
What Doxiadis and Fathy had so spectacularly failed to appreciate was not only 
the highly sectarian nature of Pakistani society – far more intricate than the 
Sunni–Shiʿa division, for which hasty readjustments were made to the master 
plan – but also the fact that for the new residents of Korangi, religion was far 
more than an objective need that had to be satisfied in the same way as their 
need for shelter and nutrition. Islam provided them with a political language to 
articulate their demands for recognition. More importantly, it was the all- 
important glue that enabled them to bond together as communities, which in 
both the inner- city slums and in the new wastelands of Korangi itself was a pre-
condition for survival. The collective effort of erecting mosques was a way for 
these communities to claim parts of Korangi as their own, to put the stamp of 
their own agency on a pre- designed space. While official community activities 
and life in official civic spaces, assiduously planned by Doxiadis in collaboration 
with local ‘social workers’, never really took off, it was only in these much 
smaller networks that a sense of solidarity could be maintained.
Islam, urban development and the Pakistani state: some 
conclusions
Subsequent efforts to bring together Islam and development in ‘official Karachi’ 
– first in the ever- changing incarnations of the federal capital project, later in the 
Korangi satellite town scheme – were never entirely able to resolve the inherent 
contradictions between the two ideological pulls. Being unable to face the 
problem on its own, the Pakistani state elite brought in a roll- call of foreign 
development consultants and architects to suggest solutions – from the urban 
engineers of Merz Rendel Vatten to the Catholic aesthete Muguruza, and from 
modernist grand master Le Corbusier to development urbanist Doxiadis. But 
rather than resolving the problem, their involvement made matters even more 
intractable, only serving to externalise and displace the inherent contradiction 
between Islam and development into a confrontation between foreign consult-
ants and representatives of the Pakistani state.
 The main problem – how Pakistan could defend its sense of religious distinc-
tiveness while also copying enough from western experiences of modernisation 
to achieve rapid catch- up and prosperity – was already recognised in the MRVP 
‘Master Plan’ for Karachi. But the contradiction was briefly revealed only to be 
immediately hidden again behind a thick veneer of developmental optimism and 
religious rhetoric that suggested that a resolution was easily possible – even 
natural – without actually providing any sense of what this solution should entail 
80  M. Daechsel
in practical terms. Ten years later, at a time when development discourse itself 
had become far more sophisticated, and with a great deal more time and under-
lying research at his disposal, Constantinos Doxiadis came much closer to an 
actual ‘solution’ to the problem of Islam and development.
 What Doxiadis proposed was a dual move: he first operationalised ‘Islam’ in 
terms of a set of variables, of specific settlement ‘needs’ which allowed religion to 
be slotted into the conceptual universe of development discourse; second, he pro-
posed to bring religious identity and ‘modernity’ together through a careful separa-
tion of spatial scales, a solution that closely resembled what religious reformers 
and colonial notables across South Asia and the Muslim world had argued since 
the late nineteenth century.33 While religious identity was to be nurtured in the 
more intimate spaces of life – the ‘inner’ world of women and children, the home 
and the neighbourhood – it was in the ‘outside’ world that modernity should be 
allowed to reign, in the predominantly ‘male’ sphere of work, administration and 
commerce.34 In Doxiadis’s eyes, a truly modern and Muslim city was one where 
most public spaces conformed to the norms of international modernism, while 
most private spaces could remain as traditional as necessary, even if this sense of 
tradition was, in his mind, a question of everyday religious functionality more than 
making religiously inspired stylistic statements.
 Strikingly, this spatial solution to the problem was almost exactly the opposite 
of what Pakistani policy makers and the general public had in mind. Although 
Doxiadis was duly hired to design and build Korangi and Islamabad according to 
his principles, his Pakistani patrons never changed their longstanding belief that 
it should be in the most public spaces – buildings of state – that the most con-
spicuous display of a ‘religious’ identity should take place. Meanwhile it was the 
private spaces – housing colonies for the poor, middle- class residencies – that a 
representation of religion was least needed. This was reflected even at the grass- 
roots level. To Doxiadis’s consternation, Korangi residents were to bring the 
outside world of work and commerce literally into their living rooms, while 
externalising their religious identity in the conspicuous construction of mosques.
 In the last instance, the problem of Islam and development was a problem of 
the nature and character of the Pakistani state itself. The fact that the Pakistani 
bureaucracy did not see much need to move beyond colonial ideals of city plan-
ning throughout the decade, and that Ayub’s junta had little use for Doxiadis’s 
provisions of Islamic community facilities, did not demonstrate that they thought 
religion did not matter to Pakistan, only that religion as it was actually lived on a 
daily basis could be safely left in the hands of ordinary Pakistanis. Just as there 
was no need for even a devout architect like Chishti to make a statement about 
Islam in the houses he designed for private citizens – and just as these citizens 
themselves could be comfortably observant Muslims while living in a latter- day 
version of colonial art deco – there was no need for a state of Muslims to look 
after Muslim community facilities. Such matters could literally be left to ‘the 
community’. It was development thought, as exemplified by Doxiadis, that actu-
ally suggested that these matters should be within the purview of official inter-
vention, that the state should somehow be worried that the Muslim citizens of 
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Pakistan could not properly look after their religious needs themselves. The rep-
lication of a welfare state under the guise of development would not only mean 
an increase in services to the people, it would also make this state more inclined 
to police its ‘ideological boundaries’, to use the infamous phrase coined by a 
later military dictatorship.
 The fact that the Pakistani state found it largely impossible to find a success-
ful representation of its Islamic identity and modern aspirations in official archi-
tecture and city planning throughout the 1950s (and arguably also in the 1960s) 
was not simply a failure. It also marked an ongoing respect for the political 
nature of religious identity as something that could never be exhaustively 
described as a mere variable, a mere set of needs, but was always open to con-
testation, differences of opinion and relationships of power, whether between 
bureaucrats who disagreed about domes and minarets, between foreign consult-
ants and nationalists eager to preserve Pakistan’s cultural autonomy, or in the 
vying for space between different groups of Korangi residents. Not being able to 
bring together Islam and development was perhaps the best representation of 
what their relationship should be like.
Notes
 1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at ‘The Long 1950s’, International 
Conference at the Centre for Social Science Studies Calcutta (CSSSC) in 2008. I am 
grateful for comments by Keya Dasgupta, Rajarshi Dasgupta and Janaki Nair as well 
as other conference participants. Research for this chapter has been funded by a 
British Academy Small Research Grant and a travel bursary from the Carnegie 
Endowment for Scottish Universities. I am also grateful for the support I have 
received over the years from Panagiota Pavlidou at the Constantinos Doxiadis 
Archive, Athens.
 2 For a comprehensive assessment of Doxiadis in Pakistan, see my forthcoming mono-
graph Daechsel (2013).
 3 The ongoing debate over the role of religion in 1950s Pakistan has been covered in 
many publications; for instance Rehman (1982), Munir (1980), Shaikh (2009).
 4 For Karachi’s recent architectural history see Khuhro (1997: 95–112), Hasan (1997: 
171–196, 1999), Cheema (2007).
 5 It was never officially endorsed and was eventually published as Merz Rendel Vatten 
(Pakistan) et al. (1951).
 6 National Documentation Centre Islamabad (hence NDC): Case 564/78/48, Appoint-
ment of Messrs. Merz Rendel Vatten as Consulting Engineers to Government of Paki-
stan, 27 October 1948, Records of Cabinet Meetings held during the year 1948, Film 
1405, p. 2567. National Archive of Bangladesh: File 3A-72/48 Appointment of con-
sulting engineer. . . . MRVP, 20 January 1949. Sl1, Commerce and Industry proceed-
ings, Bundle 6.
 7 This was actually explicitly rejected by MRVP (Merz Rendel Vatten (Pakistan) et al. 
1951: 83).
 8 See http://museodelprado.es/enciclopedia/enciclopedia- on-line/voz/muguruza- otano-
jose- maria [accessed 10 October 2010].
 9 NDC: Cabinet Records, File 385/CF/48 Land Control – Capital of the Federation, 
Memorandum (25 March 1952).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.; Minutes Cabinet Meeting (23 July 1952).
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12 NDC: Cabinet Records, File 232/CF/47 II, Site for the Federal Capital, Letter Bokhari 
(12 September 1955).
13 NDC: Cabinet Records, File 385/CF/48 Land Control – Capital of the Federation, 
Minutes Cabinet Subcommittee (30 October 1952).
14 Ibid.
15 For the full back- story of his engagement in Pakistan, see Daechsel (2013).
16 Constantinos A. Doxiadis Archive, Athens (hence CADA): Pakistan Vol. 6, pp. 350 ff.
17 NDC: Cabinet Papers, File 213/CF/47 Federal Capital, Progress Report 1 August 
1956; also (same file) Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 19 December 1956; Briefing paper 
Ministry of Health and Works.
18 Interview, Fatima Kaniz Yusuf, Islamabad (1 December 2007).
19 Interview, Mehmood Alam, Managing Director ACC, later Pakistan State Cement, 
Lahore (5 November 2007).
20 A yet- unpublished analysis of this literature is offered by McGowan (2012).
21 Interview, Mazharul Islam, Dhaka (August 2007).
22 Interview, Parvaiz Chishti, Lahore (2 November 2007).
23 Letter to Pakistan Times, transcribed without date and attached to CADA: R- PAK LU 
12, Pak Vol. 202, Housing and Settlements Agency, 1964.
24 CADA: Government of Pakistan, unpublished ‘Report on the Location of the Federal 
Capital of Pakistan’.
25 NDC: File 232/CF/47 II, Minutes of Cabinet Meetings, 14 April and 2 July 1955.
26 For a more extensive discussion of the project in terms of architecture see Mahsud 
(2008). For the political negotiations from an official perspective, see Yakas (2001).
27 CADA: India Vol. 3, Notes pp. 54, 104.
28 CADA: Report Dox 21, Pakistan Diary, Pak Vol. 3.
29 For an overview of these facilities see CADA: Government of Pakistan – Ministry of 
Rehabilitation, National Housing and Settlements Agency: The Korangi Township in 
Karachi: special issue on the occasion of the visit to Pakistan of the President of the 
United States of America Dwight D. Eisenhower, Archive File 25310.
30 CADA: C- PKH 1865 13/10/1960, Vol. 71; Islamabad Development Agency Library: 
Dox PA 97 (26/02/1961) ‘Islamabad: Community Buildings for Sector G6’.
31 CADA: J.A. Khan, ‘Social Needs in Neighbourhood Planning’, unpublished disserta-
tion, Athens Institute of Ekistics, 1961.
32 CADA: ‘Demand and Collection in Korangi (Arif )’ C- PKH 5047 13/10/1962. 
ArchiveFile 17928.
33 Sir Sayid Ahmad Khan, leading Muslim reformer of the nineteenth century, for 
instance, advocated education outside the home and in western scientific disciplines 
for boys, but emphatically not for girls (Lambert- Hurley 2006: 22–23). For a general 
statement of this division as a feature of Indian nationalism, see Chatterjee (1993).
34 CADA: C.A. Doxiadis, ‘The Arab Metropolis’, lecture delivered at seminar ‘The New 
Metropolis in the Arab World’, Congress of Cultural Freedom, Cairo 1960; General 
reports R- GA-211.
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6 Slums and the global city
Housing plans in Dharavi, Mumbai
Roma Chatterji
Since the 1990s there has been a renewed emphasis in India on megacities such 
as Mumbai as symbols of economic growth – as organisational nodes in the 
global economy. Slums such as Dharavi, once located on the urban fringe, now 
constitute the residence of more than 50 per cent of Mumbai’s population and 
are becoming the focus of attention in the ‘new’ developmental discourse which 
brings terms such as participatory governance, public–private partnership for 
inclusive growth, social capital and local level entrepreneurship to the fore. 
Media representations of slums seem to have undergone a dramatic change over 
the years, from earlier representations which described them as spaces of urban 
disintegration where the state had abandoned its civic responsibility, to current 
descriptions that talk about entrepreneurial slums and economic success stories. 
This chapter argues that these shifts in representation are tied to changes in the 
way in which the state is perceived: from initially being an ‘agent of develop-
ment’, it is now commonly seen as an ‘enabler’ whose role is to coordinate the 
activities of other administrative and financial bodies. To this end, this chapter 
makes use of ethnography based on research on housing issues in Dharavi since 
the 1980s.
Dharavi: an entrepreneurial slum
Spread over 216.51 hectares, with a population that varies between 600,000 and 
one million people depending on how the boundaries of this area are drawn, 
Dharavi is the largest slum in Asia, if not the world.1 Yet, this is not the only 
reason why Dharavi is so widely known. In recent years it has become famous 
as an ‘entrepreneurial slum’, producing goods that are exported all over the 
world, with an annual turnover of approximately US$600 million.2 Most produc-
tion units are very small and belong to what is known in India as the ‘informal 
sector’, as they are located in residential areas, often within dwelling sites, and 
have non- legal status. Slum redevelopment programmes and low- cost housing 
schemes have had a direct impact on the production process and on the economic 
contribution that Dharavi makes to the city as a whole. It is, however, only 
recently that Dharavi’s contribution to the economy has been acknowledged, at a 
time when the state is withdrawing from its role as an agent of development in 
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the society at large under pressure from neo- liberal reform policies. Non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) and community- based organisations 
(CBOs) first began to mobilise resources around slum development issues in the 
1980s, in the context of social movements for development and civil rights. They 
have now become even more important as they can provide crucial services to 
marginal populations that the state is no longer willing to. In fact, they have 
taken over many of the concrete developmental activities that were once the 
responsibility of the state.
 Until the late nineteenth century, Dharavi was an island inhabited by Kohli fish-
erfolk. However, the marshy land around the island then filled up, new migrants 
from Gujarat and Maharashtra began to move to Dharavi and Tamil migrants 
arrived to man the tanneries that were being set up. Some of the earliest migrant 
communities to have settled there are Kumhars (potters) from Gujarat, leather- 
working castes like the Charmakars, Dhors and Mahars from other parts of Mahar-
ashtra and Tamil Nadu, and artisans from Uttar Pradesh who set up industries 
dealing in ready- made garments, shoes, bags and metal work. Today Dharavi is 
known for its garment and leather industries. It also has a flourishing recycling 
business that processes recyclable waste from other parts of Mumbai. This chapter 
is not so much concerned with the activities that have given Dharavi its extra-
ordinary status as an economic hub, but rather with the documentary practices of 
the state that led first to its public recognition as a slum and then to some of the 
redevelopment schemes that have given it the shape that it has today.
Populations or citizens: slum dwellers and the state
A key term in this analysis is the ‘state’, looked at not so much as an auto-
nomous entity, but rather as a complex of governmental practices among which 
are documentary practices that are crucial in shaping political entities such as 
slum populations. The perspective of this chapter is shaped by Foucault’s work 
on ‘governmentality’, in which he shows that the articulation of power and 
knowledge in the practices of governance leads to the development of technolo-
gies of mapping and enumeration by which the state makes society legible to 
itself (Foucault 1991). In the process, however, official practices also constitute 
new types of social collectivities. Populations generated by these practices of 
enumeration often begin to see themselves as communities with a capability to 
resist the very technologies of power- knowledge that helped bring them into 
existence. Foucault’s argument is posed in the context of the development of the 
liberal democratic state, wherein issues such as welfare and the rights of citizen-
ship configure state–society relationships. Practices of governance assume as a 
corollary that citizens are free and capable of self- reflexivity. Citizenship, then, 
is constituted in the very practices of governance, as concrete rights and duties 
involving both public action and the expression of a particular kind of subject-
ivity (see also Procacci 2001).
 Is it possible to apply this argument to democracies like India, which are riven 
by divisions that severely test the notion of nation state as a political community 
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based on consent? It is sometimes assumed that conditions of extreme social 
inequality make the articulation of citizenship impossible in any meaningful 
sense. Thus Partha Chatterjee (2004) makes a distinction between the domain of 
citizenship that is civil society and political society that is the domain of popula-
tion. Even though governmental practices open up the domain of ‘population’ so 
that it becomes a site for contestation and negotiation, it still remains the domain 
of ‘extra- legal’ practices. Chatterjee calls this the ‘domain of political society’, 
where governments interact with poor people as populations rather than as 
rights- bearing citizens who are full- fledged members of civil society. Govern-
mental policy, in Chatterjee’s view, carries an enormous potential for violence – 
especially when it targets people as populations. This violence is a structural 
feature of governmentality and arises from the ambivalent status of slum dwell-
ers as populations outside the purview of civil society who then become the 
target of state policy and control without the attendant claims on the law.
 While not denying the non- legal dimension of governmental practices as far 
as slum dwellers are concerned, this chapter takes a somewhat contrary view to 
the one described above and regards citizenship as a state that is aspired to by 
many slum dwellers. Housing is one of the sites on which citizenship claims and 
claims to alternate community formation are articulated (Appadurai 2002).
Slums and governmental schemes
To understand the relationship between state and community, this sections 
begins by examining some of the important policies and schemes for slum rede-
velopment in Mumbai, specifically with a view to examining the process of com-
munity formation in Dharavi. Each of the three schemes discussed marks a 
significant moment in the process by which the inhabitants of Dharavi are first 
constituted as a population, which is then transformed into a community attrib-
uted with agentive capacity.
 This section starts with a review document produced by the public housing 
policy, taken from the ‘Draft Report of the Brihan Mumbai Regional Develop-
ment Authority (BMRDA) 1991–2011’. This review document is interesting 
primarily because of the way the government is presented in the discussion of 
each policy – acknowledging major shifts in its self- presentation while trying to 
rationalise these shifts by presenting them within a single frame of reference. 
Thus, the report categorises slum legislation into three types, which are supposed 
to reflect the three different types of roles that the government has taken vis- à-
vis the slum population of Mumbai. These roles are: controller, provider and 
facilitator. This formulation is interesting because it recognises both that govern-
ment legislation is constituted from a specific point of view, but also that this 
can change over time. It seeks to rationalise this by articulating these three roles 
within an evolutionary perspective. Despite claims of chronological develop-
ment, however, specific legislation from all three categories co- exists in 
Bombay; this makes it difficult to interpret slum legislation in terms of a rigid 
chronology. To take just one example, the controller phase of the government is 
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used to describe the various health and safety measures that date back to the 
British period: the rent control legislation of 1948; the municipal regulations 
stipulating use- zones, tenement densities, floor space indices (see note 7) and so 
on that date back to the 1960s; the Urban Land Ceiling Act of 1976; and the 
Coastal Regulations Act of 1991.
 According to the report, The Maharashtra Slum Areas Improvement, Clear-
ance and Redevelopment Act of 1971 marks a radical change in the attitude of 
the government to its slum population. With this act the government recognised 
for the first time that, rather than being a problem that had to be resolved, slums 
could provide an answer to Mumbai’s chronic housing shortage. Thus, the gov-
ernment moves from the role of ‘controller’ to that of ‘facilitator’, providing 
facilities to slum colonies. It is claimed that this change of role is not only 
accompanied by a radical change in viewpoint, but also legitimises that which 
was previously thought to be illegitimate in terms of housing legislation.
 Gautam Chatterji, Chief Executive Officer of Slum Rehabilitation, Maharash-
tra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA), spoke to me about the 
‘unintended consequences’ (to use his own words) of urban land ceilings and 
rent control. He explained that the official restrictions on legitimate land use by 
private owners helped to create an ‘illegal’ nexus between land owners and 
slum- lords so that rental housing came to be taken over by the ‘informal sector’. 
Similarly, the Slum Clearance Act of the 1960s reinforced the power of slum- 
lords by creating an unofficial nexus between them and the government officials 
doing the clearing. The Act, as Chatterji said, did not specify that the rubble pro-
duced when illegal structures were demolished had to be cleared, meaning that 
the rubble could be used to re- construct houses on the same location, and gov-
ernment agents sometimes demolished the same structure over and over again 
and reported each instance as a new demolition.
 It should be obvious that the articulation of new domains of legitimacy is 
accompanied by procedures that must make them legible. Cultures of bureau-
cracy often use procedures of enumeration to accomplish this (Blau 1963). The 
Slum Improvement Programme (SIP) of 1972 that followed the Maharashtra 
Slum Areas Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment Act of 1971 and was 
supposed to provide basic civic amenities like water, electricity, latrines and 
sewage disposal to slum areas could not be implemented properly since no com-
prehensive census of the slum areas of Mumbai existed. Such a census was 
carried out in 1976, but since it was restricted to slums on state government land 
it was thought to be incomplete.3 The SIP is still being implemented in Dharavi 
on land that is owned by the municipal corporation. But it has not been very suc-
cessful because it has failed to make provisions for the day- to-day maintenance 
of the amenities that were provided under it. It is said that the lack of a compre-
hensive and centralised plan for the whole of Dharavi, indeed for the total slum 
population of Mumbai, means that all slum development schemes are imple-
mented in a piecemeal fashion.
 The inability of any state government to formulate such a plan is thought to 
be a consequence of the segmented nature of land ownership in Bombay. 
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However, the SIP was an important step because it recognised for the first time 
that the slum dweller had a legitimate status and had, as Chatterji put it, a right 
to acquire land in slum areas. There is some ambivalence around the term ‘legiti-
mate status’, however. After 1976, residents of the surveyed slums were issued 
photo identity passes and were required to pay a licence fee of 20 rupees, of 
which one rupee was taken as ‘land rent’. For most residents of Dharavi, 
however, it was not clear whether this amount of one rupee was a fine for occu-
pying government land ‘illegally’ or a kind of ‘ground tax’ (bhumi tax). The 
term ‘rent’ circumvents the question of legal status articulated in terms of owner-
ship. Instead, acquisition is thought to refer to right of use and to the responsib-
ility of the state to provide alternative accommodation if it has to displace the 
population residing on its land. This ambivalence is built into the Slum Areas 
Act itself, which empowers the government to declare particular slum colonies 
as unfit for human habitation while simultaneously affirming its objective of 
slum redevelopment for those colonies that are declared safe. Here both roles of 
the government are seen to co- exist; its role as controller is hidden behind the 
fiction of facilitator (Desai 1995).
 The Slum Upgradation Programme (SUP) of 1980 is the next important 
scheme that will be discussed in this chapter, not because it intends to provide a 
chronological account of slum development in Mumbai, but rather to demon-
strate how sites of legitimacy are constantly shifting as each new governmental 
action seeks to redress the unintended consequences of previous schemes. Thus 
the SUP will be discussed together with the SIP and the 1976 slum survey, as 
each one of these schemes has unintended consequences only revealed in the 
implementation stage, which are then taken up by the next ‘improved’ scheme.
 The SIP was instituted as part of the government’s new initiative as facilitator 
after the Slum Areas Act was passed in 1971. However, it only became effective 
after the registration of slum pockets that occurred with the 1976 census. The 
security of land tenure given to slum dwellers upon registration allowed for the 
implementation of concrete developmental schemes that required stable popula-
tions if they were to be effective. With the World Bank- aided SUP, the focus of 
government intervention is seen to shift from the category of population to that 
of community. The SUP required that slum dwellers organise themselves into 
housing cooperatives which could then be given secure tenured rights in land at 
the rate of one rupee a month as mentioned above.
 The importance of the SUP is that tenure was given to a cooperative formed 
by a group of contiguous huts rather than to individuals. This was supposed to 
enable the housing societies to undertake ‘upgradation’ work in their respective 
colonies. This proposal, it was felt, would take care of the problems of mainte-
nance of amenities that had not been catered for in the SIP of 1972. The SUP 
makes a distinction between ‘upgradation’ and ‘rebuilding’. Houses could not be 
rebuilt as regular apartments or as reinforced concrete structures (RCCs), but 
could instead be reconstructed with materials such as plaster and brick, instead 
of tin, mat and plastic sheeting. Also, provision was made to extend the habitable 
area of these residential units to allow for the construction of lofts by raising the 
Slums and the global city  89
maximum permissible roof height. Water and electricity were also provided. 
However, this scheme was underutilised and was thus wound up in 1991.4 The 
poor response to the scheme on the part of slum dwellers was attributed to 
administrative difficulties, especially regarding the complex procedures involved 
in forming and registering housing societies and also the fragmented nature of 
land ownership, along with the fact that it was easier to implement this pro-
gramme on state government land that came under the direct control of the muni-
cipal cooperation. It was thought that developmental activity could not be 
undertaken on private land that was under the de facto control of slum- lords who 
would interpret this as an encroachment of their power base.
 The next landmark as far as Dharavi is concerned is the Prime Minister’s 
Grant Project (PMGP), which started in 1985 with a grant- in-aid of 100 crore 
rupees sanctioned by the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, of which 30 crore 
rupees was reserved for Dharavi alone. The PMGP, like the slum projects that 
came before it, tried to address the perceived lacunae in the way that slums had 
been conceptualised. All projects that became effective after the 1976 slum 
census talk about the security of tenure for slum dwellers as being an essential 
prerequisite for the amelioration of their living conditions, yet their concrete pro-
posals belie this. Slum development, according to Kalpana Sharma (2000), is 
conceptualised in a piecemeal fashion not merely because of inadequate informa-
tion regarding slum populations, as mentioned earlier, but because slums are 
thought to be inherently unstable dwelling sites. Recollect, for example, the SUP 
of 1980 that permitted improved material for the construction of dwellings, but 
insisted on their impermanent status. The PMGP was the first scheme that actu-
ally considered slum redevelopment in a systematic fashion and planned for the 
construction of new residential structures for slum dwellers on the same site 
where they squatted.
 It was also acknowledged in this scheme that slum communities were capable 
of taking the initiative where issues such as housing were concerned. It allowed 
housing societies in Dharavi to appoint their own architects who would be 
accountable to them, with the proviso that the government would appoint the 
building contractors, even though they would be working under the supervision 
of the architects. It was also recognised, for the first time, that slums in Mumbai 
often formed centres of commercial activity and slum dwellers needed to live 
near their place of work. Huts were not just dwellings but also commercial 
resources – places from which people could generate income. Dharavi was no 
longer considered to be peripheral to Mumbai. Its location near a new business 
district – the Bandra- Khurla complex – gave it a new significance. Thus, there 
were attempts to broaden roads within Dharavi, to make it more accessible for 
vehicular traffic and so on. However, despite its promising proposals, the PMGP, 
like all the schemes that preceded it, was not able to implement its plans in the 
way that it had conceived them. The reason was simple – it had failed to con-
sider the fact of spatial density, and the development work that it was able to 
undertake was largely confined to the area along the two main roads that skirt 
Dharavi.
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 The state government commissioned the architect Charles Correa to head a 
committee that was to prepare a proposal for the redevelopment of Dharavi in 
1986. Since there was no comprehensive survey of structures and settlement pat-
terns in Dharavi, the Correa Committee ordered an aerial survey of the area. 
Given the layout of Dharavi – the fact that boundaries between settlements and 
sometimes even between tenements are blurred – it is not surprising that the 
survey came up with a population estimate that was far less than that which later 
and more detailed surveys provided. On the basis of this estimate, the Correa 
report proposed that 43,000 households be accommodated in Dharavi, while the 
rest of an estimated total of 55,000 households be moved to sites nearby so as to 
provide open spaces for parks, civic amenities and other recreational facilities 
(Sharma 2000). Even though this recommendation was never implemented, it 
remains important to the extent that it is one of the more significant govern-
mental actions around which a public voice is constituted. Local CBOs say that 
the PMGP almost led to the disintegration of the slum voice that they had so 
assiduously tried to cultivate over the years. If successful, the PMGP would have 
led to divisions within Dharavi’s population by creating new categories of legal 
and illegal residents. Organisations like the People’s Responsible Organisation 
for United Dharavi (PROUD) claim that it was through its initiative in organ-
ising a public protest that the withdrawal of the proposal made by the Correa 
committee came about. CBOs became important players in the field of housing 
in slums like Dharavi in the early 1980s, especially after the implementation of 
the SUP and the PMGP, which required slum dwellers to organise themselves 
into cooperative housing societies.
 In the narrative of Mumbai’s slum development, the motif of plan failure 
punctuates the discussion of each redevelopment scheme. It also provides the 
connecting thread between the different episodes in the story – the failure of one 
scheme leading to the emergence of the next. The causes for failure are the same 
each time – spatial density and inadequate mapping. It is also assumed that this 
inadequacy is a result of the failure of the government to rationalise its practices 
and to exercise more centralised control. Newspaper reports, as well as more 
scholarly accounts of slum redevelopment policies, often attribute this to a lack 
of political will (Verma 2002). However, an analysis of the political process 
itself – its role in the formulation of housing policy – is rarely undertaken. This 
is surprising, because slum housing is probably one of the most emotive political 
issues in Mumbai. This section will discuss this with reference to the ‘Free 
Scheme’, a new housing scheme that became an election issue in 1995.5
 Each successive government in Maharashtra has drawn up its own plans for 
slum redevelopment and low- cost housing. The Shiv Sena came to power in 
1995 on the promise of a ‘peoples’ government’. Symbolic gestures such as per-
forming the oath- taking ceremony in Shivaji Park, the ‘heartland’ of Shiv Sena 
support, instead of in the Raj Bhavan were supposed to reinforce this (Purandare 
1999). The declaration of the free housing scheme by Balasahib Thakerey also 
seems to partake in this symbolism. Balasaheb Thakery, the Shiv Sena leader, 
made an election promise to house 40 lakh6 slum dwellers at the government’s 
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expense. However, within a year of its formation, the Shiv Sena/BJP govern-
ment had to climb down and modify the number to 50,000. This is elaborated 
upon below.
 In 1995, the government proposed a new slum rehabilitation scheme soon 
after it had come to power, to implement its election promise. It proposed that 
the charge of building these free tenements would be given to private builders, 
who would be offered extra FSI and TDR7 in exchange. However, owing to the 
sudden collapse of the real estate market, very few private builders took up this 
offer. The government then decided to float its own company – Shivshahi 
Punarvasan Prakalp Limited (SSPL) – through which the ‘free scheme’ was to 
be implemented. The Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority 
(MHADHA) and the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority 
(MMRDA) were asked to each transfer 300 crores of rupees to the SSPL as seed 
money. In January 1999 the SSPL finalised a plan to construct 10,550 houses in 
seven different locations across the city. However, by the time of the next elec-
tions, which were held at the end of 1999, only 78 apartment blocks had been 
completed, one of which is the Milind Nagar Cooperative Housing Society in 
Dharavi (cf. Indian Express, Mumbai 25 August 1999). The next government, 
formed by the Nationalist Congress Party and Congress Indira, decided that the 
‘free scheme’ was not viable and thus concluded that no further housing projects 
would be initiated under it.
 Newspaper accounts of this period give dramatic reports of ministerial squab-
bles and bureaucratic wrangling. Using the print media, ministers publicly 
blamed bureaucrats, the law courts and each other for the failure of the ‘free 
scheme’. The newspapers also described the almost desperate search for land 
that could be used for the ‘free scheme’. To give a few examples, Suresh Jain, 
the housing minister, accused Narayan Rane, the revenue minister, of deliber-
ately delaying the signing of documents pertaining to the scheme, and the admin-
istration of creating ‘unnecessary’ complications in its implementation (cf. 
Indian Express, Mumbai 20 December 1998). Balasaheb Thakerey accused the 
courts of holding up his ‘dream project’ at a public meeting. (He was referring to 
the Bombay High Court’s ruling, in January 1996, restraining the state govern-
ment from building on land that fell under the Coastal Regulation Zone. Since 
much of the marshy land that falls under this zone has already been subject to 
illegal filling and construction activity because of lack of supervision by the gov-
ernment’s environment department, those in charge of implementing the ‘free 
scheme’ were probably unaware that the MHADA and MMRDA plots that had 
been earmarked for slum housing could not be used for this purpose.)8
 What is most interesting about the ‘free scheme’ is the gap between political 
compulsion and the pragmatics of governance, and not only this, but also the 
fact that these contradictions were articulated publicly in newspapers on a day- 
to-day basis. Thus, the minister of housing accused the bureaucrats who worked 
under him of insubordination and of ‘adopting an approach against the demo-
cratic system of government’ (Indian Express, Mumbai 20 February 1999). In 
turn, officials in the bureaucracy accused the ministers of populism, saying that 
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the free scheme was not economically viable. Housing activists, who were also 
interlocutors in this debate, accused the ‘state’ of having a hidden agenda. 
According to activists such as Stephen Rego (cf. Humanscape, Mumbai Septem-
ber 1995), slum colonies like Dharavi can become valuable properties if 
developed, leading to houses passing on from slum dwellers to the gentry. He 
argued that since the ‘free scheme’ makes participation obligatory on the part of 
the slum dweller, it may well lead to the gentrification of the resident population. 
Rego and other activists suspected that with an enhanced transferable FSI a large 
proportion of the built- up slum area would increase in value, and slum dwellers 
would not be able to afford the maintenance costs of apartment buildings. Thus 
the hidden agenda, they suspected, was to clear the area of slum dwellings, 
thereby accomplishing what government- organised demolitions could not. This 
chapter goes into more detail on the question of the gentrification of slum popu-
lations later. In the next section it seeks to draw attention to the enormous costs 
that slum redevelopment projects usually entail and the violence that ensues 
when centralised schemes are undertaken.
Demolitions and slum redevelopment schemes
If we examine the period between 1971, when the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act 
was introduced, and 2004–05, when large- scale demolitions of slums took place in 
Mumbai, it becomes clear that events of large- scale displacement and the imple-
mentation of radical slum redevelopment schemes occur side by side. Thus the 
Maharashtra Vacant Lands Act of 1975, by which all residents of slums on state 
government and municipal land were declared illegal, was followed by the first 
slum census of 1976, after which slum dwellers came to acquire an acknowledged 
presence. The Kerkar Report of 1981 for slum renewal coincided with the mass dis-
placement and deportation of slum and pavement dwellers from Bombay. (This was 
temporarily stopped when NGOs and CBOs filed a series of writ petitions against 
the state of Maharashtra.) However, 1985, the year that saw the initiation of the 
PMGP and the active implementation of the SUP, two very progressive slum rede-
velopment schemes, also saw the Supreme Court give a negative ruling against 
slum dwellers when it vacated the stay order against the government’s demolition 
drive.9 In recent memory, the ‘Free Scheme’ of 1995 followed the riots of 1992–93. 
(To recollect, the Shiv Sena, one of the political parties implicated in the riots, was 
also the initiator of the Free Scheme.) Finally, the mass demolitions ordered by 
Vilas Rao Deshmukh, the chief minister of Maharashtra in 2006, occurred at a time 
when the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) was in the process of implementing 
large- scale rehabilitation schemes in the slums of Bombay.
 In 1980, the Congress (Indira) government in Maharashtra, led by the chief 
minister A.R. Antuley, ordered the mass eviction of pavement dwellers from the 
city of Bombay. Responding to the large number of petitions that were filed 
against this move in the courts, the Supreme Court ordered a stay on the so- called 
‘Operation Demolition’. However, in 1985, the stay order was evicted, following 
the judgment of the Supreme Court which declared the use of pavements for the 
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purpose of shelter illegal. Hundreds of pavement dwellers were dumped outside 
the city limits (Heredia 1985). The three most important NGOs that were estab-
lished after these demolitions are Society for the Promotion of Area Resource 
Centres (SPARC), Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti (NHSS) and Youth for Unity 
and Voluntary Action (YUVA). SPARC was set up in 1984 by a group of profes-
sional social workers who were dissatisfied with the more traditional ‘welfare ori-
entation’ of conventional social work and its inability to deal with the demolitions. 
NHSS was set up in 1982, when 26 mass organisations came together under the 
convenorship of the documentary film maker Anil Patwardhan. He and Shabana 
Azmi, the noted film actress and member of parliament, led a series of high- 
profile morchas (demonstrations) and hunger strikes against various demolition 
drives in the 1980s.10 YUVA was established in 1984 by a group of students and 
teachers from Nirmala Niketan College of Social Work in Bombay.
 The accounts that NGOs produce about themselves often privilege unique 
events that have had powerful social effects, as observed in the last chapter. 
These events become the ‘conditions of possibility’ for some future develop-
ment – in this case the self- institutionalisation of NGOs. Thus, events like the 
mass eviction of slum dwellers in 1980–81, the 1985 PMGP for the develop-
ment of Dharavi, the riots in 1992–93 and the ‘Free Scheme’ in 1995, have all 
been responsible in different ways for the manner in which NGOs perceive 
themselves vis- à-vis slum populations. The one feature that these seemingly 
disparate events have in common is that they all lead to the perception of desta-
bilisation and mass displacement initiated by the state. This is followed by an 
immediate response from the public in the form of massive mobilisation to 
resist these actions (Heredia 1985). They have also had long- term institutional 
effects. Many of the NGOs discussed here developed federated structures – that 
is, networks and alliances with other organisations – to resist such forms of 
state intervention. Side by side with the growth of institutional networks is the 
perception that slum dwellers need to organise themselves into communities to 
develop a public voice that will be heard by governments and by the larger 
population.
 Most of the important NGOs that played significant roles in the development 
of slum communities as political pressure groups in Mumbai are involved in 
slum redevelopment projects today. Can NGOs still represent the interests of the 
poor while simultaneously serving as ‘delivery systems’ for the state as it retreats 
from its traditional welfare role in the wake of neo- liberal reforms (Mendoza & 
D’Souza 2002)? It is paradoxical that NGOs and CBOs that once played a 
seminal role in constituting the public voice in slums like Dharavi are also con-
tributing to the depoliticisation of that voice today. As they come to occupy an 
increasingly important role in the development process, they are also criticised 
for indirectly legitimising neo- liberal reforms11 and the new forms of exploita-
tion that follow from this process. However, most of the NGOs see this as a 
fallout of their successful interventions on behalf of slum dwellers and regard 
their new role as a natural progression from protest movements and advocacy to 
development work.12
94  R. Chatterji
 Scholars such as Foucault (2008) and Ranciere (2010) say that the idea of 
economic freedom that is the foundational principle of liberalism
produces a permanent consensus of all those who may appear as agents 
within these economic processes, as investors, workers, employers and trade 
unions . . . which is a political consensus in as much as they accept the eco-
nomic game of freedom.
(Foucault 2008: 84)
The change of orientation among NGOs and CBOs – to work with rather than 
against the state – is related to changes in their orientation to slum areas and 
slum populations. Dharavi, built on reclaimed marshland at the edge of the city, 
is now close to a new financial hub, and land prices have risen. Dharavi itself, as 
an ‘entrepreneurial slum’, is supposed to be a major contributor to Mumbai’s 
economy, as stated earlier in this chapter. This is in spite of the informal nature 
of all the industries and the threat of forced eviction. It is this vision that is 
behind the latest project in Dharavi. Conceptualised and developed by the archi-
tect Mukesh Mehta, the Dharavi Redevelopment Plan (DRP) was announced by 
the government in 2004 and conceived like other recent programmes as a state- 
supported public–private partnership. Like the PMGP, the DRP is conceived as a 
centralised project in which Dharavi will be divided into five separate residential 
and commercial sectors, and the development of each assigned to a separate 
private developer. However, inordinate procedural delays in the tendering and 
bidding process, the complexities regarding land ownership, the fall in real estate 
prices, economic recession and policy changes regarding floor space area for the 
apartments that are to be given to the slum dwellers have created insecurity 
among the prospective bidders, meaning that the project has still not got off the 
ground. Much is made of grass- roots opposition to the project, but to the best of 
my knowledge opinion is divided on this count. The people with whom I have 
worked are aware of the benefits to be gained from legalised property rights and 
the increase in property prices that the project will lead to and are by and large 
enthusiastic about the project. Dharavi, however, has a mixed population, and 
there are old residents, such as the Kohli fisher folk, who are the original inhabit-
ants of Dharavi, and the Kumhars – or potters – both of whom own large tracts 
of land, which they would lose if they had to move into residential apartment 
blocks.
 In- situ development strategies that involve the upgrading and improvement of 
slum houses have had mixed success, partly due to procedural complexities, as 
seen in the case of the SUP. A pilot project conducted by the PMGP that 
involved redeveloping a limited area in Dharavi and constructing apartment 
blocks was a popular scheme among the local population. Most critics of cen-
tralised slum redevelopment plans, including NGOs and CBOs who have worked 
on issues pertaining to low- cost housing, are silent when it comes to questions 
about property value in slum areas and the fact that land may be seen as an eco-
nomic investment. It is commonly assumed that slum residents think of their 
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dwellings purely as spaces of habitation. It is also assumed that residents prefer 
to live in ground- level dwellings because of the home- based nature of their occu-
pations. A study of the Markandeya Housing Society conducted by Vinit 
Mukhija (2003) shows that slum dwellers preferred apartments on the third and 
fourth floor, in order to be away from the noise and the dirt of Dharavi. Gentrifi-
cation is an aspiration that many slum dwellers nurture. However, centralised 
projects for redevelopment are unlikely to be successful, and if they are it will be 
at an enormous human cost. It is hard to know whether any elected government 
that is dependent on the slum population for its vote will want to pay the price 
for this kind of development.
 Most critics of centralised planning for slum redevelopment say that such pro-
grammes increase the scope for corruption. As the lines between legal and illegal 
residents are re- drawn, the scope for underhand negotiations and the misuse of 
power increases. Slum dwellers want their status to be legalised, and government 
officials use their powers to create long- term dependency relations based on 
corrupt practices. Critics also say that the failure of such programmes may be 
less to do with poor implementation and planning and instead be a sign of a 
‘failed authoritarianism’ of the planning process itself and a broadening of parti-
cipation in the self- fashioning of Mumbai (Hull 2010). My own study leads me 
to believe that some centralisation of the planning and implementation process 
would be welcomed by the residents of established slums such as Dharavi. It 
would make for efficiency and perhaps quicker implementation of redevelop-
ment projects. However, centralised planning is unrealistic in cities that have 
heterogeneous interests, such as Mumbai, and cannot be implemented in a demo-
cratic fashion, as has been shown here. Perhaps only a pragmatic mix of centrali-
sation with a focus on local- level conditions can work in the long run.
Notes
 1 Downloaded from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dharavi on 8 December 2010. This 
chapter is a summary of some of the arguments presented earlier in a book I co- 
authored with Deepak Mehta, entitled Living with Violence: An Ethnography of 
Events and Everyday Life (Delhi: Routledge, 2007).
 2 ‘Harvard Students get Lessons on Dharavi’, Wall Street Journal (19 May 2010). 
Downloaded from www.livemint.com/2010/03/23000503/Harvard- students-get- 
lessons-o.html.
 3 The land on which slums have emerged can be classified into three types depending 
on whether it belongs to the state government, central government or is owned pri-
vately. Slum colonies on state government land are called surveyed slums, as opposed 
to notified slums on private land. There is virtually no official data on the status of 
populations that comprise the slum colonies on central government land, as they have 
never been officially surveyed (Source: Gautam Chatterji, private conversation; 
Indian Express, Mumbai 11 May 1996). The land on which Dharavi is situated is 
partly owned by the municipal corporation, partly privately owned and partly ‘collec-
tor’ (state government) land.
 4 According to a Times of India, Mumbai, report of 19 May 1996, only 200 housing 
societies came forward while World Bank expectations were that at least 1,000 
housing societies would participate in the programme.
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 5 Officially designated ‘The Slum Re- development Programme’ (SRD), it is popularly 
known as the ‘Free Scheme’.
 6 A lakh is 100,000.
 7 The Floor Space Index or FSI refers to the ratio of the total permissible built- up area 
to the total available land area on a particular plot of land. There was a tentative pro-
posal that private builders would be offered an increased FSI as an incentive to parti-
cipate in the ‘Free Scheme’. They would be permitted to construct apartments for sale 
on land that was left over after they had constructed the required number of apart-
ments for the slum dwellers (cf. Indian Express, Mumbai 13 September 1998). Trans-
ferred Development Rights, or TDRs, are used in cases in which the FSI is 
transferable. Government land in premium locations can be given to builders as cross 
subsidies for their participation in the various slum development schemes, specifically 
for the building of houses for slum dwellers.
 8 Newspapers also report proposals made by the urban development department to 
redraw the boundaries of central government plots already encroached upon by slum 
dwellers so that land could be made free for slum development. There are also 
accounts of work started by the SSPL that could not be completed because of the lack 
of approach roads, especially in cases where this required building the roads on 
central government land. The juxtaposition of state- owned land and central govern-
ment land make large- scale building extremely difficult.
 9 The Shiv Sena has traditionally been anti- slum because it believed that slum popula-
tions were largely made up of immigrants. In 1985, when it won the municipal council 
elections in Mumbai, it announced a massive slum demolition programme called 
‘Operation Slum Wreck’. However, the party soon realised that a substantial portion 
of its voter base lived in the slums of Mumbai (Mukhija 2003).
10 The Daily (Bombay, 14 May 1986).
11 This term is used to characterise the process of ‘destatisation’, which has been 
taking place in many countries since the 1980s. As Andrew Lakoff (2005) says, ‘the 
goal of neo- liberal reform was to limit the role of the state in overseeing human 
welfare, and to extend market rationality to areas that had not previously been seen 
as economic’.
12 SPARC has always tried to implement its goals by working with the state and has 
always been slightly sceptical of the ideological slant of many of the other NGOs that 
worked within the social movement framework. See Hilhorst (2003) for a comparative 
account for what seems to be a worldwide trend in NGO discourse.
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7 Cities within and beyond the 
plan*
Solomon Benjamin
Bangalore’s elitist policy, programmes and modernist 
developmentalism
In 1998, S.M. Krishna, then chief minister of Karnataka, portrayed Bangalore as 
India’s ‘Silicon Valley’ as part of his vision to transform the city into another 
‘Singapore’. Such rhetoric was also seen as a lesson for the country’s economic 
development and as a justification for high- grade infrastructure and services to 
particular Master Plan- designated areas and to counter ‘non- planned develop-
ment’ and ‘slums’ (Benjamin 2000). Fifteen years later in 2013, Bangalore, a 
city of around 11 million inhabitants, was urged by international development 
agencies to address its failed infrastructure.1 Other public controversies that have 
gained political ground are those of land regularisation via ‘Akrama Sakrama’ 
(setting prior wrongs right). A previous work explored how Bangalore’s elite 
capture and rationalise the space of plan and policy via the rhetoric of ‘good 
governance’ (Benjamin 2010). The city’s vastly increased territorial boundary 
locks mega- projects, rationalised within a master- planning frame, towards a 
competitive ‘productive’ city. When accompanied by a political shift towards 
empowering special- purpose agencies under the rubric of hi- tech modernism, 
this frames other practices of governance within a binary of ‘traditional and cus-
tomary’ (Benjamin 2010, 2014). Bangalore drains off its 3,200 ft plateau into 
three major valley systems, via a series of wetlands of ‘tanks’ or ponds called 
‘kere’ in the local language, Kanadda.2 The keres are sites of intense contesta-
tions, which are revealed when one looks closely at the reworking of land 
tenures: a range of tenures connected to various seasonal agro practices, includ-
ing fishing rights. This chapter points to the politics of these territories being 
conflated by higher levels of the government, but also via elite actions mobil-
ising the judiciary into a homogeneous wasteland categorised as ‘public’; this 
re- categorisation feeds a land acquisition process used under eminent domain. It 
also opens up territory to large private developers for high- end housing or land-
scaped lakes under more recent forms of ‘public–private partnership’ manage-
ment with elite resident welfare associations (RWAs).3
 The important conceptual point here is that the homogeneous re- categorisation 
of wastelands portrays a singular logic of territoriality where both ‘urbanisation’ 
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and market- based political experiments attempt to turn wetlands into manage-
able ‘lakes’. The logic of plan and policy with technical inputs from corporate 
partnerships is seen to serve as a counterweight to the threat from amorphous 
groups. It is important to note that even in neighbourhoods considered to be of 
very high income in terms of their plot sizes and relative level of infrastructure 
(and of course the occupations of their residents), not all are homogeneous in 
their attitudes towards the poor – including street hawkers and small shops. For 
instance, in Koramangala’s 3rd Block in south- east Bangalore (a case discussed 
later in this text), several residents blocked the dominant group who sought to 
mobilise the official machinery to act against ‘un- authorised hawkers and 
vendors’. This same group has fought to ensure free and open access to a library 
set up in the ‘neighbourhood’ park. Despite these relatively progressive actions, 
the only imaginary of these groups remains within the ‘plan and policy’. The 
intervention of techno- managerial policy planners and academics tends most 
often to co- produce a singular logic of territoriality and in turn notions of 
singular forms of private property. Scholars have astutely observed that such 
readings of law premised on private property are generative of violence.4
 This framing of a ‘public common’ is, on closer examination, a privatised 
public to be managed via a ‘public–private partnership’ (PPP) whose market- 
based business model is seen to replace what are posed as ‘traditional’ and cus-
tomary practices. Significantly, two well- meaning groups of academics are 
supporters of this perspective: first, environmental academics who are driven by 
‘scientific rationality’ (rather than politicised perspectives); second, environ-
mental planners of a positivist persuasion who also seek techno- managerial 
systems as an approach, combined with de- politicised ideas of ‘participatory and 
inclusive planning’.5 The way forward is to soften the blow of the market by a 
humanised technocracy – adding another ‘P’ (standing for ‘people’) into the PPP 
and setting in place by participatory planning and NGO- driven consultation 
‘inclusive’ policy and programmes that will protect ‘public interest’ in the 
‘common’ (Unnikrishnan & Nagendra 2014, last page, concluding paragraph). 
This perspective is evidenced not just in legal argumentation, but also, as we 
shall shortly see, in descriptions of the ‘lakes’: ‘The lakes are now facing severe 
challenges due to pollution, encroachment and disruption in connectivity follow-
ing urbanisation [emphasis by author]’ (Unnikrishnan & Nagendra 2014: 3). 
Located in ‘slums’, the poor are seen to be in exploitative existence within the 
‘unorganised informal sector’ that marginalises them as ‘encroachers’ on 
‘unplanned’ areas. All this serves to justify the ‘rule of law’ for the enforcement 
of mega- urban planning to control ‘slums’, while ‘governance reforms’ cut down 
‘vote- bank’ politics. Such a framing entails the elite posing as a ‘civil society’ 
seeking to transform their neighbourhoods into micro- scapes of ‘India Shining’, 
uncontaminated by vote- bank politics.6 This is not a very different language and 
tone to that used in directives from the higher levels of courts, which a wider 
scholarship shows to be anti- poor in motivation. One intersect between these two 
sets of academics located in a nostalgia of ‘tradition and custom’ in the loss of a 
‘common’ poses territorial contestations as ‘traditional and subaltern’ groups 
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conflicting with feudal power structures or the ‘land mafia’. The elephant in the 
room – the huge influence of elite residents and their well organised lobbying – 
is given a miss.7 Ironically, as witnessed in web- based group discussions, some 
well-meaning academic circles assist in producing technical reports framed for 
the legal process to feed a legal process to protect and hegemonise the plan and 
policy frame.8
 In effect, progressive activists, academics, and some policy makers, tacitly 
accept the inevitability of ‘economic growth’ to be tapped for welfare purposes, 
but do so in seeking a constitutionally derived Habermasian space to frame 
‘inclusive policy and programs’ (Flyberg & Richardson 2002). Unsurprisingly, 
there is an expansion of techno- rationalistic research – ‘evidence- based’ policy. 
This involves the extensive mobilisation of econometric data, the analysis of 
which justifies corporate partnerships dressed up as stakeholders to seek public 
funds and conducive, growth- oriented policy.9 Like ‘participatory planning and 
consultation’, these realms too emphasise cartographic logics – a visual aesthetic 
that frames the neat, landscape, colour- zoned plans with ‘unplanned’ territorial 
forms located as ‘encroachment’. These critiques located in contrasting ideo-
logical planes treat territory and land as a passive setting, set within homoge-
nised tenurial categories. Other criticisms locate their efforts in a much higher 
conceptual frame of meta- historical changes – treating and constructing material 
terrains as a ‘local’ contingent on consciously received contractions in 
capitalism.
Using cartographic law and order to reinforce aesthetics of 
private property
Bangalore’s context as a conceptual setting underlines how terms and categories 
are mobilised to fuel an elitist politics of urban space. At the centre is a hege-
monic project of planning that in the attempt to resolve and define ‘rights’ set 
within the logic of inclusive ‘market- based’ arrangements moves towards the 
‘settlement of property’ into singular tenure forms. It is framed under ‘expert 
rules’ to define ‘inclusive’ development ‘balanced’ within an overall economic 
development. The emphasis is on survey- based cartography co- joined with a par-
ticular reading of law around ‘urban decentralisation’ for ‘inclusive participatory 
planning’. Also of central concern here is how such rationality is built around 
‘lawful’ planning and policy, openly accepted by even progressive NGOs in their 
endorsement (if not lobbying) for the 74th Constitutional Amendment. These nar-
ratives adopt a conception of law that is framed in binaries of ‘legal–illegal’, 
divorced from its spatialisation, which emphasises notions of ‘developmentalism’ 
whose narrative is constituted around ‘rapid’ urbanisation rates, inclusive eco-
nomic development and a nostalgia over a loss of tradition. Such a construction 
builds an underlying message of ‘inaction’ that will result in violent chaos.10
 If one assumes a normative logic of ‘plans and policy’ then let us consider 
where this can lead, in territorial imaginaries shaped by planning regulations to 
claim city territories in unexpected ways. For instance, just at the time when the 
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courts were coming down heavily on roadside shrines in Bangalore, a religious 
mega- business was mobilising this rhetoric to claim far larger territorialisation. 
Land issues shaped by the legality of planning run deeper in Bangalore’s reli-
gious cults. In June 2010, a spectacular news item, accompanied with a colour 
image, spurred the imagination of ISKCON followers and also a more general 
audience: ISKCON Bangalore announced the foundation stone puja ceremony 
for a massive Rs. 350 crore, Disney World- inspired Krishna Lila theme park 
outside the city.11 Curiously, within days, it also published a strikingly detailed 
press notice that read like a legal response to its ‘sister’, ISKCON Mumbai. 
ISKCON Bangalore claimed greater legitimacy than the ‘illegal’ ISKCON 
Mumbai, and attempted to demonstrate its legitimacy by publishing a very 
detailed list of its real- estate activities. This included hi- tech townships and the 
Krishna Lila Park, all of which were portrayed as following modern practices of 
raising finance and real- estate management facilitated by PPPs (ISKCON Ban-
galore 2009). These arguments were circulated in the media via YouTube, and 
such reports were perhaps intended to counter opposition not just from ISKCON 
Mumbai, but also Karnataka’s senior Congress I leader, who accused ISKCON 
Bangalore of illegal real- estate activities.12 The claims to legality and territory 
are often complex and not new to religious cults. For instance, June 2010 wit-
nessed media- spurred excitement concerning an allegation by Bangalore’s 
famous don turned journalist and land broker, ‘Agni’ Sreedhar.13 Agni claimed 
that the self- styled guru Sri Sri Ravi Shankar’s ‘Art of Living’ (AOL) Founda-
tion had ‘illegally grabbed’ 14 acres of land near their ashram.14 The AOL, with 
extensive membership from the elite of India and certainly of Bangalore, has had 
a central presence in higher- end policy and administrative circuits, and it is well 
known among residents of south Bangalore’s Kanakapura Road as a very signi-
ficant owner of rapidly developing real estate acquired in ‘stealth like’ ways and 
also by outright purchase with some state support.
Conceptualising cities beyond plan and policy
One way to counter cartographic de- politicisation and its associated violence can 
be to spatialise legal pluralism via the concept of Occupancy Urbanism (Ben-
jamin 2008, 2014). Here, the intent is to mobilise a heuristic around the embed-
ded histories of land tenures and to bring into conversation non- cartographic 
logics of territorial formations to reveal a criticality in our understanding of 
space (Lund, 1998).15 It allows engagement with complex understandings of 
property in terms of how these are shaped by cultural meanings to view land 
made alive: to consider territory as an open- ended political space and build a 
conceptual frame for unpacking contestations. Such a critical perspective rejects 
anxieties of chaos resulting from a lack of planning and law and order, to con-
sider four overarching themes.
 First, thinking beyond the ‘mess’ of everyday life. In exploring the ‘south’ of 
cities beyond ‘northern’ perspectives, the intent is to take seriously the complexity 
of how people engage with land, infrastructure, economy and politics, exemplified 
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in works by Ananya Roy (2004) and Jennifer Robinson (2006) on the ‘ordinary 
city’. Of particular importance is the work of Abdou Malik Simone (2006, 
2011), who introduces the concept of the ‘surfacing of urban life’. In particular, 
in these diverse practices there is a central need to recognise the social underpin-
nings of how law is constructed and to consider a particular perspective within 
legal pluralism, and what is termed as ‘street life’, as a political space (Kalpagam 
2006).
 Second, the entry via ideas of land tenure and constitution of property helps 
us to reject narratives of modernity and tradition, and to seek out complex ways 
in which territories are occupied but also ‘possessed’. For instance, territorial 
formations in ‘high- growth’ South Canara in south India are shaped by sites of 
possessions – known as the Bhoota (pre- time) Kola. These are not just seen by 
the groups involved as a way of reviving ‘tradition’, but form one of the multiple 
realms and registers that co- exist with the courts, the village and the city council 
administration, to negotiate and address conflicts over territory, objects, and per-
sonal conflicts of honour. In effect, these are non- cartographic, yet deeply mate-
rialised spaces, which include political realms. The point here is that one must 
recognise the close intertwining of complex logics and rationalities that move 
beyond cartographic ones, and the material and transcendental aspects of such 
space. This effort towards the impossibility of modernity is also a way to think 
about its mobilisation as a politics of claiming elite status. Here, following Dean 
and Lamarre (2004), it seems far more useful to focus on transformation. As 
they argue, the adoption of a modernity perspective assumes the inevitability of 
a rupture from ‘tradition’ that in effect relegates the latter to a narrow ritual of 
no real material significance.
 Finally, the function of the ethnographic method is to underline the political. 
This way of understanding cities is not intended merely to reveal some interest-
ing curiosities of ‘third- world cultures’. Rather, it is essential to understand con-
tests over territory, institutional space and economy. The emphasis on the 
ethnographic method is, then, not just to compliment economic data (as an illus-
tration of the material consequences of a meta- force) but rather to generate polit-
icised conceptual categories (Lund 2014).
 The intent here is to make a different point about how singular logics of ter-
ritory are a source of violence. These are inherent in the aggressively pursued 
elitist policy agendas, including those witnessed as Bangalore’s mega projects: 
an IT corridor, a regional expressway and its recently built international airport.16 
Previous work on the city’s contested governance pointed to the shortage of 
basic services, while the demand for hi- tech infrastructure necessitates massive 
investments, many times that of funds allocated to infrastructure forms that cater 
to popular groups.17
 With this discussion of Bangalore’s context, we now consider the fluidity of 
politics on the ground. The idea is not to portray the poor as being victorious 
from a perspective of a resistance set within a defined order. Rather, the intent is 
to show city terrains as being necessarily rife with political uncertainty by 
moving to consider more nuanced versions of city histories rather than being 
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 disciplined by ‘western’ genealogies of city development and contests. Cities are 
born out of complex processes ‘beyond the plan’, where spaces (political, insti-
tutional, legal) are shaped by the complexity of politics on the ground and con-
stituted by everyday practices. Such fluidity in identity politics is not new and 
has been documented in previous research exploring how poorer groups estab-
lished claims to highly contested territories in Whitefield in IT- dominated east 
Bangalore, where social and political relationships are just as complicated (Ben-
jamin 2008). The eastern fringes of the city in Whitefield and parts of the south 
have the glass–steel–granite complexes that most upper- class Indians and people 
abroad associate with India’s IT capital. But set within these hi- tech IT terrains 
are vast territories of small plots strung together into what is known locally as 
‘revenue and gramthana (or village) layouts’. An important practice here, 
common to the creation of large plot developments for high- end residential and 
also IT complexes, is to convert land from common pasture gowmala categories 
to public land, which then is consolidated and allocated to private development.18 
Here, many settlements, termed as ‘encroachments’, non- planned or slums, pre- 
date master planning, but the important point is that almost all of these are territ-
ories developed under very different institutional, legal and territorial processes. 
The second important point here is that they embody action by both occupants 
and small developers, and various levels of public administration, especially the 
local government that problematises the term ‘informal’.
Contesting logics and territorial conflicts
Shifting political governance and conceptual frames have environmental con-
sequences. The geography of Bangalore’s keres, the lace- like wetland system, 
has been constructed and refined over the past 400 years. These wetlands are 
managed via a sophisticated set of customary practices embedded in turn into 
sacred grounds associated with various protective deities (Figure 7.1).19
 Such ‘mystical’ associations with territory are not associated with wetlands 
only, but a variety of spaces and places: street- side religiosities are embedded in 
how most groups mobilise deeper associations.20 Such practices of working ter-
ritory remain outside the ‘modern’ grid of master planning and are assumed by 
many elite groups to be vestiges of tradition that will soon die out. It is little 
wonder that popular street- side temples and shrines, along with small shops and 
workshops, are considered irritants as unauthorised developments and illegali-
ties. The Supreme Court, for instance, has issued directives with stringent liabil-
ities to city commissioners for their removal. A significant part of the territorial 
logics of the kere is its functionality as a sacred realm: protective goddesses are 
associated with the keres. But these too are contested – some goddesses are 
deemed to be more important and powerful than others, and their believers 
topple older ones. This does not dissolve the sacredness, as this resides not in the 
physical attributes of these places, but rather their location as space.
 Sarukkai and Baindur make the important point that often it is not the deity 
but the place that is important.21 As they astutely note, these ‘sacred spaces’ also 
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function as wetlands and are contested, perhaps more seriously with recent 
entrants into Bangalore’s social and political moorings: the richer and usually 
IT- connected groups. For such groups, influential in policy circles and especially 
as ‘good citizens’ located in what the media and some academic circles respect-
fully term ‘civil society’, these spaces impair Bangalore’s modernity. With this 
embedding in place, it is also materialised in more complex ways through land 
tenures. The temple lands of the famous Temple town of Kancheepuram and 
Udupi underpin an extensive weaving economy. Similarly, most wetlands that 
appear to be just ‘water and land’ are constituted around a range of groups who 
work their range of territories for seasonal agriculture and fishing, and as a 
source of silt- rich soils. Such ‘commons’ are often located under the protective 
sphere of a deity, demonstrating the thin line between the metaphysical and 
material realms. These are not just ‘traditional’, but located in the contemporary. 
Poorer groups evicted to peri- urban areas of Bangalore attempt to reinforce their 
claims to their resettled housing by way of naga (cobra) shrines built on anthill 
mounds. Jane M. Jacobs (1996), arguing for non- cartographic counter- mapping 
in the context of Australian Aboriginal claims, points to a deeply material pol-
itics. Should the ‘mystical’ beliefs ascribed to the protective goddess associated 
with Bangalore’s wetlands be placed as rationally as the economic data sheets 
that imbibe territories set aside for special economic zones (SEZs)? If so, is the 
Figure 7.1  Protective goddesses associated with Bangalore’s wetlands or keres.
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politics of the rationality claimed via cartographic–economic–managerial located 
in its mystical projections? If so, just as ‘all law is customary’ this border 
between rationality and irrationality is very thin.
 This work does not attempt to undertake an anthropology of sacred spaces, but 
rather seeks to explore the political consequences of such diverse logics. Here a 
conceptual frame of substantiating territory as an open- ended political space is 
central to unpacking the spatial constructions mobilised by an elite politics.
Landscapes of power shaping rationality22
To explore the wider political consequences of adopting a conceptual frame of 
legal pluralism, this chapter focuses on the everyday practices of territoriality, 
centering on the Mayestripalya Kere, a wetland in Koramangala’s 3rd Block – 
one of Bangalore’s most elite neighbourhoods. The following section is a critical 
analysis of the city’s elite ‘civic’ politics, which mobilise a language of citizen-
ship and good governance and appeal to the logic of plan and policy. Ironically, 
claims that its rationality subsumes notions of power in an attempt to subsume 
poorer groups comes full circle when elite utopian visions for the large neigh-
bourhood district are threatened by a mega- development by one of Bangalore’s 
largest land developers. Here, master planning can be explored through ques-
tions such as: Who plans and at whose cost? What is the city beyond the plan? 
Are there multiple realms of law, and how do these connect with power struc-
tures in society? Such questions set the tone for the type of analysis that looks at 
city contestations beyond the frame of policy and the plan.
 We begin with a news item on roadside religious shrines:
In the case of multi- religious structures constructed by various religious 
groups illegally in parks and other public places, which could trigger 
tension, then all such structures will have to be demolished. [It’s curtains for 
illegal shrines in the state.]23
This press report about the adoption by the Karnataka State Government of the 
April 2009 Supreme Court directive would gladden Bangalore’s elite, who are 
vehemently opposed to illegal shrines and hawkers that block pavements, and 
who pressure city commissioners to come down hard on the unauthorised, non- 
conforming structures that generate slums. As one of the four most exclusive 
areas of Bangalore, Koramangala’s 3rd Block RWA had, in the past, seriously 
discussed how to restrict the expansion of, if not remove completely, road- side 
shrines and small shops.24 Leading the other relatively less advantaged RWAs, 
the 3rd Block association view themselves as esteemed citizens of Bangalore, 
and have consolidated significant political and administrative acumen. But most 
other blocks too, such as the 4th Block and the 1st Block, see themselves as col-
lectively forming a substantive interest group influencing senior administrative 
officers, higher levels of the political class and, most importantly, the Bangalore 
Development Authority (BDA).25
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 The crises and anxiety always remain. Their political clout and the recent 
municipal elections witnessed renewed activities, such as the ‘Smart Vote’ cam-
paign, and evidenced that the new ward boundaries are framed to exclude poorer 
groups and their threatening, patronage- based vote- bank politics.26 This invoked 
a mythological construct of Bangalore as a possible Singapore: clean roads, 
landscaped parks and managed by PPPs devoid of ‘riff- raff ’ (as one association 
member from the 1st Block called them during a meeting).
 Koramangala had, until recently, a huge open space within the 3rd Block that 
was intensively used by the youth of the wider district, mostly of lower income 
and from castes/ethnic groups that contrast with the surrounding 3rd Block. This 
also included school children from nearby – again mainly from lower income 
groups. However, persistent efforts by the 3rd Block RWA to lobby the BBMP 
administration27 (pressured in turn by high- level political and administrative cir-
cuits) eventually paid off. This included lobbying to landscape half of the ground 
into walking paths, exotic plants and flowers, and most importantly, a 16 ft high 
chain- link fence to demarcate this from the open ground (Figure 7.2). Thus, one 
section was converted into a park for senior citizens to walk dutifully along the 
paved path that encircles a ‘touch- me-not’ landscaped green (Figure 7.3). Every 
Sunday, even in the rain, the remaining ground, the size of a football field, wit-
nesses between nine and twelve teams playing an adapted form of cricket and 
occasionally football all together. Smaller children are pushed out due to the 
severe pressure on space. If this is not enough, the RWAs are moving towards 
landscaping this remaining part too. The neat architectural plans include a swim-
ming pool, tennis and badminton courts. Also central to such policing, as in 
other landscaped parks, was a locked gate whose timings were maintained by the 
RWA to ensure ‘immoral’ activities and ‘anti- social’ elements were excluded. 
Curiously, children are excluded from playing in the landscaped area, with 
restrictions on stepping on the grass. Faced with increasing maintenance costs, 
this was arranged with an adjoining luxury hotel.28 These actions were seen by 
the RWA to be a victory – taking space back into proper ‘planned use’. Of 
Figure 7.2  Youths on open ground – subsequently walled off by Koramangala RWA.
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central importance was the use of planning logic – calculating the percentage of 
master- planned open space – irrespective of how almost no other residential 
areas have such access. In interviews, the cricket- playing youths were found to 
have travelled almost 5 km from more densely developed areas with few open 
spaces to play soccer or cricket.
 Around 2009 a new warfront opened up for Koramangala’s 3rd and 4th Block 
RWAs, as they set out to reclaim an open green space, Maistripalya Kere, one of 
the city’s many wetlands, as a ‘lake’.29 This was to be landscaped, inspired by 
what many of these wealthy residents and avid international travellers had seen 
in North America. Being well connected to the highest administrative circles, the 
RWAs lobbied their way into the city’s highest administrative policy- making 
and legal circles, including India’s Supreme Court. They were also assisted by 
two of the city’s party bosses: a Member of Parliament (MP) residing in their 
block and a Member of the State Legislative Assembly (MLA).30 This lobbying 
was mainly to counter claims by earlier settler groups around the Maistripalya 
Kere who enjoy customary rights. The RWAs see these groups as encroachers 
on the master- plan-designated boundaries, facilitated in this illegal act by vote- 
bank politics and promoted by the ‘land mafia’. The RWAs mobilise particular 
forms of legal argumentation premised on a cartographic logic built around the 
Figure 7.3  Landscaping a neighbourhood park in Koramangala’s 4th C Block – curtailing 
use by poor youths.
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master plan. This logic is premised on three realms of ‘expert’ knowledge: land-
scape architects and planners – the creators of the ‘cartographic frame’ – and 
lawyers to demonstrate the correct rule of law around the logic of the master 
plan and earlier Geological Survey of India maps. A more important goal is to 
access the Supreme Court to pass directives and pressure senior administrators 
to act stringently against lower- level administrative staff, many of whom live in 
similar ‘encroachments’ and usually stonewall such pressures by way of admin-
istrative loopholes. The court directives lay out a central role for the BDA as the 
city’s main planning agency, as well as a role for the more recently constituted 
Lake Development Authority (LDA). Both the BDA and LDA are institutional 
realms that counter claims established by the city’s elected municipal corpora-
tion – viewed as a location of political subversion of the grand plans. These 
plans were summarised by a judicial committee as follows:
Encroachments are rampant in lake areas due to high value of land conse-
quent to the unprecedented rapid urbanisation of the city, especially during 
the past two decades. . . . Land grabbers in the guise of developers and build-
ers pose serious threat to the protection of all public lands; lakes are no 
exception. Fabrication of records and documents is resorted to, leading to 
grabbing of lake lands. . . . Lakes have a great recreational value in urban 
setting. If parks are developed surrounding the lake at the time of layout 
development, they add to the quality of urban life. The jurisdiction of the 
[LDA] extends over the lakes in metropolitan area of Bangalore inclusive of 
BMRDA area. Besides the LDA has jurisdiction of lakes over other City 
Municipal Corporations and Town Municipal Councils in the State. LDA is 
the regulatory, planning and policy making body with nodal functions for 
protection, conservation, reclamation, restoration, regeneration and integ-
rated development of lakes in the jurisdiction of the authority.31
This case is conceptually useful in another way. More recently, the RWAs con-
fronted a mega- development adjoining their neighbourhood: Bangalore’s 
biggest- ever high- end housing and commercial development to cover, in part, 
the city’s largest wetland, Belandur. Significantly, the land developers mobilised 
the same cartographic logic now extended under the SEZ procedures. As of the 
present, both projects remain incomplete. The first was stalled by municipal bur-
eaucracy and the second, connected to global financial circuits, stalled in both 
clearances but also because of the uncertainty of an over- built housing and com-
mercial market.
 The RWAs sought to evoke pristine nature, where the Maistrypalya wetland 
kere, perceived as a dangerous wild area, was to be ‘projectified’ as a natural 
lake. Just as the 3rd Block open ground was converted via a plan, the strategy 
included a PPP with the BDA – the city’s de- politicised planning authority – the 
LDA, and a range of technical experts and lawyers. Interestingly, in this ‘public 
process’ the documentation mobilised included a map from the Geological 
Survey of India whose representational categories hid earlier histories of land 
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claims, especially those of the Maistrypalya village. The survey map used by the 
Koramangala groups, like many colonial projects, is suitable to use as a modern 
zoning plan, including a lake, an ‘eco’ zone and a sunbird corner. When instru-
mentalised via a PPP governance model, these zones are in effect the first steps 
towards a public private commons. They claimed that in part their reaction was 
also against the wetland being sought for development into housing for senior 
politicians.32 Some members of the RWA proposed converting the small remain-
ing water body into a swimming pool. In a public presentation, one of the vocal 
‘citizens’ of Koramangala 3rd Block (nicknamed ‘Privatisation M’ by his col-
leagues), provided a vivid history on how they became organised against the 
opposition – powerful politicians protecting their vote- bank. He explained how, 
by lobbying the BDA, they had been successful in securing the removal of most 
of the 150 families, with only 6–8 remaining. This was not an easy path, as the 
occupants claimed that the acquisition of their land in the 1940s by the City 
Improvement Trust Board (CITB) had taken territory of religious and ritual 
value and subsequently re- conveyed it back to the owners. The RWA now had to 
not only confront this earlier decision but also hire the best lawyers and garner 
support from senior politicians and administrators to successfully appeal to the 
Supreme Court against the second decision.
 The RWAs sought to landscape this territory with the assistance of the LDA 
PPPs. Assisted by a good lawyer, the RWA claimed this to have been allocated 
to them under the master plan norms and that this territory was intended for 
redevelopment into high- end housing for politicians. Thus the idea was to 
convert this wetland into a landscaped lake – fenced in for proper management, 
with a sunbird section and jogging paths inspired by North America.33 An extract 
from the PowerPoint by the 3rd Block Association for the BDA is revealing in 
its portrayal of the existing settlers as an SC- ST vote- bank; of the eclipse of ‘tra-
ditional’ (and ‘rural’) fishing activities to be replaced by a proper urban ecology; 
and most important, of the expansion of the encroaching settlers that would 
engulf the entire area if nothing was done.
 An extract from Meistripalya Lake Development Technical Report reads:
5.5 Sociological
A detailed report on the socio economic status of the residents of the Mestri-
palya village was conducted. Highlights of the survey:
1. 30 years back only 30 families lived there – now there are 150–200 
houses, and the total population is around 2000.
2. The overflow of Madivalalake used to come into this lake and from this 
lake into Bellanduramanikere [wetland] upstream of Shinivagulu tank. 
Upstream to the lake there was dry agricultural land, and fishing done 
in the lake about 20 years ago.
3. The area is a SC vote bank.
4. Conservation in urban settings requires concerted, committed action 
from a number of sectors, that takes into account principles of ecology, 
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along with a proper recognition of the role played by nature in an urban 
setting, where recreation, access to greenery, and considerations of 
technical and economic feasibility must be taken into account along 
with designs that incorporate the requirements of citizens from varied 
socio- economic and cultural backgrounds.34
The last ‘inclusive’ point remains symbolic and rhetorical when viewed along-
side the actual development plan, earlier actions on hawkers in the area and the 
3rd Block grounds. The interesting issue is that of incomplete success on behalf 
of the elite RWAs. In the case of the open ground to park, only half of this was 
converted. For several months, the chain- link fence had a huge hole through 
which youths would enter the park to retrieve cricket balls that had crossed over. 
Even when this was fixed, they would simply climb over. The attempt to trans-
form the kere into a lake take time. It was only in February 2013 that the 
dumping of waste building material formed the basis for landscaping. The Mais-
trypalya Kere is constituted around diverse older tenure forms under which the 
wetland, but also associated upstream and downstream territories of the mainte-
nance of the ecological- economic system, are categorised as government land, 
and then allocated under various forms of planning processes to particular 
groups in society – in this case via the BDA – towards uses and visions lobbied 
by the elite RWAs. In effect, although occupied by other groups, this territory 
became naturalised as a wilderness to be tamed according to the norms laid out 
by ‘rationalistic’ policy frames. These norms also help the consolidation of 
smaller territory to one larger plot that facilitates the master planning of it – in 
this case as a ‘civic eco- friendly’ project. The city’s elite ‘civic’ politics, as illus-
trated in Koramangala’s 3rd Block, mobilise a language of citizenship and good 
governance, and appeal to the logic of plan and policy. Their projection of plan 
and policy as a rational, ‘legally endowed’ space helps them to subsume notions 
of power. This in turn allows the elite to subsume poorer groups. There is, 
however, a distinct irony. Ending in 2012, press reports emerged of a mega IT 
complex development that threatened the elite’s utopian vision for a large neigh-
bourhood district.35 The Manipal ETA Infotech, spread across a massive 72 
acres, is promoted by a very powerful lobby. Here again, in a process not dif-
ferent from that of the Maistrypalya case, planning and policy allow the devel-
opers to appropriate a significant part of the wetland of the adjoining Belandur 
Kere. For the Koramangala residents, this was a shock, particularly on issues of 
depleting groundwater and the increased ‘through’ traffic causing congestion and 
pollution.36
 Counter politics operate not within the logic of planning and policy, with calls 
for ‘inclusive participatory planning and public consultations’, but rather as con-
testing occupancies. On a rainy day in early October 2011, my then 11-year- old 
son and I went to Koramangala’s BDA commercial complex to meet our guest, 
Aya Ikegame, who was visiting us for the day. On the way back home, we 
passed Maistrypalya Kere. The nursery, sheltered by a massive ‘rain tree’ that 
forms a natural shade for the sensitive plants below, is a territory that pre- dates 
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the master- planned Koramangala. A family of Tamil Thigalas37 runs this nursery, 
as it does others surrounding the city’s botanical garden, Lal Bagh, but also in 
close proximity to Dalit families, some of whom claim their land has been taken 
over by the BDA. The light drizzle had not deterred some families congregating 
at the adjoining nursery and, as we drove past, we noticed the beginnings of a 
ritual as they walked past the nursery into the wetland beyond. Reversing my 
car, I thought this would be a way for the three of us to explore the scene: for 
Ikegame, as an anthropologist; for my son who, with a deep interest in anything 
Japanese or Chinese, was excited to show her around; and myself, drawn into 
the local politics that had over the last six months centred around the Maistryp-
alya Kere. The ritual we meandered into was the eleventh day memorial cere-
mony, and moved some of the close relatives deep into the grass adjoining the 
water body. The Thigalas and their claims over territory had been in the news 
some years ago, when the BDA confronted several court cases contesting their 
acquisition of land around the Lal Bagh.
 Such a complexity of claims is witnessed in most kere that dictate most of Ban-
galore’s territorial ecology. Ending in 2009, as part of a NIAS project, a group of 
researchers, including this author, visited several community- managed keres in 
Bangalore’s peri- urban areas, some dating back to the eighth century. The group 
observed small shrines that marked various types of wetland territory – represent-
ing particular ethnic groups that managed particular activities. Meera Baindur 
explained how, in previous studies of wetland management practices conducted by 
herself and other researchers, there were serious contestations over such rituals and 
their shrines (Baindur et al., 2008). We could ourselves see deities broken and 
moved aside to make space for newer ones. Some of the wetland activities, such as 
fishing, were made possible via actions of the Karnataka fisheries department, 
which set about planting seedlings after the summer months when the kere would 
dry up, allowing one group to de- silt the water body and thus replenish adjoining 
farmland. The monsoons would soon replenish the water body. There were other 
locations where these practices were replaced with ‘high- end’ paid- for recreation – 
facilitated by the LDA established in 2007. Thus, a key theme of earlier research 
in these wetland locations termed this politics as the movement from kere to ‘lake’, 
the latter representing a form of beautified landscaped territory, with edges stone- 
clad and boating introduced.38 Most importantly, the management under the LDA, 
assisted by the BDA, opened up space for adjoining elite gated residential housing 
complexes involved in the redevelopment of these areas.39 But to view this process 
as a complete erasure of the traditional by the modernist neo- liberal would be to 
miss its complexity. The PPP mode, like other market- based mechanisms, is prone 
to financial crises, made more complicated by the usually messy internal politics 
of elite RWAs. This occurs especially when RWAs cannot maintain control. This 
inability manifests in poorer neighbourhoods, with other groups ‘gradually 
encroaching’ and developing their own counter- claims via both political and bur-
eaucratic circuits.
 The counter- politics do not appear as explicit ‘social movements’, but rather 
as a range of contesting ‘force fields’ (Nuijten 2005). Territories are constituted 
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by multiple rationalities that do not necessarily form mirror images of each 
other, nor can they be placed in oppositional ways. There are several other exam-
ples of such political openings; some located within administration, others 
located in the intersect of law and religiosity.40 When it is the latter, these 
‘strange’ logics make news in both academia and elsewhere. For instance, even 
the use of the term ‘Thigalas’ in the issue is complicated. In the final months of 
2010, Thigala claims over territory had been in the news as the BDA confronted 
several court cases contesting their acquisition of land around Bangalore’s 
central green space, Lal Bagh. At that time, a very interesting report appeared in 
The Hindu, focusing on the Thigalas and their rituals in various locations, includ-
ing Maistrypalya Kere. While Sudipto Mondal terms these groups and their 
practices ‘subaltern’, what is interesting is the fluidity of identities.41 Most inter-
esting is the sense of appropriation and perhaps subversion. Perhaps it is pre-
cisely such fears that may both explain, in the context of the Supreme Court 
order, which shrines become regularised and which demolished, and also allude 
to a politics that is difficult to discipline – a politics that is constituted beyond 
what Blomley (2003) terms the ‘grid and the plan’. This perspective contests 
portrayals of city politics where the poor remain marginalised and ritual remains 
enshrined as a dying tradition, and then subsumed by a hegemonic plan. Such 
arguments of marginality and an assumed hegemony of the plan feed narratives 
mobilised by the city’s elite that see such actions as violations, a breakdown of 
‘law and order’ driven by a fear that the unplanned and unsanitised represent a 
frontier for the ritual of modernist planning.
 There are other indications of more subtle politics being mobilised. A closer 
look at roadside shrines suggests that here, too, stealth- like actions are the way 
the poor, among other ‘subaltern’ groups, appropriate and transform space. Some 
illustrations emerge from wonderful fieldwork by Rohan De Souza and Manju-
nath, conducted as part of a NIAS–ATREE research project. The larger project 
looked comparatively at the politics of wetland management within the city ter-
ritory and adjoining ones under the control of village councils. These sites 
included locations of resettlement of some poor groups from squatter areas 
located in the central city to outer- city wards. This was done by building two- 
storey blocks as per the rehabilitation and resettlement policy (R&R). Figure 7.4 
shows a snake goddess shrine used to secure territory in a resettlement- housing 
block where residents face constant instability.
 The process was revealed as complex and interesting, unfolding over several 
months of site visits. It quickly became evident that the poorer groups, resettled 
into four- storey, walk- up apartment blocks deep within the southern metro areas, 
were thoroughly disempowered in multiple ways. They were located far from 
jobs, had no school or health facilities to speak of, and environmental sanitation 
was at its worst. Most significantly, many had lost their right to vote due to the 
elite- group-driven new form of voter ID, aimed at flushing out ‘bogus’ voters.42 
Unsurprisingly, many other poor groups refused to move and continued to main-
tain their older places in central- city squatter areas. The new location was also 
an extension of a wetland, where the kere- associated forms of tenure allowed the 
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public authority to portray this territory as an unused wetland, and thus an 
uncontested public space.
 In the bushes in front of the two- storey blocks lay an old anthill. De Souza 
and Manjunath observed how this formed the location of a shrine, which, over 
six months, rapidly transformed into a larger one – signifying a marker for both 
caste- specific and religious rituals. Manjunath noted that such shrine building is 
a common process in establishing claims. This was significant in the current 
R&R, when, to prevent eviction groups claiming their new locations, the specific 
flat and house number is missing on electricity bills, which provide instead only 
the ID number of the resettled person. Thus this is seen to reduce all claims to 
the allocated flats. Based on the trajectory of rapid construction around the 
anthill into a ‘proper’ shrine, we were reasonably sure that this expansion was, 
over the coming years, to become a site in the intertwining of ethnic politics 
shaped by real estate and other factors.
 There are several other ‘out of the plan’ political realms; not all can be cate-
gorised as ‘resistance’. De Souza and Manjunath revealed, for instance, that the 
resettled groups, though predominantly mixed- caste Dalit groups, mobilised a 
fluid identity in shaping realms of politics. First, as occupants in squatter settle-
ments in central city areas, they engage with other central- city ethnic groups via 
trade- based credit and other relationships. During election time, these connec-
tions shape their political strategies through building coalitions. Such coalitions 
are played out during the ‘resettlement project’ – this involves working both the 
bureaucratic system and state- level party politics, including the higher realms of 
the Dalit Sangrash Samati (DSS). For those settlers choosing to occupy the alloc-
ated flats, their move into the housing includes moves to establish wider territo-
rial claims via the anthill shrines. In parallel, this also serves to gradually make 
an entry into the lower- level cadres of another DSS faction, which has a constit-
uency among the poorer agricultural workers in these outer areas. This second 
Figure 7.4  Snake goddess shrine securing territory for poor residents (resettled from 
central Bangalore).
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group is also attracted by the potential of real- estate profits when such apartment 
blocks are occupied and rented out, sometimes to better- off groups who can 
afford to stay further away from the job- providing city centres. This last factor 
may explain why poorer groups are facing a very harsh resettlement in the 
central city area of Ejipura.43 Here, activists paradoxically noted that a substan-
tial number of the poor voted in support of politicians who may have played 
some role in the real- estate-shaped politics that moved them out in the first place. 
The point here is not to minimise the pain and trauma of eviction and resettle-
ment, but to make the point that there are realms of politics that are not easy to 
categorise as ‘resistance’. These locate and operate in complicated ways to 
manipulate the bureaucracy, parts of the organised party politics, and also 
identity- based political organisations and particular factions within them.
Substantiating territory
These are unruly place- making events which undermine colonial authority 
not by a shrill oppositional ‘resistance’ but by a subtle, subversive interplay 
with the colonial constructs of and jurisdictions over cultural property. 
[Such a] reclamation presents a ‘new territory’. This is a space that is neither 
the panoptic, flattening space of imperialist visions nor a restoration of the 
pristine or pre- modern. The J.C. Slaughter Falls art trail is a remapping, 
which is intended to herald a new territory. Its hybrid form suggests the 
demise of the persistent and static binary oppositions that are so funda-
mental to the culture of colonialism.
(Jacobs 1996)
This extended quotation suggests the need to recognise spaces that refuse the 
conceptual category of ‘economic growth shaped resistance’ and the disruptions 
associated with the transition from ‘tradition to modernity’, as Dean and Lamarre 
(2004) explain. The important point is to reinforce these ideas rather than 
seeking homogeneity, as is often the project of cartographic developmentalism. 
Instead, as argued by Pottage (2004) and Saumarez Smith (2004), it is useful to 
recognise the political spaces that emerge from disconnects, especially temporal, 
between map and identity, and between maps and overlapping social practices, 
and finally the differentiation of continuous terrain. One can see these as reflec-
tions of diverse logics where political opening relates to the impossibility of 
hegemony via cartographic practices.
 Jacobs’s counter- cartographic strategies are central to visualising ways of 
rethinking critical planning practices. A closer consideration of ‘active’ political 
spaces reveals that ‘popular’ groups confronting elite groups, empowered by 
policy- developmentalism and urban renewal, adopt non- cartographic modes of 
claiming space. These methods may not be intent only on resistance. For 
instance, ways of thinking about the ‘sacredness of place’, of locations believed 
to be protected and possessed by guardian spirits, are legitimate logics and 
should be treated as equally legitimate as claims by policy experts who promise 
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to bring about economic growth by reforming regulatory architectures, often in 
ways that cut off political opposition. The possible weakness of expert- driven 
resistance is the acceptance of an overarching logic of their opposition. As such, a 
closer look at political practices opens ways to re- define a criticality of ‘com-
munity planning’, to move beyond normative frames built around the ‘grid’, and 
also to consider closely the politics on the ground via the lens of legal pluralism 
that helps us to understand multiple rationalities in the construction of space. At a 
time when normative approaches seem distant from those exploring the practice of 
politics, substantiating territory may help us to bridge normative concerns with 
practices of community- based planning. This conceptual shift may help to re- 
politicise and bring ‘criticality’ into community- based planning. This shift is based 
not just around normative logic; it also comes from recognising realms where the 
practices of politics go beyond cartographic ones. A closer consideration of these 
practices helps us recognise the fluidity of political space and openings. ‘The plan’ 
is thus implicated in the rationalities of developmentalism, anxieties of modernisa-
tion and, most centrally, a failure to recognise the construction of law as a social 
process that is necessarily ‘customary’ (Webber 2009). From this perspective, 
institutional realms are seen not so much through the lens of the nation state, but 
rather are located within a conception of legal and institutional pluralism (Falk 
Moore 1973; Razzaz 1994; De Sousa Santos 1992, 2004).
 Cities remain to be constituted out of fluid and unresolved realms that demand 
conceptual frames beyond those of a normative promise. Careful ethnography 
can uncover the production of contested political space that is necessarily fluid: 
shaped by complex and ‘thick’ relationships with a variety of groups, including 
middle- income ones. Much of this politics is ‘stealth- like’ and points to a vast 
city undisciplined by ‘the plan and policy’, and one that contests the disciplines 
imposed by a centralised political party politics. To conceptualise such contested 
city terrains, we start with Ananya Roy’s (2004) call for a ‘situated’ urban theory 
in considering and taking seriously the density of politics. These realms lie 
beyond Chatterjee’s (2008) binary disciplined by the nation state; we look into 
Merrifield’s (2012) ‘encounter’. Here, ‘the encounter’ gives substance to writ-
ings of Singerman and Simone’s deep ethnography on an everyday politics and 
economy. It also gives substance to Robinson’s (2006) arguments concerning 
‘the ordinary city’. The city in these conceptions is heterogeneous, with con-
tested spaces constructed around the complexity of land claims. In effect, rather 
than an overarching frame, ‘plan and policy’ becomes one of the many realms of 
contestations, and one that may not be emancipatory. Instead, we should con-
sider what Blomley (2003) refers to as the ‘grid and survey’ and its associated 
‘geography of violence’. While shaping most of the territorial production of 
Indian cities, the dense opaque form of city politics beyond policy and plans 
unsettles singular forms of private property that form the foundation of planning 
practice and its associated institutions. Much in the line of De Sousa Santos’s 
porous legalities (2004), these reveal multiple registers of claiming, which fall 
beyond the grid and the survey and instead around contested territory created 
during the processes of urbanisation.
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 Political space, then, represents uneven and conflictual spaces with unex-
pected turns. As Rancière (1998) argued, it is such spaces that open up political 
possibilities that, arguably, defy/bypass/contest ‘the grid and survey’.44 Thus, we 
are interested in a politics that may be necessarily opaque and dynamic, and 
reject the inevitability of being disciplined by the ‘grid’ instituted by planning 
institutions and processes.
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Part III
The city as an arena for 
struggles among multiple 
identities

8 The city as nation
Delhi as the Indian nation in Bengali 
bhadralok travelogues 1866–1910
Sandeep Banerjee and Subho Basu
In 1906, Gordon Hearn, a captain in the Royal Engineers of the British Indian 
Army and an associate of the Institute of Civil Engineers in India, published The 
Seven Cities of Delhi (Hearn 1906). Combining myth and reality, Hearn posits a 
‘Hindu’ Delhi and a ‘Muslim’ Delhi as if they were two neatly divided historical 
eras with distinct affiliations of religious ideology. Despite aligning Delhi with 
the ‘Muslim empires’, he mentions the ‘Hindu King Yudisthir’ whose capital, 
Indraprastha, was supposedly located in the Purana Killa (Old Fort) region of the 
city (Hearn 1906: 68–85). Hearn, however, refutes the ‘myth of Indraprastha’ 
but does gesture towards Delhi as a city from ‘time immemorial’. Moreover, 
Hearn compares Delhi to Rome, and narrates the proverbial history of the Indian 
city, focusing on its architectural landmarks (Hearn 1906: 1). By stressing its 
built environment and erasing the people from his description of the city, he 
implicitly projects Delhi as a living museum of history.
 Hearn’s depiction of Delhi as both an ancient imperial centre of India and a 
living museum underlines the British conception of the city. The British retained 
the notion of Delhi as an imperial centre by making it the site of colonial ritual 
through much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The centrality 
of Delhi was repeatedly enacted by the British as they reinforced their claims as 
the legatee of the Mughal Empire. In 1876, the Prince of Wales (the future 
Edward VII of Britain) was entertained at a ball in the Diwan- i-Khas (Hall of 
Special Audience) of the Mughal palace at Shahjahanabad within what came to 
be known as the ‘Red Fort’. The following year, the viceroy Lytton proclaimed 
Queen Victoria the Empress of India – not from Calcutta, the capital of British 
India, but from a durbar in Delhi. In 1903, the viceroy Curzon celebrated the 
coronation of Edward VII at a durbar in Delhi; in 1911 George V was crowned 
Emperor of India in Delhi. There, following Mughal tradition, he appeared for 
darshan, or viewing, on a balcony of the ‘Red Fort’ (Cohn 1983: 165–210).
 Importantly, the iteration of Delhi as the imperial power centre of India was 
coupled with its projection as a museum of India’s past. This owed largely to the 
selection of the city as the symbol of the lost empire by the leaders of the 1857 
Rebellion, which had underlined the dangers of projecting it as a living embodi-
ment of ‘India’. Consequently, the British emphasised the image of Delhi as a 
symbol of a past imperial tradition that could be re- enacted and re- lived only 
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through British imperial agency. This necessarily obscured from view the lived 
dimension of the city and transformed Delhi into a historical relic; a living 
museum of India’s past. This perception of Delhi – engendered by a certain ter-
ritorialisation of Indian history by the colonisers – also informed the attitudes of 
the emergent nationalist elites of India between 1858 and 1911, the zenith of the 
British Empire.
 This chapter focuses on late nineteenth- century and early twentieth- century 
travel accounts of Delhi by visitors from Calcutta, the quintessential ‘modern’ 
colonial city of India and Delhi’s urban antithesis. It argues that the Bengali 
middle- class viewed Delhi through the lens of colonial modernity and, following 
what Nicos Poulantzas has termed the ‘territorialization of history’, it contends 
that the Bengali middle class constructed a dialectical pairing of the spaces of 
Calcutta and Delhi.1 Early travellers from Calcutta perceived Delhi as a relic of 
Muslim authoritarianism, often dismissing it as antiquated in comparison to Cal-
cutta’s modernity. Yet as the nineteenth century progressed, the material basis of 
the intelligentsia changed from that of portfolio capitalists to intermediate tenure 
holders who failed to become a hegemonic capitalist force in Bengal.2 As the 
Bengali middle class supplemented their incomes through work in the colonial 
bureaucracy, their identification of Calcutta with colonial modernity produced 
new doubts and a sense of alienation.3 Though Muslims remained a symbol of 
backwardness in these writings – a perspective undoubtedly characterised by 
their class position as landlords, that is, appropriators of the surplus produced by 
the predominantly Muslim Bengal peasantry – Delhi gradually emerged as the 
symbol of the glorious past of India. The cityscape of Delhi came to be seen as 
the graveyard of both Hindu and Muslim India, owing to the ravages of 
colonisation.
 This chapter examines representations of Delhi in a number of Bengali 
bhadralok travelogues. It begins by discussing Bholanath Chunder’s The Travels 
of a Hindoo to Various Parts of Bengal and Upper India (1869; hereafter, 
Travels), one of the first Indian travelogues written in English. Subsequently, it 
engages with Durgacharan Ray’s Debganer Martye Agaman (The Gods Visit 
Earth; hereafter, Gods) (1880), a farcical documentation of the travels of Hindu 
Gods across India. The chapter concludes by discussing Nabin Chandra Sen’s 
Prabasher Patra (Letters from Distant Lands; hereafter, Letters)4 (1892) and 
Dharanikanta Lahiri Chaudhuri’s Bharat Bhraman (Travels across India; here-
after, India) (1910). These texts devote considerable attention to Delhi and, 
importantly, demonstrate the divergent attitudes of Calcutta’s middle class 
towards that city. First, however, this chapter will briefly look at Delhi and Cal-
cutta in the late nineteenth century under colonial rule.
 Delhi is located between the ridges that divide the Indus- centric Punjab plains 
and the Gangetic plains of north India. The history of the city’s urbanisation 
stretches back to 1052, under the Tomar ruler Anangpal. The seven cities within 
the region of Delhi achieved fame during the time of the Delhi Sultanate, estab-
lished by Qutubuddin Aibak in 1206. Rai Pithora, the fort established by the 
Chauhan king Prithviraj in the twelfth century, became the centre of the city 
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during the early period of the Sultanate. In the later years, various Tughlaq mon-
archs established their own capital cities around their royal palaces. This early 
urbanisation impulse came to an end with the invasion of Timur in 1398 
(Hambly 1986: 45–62). Subsequently, the Sayyid and Lodhi dynasties, Sher 
Shah Suri, and the Mughal kings all contributed to a renewed drive for urbanisa-
tion, which further contributed to the expansion and evolution of Delhi’s land-
scape. It was in 1648, however, that Delhi gained a new status when the Mughal 
Emperor Shah Jahan completed the new, walled city of Shahjahanabad and made 
Delhi the capital of his empire. This remained the modern city of Delhi until the 
British ‘new’ Delhi was completed in 1931 under the guidance of Edwin Luytens 
and Herbert Baker. The final years of Shahjahanabad were characterised by 
ravages and plunders by both foreign and Indian conquerors, such as Nadir Shah 
in 1739, Ghulam Qadir Rohilla in 1787 and, finally, the British army, victorious 
after suppressing the 1857 Rebellion.
 The model of urbanisation in Delhi was driven primarily by the political 
impulses of ruling dynastic or capitalistic imperial regimes. Stephen Blake has 
focused on Shahjahanabad to highlight the symbolic significance of such a 
dynastic capital using his concept of ‘sovereign city’ (Blake 1991: 31–32), 
defined as the capital of a patrimonial bureaucratic empire that represents a par-
ticular early- modern state- building process in Asia (Blake 1991: 183). The 
sovereign city in micro- perspective, Blake notes, was an enormously extended 
patriarchal household of the emperor himself; the organisation and production of 
space within the city itself reflected the social and spatial organisation of the 
palace (Blake 1991: xxii–xiii). At a macro level, it was the kingdom in mini-
ature. Drawing on Max Weber’s notion of ‘patrimonial realm’, Blake contends 
that in the political characterisation of state formation, the emperor extends per-
sonal patrimonial control over the space of the kingdom through a bureaucratic 
arrangement where the bureaucracy was loyal to the emperor through complex 
military, political and economic arrangements. Shahjahanabad as a ‘sovereign 
city’, then, was an urban spatial expression of such political authority where the 
city acted as axis mundi, with the palace symbolising the centre of cosmic order 
created and validated by the presence of the emperor himself.
 The idea of the Mughal state as patrimonial has been substantially revised by 
scholars such as Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Muzaffar Alam (Subrahmanyam & 
Alam 1998). However, the symbolic significance of Shahjahanabad can be 
asserted through the notion of loyalty not so much to the person but to the 
Mughal crown. The political culture of this symbolic capital of the early modern 
era thus provided Delhi with a special characteristic that owed particularly to the 
presence of the emperor as the symbolic head of the realm. Delhi retained this 
special status despite the eclipse of Mughal rule and the plunder of the city by 
Nadir Shah in 1739 and subsequently by Afghan chieftains.
 In 1803, the British general Lord Lake extended British sway over the city by 
replacing the Marathas as the custodians of the Mughal Emperor who, in reality, 
had authority only over his palace (Gupta 1981: 13). Under British protection, 
the city witnessed a social revival. The ‘White Mughals’ – to borrow William 
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Dalrymple’s evocative term – continued to support the cultural and academic 
fabric of Delhi, which witnessed the last efflorescence of the Indo- Persian 
Mughal culture (Dalrymple 2002).5 Many British officials became crucial parti-
cipants in this process despite the gradual eclipse of orientalist scholars among 
the imperial bureaucratic elites. Despite the decline of the Mughal patrimonial 
bureaucratic empire, the city continued to survive as a living symbol of Mughal 
imperial culture with a benign British imperial benediction.
 This culture continued to seek the accommodation of diverse religious tradi-
tions within the Mughal imperial domain.
 It was during these years that the Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar con-
tinued to ban the slaughter of cows while the British sought to allow it (Gupta 
1981: 10). At this time the western- educated Mughal aristocrat Syed Ahmed 
Khan scaled the Qutub Minar not only to decipher the script on the tower but 
also to prove that it was originally built by a Hindu monarch. His work, Aasar us 
Sanadid (The Ruins of the Cities of Delhi) was a first of its kind. His article was 
subsequently published in the Archaeological Survey of India proceedings and 
brought him fame and government employment. Delhi thus remained a living 
symbol of the syncretic Mughal culture and is commemorated in the con-
temporary lyrics of Mirza Ghalib.6 In this sense it represented the early modern 
cultural framework of northern India.
 The 1857 Rebellion altered this balance of power. The British became con-
vinced that Muslim aristocrats sought to restore the pre- eminence of the Mughal 
elites, while Delhi’s Hindu bankers were loyal to them. After quelling the 1857 
Rebellion, the British army murdered the Mughal princes and sent Bahadur Shah 
Zafar into exile; they also systematically dismantled the Muslim aristocracy. 
Muslim households were plundered and the prize money found its way into the 
pockets of Delhi army soldiers. The Muslim residents of Shahjahanabad were 
evicted from their homes and not allowed to return for a decade. Further, parts of 
the fort were destroyed; barracks were set up to house the army while Mughal 
palaces were occupied by British officers; the Jama Mosque became an army 
storehouse, and the Akbarbadi Mosque was razed to the ground. The Fatehpuri 
Mosque was auctioned off to Chunna Mal, a Delhi banker who had been loyal to 
the British during the rebellion, and eventually gifted back to the Muslims during 
the Durbar of 1877.
 Likewise, the British replaced the old aristocratic elites of Delhi with bankers 
who came from Hindu and Jain money- lending families (Gupta 1981: 27, 73). 
These groups framed policies for the city and petitioned for the extension of the 
railways into Delhi. Between 1867 and 1878 the railways connected Delhi to 
Calcutta and the Punjab; this railway extension further destroyed Muslim habita-
tions in the city. As colonial capitalism triumphed over the proto- capitalistic pat-
rimonial bureaucratic imperium, the city was transformed into a town of 
commerce (Gupta 1981: 30, 39–49). In an ironic twist, Delhi came to be admin-
istered from Lahore, originally a city of provincial Mughal satraps. The new city 
became a museum of history for the tourists – British and Indian – brought in by 
the railways (Gupta 1981: 26–31). British taverns and hotels catered to tourists, 
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and Shahjahanabad, with its palaces, mosques and ruins, was transformed into a 
relic without a place in the colonial capitalist modernity of India. Delhi’s trans-
formation from a sovereign city to a nondescript trading town was complete. 
This museum city – an instrument of nostalgia – reminded some visitors from 
Calcutta of oriental despotism; others perceived it as a graveyard of Indic 
civilisation.
Calcutta: colonial capitalism and Hindu modernity
In contrast to Delhi, Calcutta was a thriving commercial city during the late 
nineteenth century. A transit point for Indian raw materials, labour for overseas 
colonies and manufactured products for distribution within India, it emerged as 
the second city of the British Empire. This period also saw the rapid industriali-
sation of the neighbourhood, particularly with the development of the jute indus-
try.7 Jute not only provided a stimulus to the cash- starved peasant economy but 
also acted as a cash crop that was traded with the outside world to meet the trade 
deficit of the British Empire vis- à-vis the newly industrialising zones of the north 
Atlantic.8 Importantly, the rise of colonial capitalism diminished the significance 
of land revenue for the colonial state. It facilitated an amalgamation of banking 
and industrial capital through umbrella economic institutions such as managing 
agency houses, leading to the emergence of new Indian intermediaries such as 
the Marwaris – the backbone of the later Indian bourgeoisie in Bengal (Timberg 
1977).
 The indigenous Hindu Bengali community was, however, not directly 
involved in this new direction of the colonial economy. This contrasted starkly 
with the preceding century, when Bengali merchants acted as portfolio capital-
ists as well as the intellectual leaders of Bengal. For instance, Dwarakanath 
Tagore, Ram Mohan Roy and other members of Calcutta’s Bengali mercantile 
community were not only intermediary capitalists but also key members of the 
cultural life of eighteenth- century Calcutta. Combining their Indo- Persian educa-
tion with training in western knowledge systems, they helped shape a distinct 
cultural identity for the city. They were capitalist elites who were either directly 
involved with, or patrons of, cultural production. Importantly, these elites 
increasingly adopted the progressive bourgeois perspective on global history. 
They sought to fashion themselves as custodians of Indian modernity which was 
introduced through the agency of the colonial state. However, the depression of 
1848 radically altered this socio- economic topography. Many pioneering Bengali 
industrialists lost their fortunes with the collapse of the Union Bank, a pivotal 
business organisation in Calcutta. Consequently, an entire class of indigenous 
entrepreneurs lost their ability to participate in the industrial development of 
nineteenth- century Bengal.9 This class of Bengalis sought pecuniary refuge in 
the land revenue that was guaranteed them by the Permanent Settlement.
 Instituted in Bengal in 1793 by the British East India Company, the system of 
permanent settlement gave tenure holders ownership of the land and the right to 
its revenue. In return, these landlords were expected to pay an annual tax to the 
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British East India Company which was fixed in perpetuity. In the aftermath of 
1848, the Permanent Settlement provided a secure source of income for the erst-
while merchant class (Ray 1975: 263–292; also see Ray 1979). Interestingly, this 
class’s move towards the colonial capitalist economy veered away from instead 
of towards absentee landlordism. Introduced by the British to foster a rule of 
property in Bengal and incubate a class of improving yeomen farmers, the Per-
manent Settlement in effect produced an intermediate, tenure- holding social 
class of rentiers who survived by appropriating the surplus of the Bengal 
peasantry.10
 This intermediary class reaped the benefits of the colonial education system 
and supplemented their income from land revenue by either joining the colonial 
bureaucracy or working in the colonial ‘service sector’ as lawyers, doctors, jour-
nalists, teachers and clerks. High- caste Hindu men became the overwhelming 
majority among professionals and landholding elites, while Muslims constituted 
a substantial segment of the peasant, artisanal and working classes in Calcutta as 
well as in the Bengal countryside.11 By 1872, census reports clearly established 
non- Muslims as a minority in Bengal proper. As members of the colonial bur-
eaucracy, and as professionals, this class was placed at the middle of the colonial 
Indian social formation. They were subordinate to their colonial masters, espe-
cially because of the racialised nature of colonial labour space. However, the 
middle class enjoyed a superior economic position in relation to the Indian 
working classes, the peasants and artisans. Further, in Bengal and elsewhere the 
middle class also formed the backbone of the colonial governance machinery. 
As a managerial class, they helped to maintain colonial domination, and aided 
the colonisers’ appropriation of surplus value produced by the working classes 
even as they aspired to the position of dominance over their colonising British 
masters.
 From the nineteenth century, periodic discontent among the working classes 
and peasantry on one hand, and the racist attitudes of the colonisers on the other, 
made this intermediary class of English- educated, upper- caste Hindu men 
acutely aware of their own location in the social formation of Bengal. This com-
bination of class anxiety, demographic insecurity and a subordinate position 
within the colonial social hierarchy informed their quest for political modernity, 
marked by a putative nationalism. Over time this group adopted for themselves 
the appellation bhadralok, literally meaning ‘the courteous folk’, replete with 
connotations of refinement and culture. Moreover, this indicates that the 
bhadralok separated themselves from the itarlok (literally, the ‘rude folk’) while 
simultaneously positing themselves as more rational and progressive than the 
abhijatlok, the precolonial aristocracy (see Banerjee 1989).
 While critical scholarship has indicated the limitations of emerging interme-
diary social constellations in Calcutta and their quest for modernity, little atten-
tion has been paid to their production of the space of India against the 
background of such insecurity.12 Indeed, the discourses of modernity promoted 
by the Bengali middle class located the British colonial state space as the space 
of the putative Indian nation.13 Importantly, this class made a distinction between 
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the ethno- linguistic homeland, or patria of Bengal, and the Indo- Persian cultural 
space of Hindustan.14 With the development of Indian nationalism, these various 
homelands were seen to be accommodated under the hegemonic sign of India 
that represented unity in diversity.
 In their self- fashioning, the Bengali middle class appropriated the colonial 
historiography of India pioneered by James Mill, John Stuart Mill, James Todd, 
Henry Elliot, and Mountstuart Elphinstone, and indeed the colonial ‘territoriali-
sation of history’ that presented Muslims as tyrannical foreign conquerors of 
India.15 As the Bengali middle class shed their Indo- Persianate moorings to 
adopt an Anglo- vernacular sensibility, this mode of historiography, along with 
precolonial Indic myths and legends, constructed Hindus as the principal inhabit-
ants of India. The relationships between Hindus and Muslims were imagined dif-
ferently by various writers.
 With the advent of the railways since the 1850s, the Bengali middle classes 
began to travel widely across the subcontinent. This growth of travel coincided 
with the group’s discovery of India’s nationhood and resulted in a large body of 
travel narratives which provided readers with a crucial way to experience the 
history and nationhood of India. They focused on Delhi, which became an 
epitome of India’s past, in contradistinction to the modernity of Calcutta. The 
implicit dialectical pairing of capitals became a strategy of territorialising history 
in which cities became a metaphor for the past – and future – nation.
Visions of Delhi in Bengali bhadralok travelogues
Almost all the bhadralok travel narratives documenting the travels of the Bengali 
middle class in north India focus on Delhi; however, they articulate divergent 
visions of the city’s past. The earlier texts follow the normative colonial logic of 
aligning Delhi with the Muslim imperium. They reject the city by portraying it 
as a symbol of Muslim tyranny and medieval backwardness, often by contrasting 
it with the modernity of Calcutta. The later travelogues complicate this antithesis 
between Delhi and Calcutta and implicitly question the assumptions regarding 
Delhi’s backwardness and Calcutta’s modernity. Instead, these texts project 
Delhi as a symbol of India’s Hindu and Muslim pasts. They transform the city 
into a space that articulates the loss of India’s glory resulting from British colo-
nisation of the Indian subcontinent. The city becomes a means of experiencing, 
and a vehicle for expressing the narrators’ lived reality of colonisation. In other 
words, these later travelogues produce Delhi as a spatial metaphor for the Indian 
nation.
 Bholanath Chunder’s Travels (1869) is one of the earliest Indian travel 
accounts written in English. It provides a detailed account of Delhi based on 
Chunder’s journey to the city in 1866. Travels presents a survey of Delhi’s built 
environments under different rulers, as well as the mythical city of Indraprastha, 
before proceeding to describe Shahjahanabad in detail. This is interspersed with 
accounts of historical events such as the invasions of Timur and Nadir Shah, and 
the 1857 Rebellion and its subsequent pacification by the British.
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 In his narrative, Chunder also focuses on the gradual degradation and the 
poverty of the Mughal court. This allows him to construct his argument of 
Mughal rule being emblematic of a moral degradation of Muslims. While noting 
that the British heaped ‘slights and insults on the head of the Moghul’, Chunder 
proceeds to note that the Mughal emperor and ‘his progeny went on multiplying 
by compound multiplication, till . . . his palace, styled the paradise upon earth, 
became [a] . . . sty, by being crowded with Sultans and Sultanas, who lay about 
in scores, like broods of vermin’ (Chunder 1869: 346). A loyal supporter 
of British rule in India, Chunder writes approvingly of the public killings of 
Bahadur Shah Zafar’s sons by General Hodgson after the British takeover of 
Delhi in 1857. Indeed, he is thankful for the end of Mughal rule. He writes:
It is well that the Great Mughal is extinct. . . . No curse that has afflicted the 
human race has . . . been so baneful as . . . Mahomedan rule . . . to mankind. 
The Moslem rose as a storm- wave to entomb all the great works of ancient 
power and wisdom . . . and to plunge the world into a state of barbarism that 
has perpetuated despotism, ignorance and anarchy.
(Chunder 1869: 355)
This disparaging tone continues in Chunder’s description of Delhi, which he 
finds – despite its former glory – to be lacking in the ‘elements of true greatness’ 
(Chunder 1869: 243). It had ‘no intelligence that enlarges the mind . . . no frater-
nizing sympathy . . . no public spirit . . . and no patriotic devotion’ (Chunder 
1869: 244). Describing the central marketplace of Chandni Chowk, he notes that 
the ‘moving throng of richly- dressed natives riding on caparisoned horses, 
lounging on elephants, or borne . . . in palankeens [sic] have passed away for 
ever’ (Chunder 1869: 279). However, Chunder cautions the reader against 
feeling too nostalgic: this may indeed be a pity for lovers of the picturesque, but 
‘the British residents of Delhi probably feel more certain about their lives now 
that the offscourings of Bahadur Shah’s court are no longer in place’ (Chunder 
1869: 279).
 Shahjahanabad, for Chunder, is the ‘living city’ in contradistinction to the 
‘heaps of ruins . . . and tombs’ of the earlier settlements that provide the viewer 
(and by extension, the reader) with sermons in stone (Chunder 1869: 270). While 
Chunder calls Shah Jahan the first and richest monarch on earth, the emperor 
remains a tyrant who obtained the wealth with which he built the Mughal city 
‘partly by presents, partly by purchase, and partly by plunder’. Shahjahanabad is 
for Chunder, ‘the city of a despot – no colleges, no hospitals, no museums, no 
public squares, no promenades, and no ghauts [sic]. He builds only . . . for 
himself, and leaves the people to shift for themselves’ (Chunder 1869: 274).
 Chunder also gently taunts Shah Jahan’s desire to build a new city, which he 
puts down to imperial whimsy. He notes that these days, money has to be made 
by ‘honest and life- long labours – and not by looting: ‘[The] health of the 
viceroy cannot be a reason . . . for the building of a new City’ (Chunder 1869: 
273). Any attempt to move the capital from Calcutta, Chunder observes with an 
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air of quiet confidence, would not only jeopardise the fortunes of the city’s house 
owners but would also devalue the crores of rupees invested in building Fort 
William, the Government House, the Town Hall, the High Court, the Bank of 
Bengal and the Post Office. Of course, these comments appear extremely ironic 
in light of the British decision to shift the capital from Calcutta to Delhi a few 
decades later, in 1911.
 Chunder ends his description of Delhi by comparing it explicitly with Cal-
cutta. For him, this great capital of northern India undoubtedly has features of a 
metropolis, but Calcutta has the ‘advantage in general magnificence’ (Chunder 
1869: 375). Delhi, Chunder claims, has nothing like Calcutta’s splendid squares, 
and no places for driving and walking like the Maidan or the Strand (Chunder 
1869: 375). The view of Delhi across the Yamuna is not, according to him, ‘half 
so grand and striking’ as the prospect of Calcutta, the ‘City of Palaces’, from 
across the Ganges (Chunder 1869: 375). Chunder notes that
it is much to be doubted whether, in its best days, Delhi had any such taste-
ful buildings as our Fever Hospital, our Metcalfe hall, and our classical 
Mint. It is not fair . . . [to compare] a fallen and a rising city.
(Chunder 1869: 376)
 Durga Charan Ray’s Gods appeared in 1880, a little over a decade after the 
publication of Chunder’s Travels. Gods belongs to the late nineteenth- century 
tradition of farcical imagined travelogues in Bengali. It depicts some members 
of the Hindu pantheon taking advantage of modern transportation systems such 
as railways and steamboats to traverse the expanse of the Indian subcontinent. 
Importantly, this tradition of writing is scornful of colonial modernity and the 
anglo- vernacular babu culture of Bengal it engendered. This self- ridicule can be 
understood as an attempt to negotiate an upper- caste, upper- class male Hindu 
identity with the fact of colonial capitalist modernity.
 In Gods, the Hindu gods Brahma, Vishnu (Narayan), Varun and Indra visit 
the historic spaces of Delhi and narrate its history through events associated with 
these architectural landmarks. Their itinerary mimics that of their more earthly 
Bengali bhadralok followers. They begin by visiting the Purana Killa area built 
by Sher Shah Suri, purported to be the site of Yudisthir’s capital, Indraprastha. 
After this, the gods proceed to the Qutub complex, which was the centre of the 
city during the Delhi Sultanate. Subsequently, they travel around Shahjahanabad 
and visit the Mughal fort and its palaces, as well as the Jama Mosque, before 
leaving the city for the north Indian pilgrim town of Mathura. As the protagon-
ists of this narrative encounter the various sites, they discuss them among them-
selves, their exchange fusing empirical facts with traditional myths to generate a 
sense of Delhi’s history. This construction of popular historical memory by the 
Bengali bhadralok class is crucial as it indicates their attempts to interpret 
India’s past through a specific territorialisation of history. Interestingly, though 
written only a few decades after 1857, there is no mention of the Rebellion in the 
narrative.
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 In Gods, the section on Delhi opens with Varun explaining to the other gods 
the reason for the presence of temples, mosques and churches in Delhi. He notes 
that the city was the capital of India’s Hindu and Muslim empires and continued 
to be the seat of British Indian political authority (Ray 1984: 45).16 He therefore 
re- inscribes Delhi as the imperial centre of India. Varun also comments that 
present- day Delhi was located on the site of Yudisthir’s capital city, Indrapras-
tha. He observes, further, that the kings of the Anga, Vanga and Kalinga regions 
came to pay tribute to the emperor Yudisthir at Indraprastha when he performed 
the Rajsooya Yagna, or fire sacrifice (Ray 1984: 46). The spaces of Anga, Vanga 
and Kalinga roughly correspond to what would come to be known, respectively, 
as Bihar, Bengal and Orissa in the colonial cartographic imagination. Published 
just over a decade after the Delhi Durbar of 1877, this appears to be a veiled ref-
erence to that event. Moreover, Varun’s mention of these spaces not only draws 
upon the precolonial notion of ethno- linguistic homelands, but also situates them 
in relation to Delhi. In other words, it replicates the hegemonic identity of Delhi 
as the centre of Indian space.
 Gods combines historical events with mythical ones in order to construct a meta- 
narrative of Indian history. For instance, answering Brahma’s query about the prov-
enance of the Koh- i-noor diamond, Varun glibly conflates it with the famed 
Syamantak gem (Ray 1984: 53–54). Mentioned in the Vishnu Puran and the Bhaga-
vat Puran, the Syamantak gem belonged to the Sun god, Surya, and was supposedly 
invested with magical powers. Surya’s gift of the gem to Satrajit, a Yadav nobleman, 
begins the jewel’s earthly life. The Puranic narratives describe its theft and sub-
sequent recovery by the mythical Krishna. This equation of the Koh- i-noor diamond 
with the Syamantak gem, and the association of the historical events around the 
Mughal diamond with the mythical stories of the Puranic gem are, of course, signi-
ficant. It allows for a certain classicisation of tradition through which a larger histor-
ical narrative can be constructed.17 According to such a narrative, Mughal India (and 
indeed, British India) is made a function of an earlier Hindu India. In this schema, 
the Koh- i-noor diamond, whether in British or Mughal hands, becomes a form of 
the original Hindu Syamantak gem; the court of the Hindu king Yudisthir 
becomes the original archetype of the Mughal court or the Delhi Durbar of 1877. 
Importantly, this transforms the Mughal city of Shahjahanabad – or any of the other 
urban complexes of Delhi built by other rulers or the British – into belated versions 
of the originary space of Indraprastha. Crucially, this move projects Hindus as the 
original inhabitants of Delhi, and by extension, the Indian subcontinent.
 In Gods, this strategy of positing the primacy of Hindus is coupled with a 
process of othering Muslims. Brahma, for instance, is scared at the sight of 
Muslim women in burkhas; he is calmed after it is explained to him that it is a 
Muslim social custom (Ray 1984: 50). Likewise, he is also stupefied at the sight 
of Muslim men performing namaaz (Ray 1984: 55). These Muslim customs are 
presented as incomprehensible and strange, with the aim of provoking laughter 
among the readers. This humour, however, also has the effect of distancing the 
subjects of the narrative, reifying them into antiquated and passive objects for 
consumption by the reader.
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 At the time of their departure from Delhi, Vishnu proceeds to purchase tickets 
for their outward journey but comes running back from the counter without 
them. When asked about the reason for his frantic return, Vishnu says that he 
could not bear the bad breath of the people at the counter; the smell of garlic 
emanating from their mouths had made him nauseous (Ray 1984: 56). This sing-
ling out of garlic as the cause for bad breath draws upon the common Bengali 
Hindu misapprehension that Muslim food is laden with fried garlic, onions and 
ginger. Moreover, it attempts to portray Muslims as unhygienic and unclean.
 The lack of cleanliness and poor hygiene of Muslims are further underlined 
by referencing the Muslim custom of halal. During their journey through the 
city, the gods see a dilapidated mosque by the roadside. From within it, a Muslim 
slits the throat of a hen and puts it out on the street through the door. The hen 
flaps about in pain and lands at the foot of Brahma. At this, Brahma stands aside, 
muttering a word of disgust (Ray 1984: 54).
 This extract projects halal as an essential feature of Muslim identity by situat-
ing the act within the premises of the mosque in Delhi. This alignment of the 
mosque, the city of Delhi and the act of ‘brutality’ in the narrative can be read as 
symbolic of Muslim culture in India at large; the description carries within it an 
implicit characterisation of Muslim daily life and the culture in general as cruel 
and disgusting. Interestingly, neither Brahma nor Vishnu – respectively con-
sidered the creator and preserver of life in the Hindu pantheon – save the hen. 
When Vishnu asks Brahma why he did not save the hen, he replies that he cannot 
overturn the dictates of fate. The god’s acknowledgement of this is, of course, 
significant as it articulates the Bengali bhadralok’s sense of powerlessness in the 
face of recent history, and the class anxiety about their lack of historical agency.
 The question of gender inflects the spatial conception of Delhi in significant 
ways. During the gods’ visit to Shahjahanabad, they see the constructions of the 
Mughal emperor Shah Jahan. At this, Vishnu comments on the similarity 
between the Muslim emperors and women. He notes that the badshahs, instead 
of saving their revenue, seem to spend it on thrones and mosques, just as women 
spend money on jewellery and clothes (Ray 1984: 52). Importantly, women here 
are not labelled along ethnic or religious lines; instead the ‘natural’ wastefulness 
of the female gender becomes the means for expressing the profligacy of the 
Mughals. The question of women also becomes important in the gods’ critique 
of Calcutta’s modernity. While Varun notes that the Mughals and the Muslim 
nawabs of Bengal kept their women under purdah, he also pokes fun at the 
Bengali babus who ‘not being satisfied with keeping their families in their street- 
side houses with many windows, take their wives to enjoy the air of Calcutta in 
open carriages’ (Ray 1984). This, then, is not just a critique of the Muslim medi-
evalism of Delhi, but also structures the angst against the colonial capitalist 
modernity of Calcutta.
 The notion of Delhi as a museum is also prevalent throughout the narrative of 
Gods. At the outset, Vishnu sees his image among the ruins of the Qutub 
complex (Ray 1984: 47). Noting that this is a museum of Delhi’s past, he rues 
the fate that has placed his idol in such a place. Later, observing the prevalence 
136  S. Banerjee and S. Basu
of graves in the city, he comments that Delhi must be filled with mamdo and 
mamdi ghosts (Ray 1984: 53). Mamdo and mamdi ghosts abound in Bengali 
folklore and refer, respectively, to male and female Muslim ghosts. This, of 
course, aligns Delhi with a Muslim past. It is important to note that Vishnu’s 
point of view reveals a Hindu perspective that sees the Muslim past as dead and 
buried; the city’s Hindu past – evidenced by his own idol at the ruins – is 
acknowledged as living, if scarcely so. In effect, this underlines the Bengali 
bhadralok’s attempt to recuperate and enliven what it sees as his own past.
 Nabin Chandra Sen’s poetical works define the Bengali canon of the late 
nineteenth century. Considered one of the most important literary figures of 
Bengal of his time, he was prominent in the years between the death of Michael 
Madhusudan Dutt and the rise to prominence of Rabindranath Tagore. Written a 
decade after Ray’s Gods, Sen’s Letters (1892; Sen 1974: 65–118) portrays Delhi 
as the site of history that conveys the rise and fall of empires. Combining myth 
and history, Sen narrates the past of Delhi, where legends of the Mahabharat, 
the preachings of the Buddha, the kingdom of Ashok, the kingdom of Pritviraj 
Chauhan and the Mughal Empire all intermingle to form part of one unfolding 
saga (Sen 1974: 82–83).
 Significantly for Sen, Delhi has been the ‘capital of India through centuries and 
from time immemorial’ (Sen 1974: 87). This articulation of the space of India and 
its symbolic centre is important as it highlights the emergent awareness of a 
nation- space among the Bengali middle class. The city is not only the centre of the 
putative nation for Sen, but also the symbol of the nation under the yoke of the 
colonisers. This is aptly conveyed by his image of the city as the ‘great cremation 
ground of Hindu empires, the graveyard of Muslim imperium, and the playground 
of Fate’ (Sen 1974: 82). In his travelogue, Sen details his elation at the thought of 
Delhi’s past greatness, and despairs at its loss (Sen 1974).
 Sen is unlike Chunder and Ray in so far as he reserves his barbs for the British 
colonisers and speaks about the Mughals in glowing terms. He calls the British 
‘heartless’ for turning an Afghan general’s tomb in the Qutub complex into a bun-
galow (Sen 1974: 84). Sen also comments on the travesty of fate that transformed 
the descendants of the great Mughals into British pensioners. He follows this up 
by praising the Indians for the 1857 Rebellion. The British General Hodgson – 
who murdered Bahadur Shah’s sons in the aftermath of 1857 – is for Sen a blood-
thirsty specimen of humankind who ‘showed how humans could be worse than 
animals when their baser instincts are aroused’ (Sen 1974: 88).
 Likewise, the Mughals – as symbols of a precolonial India – are worthy of 
special respect for Sen. He writes that he paid his respects at the tombs of Akbar 
and Shah Jahan’s daughter, Jahan Ara, for they were exemplary individuals (Sen 
1974). In fact, in another virtuoso display of combining myth and history, Sen 
even claims the Mughals belonged to the Yadav clan, whose most famous 
member is the mythical Krishna, worshipped by Hindus as a god (Sen 1974: 84). 
The construction of this genealogy of the Mughals is significant as it once again 
foregrounds the Hindu classicisation of tradition. It posits Hindus as the origi-
nary inhabitants of India. Moreover, by positing the Hindu identity as hegemonic 
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in the context of India, it positions Hinduism as the civil religion of India.18 This 
construction of a hegemonic Hindu identity is critical for Sen’s articulation of an 
inclusive vision of India, and Indians. For Sen, then, Delhi as the symbol of the 
Indian nation reflects this inclusive ethos.
 This inclusionary impulse is further highlighted in Sen’s recurrent description 
of Delhi as both graveyard and cremation ground. The juxtaposition of Hindu 
and Muslim funerary sites indicates his attempt to construct a sense of shared 
oppression for the two communities under the British. Moreover, it underlines 
Sen’s gesture at producing a shared space for Hindus and Muslims. Again, Delhi 
stands in as a symbol of the lost (and future) Indian nation. It is a space – like 
India – that belongs to both Hindus and Muslims; it is a space to which Hindus 
and Muslims belong.
 Dharani Kanta Lahiri Chaudhuri was the scion of a great Hindu landholding 
family from the predominantly Muslim district of Mymansingha in eastern 
Bengal. Though a landlord, he trained as a doctor. Lahiri Chaudhuri travelled 
widely and wrote Bengali with a hint of drama, following the style of Bankim 
Chandra Chatterjee. His high professional standing, well known erudition, fab-
ulous wealth and deep political loyalty to the British Raj earned him a berth in 
the Indian Legislative Chamber. His travelogue, India, was published in 1910, a 
year before the British shifted the capital from Calcutta to Delhi. A narrative rich 
in historical and ethnographic details, it claims to have been inspired by his 
desire to know and experience the natural and man- made beauties of India 
(Chaudhuri 1910: Preface). India, as its name suggests, documents Lahiri 
Chaudhuri’s travels across the Indian subcontinent. It is modelled on the Grand 
Tour of continental Europe, popular with British travellers since the eighteenth 
century. His narrative devotes considerable space to the city of Delhi, which he 
portrays as a peerless Indian city (Chaudhuri 1910: 134).
 Chaudhuri’s description of Delhi opens with the panoramic view of the city’s 
surroundings from his rail car. In a description that recalls Sen, he imagines the 
old mosques and temples and ruins of palaces as a crematorium for India’s glori-
ous past (Chaudhuri 1910: 134). These fleeting images inspire in Chaudhuri 
thoughts about Delhi’s history and marauding invaders such as Nadir Shah and 
Ahmad Shah Abdali (Chaudhuri 1910: 134). Interestingly, in his description of 
the cruel invaders of the city he fails to mention the pillaging British Army and 
its attendant destruction of Shahjahanabad in the aftermath of the 1857 Rebel-
lion. His description of Delhi is laced with nostalgia for its lost glory; however, 
as Chaudhuri proceeds, it becomes apparent that Delhi is little more than a living 
museum of history for him. After reaching Delhi, Chaudhuri briefly mentions 
the everyday city, noting that although the ancient goddess of prosperity has 
deserted it, Delhi still retains a sense of comfort and wellbeing. Describing the 
city he sees, Chaudhuri mentions the rows of stores, Indian and European hotels, 
inns and Turkish baths, and the Queen’s Park opposite the station (Chaudhuri 
1910: 135). These for him are markers of Delhi’s contemporary glory.
 Subsequently, he proceeds to provide his readers with an extended survey of 
the city’s history, following the normative colonial mode of narrating Delhi’s 
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history based on architectural landmarks. Like the British narratives of Delhi, 
this too fetishises the city, excluding from its ambit the lived social relations that 
produce the cityspace. Moreover, Lahiri Chaudhuri cites from a wide variety of 
British and European sources during his re- telling of the city’s past. Not only 
does this claim, implicitly, authenticity for his narrative, it also uses British his-
toriography to legitimise his accounts of Delhi’s past.
 Unlike Chunder and Ray, Chaudhuri does not present the Mughals as medi-
eval tyrants and oriental despots. He cites a British source to underline that Shah 
Jahan, the founder of Shahjahanabad, ‘reigned not so much as a King over his 
subjects, but rather as a father over his family and children’ (Chaudhuri 1910: 
138). However, Chaudhuri’s narrative repeatedly omits any mention of the 
British impact on the city. In fact, during his visit to Shahjahanabad, he elides 
over its plunder by the British forces in the aftermath of the 1857 Rebellion. He 
cautiously notes that the ‘diamonds, pearls and rubies that adorned the ceiling 
and floor of the Hall of General Audience [Diwan- i-Am] of the Mughal fort (the 
“Red Fort”) at Shahjahanabad were now missing. The British government has 
replaced them with colored glass’ (Chaudhuri 1910: 140). He also observes that 
the gold plaque that extolled the virtues of the palace was replaced with a brass 
one by the British (Chaudhuri 1910: 141). As a loyal subject of the British 
crown, Lahiri Chaudhuri avoids mentioning these as acts of active pillage by the 
colonisers.
 Chaudhuri quotes a Persian couplet regarding the beauty of the Mughal palace 
at Shahjahanabad: ‘If there is paradise on earth, then it is here, it is here, it is 
here.’ However, concluding his description of Delhi, Lahiri Chaudhuri displays 
his colonised subjectivity by relying on the poetry of Lord Byron to articulate 
the (lost) greatness of Delhi. Reworking lines from Byron’s Childe Harold’s Pil-
grimage, he writes, ‘Oh Delhi! my country city of the soul!’ (Chaudhuri 1910: 
168). In this configuration, Chaudhuri replaces Rome with Delhi, once again 
attesting to Delhi’s status as the spatial metaphor of the putative Indian nation- 
space. Yet, this imagining itself manifests the stranglehold of colonial know-
ledge systems as it underlines the epistemic colonisation of the Indian subject.
Conclusion
This chapter deals with the interaction between the idea of a putative Indian 
nation- space and various readings of Delhi’s history. It examines the place of 
Delhi as an ancient capital city within that imagined nation- space of India. It 
studies the representations of Delhi, the capital of the Mughal Empire, by the 
Bengali intelligentsia from Calcutta, the capital of the British Empire in India 
during the nineteenth century. Those who were committed to the notion of colo-
nial modernity and who remained influenced by the emerging colonial histori-
ography of India viewed Delhi as the antithesis of modernity and representative 
of the oriental despotism of earlier Muslim dynasties.
 As these narratives demonstrate, their authors combined the progressive his-
toriography of India produced by the colonisers with indigenous myths and 
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legends. This underlines the processes through which Indian nationalism 
emerged through the interactions and interpenetrations of discourses and spatial-
ities, both indigenous and colonial. Delhi remained at the heart of the imagina-
tion of the Indian nation- space. The city was conceived as the representative 
symbol of, often divergent, threads of national history, significantly informing 
and impacting the debates around who did (or did not) belong to the putative 
national space; and to whom that space belonged. Crucially, these travel writers 
engaged with the question of nationalism within the limits imposed, and pres-
sures exerted, by the socio- economic and ideological structures of colonialism. 
A strand of the homespun notion of Hindu nationalism incorporated and synthe-
sized the claims of colonial modernity to regard Delhi as specifically Muslim, 
and therefore irredeemably medieval and barbaric. And as the country’s Hindu 
Right continue to scream out about India being a Hindu country, it is evident 
that some of these ideas continue to haunt the imagination of the Indian nation- 
space and the question of who is (or is not) ‘truly’ Indian.
Notes
 1 According to Poulantzas, the state establishes a peculiar relationship between history 
and territory, between spatial and temporal aspects of nation formation. He notes that 
the capitalist state marks out frontiers when it constitutes what is within, the people- 
nation, by homogenising the before and after of the content of this enclosure. National 
unity or modern unity thereby becomes the historicity of a territory and territorialisa-
tion of a history – in short, a territorial national tradition concretised in the nation 
state, the markings of a territory became indicators of history that are written into the 
state. See Poulantzas (2000: 114).
 2 According to Sanjay Subrahmanyam, portfolio capitalists comprised a group of 
persons who gradually emerged into prominence from the second half of the sixteenth 
century, eventually assuming formidable proportions in the first half of the seven-
teenth century. These persons, who we have termed ‘portfolio capitalists’, occupied a 
shadowy middle ground between the state and the productive economy, and combined 
a role in the fiscal structure with participation in inland trade, currency dealing, move-
ments of bills of exchange, and even seaborne trade on a quite considerable scale. See 
Subrahmanyam (1990: 355).
 3 The Bengali middle class’s identification with, and alienation from, Calcutta is best 
reflected in Sinha’s Hutom Pyanchar Noksha (1862), which provides a series of satiri-
cal vignettes about nineteenth- century Calcutta life. See Sinha (2008).
 4 A note on translation: ‘prabash’ in Bengali refers to spaces in the Indian subcontinent 
that lie outside the ethno- linguistic homeland of Bengal. There exists no equivalent 
word in the English language. Since it refers to places within the spatial conception of 
India and not to foreign spaces, we have translated it as ‘distant lands’.
 5 Dalrymple highlights the story of James Achilles Kirkpatrick, the British resident at 
Hyderabad who married an Indian and embraced Islam. He also questioned many of 
the decisions of his superiors. In the twilight years of Mughal rule, Delhi too had its 
share of such characters. Ochterlony, an Indianised Englishman of Delhi, had 13 
wives and was popularly known to the locals as Loony Akhtar. For details, see Gupta 
(1981: 10).
 6 For details, see Prigarina (2000).
 7 For details, see Basu (2004).
 8 For details, see Goswami (1991). Also see Bose (1993).
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 9 For details, see King (1976). For later developments, see Misra (1999).
10 For intellectual antecedents of the Permanent Settlement, see Guha (1963). For the 
effects of the Permanent Settlement, see Islam (1979).
11 For details regarding the composition of the artisanal classes of Calcutta, see McPher-
son (1974).
12 The social and intellectual history of Calcutta has attracted enormous critical atten-
tion. Prominent among these works are Chakrabarty (2000); Sarkar (1999); Chatterjee 
1993); Kaviraj (1993).
13 Manu Goswami has pointed out how colonial rulers created a homogeneous economic 
space of India and delineated a process of territorialisation of history within it. 
However, she refrains from analysing how this space was appropriated as a lived 
space from a historical perspective. See Goswami (2004). For a different interpreta-
tion of the process of the production of space, see Basu (2010: 53–79).
14 We follow Chris Bayly in our understanding of patria as a precolonial conception of 
space that is coeval with the notion of an ethno- linguistic homeland. See Bayly (1997).
15 For the impact of James Mill’s ideas on Indian history, see Majeed (1992). For the 
cumulative impact of these scholars, see Dirks (1993). For an analysis of Elliots’s 
engagement with Islam in Indian history, see Eaton (1993) and for Todd’s influence 
on nationalist imagination of Indian history, see Peabody (1996: 185–220). For an 
analysis of the role of historiography in informing Hindu–Muslim relationships, see 
Basu and Das (2005).
16 All citations from the Bengali texts are the authors’ translations as there exists no 
known English translation. Page numbers refer to the original Bengali text.
17 For an elaboration of the idea of ‘classicization of tradition’, see Chatterjee (1993: 
72–75)
18 For a detailed discussion on the construction of Hinduism as the civil religion of 
India, see Banerjee and Basu (forthcoming).
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9 The multilingual city of Bombay 
and the formation of linguistic 
states, 1947–60*
Riho Isaka
This chapter examines the way in which Bombay state was reorganised after the 
independence of India and what influence this process had on the social and 
political situation of Bombay city. Although the Indian government conducted a 
large- scale reorganisation of states based on linguistic differences in 1956, it was 
not until 1960 that Bombay state was divided into Maharashtra and Gujarat. This 
was mainly because there were conflicting opinions on the position of Bombay 
city, namely whether it should be included in the linguistic state of Maharashtra, 
if the state were to be created. While there had been a demand among the 
Marathi- speaking elite for the creation of Maharashtra with Bombay as its 
capital,1 there was strong opposition to this idea, mainly among the Gujarati- 
speaking elite in and outside the city. They argued that Bombay was a multilin-
gual city and was connected historically, economically and socially not only 
with Marathi- speaking areas but also with Gujarati- speaking ones. While repeat-
edly rejecting the idea of including Bombay in Maharashtra, the Indian govern-
ment suggested alternative solutions, which caused serious disturbances. This 
chapter will examine in detail various ideas of the city presented in this process 
by different groups of people, and show how the notion of Bombay as a city for 
Marathi speakers increased its influence in the late 1950s. This development not 
only led to the birth of Maharashtra in its present form, but also made an 
important impact on Bombay politics after 1960. By examining this process 
from the perspectives of different communities and groups, in particular those 
who were opposed to the inclusion of Bombay into Maharashtra, this chapter 
tries to understand the implications that the formation of linguistic states had for 
a large city like Bombay, which was bound to be multilingual and cosmopolitan 
and continued to be so even after it became part of a linguistic state.
The idea of linguistic provinces and the city of Bombay
The demands for the redistribution of provinces on a linguistic basis had already 
begun among the elite in several regions of India in the late nineteenth century. 
Under the influence of English education, the elite in these regions took an active 
interest in reforming their vernacular languages and developing literature based 
on what they considered as the ‘western’ model. In this process, they articulated 
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their identities based on languages that were associated with specific regions. In 
many cases the ‘regions’ they discussed in this context did not correspond with 
existing administrative units, and it was not long before the elite began to 
demand the reorganisation of provinces based on linguistic differences. In 
western India, this demand began to be expressed by Marathi- speaking intellec-
tuals as early as the late nineteenth century. For instance, in 1891, an editorial in 
a Marathi paper, Kesari, edited by B.G. Tilak, criticised the situation in which 
the Marathi- speaking people were divided into different provinces and princely 
states (Phadke 1979: 66, King 1998: 59).
 The Indian National Congress also began to pay attention to the issue of the 
reorganisation of provinces at the time of the partition of Bengal in 1905 (King 
1998: 59, Schwartzberg 2009: 143). In 1920, the Congress officially accepted 
the principle of ‘linguistic provinces’ in its Nagpur session and accordingly 
decided to form the Provincial Congress Committees. The so- called ‘Congress 
provinces’ created at that time were, however, significantly different in shape 
from the linguistic states that were to be formed in postcolonial India; for 
example, the territories of princely states were excluded from the Congress prov-
inces. In the case of Marathi- speaking areas in British India, it should be noted 
that they were divided into as many as four Congress provinces, namely the City 
of Bombay, Maharashtra, Central Provinces and Berar (Report of the Thirty- fifth 
Session of the Indian National Congress, 1920: 109–110).
 The fact that the city of Bombay was given the status of a separate Congress 
province presents a clear contrast to other presidency towns, that is, Calcutta and 
Madras, which were included in the Congress provinces of Bengal and Madras, 
respectively. This was partly because the Marathi speakers formed only half of 
the entire population in the city, while the Gujarati speakers formed more than 
20 per cent (Mead & Macgregor 1912: 164). However, other reasons, which 
were related to the way in which Bombay developed after it came under British 
rule in the seventeenth century, seem to be more important. The East India 
Company, in the process of developing Bombay as the centre of trade and com-
merce, encouraged the trading communities in Gujarat, such as the Parsis, 
Vaniyas (Banias) and Bohras, to move to Bombay. They came in large numbers 
and played an important role in its economic activities (Dobbin 1972). From the 
early nineteenth century, with its victory over the Marathas, the British further 
developed Bombay as the capital of the Bombay presidency (‘Bombay province’ 
after 1935), consisting of the Marathi-, Gujarati- and Kannada- speaking regions, 
to which the Sindhi- speaking region was later added. Bombay city thus became 
the centre not only of trade and commerce, but also of administration and educa-
tion for all these regions. The elite from the different linguistic communities 
came here to receive higher education and became involved in social reform 
movements, cultural activities and then political activities, which, from the end 
of the nineteenth century contributed to the rise of the nationalist movement. It 
should also be noted that from the late nineteenth century, the growth of industry 
such as the cotton industry attracted a large number of Marathi labourers, who 
migrated from the hinterland. The population of the city, which was only 10,000 
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at the end of the seventeenth century, expanded to 800,000 in the late nineteenth 
century.2
 For the Gujarati elite in the colonial period, Bombay was an important centre 
for their economic, social and cultural activities.3 They occupied a dominant 
position in commerce and industry. Those from elite families in Gujarat came to 
look for opportunities for higher education and better jobs. The Gujarati publish-
ing industry began to develop in Bombay from the early nineteenth century, 
before it started in other places. Various Gujarati social reform organisations and 
literary associations were also founded; among them, Bombay was considered 
almost as part of Gujarat.
 From the middle of the 1940s, with the prospect of independence, the elite in 
several regions in India began to make more vocal demands for the creation of 
linguistic provinces. In the Marathi- speaking region, the demand for Samyukta 
Maharashtra (United Maharashtra) was expressed in the Maharashtra Sahitya 
Sammelan and the Maharashtra Unification Conference, which were both held in 
1946 (Palshikar 2007: 31–32, Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad 1954: iii). The 
latter was chaired by a Congress leader, Shankarrao Deo. As a result of this con-
ference, an all- party organisation, the Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad (SMP), 
was formed, which expanded to have as many as 13,803 members by the end of 
October 1946 (Phadke 1979: 74). It became the main organisation leading the 
Samyukta Maharashtra movement.
 In contrast with this development among the Marathi speakers, there was 
hardly any political movement for the creation of a separate province of Gujarat 
before independence. Although some Gujarati intellectuals began to stress the 
unity of the Gujarati- speaking territory (which they sometimes called ‘Maha 
Gujarat’),4 which was at the time divided into a part of Bombay province and 
many princely states, they showed little interest in the idea of a separate prov-
ince for Gujaratis. It might be partly because in Gujarat, where the nationalist 
movement under the leadership of Gandhi had a great influence on society, the 
elite was generally hesitant to organise a political movement based on their lin-
guistic/regional identity. A more important reason, however, seems to be their 
attachment to the city of Bombay. As described above, this city occupied an 
important position for various activities among Gujaratis. It is likely that those 
who had strong links with Bombay preferred not to change the current form of 
Bombay state to avoid the possibility of losing their claim on Bombay.
The debates over Bombay after independence
Although, as mentioned above, the Congress had already accepted the principle 
of linguistic provinces in 1920, when it took power after independence its 
leading politicians, including Nehru and Patel, showed their reluctance to reor-
ganise provinces accordingly.5 They feared that it would weaken the unity and 
stability of India, which had only recently gone through great confusion and 
tragedy because of partition. Yet, in response to the increasing demands for the 
creation of linguistic provinces in several regions, a commission was appointed 
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by the Constituent Assembly in 1947 to study the desirability of creating the 
states of Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra.
 The appointment of the commission, officially called the Linguistic Prov-
inces Commission but commonly known as the Dar Commission, triggered 
active debates in different parts of India. In western India, as expected, the 
future of Bombay became one of the major issues of debate. In August 1948, a 
meeting of some Congress members of the Bombay Legislature passed a res-
olution that declared their support for Samyukta Maharashtra, which included 
Bombay. In the same year, B.R. Ambedkar, the then Minister of Law in the 
Government of India, individually submitted a memorandum to the Dar Com-
mission in which he strongly objected to the idea of making Bombay city a sep-
arate administrative unit, arguing that Maharashtra and Bombay were ‘one and 
integral’ (Ambedkar 1948: 39–40).6 The SMP also submitted a memorandum, 
demanding the creation of Maharashtra state and insisting that Bombay city be 
part of Maharashtra.7
 A few organisations in Bombay city, such as the Indian Merchants’ Chamber 
and the Bombay Committee, however, presented to the Commission their strong 
objections to the inclusion of Bombay in Maharashtra.8 The Bombay Commit-
tee, claiming to represent different communities in the city, argued that the cre-
ation of new provinces be postponed in the wider interests of the country and 
that if, however, the reorganisation of provinces on a linguistic basis was to take 
place, Bombay be constituted as a separate province ‘on the strength of political, 
economic, strategic and cultural considerations and its cosmopolitan and multi- 
lingual character’ (Bombay Committee 1948: 26). This organisation, dominated 
by Gujarati industrialists and businessmen, also stressed that Bombay owed its 
development to ‘all communities, such as Parsis, Gujaratis, Cutchis, including 
Khojas and Memons, Maharashtrians, Canarese, Tamilians, Telugus and Chris-
tians, including even the foreign settlers’ (Bombay Committee 1948: 9). It 
expressed the opinion that the Marathi- speaking population actually constituted 
only 36 per cent and that, from the viewpoint of trade, commerce and industry in 
the city, the dominant language was Gujarati (Bombay Committee 1948: 16–17).
 The Dar Commission also received a memorandum on this issue from an 
influential Gujarati politician, K.M. Munshi, in which he criticised ‘linguism’ 
and the demands for the creation of linguistic provinces.9 Regarding the case of 
Bombay province, he too argued that Bombay should be made into a centrally 
administered area if the province was to be divided. To support this view, he 
emphasised the historical, cultural and economic unity of Gujarat, North Konkan 
and Bombay city and the contributions of the Gujaratis to the growth of the city 
(Munshi 1948: 18–51).10 If the city was handed over to Maharashtra, Munshi 
argued, its non- Marathi-speaking majority would be subjected to the ‘political 
domination of aggressive linguism’ (Munshi 1948: 50).
 The Dar Commission submitted its report to the Constituent Assembly in 
December 1948. This report concluded that the formation of provinces on lin-
guistic considerations was not in the larger interests of India. As to Bombay city, 
the commission was of the opinion that it should be kept outside the ‘vortex of 
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linguistic politics’ (Report of the Linguistic Provinces Commission 1948: 13). 
Soon afterward, the Congress also appointed its own committee to examine the 
question of linguistic provinces. The committee, officially called the Linguistic 
Provinces Committee but generally known as the JVP committee, reached more 
or less the same conclusions as those of the Dar Commission (Report of the Lin-
guistic Provinces Committee 1949). However, the situation surrounding Bombay 
changed significantly after Andhra state was founded in 1953 as a central gov-
ernment response to disturbances in the region during the previous year. These 
disturbances occurred as a result of the death of a Telugu leader, Potti Sriramalu, 
who had been fasting to demand a separate state of Andhra.11 The government, 
while creating Andhra state, also appointed the States Reorganisation Commis-
sion, chaired by Fazl Ali, to re- examine the issues of linguistic states. Again the 
issue of Bombay city became the subject of heated debates among different indi-
viduals and organisations in western India.
 While the SMP again submitted a memorandum to the committee to demand 
the creation of Maharashtra, which included Bombay (Samyukta Maharashtra 
Parishad 1954), the Bombay Citizens’ Committee (BCC), previously known as 
the Bombay Committee, also repeated its objection to its inclusion in Maharash-
tra (Bombay Citizens’ Committee 1954). Among the members of the committee 
were leading figures in Indian commerce and industry, such as Purshottamdas 
Thakurdas, J.R.D. Tata and Rameshwardas Birla. The members of the commit-
tee consisted mainly of Gujaratis, Parsis, Marwaris and Muslim mercantile com-
munities from Gujarat (Stern 1970: 45–46). The Committee frankly expressed 
its fear that the protagonists of Samyukta Maharashtra would utilise the 
resources of the city for the development of Maharashtra, even to the extent of 
diverting industries from the city of Bombay to Maharashtra under the name of 
decentralisation (Bombay Citizens’ Committee, 1954: 27). It quoted the words 
of a Marathi leader, G.V. Deshmukh, in which he asked whether Maharashtrians 
were content to play a secondary role in their own city. From the perspective of 
the BCC, it was highly likely that the inclusion of Bombay in Maharashtra 
would directly affect Bombay’s economic activities and their lives.
 Along with the BCC, several other non- Marathi organisations in Bombay and 
Gujarat expressed their views that the present Bombay state should not be 
divided on a linguistic basis and that, if it were to be divided, Bombay should 
form a separate administrative unit.12 These organisations include the All- India 
Sindwork Merchants’ Association, the Parsi Federal Council, the Bombay 
Pradesh Congress Committee,13 the Gujarati Sahitya Parishad, the Gujarat 
Pradesh Congress Committee, the Maha Gujarat Sima Samiti (the Great Gujarat 
Boundary Committee) and the Indian Merchants’ Chamber. It seems that, on the 
issue of Bombay, opinions were thus clearly divided between the Marathi elite 
and non- Marathi elites in western India.
 However, outside Bombay a somewhat different idea began to gain support 
among some sections of the Gujarati elite. The Maha Gujarat Parishad, founded 
in 1952 in Vallabh Vidyanagar, a town in Kheda district, argued in its memoran-
dum that the Gujarat region had been exploited historically by Maharashtra and 
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that ‘the common man of Gujarat’ now felt that without the formation of Gujarat, 
his vital problems could not be solved (Maha Gujarat Parishad 1954: 56). This 
memorandum seems to indicate that by then the idea of a separate state for the 
Gujaratis had begun to attract some portions of the elite in north and central 
Gujarat, who were likely to benefit from this administrative change. As to the 
city of Bombay, however, the Maha Gujarat Parishad was also of the opinion 
that it should not be included in Maharashtra (Maha Gujarat Parishad 1954: 77).
 The States Reorganisation Commission submitted its report in 1955. It admit-
ted that the demand for a united Maharashtra, in which Bombay was included, 
had already ‘gathered considerable momentum’ (Report of the States Reorgani-
sation Commission 1955: 112). However, it also observed that important sec-
tions of public opinion in the Marathi- speaking districts of Madhya Pradesh did 
not subscribe to the ideal of Samyukta Maharashtra, and thus it proposed that 
these districts form a separate state of ‘Maha Vidarbha’. In regard to the problem 
of Bombay city, the commission concluded that the special position of Bombay 
should be recognised, taking into account the mixed population of the city and 
the ‘views and apprehensions of the minor language groups’ (Report of the 
States Reorganisation Commission 1955: 116). Having examined various possib-
ilities, the Commission proposed that Bombay state be reconstituted as a bilin-
gual state. According to this proposal, the reconstituted state of Bombay would 
comprise the areas of the existing Bombay state minus the Abu Road taluk of the 
Banaskantha district (which was to be merged into Rajasthan) and the Kannada 
region (to be merged into Mysore), plus Marathi- speaking Marathwada (then 
included in Hyderabad) and Gujarati- speaking Saurashtra and Kutch.
The 1956 disturbances in Bombay
The central government, however, soon began to examine another alternative in 
response to the objection of the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee 
(MPCC) to the above proposal. This alternative, which was called the three- state 
formula, was to create Maharashtra, Gujarat and Bombay city as separate admin-
istrative units. In spite of the fact that the MPCC opposed this proposal even 
more strongly, in November 1955 the Congress High Command decided to 
create the following three states: (1) Maharashtra, including Vidarbha and 
Marathwada; (2) Gujarat, including Saurashtra and Kutch; and (3) the City of 
Bombay.
 This three- state formula was received with strong resentment by the sup-
porters of the Samyukta Maharashtra movement. While the Marathi- speaking 
Congress members were negotiating with the central government, the leadership 
of the movement began to pass into the hands of leftist politicians. They pro-
jected this movement as a fight against the Congress and Congress- allied capital-
ists. On 18 November, when the Chief Minister of Bombay State, Morarji Desai, 
moved the resolution to create three states in the Bombay Legislative Assem-
bly,14 a procession was organised by the leftist leaders to protest against this res-
olution. Another large- scale procession, organised three days later, led to a clash 
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between the crowd and the police near Flora Fountain in which the police 
opened fire, killing demonstrators. There were disturbances afterwards in dif-
ferent parts of the city, including attacks on buses and trams (Phadke 1979: 
135–138, Palshikar 2007: 55–60).15 The ‘battle for Bombay’ thus began to affect 
the lives of a wider range of citizens.
 The incident of the police opening fire immediately increased the tension 
between Marathi and Gujarati politicians. While the former criticised the police 
and the state government for the loss of lives, the latter blamed the leaders of the 
Samyukta Maharashtra movement for the disturbances.16 The supporters of 
Samyukta Maharashtra claimed that the Gujarati Chief Minister, Morarji Desai, 
represented Gujarati ‘vested interests’ and thus protected these interests, to the 
cost of the Marathi people. The debates over the status of Bombay now began to 
be interpreted by the advocates of the Samyukta Maharashtra movement as a 
fight between the ‘Marathi masses’ and the ‘Gujarati capitalists’. In this context, 
questions such as which linguistic community Bombay ‘originally’ belonged to 
and whose interests should be protected were also openly debated.
 On 16 January 1956, the Indian government announced the creation of the 
states of Maharashtra and Gujarat and the placement of Bombay city under 
central administration. This was immediately followed by a series of large- scale 
disturbances in the city, which continued for nearly a week. Buses and trams 
were attacked, and shops, offices and houses were looted; a curfew was 
announced and a large number of police were called out to quell the riots.17 This 
time there were attacks on Gujarati shops and houses, as a result of which a 
number of Gujarati residents were forced to move to safer places within the city 
and outside of it. According to an article in the Times of India dated 22 January, 
400 men, women and children had sailed for Kutch- Mandvi the previous day, 
and another ship was to sail that day with over 600 evacuees. The booking 
offices of the Bombay Steam Navigation Company were crowded with people 
‘anxious to leave the city’.18 Passenger trains leaving for Gujarat and Saurashtra 
were packed, with the majority of the passengers being women and children. 
Probably the men stayed behind to look after their businesses and properties. 
According to the same article, about 3,000 people had sought shelter at the 
‘Kutchi Visa Oswal Jain Mahajanwadi’ in a place called Masjid Bunder. These 
people, the article noted, comprised petty traders whose shops had been looted, 
and their families, as well as those who had been compelled by ‘unsocial ele-
ments’ to leave their homes.
 Later these disturbances were discussed at length in the legislature of Bombay 
state. Again, the interpretations of the event were largely different between the 
Marathi and Gujarati members. One Marathi member expressed his view that 
these disturbances had been created not by Maharashtrians but by ‘cosmopolitan 
goondas’.19 This argument was strongly criticised by Morarji Desai, who 
asserted that these ‘goondas’ had been utilised by a section of the Maharashtrian 
community who were not ‘goondas’ themselves.20 In his view, these disturbances 
were intentionally created by these leaders to make non- Marathi people agree to 
give Bombay to Maharashtra.
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 In this process, even the linguistic identities of policemen became a matter of 
concern for both Gujarati and Marathi politicians, as they suspected that the 
policemen belonging to the other community could be biased against their own 
community. For instance, in his memoir, Desai mentioned that at the time of the 
disturbances 95 per cent of the Bombay police were Maharashtrians ‘whose 
natural sympathy was with Samyukta Maharashtra’ (Desai 1978: 58). Desai also 
wrote that the action taken by the police to quell the disturbances was ‘therefore 
half- hearted, which gave a fillip to the riots’. Similarly, soon after the riots, a 
Marathi member of the assembly asked the government for the number of police 
officers, police constables and home guards stationed in Bombay city, and then 
the number of Gujaratis and the Maharashtrians among these officers of each 
rank. He further asked Desai whether the government had recently increased the 
strength of Gujarati officers.21 The fact that the number of those dead due to 
police fire reached as many as 7622 created great suspicion among the Marathi 
leaders about the impartiality of the police. The tension between the two lin-
guistic communities thus increased both inside and outside the legislature.
 The events of January 1956 had a great impact on a wide range of residents in 
Bombay. The psychological impact on the Gujarati residents was particularly 
significant. A Gujarati family in Mumbai, whom I interviewed, recollected how 
Marathi people began to throw stones at the building in which they lived, and how 
they left the building and spent the night in a nearby Jain temple that had become a 
temporary shelter for Gujaratis in the area. They also recollected that Marathi 
people shouted slogans such as ‘Mumbai amchi (Bombay is ours)’ and had black 
flags in their hands. The family went to their relative’s house in a safe locality the 
next day and afterwards left Bombay for their home village in Saurashtra. Soon 
the father came back to Bombay, as he could not leave his business for long; 
several months later, the other family members also came back. It seems that life 
gradually returned to normal for them, though the memory of the events lived on.
 Soon after these disturbances, one of the Gujarati members in the Legislative 
Council argued in its session that the Gujaratis in Bombay, as well as other com-
munities, identified themselves as ‘Bombayites’, thus trying once again to 
emphasise the multilingual and cosmopolitan character of the city. He stated: 
‘We are Bombayites. We do not call ourselves Maharashtrians, Gujaratis, 
Kutchis or Kathiawadis but we call ourselves Bombayites.’23 Their language and 
mode of living might be ‘Gujarati’, he argued, but they were Bombayites, not 
Gujaratis. Attempts to stress the ‘Bombayite’ identity, however, attracted little 
attention in the contemporary political context.
 In February 1956, under instructions from the centre, Shankarrao Deo, the 
MPCC leader, who had been involved in the SMP, dissolved the organisation. In 
its place, the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (SMS) was formed under the leader-
ship of leftist politicians (Phadke 1979: 96–97, Palshikar 2007: 63–64). In June, 
when the session of the All India Congress Committee was held in Bombay, the 
SMS organised fierce agitations to express its disagreement with the three- state 
formula, which again caused a clash between them and the police (Phadke 1979: 
177–179; Palshikar 2007: 66).24
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 In August, the situation took a new turn. In the parliament, an attempt was 
made among its members to replace the three- state formula with that of a bilin-
gual state. One hundred and eighty members of parliament submitted a memo-
randum to Nehru that endorsed the creation of a bilingual state of Bombay, and 
he willingly accepted this proposal (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru 2005: 
124). The shape of this bilingual state of Bombay was similar to that which the 
States Reorganisation Commission had suggested, except that Marathi- speaking 
Vidarbha was now included in this state. The MPCC also accepted this decision 
readily to avoid the separation of Bombay from Maharashtra.
 Ironically, this time it was the Gujarati elite in Ahmedabad that expressed 
their strong objection to this change of government policy. They had expected 
that ‘their’ state with Ahmedabad as its capital would be formed soon and thus 
felt betrayed by this sudden change of policy. On 8 August, a large- scale demon-
stration was held in Ahmedabad and marched towards the Congress House. The 
police fired on the crowd, causing several deaths. Disturbances soon spread 
through the city, and a series of demonstrations were organised throughout 
August. These deaths, especially those of the students, aroused great sympathy 
as well as severe criticism of the Congress among a wide range of people.25 In 
September, the Maha Gujarat Janata Parishad (MGJP) was founded under the 
leadership of Indulal Yagnik, who was once known for his involvement in 
the nationalist movement. The MGJP became a major organisation leading the 
movement for a separate state of Gujarat, which was generally called the Maha 
Gujarat movement. Although it tried to project itself as a body that was repre-
sentative of Gujaratis as a whole, in reality its supporters were mainly limited to 
north Gujarat. The elite in south Gujarat, Saurashtra and Kutch did not show 
much interest, as it was likely that the creation of this new state would for them 
result in the loss of Bombay city and the dominance of Ahmedabad over other 
Gujarati- speaking areas. Yet the Maha Gujarat movement, while emphasising 
the violence of the state, gradually succeeded in diverting the public attention 
from the ‘battle for Bombay’.
Bifurcation of Bombay state and the city of Bombay
On 1 November a bilingual state of Bombay was established with a Maratha pol-
itician, Y.B. Chavan, as its Chief Minister. What Nehru later called ‘the bilin-
gual state experiment’ was, however, only short- lived. In 1957, the Congress lost 
a significant number of seats in the Legislative Assembly and Lok Sabha elec-
tions, throwing the future of a bilingual state into question. In both elections, 
most of the seats went to SMS- backed candidates in western Maharashtra. In the 
city of Bombay, the seats were shared almost equally by the Congress and the 
SMS (Sirsikar 1995: 40–41). In Gujarat, the Congress won on the whole, though 
in Ahmedabad district, the MGJP- backed candidates gained more seats than the 
Congress in the assembly election (Pathak et al. 1966: 66, 76, 136, Sanghvi 
1996: 148–149). The Congress again lost in by- elections and the Bombay Cor-
poration election in 1957 (Sirsikar 1995: 41, Phadke 1979: 217). With the next 
152  R. Isaka
general election in mind, the Congress, both in the state and at the centre, now 
began to explore the possibility of bifurcation.
 Meanwhile, the SMS and the MGJP started negotiations on issues related to 
the bifurcation. The MGJP accepted the claim of the SMS that Bombay city be 
included in Maharashtra, while at the same time demanding safeguards be made 
to avoid discrimination on a linguistic basis. The MGJP also suggested that fin-
ancial support be provided by Maharashtra for Gujarat (Phadke 1979: 258). 
Indulal Yagnik believed that the criticism against the inclusion of Bombay in 
Maharashtra was made by the ‘Gujarati capitalists of Bombay’, who ‘wanted 
only to exploit the poor people of Gujarat and Maharashtra by joining hands 
with the Congressites in the bilingual state’ (Yagnik 2011: 586). Here, again, the 
‘battle for Bombay’ was projected as a class struggle in the same way as it was 
defined by the leaders of the Samyukta Maharashtra movement. From the view-
point of the supporters of the MGJP, a separate state for the Gujaratis with 
Ahmedabad or some city near Ahmedabad as its capital would mean more 
opportunities for better jobs and promotions. A Gujarati couple in Ahmedabad, 
whom I interviewed, told me what they thought about the creation of Gujarat in 
those days. The wife, who had not been married then and who lived with her 
family in Bombay, was unhappy about the prospect of leaving Bombay city, 
since her family had been living in Bombay for about 150 years, and she had 
been born and brought up there. In contrast, the husband, who was then a pro-
fessor in a college in Gujarat, was excited at the thought of bifurcation, because 
he could see more prospect of promotion in a new state. According to him, many 
people were in fact promoted after the bifurcation, in the way in which many 
people had been promoted in India after partition.
 In August 1958, the MGJP renewed its campaign to demand the creation of 
Gujarat, which was combined with the campaigns to erect memorials for the 
‘martyrs’ who lost their lives when the police opened fire in August 1956. This 
again led to serious disturbances and deaths as the result of police gunfire in 
Ahmedabad.26 This event further encouraged the government to revise its policy 
on Bombay state. In December 1959, the Nehru government decided to bifurcate 
Bombay state into Maharashtra, with Bombay as its capital, and Gujarat.27 Some 
parts of the border areas that were claimed both by Maharashtra and Gujarat, for 
instance, the Dangs district, were included in Gujarat. Chief Minister Chavan 
later described this decision as being ‘in the nature of a compromise’, implying 
that these areas were given to Gujarat because the latter gave up its claim on 
Bombay.28 It was also decided that Maharashtra would provide financial support 
for Gujarat for the next ten years and in addition furnish ten crore rupees for the 
building of its new capital (Phadke 1979: 224).
 In March 1960, the Bombay Reorganisation Bill was presented to the legis-
lature in Bombay State for discussion. Some Gujarati members voiced their 
unhappiness about the loss of Bombay. For instance, one of them argued that 
Gujaratis had ‘almost poured their heart and soul’ and had ‘shed their blood, 
tears and sweat in building Bombay’.29 He further stressed that the majority of 
Gujaratis did not vote for a separate Gujarat, a view that was also expressed by 
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the first Chief Minister of Gujarat, Jivraj Mehta, just before the day of the bifur-
cation.30 In spite of the rise of the Maha Gujarat movement in north Gujarat, the 
idea of bifurcating Bombay state and giving up Bombay city was not necessarily 
supported by a wide range of the Gujarati elite even at the last stage.
 It seems that the sense of Gujarat being deprived of Bombay remained among 
the Gujarati elite for a long time after 1960. According to Aseema Sinha, a polit-
ical scientist who interviewed state bureaucrats, businesspeople and politicians 
in Gujarat in the 1990s, almost all of her interviewees discussed the role that 
Bombay played in ‘fashioning an ideology of competitive developmentalism’ in 
their state (Sinha 2005: 182). One senior IAS officer, answering the question 
about why Gujarati leaders pursued development in the state, said: ‘Bombay had 
been taken away from us, we had to replicate that here.’ (Sinha 2005: 182). 
Sinha’s analysis concludes that the inclusion of Bombay in Maharashtra pro-
vided the regional context for the competition between Gujarat and Maharashtra 
and that this became the motivation for Gujarat’s developmental strategy.
 It should be also noted here that Chavan, before the debates on the Bill 
started, read out in the Legislative Assembly the ‘Statement of Government 
Policy’, in which he gave assurances that the cosmopolitan character of Bombay 
City would be preserved and that special attention would be paid to its proper 
development.31 The fact that such assurances had to be made, however, seems to 
indicate the deep concerns of the non- Marathi population in the city about the 
birth of Maharashtra. Now, with the inclusion of Bombay in Maharashtra, it was 
officially recognised that the Marathi speakers were the ‘majority’, while the 
non- Marathi speakers were ‘minorities’; since they were ‘minorities’, their rights 
had to be assured by the government. The Gujarati family in Mumbai whom I 
interviewed, after recounting the 1956 disturbances, mentioned that Chavan had 
later assured the Gujaratis that they would be safe in the city. The fact that the 
family mentioned this also seems to indicate that the situation on the eve of 
bifurcation required the government to make such assurances, which were care-
fully noted by non- Marathi-speaking residents.
 Just before the formation of Maharashtra and Gujarat on 1 May 1960, a large 
number of government employees, mainly consisting of Gujarati speakers, 
moved from Bombay to Ahmedabad,32 further enhancing the public perception 
that Bombay would from now on be the capital of a Marathi- speaking state. 
Various events organised in the city to celebrate the formation of Maharashtra 
must have strengthened this perception too. Importantly, now the incident of the 
police opening fire near Flora Fountain in 1955 was depicted in the discourse of 
the government and the main political parties as a historic moment in the fight 
for Samyukta Maharashtra. Those who died there, along with others who were 
killed by the police in the 1956 disturbances, were glorified as ‘martyrs 
[hutatma]’ for their homeland. On the eve of bifurcation, a torchlight procession 
organised by the SMS marched toward Flora Fountain, where a special memorial 
pillar had been erected (Palshikar 2007: 221). The next year, the foundation 
stone of the memorial to the martyrs was laid in the same area.33 This area, 
which was officially renamed Hutatma Chowk (Martyrs’ Square), continues to 
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be projected even today as a place to invoke ‘patriotism’ towards Maharashtra, 
with a bronze sculpture on a tall pillar of a farmer and a worker jointly holding a 
torch and a slab on which the names of 105 ‘martyrs’ are inscribed. On 1 May 
2010, as part of the government celebrations of the golden jubilee of Maharash-
tra, the Governor and Chief Minister paid tributes to the ‘martyrs’ of the Samy-
ukta Maharashtra movement on this spot.34 The stories of martyrs were thus 
presented repeatedly by the government and other political forces, while the con-
flict between the two linguistic communities over Bombay was largely marginal-
ised in their discourse.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the debates over the future of Bombay in the late 
1940s and 1950s. As discussed above, the idea of creating linguistic states 
posed an extremely difficult problem for the multilingual city of Bombay. 
With a large population of people that spoke languages other than Marathi, 
among whom the Gujarati speakers were the most prominent, there were indi-
viduals and organisations that raised their voices strongly against its inclusion 
in Maharashtra. However, with the reorganisation of states on a linguistic basis 
in other parts of India in the 1950s, and with the rise of political forces which 
associated those opposing the bifurcation with ‘vested interests’, it became 
increasingly difficult for the government to pursue other possibilities besides 
the formation of linguistic states and the inclusion of Bombay in a Marathi- 
speaking state.
 In the words of Sujata Patel, Bombay ‘became firmly integrated within the 
state of Maharashtra and its ethnic and cultural heritage’ after the state’s forma-
tion and started being redefined both politically and in the imagination (Patel 
2003: 5). This development is reflected most evidently in the rise of a regional 
party, the Shiv Sena, in Bombay politics. The party was founded in 1966 by Bal 
Keshav Thackeray, whose father was an active leader of the SMS and who 
himself had been involved in the Samyukta Maharashtra movement. Thackeray 
started publishing a Marathi weekly, Marmik, in 1960, in which he claimed that 
Bombay was still not in the hands of Marathi speakers, for the city had been 
invaded by non- Marathi speakers, particularly south Indians, who deprived the 
former of their jobs (Palshikar 2007: 238, Gupta 1982: 61, Lele 1995: 190, 
Hansen 2001: 46, Prakash 2010: 231–235). The ideas and the expressions that 
were presented in this weekly were strikingly similar to those presented in the 
Samyukta Maharashtra movement in the late 1950s, though this time the main 
target of criticism was not the Gujaratis. The Shiv Sena claimed to represent the 
interests of Marathi speakers irrespective of class differences and succeeded in 
obtaining support from a wider range of Marathi residents. The rise of this 
organisation, according to Aseema Sinha, ‘created some apprehensions in the 
minds of the Gujarati population’ (Sinha 2005: 183), even though at the time 
south Indians were the target of its criticism. The first stage of the investment of 
Bombay- based Gujarati businesspeople in Gujarat began, Sinha argues, as a 
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result of this. The Shiv Sena later changed their target and attacked Muslims and 
north Indians, whom they also projected as ‘outsiders’.
 Paradoxically, the continuous attempts by the Shiv Sena and another party, 
Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (which was founded in 2006 by Raj Shrikant 
Thackeray, a nephew of Bal Thackeray), to marginalise ‘outsiders’ in fact show 
that the multilingual and multicultural aspects of Bombay (or Mumbai, as it was 
renamed in 1995 under the state government consisting of the BJP and the Shiv 
Sena) survived, despite such attempts to suppress them. This is reflected even 
in the policy of the Shiv Sena itself, which gradually changed its notion of 
‘Maharashtrians’ to include the non- Marathi speakers (Palshikar 2007: 
256–258), while at the same time trying to maintain its claim as the representa-
tive of the Marathi speakers. What emerged in Bombay from 1960 was the 
paradoxical situation in which this multilingual and cosmopolitan city was 
expected to play a symbolic role as the capital of a linguistic state, the situation 
that was also shared to some extent by capitals of other linguistic states. The 
situation was certainly able to be exploited by political forces, which led to ten-
sions among different communities and sometimes even cases of violence. 
However, it is evident that, among the residents of Bombay/Mumbai, there has 
been a widely shared perception that one of the biggest strengths and unique 
aspects of the city lies precisely in the diversity of its population in terms of 
their social and cultural backgrounds. This is often vividly illustrated in works 
of fiction and films set in this place. The politics of language in Bombay/
Mumbai has been and will be bound to keep swinging back and forth like a 
pendulum in response to these competing ideas of the city.
Notes
 * This chapter is largely based on the following article of mine, in Japanese. Riho Isaka, 
‘Indo ni okeru Syu Saihen Mondai: Bombay Shu no Bunkatsu Katei (Debates over 
the Reorganisation of States in India: The Bifurcation of Bombay State)’, Journal of 
Asian and African Studies 81 (2011): 71–103. Interviews mentioned in this chapter 
were conducted in Mumbai and Ahmedabad in 2009.
 1 Several scholars have examined in detail the movement for the creation of Maharash-
tra. See, for example, Phadke (1979); Palshikar (2007); Stern (1970).
 2 For the details, see Imperial Gazetteer of India, Bombay Presidency (1909: 224).
 3 For the details, see: Gujarat Pradesh Congress Committee (1954: 13–18); Mallison 
(1995); Shukla (1995).
 4 For instance, see Munshi (1939, 1967: 234).
 5 On the reorganisation of states in postcolonial India, see: Sarangi & Pai (2011); Guha 
(2007: 180–200).
 6 Ambedkar, however, changed his views later and submitted different opinions to 
the States Reorganisation Committee in 1955, in which he argued that Maharashtra 
be divided into four states, that is, Bombay city (Maharashtra City State), 
Western Maharashtra, Central Maharashtra and Eastern Maharashtra (Ambedkar 
1955: 21).
 7 ‘Memorandum Submitted by the Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad’s Deputation to the 
Linguistic Provinces Commission on 4th November, 1948’, in Maharashtra’s Case 
before the Linguistic Provinces Commission: Memorandum (n.d.: 29–39).
156  R. Isaka
 8 The Indian Merchants’ Chamber had a close relationship with the Bombay Commit-
tee (which later became the Bombay Citizens’ Committee) (Stern 1970: 46).
 9 On Munshi’s ideas on languages and linguistic states, see Isaka (2012).
10 The same view was expressed also in the memorandum of the Gujarat Research 
Society, the organisation established in 1936 in Bombay to encourage research on 
Gujarat (Gujarat Research Society 1948).
11 On the demand for the creation of Andhra state, see Mitchell (2009).
12 ‘Resolutions Passed by Organisations in the City in Support of the Memorandum 
Submitted by the Bombay Citizens’ Committee’, in Purshotamdas Thakurdas Papers, 
subject file 383, Nehru Memorial Museum & Library.
13 The Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee (BPCC), which avoided expressing its 
view on Bombay at the time of the Dar Commission, this time openly opposed the 
inclusion of this city in Maharashtra, though there were also members within the 
BPCC who supported the Samyukta Maharashtra movement (Bombay Pradesh Con-
gress Committee 1954, Phadke 1979: 112–113).
14 Bombay Legislative Assembly Debates: Official Report [BLAD], Vol. 30, No. 1, Part 
II, 18 November 1955, p. 4.
15 Times of India, 22 November 1955, p. 1.
16 BLAD, Vol. 31, No. 49, Part II, 20 April 1956, pp. 2391–2430.
17 Times of India, 17–23 January 1956. There were disturbances also in Belgaum, Nasik, 
Kolhapur and other areas.
18 Times of India, 22 January 1956, p. 1.
19 Bombay Legislative Council Debates: Official Report [BLCD], Vol. 34, No. 26, Part 
II, 7 April 1956, p. 945.
20 BLCD, Vol. 34, No. 26, Part II, 7 April 1956, pp. 951–52.
21 BLAD, Vol. 31, No. 5, Part I, 24 February 1956, pp. 105–106.
22 BLAD, Vol. 31, No. 13, Part I, 8 March 1956, p. 343; BLAD, Vol. 31, No. 17, Part I, 
15 March 1956, p. 472; BLCD, Vol. 34, No. 6, Part I, 29 March 1956, p. 105.
23 BLCD, Vol. 34, No. 20, Part II, 29 March 1956, p. 699. It should also be noted that 
many Marathi- speaking or Gujarati- speaking Parsis, Muslims, Christians and Jews 
did not necessarily call themselves Maharashtrians or Gujaratis. For instance, see 
Times of India, 23 November 1955, p. 5.
24 On the opinion of the SMS on the States Reorganisation Bill, see Samyukta Mahar-
ashtra Samiti (1956).
25 For the details, see Isaka (forthcoming).
26 For the details, see: Times of India, 13–14 August 1958; Kotval (1959); Isaka 
(forthcoming).
27 BLAD, Vol. 10, No. 9, Part II, 14 March 1960, p. 392; see also Phadke (1979: 224).
28 BLAD, Vol. 10, No. 9, Part II, 14 March 1960, p. 394.
29 BLAD, Vol. 10, No. 9, Part II, 14 March 1960, p. 425.
30 Times of India, 1 May 1960, p. 1.
31 BLAD, Vol. 10, No. 9, Part II, 14 March 1960, p. 391. It also assured that the medium 
of instruction in the University of Bombay would continue to be English until it was 
replaced by Hindi.
32 Times of India, 7 April 1960, p. 3; 24 April 1960, p. 12.
33 Times of India, 22 November 1961, pp. 1, 7.
34 www.hinduonnet.com; http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com; www.indianexpress.com, 
1–2 May 2010.
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10 Durga Puja and neighbourhood in 
a displaced persons’ colony in 
New Delhi
Tetsuya Nakatani
Chittaranjan Park, formerly known as the ‘East Pakistan Displaced Persons’ 
Colony’, in Delhi was constructed by the government exclusively for Bengali 
displaced persons. This chapter discusses how this neighbourhood has been 
formed and influenced by urbanisation by examining two aspects of life in Chit-
taranjan Park. One is the ritual aspect, namely the changing processes of the 
annual Hindu Durga Puja festival. We describe how Durga Pujas have changed 
alongside the transformation of neighbourhood in the colony, becoming progres-
sively more commercialised as the size of the urban neighbourhood expanded 
until the residents moved to improve the neighbourhood and adapted the celeb-
rations to a more appropriate scale. It further demonstrates how rituals such as 
Durga Puja not only help to integrate and maintain urban neighbourhoods, but 
also are organised as afterimages of neighbourhoods that physically no longer 
exist. Our second focal point is the ethnic aspect of the urban neighbourhood, 
exploring the impact of urbanisation – specifically rapid urbanisation in Delhi 
and the redevelopment of two squatters’ markets in the colony – upon the ethnic 
composition of Chittaranjan Park.
 Before describing the case of Chittaranjan Park, it is appropriate to comment 
briefly on the terms ‘community’, ‘neighbourhood’ and ‘locality’, and place this 
chapter conceptually in the context of those related terms. These terms have 
likely been used uncritically as interchangeable in urban studies in India (De 
Neve & Donner 2006: 7). However, they have also been used in the specific 
context of this discussion.
 First, ‘community’ has generally been treated as synonymous with traditional 
society, pre- industrial agrarian Europe or the non- western civilisations of the 
east (Jodhka 2001: 18). The same tendency can be found in Indian social studies. 
In a review article on the concept of community in the Indian context, Upadhya 
(2001: 33–36) points out that ‘community’ has been associated with social 
organisations considered fundamental to traditional or precolonial Indian society 
such as jati (caste), village or religious sect. Community is usually regarded as 
being in opposition to the individualism of modern society as well as market, 
class and the state; it is considered to belong to culture, and hence is more 
authentic than other social units. Upadhya concludes that although conceptuali-
sations of community have shifted from such primordial or ‘substantivist’ 
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notions to constructivist understandings, community continues to belong to the 
realm of culture but not economy, and represents genuine social formation and 
the principal source of identity (Upadhya 2001: 53–54). In the context of this 
chapter, Chittaranjan Park might represent an ethnic ‘community’ of Bengalis 
who share language, culture, religion and identity. However, the Bengali com-
munity in the urban environment of Delhi goes far beyond the community 
explained by Upadhya. Chittaranjan Park was the outcome of negotiations with 
the government (state). It is not a traditional community but a newly constructed 
colony whose residents are disconnected from their homeland; it is under the 
influence of domestic and global markets. The identities of its residents are not 
based on caste but on educational qualifications, occupation and being urban 
middle class.
 Second, though the ‘neighbourhood’ is the principal concept in this chapter, 
the local has received much less attention and tends to be treated as a less central 
concern in contemporary social analysis of globalisation (De Neve & Donner 
2006: 2). However, De Neve and Donner emphasise the importance of studying 
the local, and state that places themselves are highly political and fluid, and 
gender, caste and community identities are constantly produced, negotiated, and 
challenged through spatial practices and shifting spatial concepts (De Neve & 
Donner 2006: 3). According to them, previous studies have assumed neighbour-
hood as the only site within which the real concerns of the study – namely caste, 
gender and family – could be researched, and thus barely explored the form and 
meaning of neighbourhoods as socially constructed places. For De Neve and 
Donner, exploring the ways in which neighbourhoods are made into meaningful 
places is fundamental to understanding urban life (De Neve & Donner 2006: 7); 
the local, particularly the neighbourhood, is not a mere space but the locale that 
actually produces social relationships in urban India. Though their approach is 
weighted on the political sphere, this chapter basically shares their concern. 
Chittaranjan Park is the space where political struggle has been deployed and the 
impacts of market, commercialism and globalisation are seen. It is also a space 
whose characteristics have been created by the processes of bordering and attrib-
uting specific meanings – namely cultural, historical and religious – to particular 
places. The spatial practices associated with Durga Pujas clearly illustrate how 
the residents of the colony manipulate the neighbourhood to make it favourable 
to them.
 Our final discussion concerns the relation between neighbourhood, locality 
and globalisation. In his well- known discussion, Appadurai defines locality as 
primarily relational and contextual rather than scalar or spatial. It is a pheno-
menological property of social life, a structure of feeling that is produced by par-
ticular forms of intentional activity. He defines neighbourhood as the actually 
existing social forms in which locality, as a dimension or value, is variably real-
ised. Neighbourhoods are situated communities characterised by their actuality 
and their potential for social reproduction (Appadurai 1997: 178–179, 182). 
While neighbourhoods are prerequisites for the production of local subjects, 
local subjects also contribute to the creation of contexts that might exceed the 
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existing boundaries of the neighbourhood (Appadurai 1997: 185). However, he 
states, in a world that has become deterritorialised, diasporic and transnational, 
the task of producing locality is increasingly challenging (Appadurai 1997: 
188–189). In the context of this chapter, his categorisation of neighbourhood as 
an actual social form, and locality as non- spatial property, is suggestive: Chitta-
ranjan Park has not only spatial neighbourhood, but locality, which is observed 
on the occasion of Durga Puja and may be shared beyond the area of the colony. 
However, his emphasis on deterritorialisation and disjuncture among his so- 
called five dimensions of global cultural flows (Appadurai 1997: 33) must be 
treated carefully. Though the urban environment and middle- class characters 
connect the colony and its residents with global flows, locality has been continu-
ously produced in the colony.
Urbanisation in Delhi
After the transfer of the capital of colonial India from Calcutta to Delhi, the area 
of Delhi expanded rapidly, and New Delhi and the cantonment area were con-
structed. The secretariat was located in Civil Lines until the construction of New 
Delhi was complete. After independence, the ‘urban area’ of Delhi expanded 
further; the urban area has increased from 326.54 km2 in 1961 to 591.90 km2 in 
1981, 700.23 km2 in 1991 and 924.68 km2 in 2001. The urban area took up 22 
per cent of the total area of Delhi in 1961, 40 per cent in 1981, 47 per cent in 
1991 and 62 per cent in 2001 (Government of NCT of Delhi 2009: 164). The 
current area of the National Capital Territory of Delhi is 1,485 km2. Hereafter, 
‘Delhi’ means the NCT of Delhi.
 The rapid increase of population is another feature of Delhi. The population 
of Delhi, which was 413,851 in 1911, had increased to 13,850,507 by 2001. The 
decennial growth rate of the population was 18 per cent in 1911–21, 30.3 per 
cent in 1921–31, 44.3 per cent in 1931–41 and 90.0 per cent in 1941–50, which 
was caused by the influx of partition refugees from Pakistan. Due to partition, 
the population of Delhi increased from 917,939 in 1941 to 1,744,072 in 1951; 
the trend to increase also continued after partition. The decennial growth rate 
had been 51–53 per cent from 1951 to 1991 (Government of NCT of Delhi 2002: 
22, 178). In Delhi the urban population percentage was 52.8 per cent in 1901, 
and it had risen to 93.2 per cent by 2001, which represents the highest percent-
age of urban population in India (Government of NCT of Delhi 2009: 30).
 The projected population of NCT Delhi as of 1 March 2009 was 174.4 lakh. 
It is estimated that the population of Delhi would continuously increase, reach-
ing 182 lakh in 2011, 199 lakh in 2016 and 230 lakh in 2021 (Puri 2010: 7). It is 
worth mentioning that in- migration has played an important role for population 
growth in Delhi. The impact of in- migration has been greater since the 1990s; 
from 1994, population growth by in- migration has generally exceeded natural 
growth.
 In the Indian context ‘urbanisation’ means a high rate of urban population 
(Sivaramakrishnan et al. 2007). The high rate of urban population has coincided 
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with the expansion of the urban area. Thus, in this chapter ‘urbanisation’ is 
defined as the process of urban population growth and urban area expansion, 
which is usually accompanied by development/redevelopment works and often 
results in the rise of land prices in urban areas.
Chittaranjan Park and Bengali displaced persons: a brief 
history of Chittaranjan Park
Chittaranjan Park was formerly known as the ‘East Pakistan Displaced Persons’ 
Colony’, and its original residents were ‘displaced persons’ from East Pakistan. 
In 1954 they formed an association which was later known as the East Pakistan 
Displaced Persons Association (EPDPA), and appealed to the Indian government 
to rehabilitate them.
 On 4 January 1966 the government released a first press note inviting applica-
tions for the allotment of plots of land. The government invited applications on 
two further occasions, in 1967 and 1977. According to the layout plan prepared 
by the Department of Rehabilitation, the total area of the colony was 218.3 acres 
with 2,072 plots in sizes of 320, 233, 160 and 533/450 square yards.1
 In July 1970 development work in the colony was, by and large, completed, 
and about 100 houses were under construction.2 The year 1970 was also memor-
able as the starting point of community activities. Some interested residents 
formed a committee to organise the centenary celebration of Chittaranjan Das, 
after whom the colony was later named. The ceremony was held in December 
1970 and attended by then prime minister, Indira Gandhi. The first community 
Durga Puja was also celebrated in 1970. Since then, the population and number 
of residences in the colony have gradually increased (Ray 1982: 26–28).
 The Department of Rehabilitation issued a third press note on 14 January 
1977, ten years after the second. This third allotment differed from the previous 
two in that it led to many people being unable to get plots despite the fact that 
they were declared equally as ‘eligible’ as others who had succeeded in getting 
allotments. Some of them did not accept this result; they formed the ‘Association 
of Displaced Persons from East Pakistan Declared Eligible for Allotment of 
Plots in Delhi’3 and started appealing both to unlucky applicants and the govern-
ment. This association was commonly known as the ‘714 Group’ as it consisted 
of 714 members. It was later officially registered. The 714 Group was lucky 
enough to get unused zonal park spaces adjacent to the colony and some fringe 
spaces inside it. In 1984 the government decided to allot plots to them4 and the 
actual implementation of this began in around 1990. Their plots were scattered 
across nine locations adjacent to the main area of Chittaranjan Park and its 
fringes. For details, see Nakatani (2007).
Some characteristics of residents in Chittaranjan Park
This section outlines some characteristics of the present Bengali residents of the 
colony.5 The data was collected by a household survey conducted by the author 
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in August 2002 using a sample of 122 households (see detail analysis in Naka-
tani 2007). First, although the place of origin of most Bengali residents is East 
Bengal, there are some with other places of origin, such as West Bengal, Assam 
and Bihar, but who received plots as they had ancestral origin in East Bengal or 
received plots in the names of their wives. Second, about 10 per cent of residents 
today are not allottees of the land; they are Bengalis both from East Bengal and 
West Bengal and had purchased or were renting flats in the colony. Third, only 
16.3 per cent of residents had lived in Delhi before partition, despite the common 
perception of the residents.6 However, 56 per cent of the allottees had migrated 
to present Indian territory other than Delhi by 1947, and 32 per cent migrated 
between 1947 and 1949. This means that allottees were earlier migrants and 
shared the characteristics of middle- class Bengalis from East Bengal.7 They 
came to West Bengal, particularly Calcutta (Kolkata), for higher education and 
were employed there or in Delhi after the transfer of the colonial capital from 
Calcutta to New Delhi. This stream continued during and after partition.
 Fourth, their middle- class character is reflected in the fact that 91.5 per cent 
of allottees came from the higher castes (Brahman, Kayastha and Baidya) in 
Bengal. These are precisely the castes that predominate among the bhadralok 
class (middle- class Bengali Hindus) who, as mentioned above, had an English 
education and were employed in Calcutta (West Bengal) in white- collar services, 
such as government officers, lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists, and so on. 
Many of them had landed property in their native home in East Bengal. Fifth, the 
educational and occupational backgrounds of the allottees reinforced their 
bhadralok character. Out of the 98 available samples, 79.6 per cent of allottees 
hold a Bachelor’s degree or higher qualification, including four with doctorates, 
two Doctors of Medicine, and 18 holders of Master’s degrees. Most of them are 
highly qualified persons relative to average educational standards in India. 
Regarding occupations, 59.1 per cent of allottees had engaged with government 
services, 14.5 per cent with professions such as doctor, journalist, editor, archi-
tect, priest, engineer, professor, teacher, painter and consultant, and 13.6 per cent 
as office workers in a private company. They are generally oriented towards ser-
vices rather than businesses. These service persons constitute the core group in 
Chittaranjan Park. Finally, allottees included those who fled the violence and 
disturbances that followed partition. Thus, some allottees were de facto refugees.
Chittaranjan Park as Mini Bengal
Chittaranjan Park is often called ‘Mini Bengal’, and many Bengali elements are 
noticeable in the colony. Visitors may wonder to see the building complexes 
such as those run by the Deshbandhu Chittarajan Memorial Society and Bipin 
Chandra Pal Memorial Trust, both of which were named after Bengali heroes of 
the nationalist movement in colonial Bengal. The former maintains a Bengali 
library and provides free medical services; the latter has a big auditorium where 
Bengali dramas, music fairs and other festivals are often organised. The Bangiya 
Samaj is another organisation concerned with Bengali culture. It publishes 
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Bengali periodicals and organises Puspa Mela, a famous festival in Bengal. If 
locals want Bengali cuisine, they can purchase their favourite fish and vegetables 
or sample Bengali dishes at the restaurants in the market. When Bengalis wish to 
pray to Mother Goddess Kali, the principal goddess of Bengal, the neat and well-
 maintained temple complex of the Kali Mandir Society welcomes them. A 
number of religious and cultural programmes are organised there, aimed at satis-
fying the religious needs of Bengalis.
 Chittaranjan Park has brought together more than 2,000 allottees and their 
family members who had lived scattered all over Delhi, thus creating a centre of 
Bengali settlement. While Chittaranjan Park is not the only Bengali settlement in 
Delhi today, it is undoubtedly the biggest. That is why non- allotted Bengalis 
desire to live there. Most of the non- allottees explained that they shifted to Chit-
taranjan Park in order to enjoy its Bengali environment. Nowadays, nearby areas 
such as Govindpuri and Alakanada have become satellites of Chittaranjan Park. 
Bengalis come to settle in these areas because of their proximity to Chittaranjan 
Park: they can taste the Bengali flavour, and the cost of living (the price of land 
and house rents) is lower than in Chittaranjan Park itself.
Durga Pujas and Bengalis in Delhi
Durga is one of the important Hindu Goddesses who are spouses of Siva and 
represent sakti (power) of Siva. In Bengal, Goddess Durga and Goddess Kali are 
the favourite deities. It is often said that there will be a Kali temple in any place 
where Bengalis have settled. Though cases of a permanent temple being estab-
lished for Durga are rare, Durga Puja, the annual festival for Durga, has been 
widely celebrated in Bengal and those places outside Bengal where Bengalis 
have settled.
 According to one story, Durga Puja was first celebrated in Delhi by a feudal 
lord from Rajisahi, a region in East Bengal, in 1842 when he visited the city for 
work (Cittaranjan Park Kali Mandir Sosaiti 1998: 49). The oldest sarbajanin 
(community) Durga Puja in Delhi is known to be the ‘Kashimiri Gate’ Durga 
Puja in north Delhi. It started in 1910 and celebrated its ninety- ninth puja when 
the author visited in 2008.8 Delhi Durga Puja Samiti, the puja committee for the 
Kashimiri Gate Durga Puja, printed a leaflet for the coming centenary celebra-
tion as follows:
This year is special to us because it is the 99th year of our Delhi Durga Puja 
Samiti. Imagine 100 years back – 1910, in the city of Delhi which was still 
then a small town surrounded by a fortified wall. And in there, in a long 
winding lane, hardly 8’ wide (which still it is) called Ballimaran – a handful 
of devoted Bengalees celebrating Durga Puja with all the reverence and joy 
as we do today. Not for long did this group remain a handful. Because soon 
after, the capital of India moved up to Delhi from Kolkata, bringing in a 
large number of families, most of them Bengalees. And as the families grew 
so did the city and Durga Mai blossomed.9
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Following the transfer of the capital, Bengali bureaucrats, who mainly came 
from the Bengali Hindu middle class, also moved from Bengal to Delhi. As the 
number of Bengalis increased, so did the number of Durga Pujas. At the time of 
partition there were Bengalis working not only for the government, but also in 
the private sector. The flow of Bengalis from West Bengal to Delhi continues 
today.
 According to an unofficial estimate, the Bengali population in Delhi is 5–8 
lakh (Cittaranjan Park Kali Mandir Sosaiti 1998: 8, 50). The official statistics, 
for instance the mother tongue report in the census, shows the number of Bengali 
speakers as 121,938 in 1991 and 208,414 in 2001 (Government of NCT of Delhi 
2009: 36). Though confirmation of the exact size of the Bengali population in 
Delhi is difficult, it is certainly very large, and their numbers have been increas-
ing over the last few decades, probably because of the economic growth and the 
expansion of job opportunities in Delhi. As the population of Bengalis in Delhi 
has increased, so has the number of Durga Pujas; it is said that there are now 
over 250 celebrated in Delhi (Cittaranjan Park Kali Mandir Sosaiti 1998: 9).10
Development and change of Durga Pujas in Chittaranjan 
Park: outline of Durga Pujas in Chittaranjan Park
Today, hundreds of Durga Pujas are celebrated in Delhi. Nine sarbajanin Durga 
Pujas are celebrated in the colony. As visitors can enjoy nine pujas in a single 
colony, many are drawn to Chittaranjan Park each year, and the pujas are over-
crowded. Even the residents face difficulty getting in.
 Durga Puja is celebrated in the month of Asvin (September–October) in the 
Bengali calendar. In 2008, the main parts of the Durga Puja in Chittaranjan Park 
started on 5 October (19 Asvin, in the year 1415 in the Bengali calendar). The 
rituals performed in Chittaranjan Park are basically the same as those performed 
in West Bengal as priests are often summoned from there.
 In Chittaranjan Park many non- ritual events were also organised, even before 
the commencement of the puja rituals. Competitions were held for songs (chil-
dren’s song, Tagore song, Nazurul song, etc.), recitations, karaoke, instrumen-
tals, dance, fancy dress, quizzes, art and musical chairs in different puja sites 
around the colony. There were some ritual- related competitions such as one for 
alpana (a kind of art drawn for domestic rituals), sangkha dhvani (conch- shell 
blowing) and arati (holy flame and smoke). A household food exhibition called 
ananda mela was a unique event in which residents prepared any food of their 
choice, including Bengali cuisine, and sold it to the public. Sports competitions 
were also held. Cultural programmes like music concerts and dance shows were 
held every night. Thus, Durga Puja does not only have implications as a ritual, 
but also includes aspects that function as a neighbourhood/community event in 
which local residents get together, participate and enjoy themselves.
 Figure 10.1 shows the locations of nine Durga Pujas in Chittaranjan Park. 
Durga Pujas today cover the entire area of the colony. Chittaranjan Park is 
divided into 20 blocks and two DDA flats (group houses constructed by the 
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Delhi Development Authority). Each block is given a letter from A to K and 
then given the prefix ‘Pocket’ 40, 52, K, L, M, N, O, P, K1. The names listed 
from (1) to (9) are the names of the organising committee for Durga Puja. 
Members of the puja committee are not necessarily confined to the residents of 
the respective block or site; they often transcend the blocks.
First stage: united Durga Puja, 1970–75
The first house was built in the colony in 1969, when the development works 
were almost over; the first sarbajanin Durga Puja was organised in 1970. Only 
18–20 households were living there at the time, and they formed ‘Kalkaji Puja 
Smiti’ and celebrated Durga Puja at the site of J Block zonal park in front of 
No. 1 market. After three years, they shifted the site slightly eastward to C 
Block and changed the name of the committee to ‘Chittaranjan Park Puja 
Figure 10.1  Durga Puja site locations in Chittaranjan Park.
Notes
* Numbers in brackets show the locations of the respective puja sites.
1  Kali Mandir Society; 2 Cooperative Ground; 3 B Block; 4 Mela Ground; 5 Navapalli; 6 Dakshin 




/  Talw^r \
Apartments RS
j l o b a l / k
r a v e l s / ^
\ E  B lock  'V
/P a r k  \
FlatsChanderiok M andakini^----
Destination 




J f e g
\  Nabapahi  ■" „
\  Nehru \  
Apartments
Apartme
\H pteD R oyal\ 
> C as tle ^ a n d ^Tattoo .>
Ss b  ■
Durga puja and neighbourhood  167
Samiti’ after the name of the colony was changed in 1973. During this stage, 
Durga Puja was organised as the sole sarbajanin puja for all residents of the 
colony.
Second stage: split and expansion of Durga Pujas in the 
second half of the 1970s
The colony was planned to provide over 2,000 residential plots. However, it took 
some years to fill the plots because not all allottees had enough funds to con-
struct houses when the development works were complete, and those who had 
services far away from the colony had plans to shift later.
 When the number of residents increased and the area of residential plots was 
expanded, Durga Puja became crowded and inconvenient for those who lived far 
from the puja site. According to an article in the silver jubilee commemoration 
volume published by the Kali Mandir Society, some residents demanded the 
shift of the puja site from C Block to Mela Ground (see (4) in Figure 10.1) in 
1976. Residents of Blocks A, B and K opposed the demand, as Mela Ground 
was far from their residential plots. In the end, Chittaranjan Park Puja Samiti, the 
sole committee, did not organise the puja, and Durga Puja was organised in both 
Mela Ground and J Block in 1976. Thus Durga Puja split into two. Residents in 
the eastern side held it at Mela Ground and those in the western side held it at J 
Block (Kali Mandir Sosaiti 1998: 46).
 Though the commemorative volume provides the version of the events of 
1976 given above, according to interviews and souvenirs published by the 
respective puja committees, Durga Puja in the colony might have split into three 
in 1976. Three Durga Pujas – Mela Ground, Cooperative Ground in J Block (see 
(2) in Figure 10.1), and B Block (see (3) in Figure 10.1) – celebrated their thirty- 
third anniversary in 2008, meaning those pujas started in 1976. On the other 
hand, Chittaranjan Park Puja Samiti started its puja inside the temple complex of 
the Kali Mandir Society (see (1) in Figure 10.1) in 1977. This committee oper-
ated until 1992 and was abolished in 1993 when the Kali Mandir Society started 
to organise a puja in its own name. Thus, the Durga Puja was split into four in 
1976–77. Mela Ground, Cooperative Ground, B Block and Kali Mandir Society 
are the four big pujas which represent Durga Puja in the colony. The single puja 
for the colony disappeared and pujas were handed over to various committees. 
The split of the Durga Puja was not necessarily seen as a negative thing, as a 
member of Mela Ground commented, ‘The split of puja is natural. It is like a 
family process. If a family has some sons, sons grow up, become independent, 
and separate from the original family.’11
 One of the factors that allowed the split of Durga Pujas in the colony was that 
Chittaranjan Park had enough open space to accommodate new pujas. All of the 
sites of the big four have huge open spaces in which even a large- scale meeting 
or sports event can be held. There are other middle- scale open spaces, i.e. parks, 
in the colony which can be converted into puja sites. In this sense, from a plan-
ning perspective Chittaranjan Park has a good spatial environment.
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Third stage: Durga Pujas organised by new residents, 
1992–95
After the Durga Pujas in the colony split into four in 1977, there were no further 
splits until 1992, when the situation changed. The government allotted new plots 
in and around the colony to the allottees of 714 Group, who started living there 
from the early 1990s. These new residents started their own pujas for 714 Group 
residents. The Navapalli committee started its puja from 1992, covering the resi-
dents of Pocket K1 and 40 blocks (see (5) in Figure 10.1). The Dakshin Palli 
committee started its puja in 1995, covering the residents of Pocket 52, M, N, O, 
P (see (6) in Figure 10.1).
Fourth stage: magnificent Durga Pujas and 
commercialisation from the mid- 1990s
There were six Durga Pujas in Chittaranajan Park from the 1990s. As it is easy 
for visitors to pass through many pujas in one place, the number of non- resident 
visitors increased substantially. This situation attracted advertisements from 
private companies, and Durga Pujas became advertising media. Such links with 
commercialism have become particularly clear since the mid- 1990s. The more 
money companies contributed to pujas, the more puja committees spent and 
competed with each other over the magnificence and entertainment of Durga 
Puja. For puja committees, the inflow of money from advertisements was easy 
money. Today the sums acquired in this way greatly surpass the money collected 
from individual residents.
 As a result of the inflow of company money, the budget for Durga Puja has 
increased hugely. Cooperative Ground spent Rs. 20.1 lakh in 2000, 22.4 lakh in 
2005 and 24.6 lakh in 2007. Similarly, the Kali Mandir Society, which in 2000 
spent Rs. 17.9 lakh for all ritual expenses, including Durga Puja, spent 25.9 lakh 
on Durga Puja alone in 2007. The competitiveness between puja committees has 
accelerated this trend. A founding member of Cooperative Ground explained:
Durga Puja changed very much. Today’s puja is completely commercial-
ised. There was personal attachment and good relation among people. But 
those who can raise money take the leadership now. The tradition of puja 
was lost. Each committee wants to organise better pujas than others. We 
became rivals. As a result, competition became very hard and the elements 
of entertainment became crucial for puja. Committees try to attract more 
visitors by performing better cultural programmes.12
The competition can be seen not only in secular entertainment, but also in 
ritual aspects. The scale and inner decoration of the temporary shed erected for 
puja (pyandal), the uniqueness and beauty of the idol of Durga and the number 
of food offerings (bhog) provided to visitors are the most important concerns. 
For instance, Cooperative Ground tries to win the prize for ‘Best Idol’ in the 
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competition sponsored by Times of India every year. It won ‘Best Idol’ in the 
south Delhi area in 2008 (see Figure 10.2).
 With this trend puja committees rely heavily on company money. The 
source of revenue from companies is divided into (1) advertisements on sou-
venirs, (2) sponsorship for any particular programme, (3) banner advertise-
ments inside and outside the puja complex (see Figure 10.3) and (4) stalls 
inside the puja complex for restaurants, food companies, banks, toy sellers, 
mobile companies, car dealers, real- estate developers, magazine publishers, 
religious bodies, etc. According to the account settlement of Cooperative 
Ground for the 2007 Durga Puja, the expenses were Rs. 24.6 lakh and the 
revenue procured by the four revenue streams noted was Rs. 25.2 lakh, which 
means that money from companies exceeded the expenses of the puja and 
created a surplus. The total amount of donations from individual households 
was only Rs. 1.3 lakh, and the amount collected in the donation box was 
Rs. 43,000. Thus, today’s big Durga Pujas are heavily dependent on company 
money and have deviated from the neighbourhood as regards money. B Block 
has given up collecting donations from individual households and is solely 
dependent on company money.
 The link between Durga Puja and company money seemed to start in the mid- 
1990s. An old member of the Mela Ground committee explained:
Figure 10.2  Durga idol.
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At the initial stage, our puja was small. The population was less and puja 
was organised based on the individual donations by residents. However, 
puja gradually became big in its scale. It was in 1995 that we got sponsor-
ship from Coca Cola and received 16,000 Rs. We then understood that com-
panies would offer money for Durga Puja. The expense of our puja, which 
was only 2–4 lakh before, is 25 lakh now.13
Nowadays company money is indispensable for any sarbajanin pujas, irrespec-
tive of scale. However, some people became very anxious about the loss of per-
sonal attachment and intimacy among residents that were found in traditional 
Durga Puja. Thus, neighbourhood pujas were restored by some willing people.
Fifth stage: return to neighbourhood Durga Pujas from the 
mid- 1990s
The idea to return to the neighbourhood Durga Puja emerged simultaneously 
with the process of commercialisation. Three new committees were formed: 
Milan Samity in 1995, D Block in 1998 and E Block in 2000 (see (9), (7), and 
(8) in Figure 10.1). While all members of Milan Samity committee had split 
from Cooperative Ground committee, members of D and E Block came from 
Figure 10.3  Banner advertisements.
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different committees. An old member of D Block most clearly expressed their 
intentions regarding neighbourhood pujas:
At that time we feel that Durga Pujas in Chittaranjan Park became commer-
cialised. The personal touch was lost and the participation of residents was 
getting less. Durga Puja became impersonal as the large- scale pujas were 
organised with money power. That is why we thought to go back to the tra-
ditional form of neighbourhood Durga Puja. We placed the importance not 
on the commercialism like food courts and shops, but on the ritual aspect of 
puja. We wanted to go back to the traditional style. We organise Durga Puja 
very simply and are careful not to become commercial. Of course we need 
funds, but a balance between religion and commercialisation should be 
made. Therefore, we do not invite expensive musicians from outside. Most 
of our cultural programmes are performed by local children and adults.14
 Similarly, the president of Milan Smaity emphasised the importance of neigh-
bourhood puja; he also referred to the discord among members of the 
Cooperative Ground puja committee, from which they separated, as a reason for 
the separation:
One of the purposes for which we organise our Durga Puja is to perform the 
ritual. Another purpose is to create the opportunity for neighbouring fam-
ilies to get together. That is why we arrange minimum cultural programmes. 
If we organise a big programme, many visitors would come to see our puja 
and the puja would be overcrowded. We want to observe the tradition of 
puja. Getting together for puja is our concept. Taking leave for puja, sitting 
together, eating together, talking together, and celebrating puja together are 
our way. We have such fellow feelings.15
 It is worth mentioning that the idea of returning to neighbourhood puja is 
realised in the personal household Durga Puja too. It is difficult to find out how 
many household Durga Pujas are arranged in Chittaranjan Park; the author found 
at least two such pujas in B Block in 2008. The household head of one of them 
explained:
We started household Durga Puja from this year. I had engaged with the B 
Block committee for 30 years. I still have personal communication with 
them. But B Block is overcrowded and personal relations among people are 
fewer. If we organise Durga Puja at home, we can celebrate it within the 
relationship of family and neighbours. It costs us some 50,000 Rs. We do 
not collect donations. But some neighbours propose to us that they would 
take charge of some part of the puja. Other neighbours give us daily food 
offerings. We invite a priest from Kolkata who has been in charge of rituals 
at our relatives’ house, where Durga Puja has been celebrated every year for 
95 years.16
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 In brief, Durga Puja in Chittaranjan Park, which was a single puja until 1975, 
split into four in 1977, when the number of residents increased and the residen-
tial area was expanded. Since the mid- 1990s Durga Puja has linked up with com-
mercialism in the urban environment of Delhi. Contrary to this trend, some 
residents sought the idea of traditional neighbourhood Durga Puja and started 
pujas that had a personal touch. This process indicates two aspects of urban char-
acteristics. One is that residents who have a Bengali background are very con-
scious of their religious culture, and their regional- ethnic culture is maintained in 
the cross- cultural environment of Delhi. The other is that where urban neigh-
bourhoods have expanded beyond a certain limit, the neighbourhood Durga Puja 
has been resized on an appropriate scale (see the four big pujas) and the neigh-
bourhood has further converged into a small unit driven by words such as ‘per-
sonal’, ‘get together’ and ‘traditional’ (see Milan Samity, D Block, E Block and 
household pujas).
Durga Pujas as an afterimage of neighbourhood
There are cases in which Durga Pujas have been maintained despite physical 
changes in the urban environment. Old Durga Pujas held in Kashimiri Gate and 
Timarpur in north Delhi have been maintained even though most of the residents 
have disappeared from those neighbourhoods. Urban space always faces 
changes. While new townships emerge, it is not unusual for existing townships 
to decline. Natural change by generation also has an impact on urban space. 
Despite all this, Durga Puja has been celebrated as an afterimage of the neigh-
bourhood in Kashimiri Gate and in Timarpur.
 Timarpur Civil Line Puja Samiti, which celebrated the ninety- fifth anniver-
sary of its Durga Puja in 2008, is a good example. There had been many Bengali 
government employees in Timarpur, where the secretariat of the colonial gov-
ernment was located until the completion of New Delhi. Though there are fewer 
Bengalis today, former residents get together only to organise the Durga Puja. A 
member of the committee explains:
Timarpur had been a settlement for government employees before as it is 
today. Those who were transferred to Delhi following the shift of the then 
capital had got residence here. Timarpur Civil Line Puja Samiti organised 
the first Durga Puja in 1914. As this settlement is for government 
employees, different people have come to stay here and gone away. Only 20 
Bengalis are living here now. As my father was a government employee, he 
had got residence and I was born here. Many people were born here like me. 
However, the children of government employees did not necessarily become 
government employees. I am not a government employee myself, so I do 
not live here. I live in Bikashpur, 20 km away from here. I come here for 
Durga Puja. We get together for Durga Puja and rent rooms nearby for 4–5 
days during puja. We are all friends with each other.17
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In Timarpur, the locality and friendship of the old days have been maintained in 
the context of Durga Puja, even after the neighbourhood was lost. Similarly, no 
members of the Kashimiri Gate puja committee live in the original neighbour-
hood, and committee members get together only for Durga Puja.
Urbanisation and its influence on the ethnic composition of 
Chittaranjan Park
This section deals with urbanisation and its influence on the ethnic composition of 
Chittaranjan Park. The rise of real- estate prices accompanied by rapid urbanisation 
in Delhi has resulted in the draining of Bengali residents from the colony. The 
redevelopment of two squatters’ markets in the colony produced the same trend. 
Thus, urbanisation in Delhi has shaken the ethnic composition of Chittaranjan 
Park, which had been established exclusively for Bengali displaced persons.
Impact of real- estate development
As discussed above, Delhi has experienced a consistent process of urbanisation. 
Chittaranjan Park has undergone the same process. Real- estate developers inter-
vened in the colony from early on in its establishment. A typical method of the 
development of residential plots is as follows: the developers demolish the ori-
ginal house and in its place construct a three- storey building with a basement. 
The allottees get the ground floor and some money, and the developers sell the 
other floors. Since residential plots were granted on a 99-year leasehold, the dis-
position of land is banned. This method bypasses this restriction.
 In some cases the pressure of land development extended to the land itself and 
the developers obtained ‘power of attorney’ over the land from the allottees. This 
was not a transfer of the ownership rights, but gave an overall legal right to manage 
a piece of land. Using this method, the developers constructed houses and sold all 
the floors. Allottees got money from the developers and bought a new residence 
elsewhere. If the money received exceeded the cost of the new residence, the surplus 
money could be kept. This was another method to bypass the restriction of lease-
hold. However, this method was against the intent of rehabilitation, and the EPDPA 
cautioned against such intervention in the mid- 1970s (Purbbacaler Katha 1975).18
 Rapid land development has raised the price of land in Chittaranjan Park. 
When allottees were granted land by the government, the price of land 
(premium) was Rs. 30 per square yard, which means a total of Rs. 4,800 for a 
160 square yard plot. According to interviews with allottees, their monthly salary 
was Rs. 400–500 at that time, so the price of the plot was equal to their annual 
income. In 2007 a local real- estate dealer said that the price of a 160 square yard 
‘flat’ (the flat only, without land) with three bedrooms was Rs. 1 crore and that 
the price of a 125 square yard flat with two bedrooms, which had cost Rs. 21 
lakh in the early 2000s, cost Rs. 60 lakh in 2007.19
 This rapid rise in property prices created a situation where the original 
Bengali allottees were unable to purchase new or extra plots when they wanted 
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to separate households. As a result, those who purchase and come into the 
colony are largely non- Bengalis, mainly Punjabis. A former secretary of EPDPA 
estimated in an article published in 2005 that 17–18 per cent of plots in the 
colony were already sold to non- Bengalis (Cakrabartti 2005). Similarly, when 
the author checked the names found in the resident directory published by 
EPDPA in 2001, 16.7 per cent of the names seemed to be non- Bengali. Bengali 
residents are anxious for the future of Mini Bengal.
Market redevelopment
The redevelopment of squatters’ markets has also affected the ethnic composi-
tion of the colony. There are four markets – Nos 1–4 – in the colony. They were 
all incorporated in the layout plan of Chittaranjan Park from the planning stage. 
However, No. 1 and No. 2 markets were occupied by squatters (shopkeepers) 
from an early stage, and their naturalisation and redevelopment had been a long- 
standing issue.
 As both markets grew as squatters’ markets, they developed depending on the 
needs of consumers. The variety of shops met the daily needs of the residents. 
There were shops related to the Bengali lifestyle. The variety of shops resembled 
markets in Kolkata. When the author visited the two markets in the early 2000s, 
the shops were mostly huts and were set out facing each other, with a narrow 
pathway between them (see Figure 10.4).
Figure 10.4 No. 1 Market before redevelopment.
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 Shopkeepers from both squatters’ markets jointly founded the EPDP Traders’ 
Association in 1975. Though the markets were illegally occupied, the association 
was officially registered and its members were all displaced persons from East 
Pakistan. The association had 49 members from No. 1 Market and 47 members 
from No. 2 Market; there were also non- member shopkeepers around the 
markets, so the market areas were congested.
 The Delhi Development Authority started redevelopment work in the early 
2000s. The purpose of this redevelopment was to end the illegal occupation of 
the land and provide shop spaces to displaced persons from East Pakistan. There-
fore the eligibility of each shopkeeper was examined by the authority. While the 
eligibility of all 96 members of the EPDP Traders’ Association was sanctioned, 
there remained 64 in No. 1 Market and 126 in No. 2 Market who were declared 
ineligible. Later, an additional 12 shopkeepers were declared eligible, making a 
total of 108 in all.20 However, as non- eligible shopkeepers claimed that they also 
needed new shop space for their livelihood, additional space was incorporated in 
the plan. Shopkeepers could obtain space if they were able to pay the prescribed 
price to the authorities.21
 Redevelopment work was completed around 2005.22 The market building was 
reconstructed as a two- storey building (see Figure 10.5). Each space was uni-
formly partitioned as a small compartment 9.5 feet wide by 9.5 feet long. 
Although eligible shopkeepers held the right to a place in the new buildings, 
things were not easy. They had to pay a certain amount of money to the authorities. 
Figure 10.5  No. 2 Market after redevelopment.
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An old shopkeeper who has dealt in real estate since the pre- redevelopment 
period explained:
The cost of the new shop space was 394,000 Rs. for the ground floor and 
675,000 Rs. for the first floor. 28 percent of the total cost was to be paid in 
advance and remaining 72 percent was to be paid after the construction of 
building was over. The cost was high for some shopkeepers. There are quite 
a few people who could not afford it. They sold the right for space to 
someone else and got out from the market. The current price (in 2007) of 
space for the ground floor is 50 lakh and 20 lakh Rs. for the first floor. The 
most expensive spaces are at the front facing the main road, they cost 60 
lakh Rs. As buying and selling of space is very active, the percentage of 
Bengali shopkeepers is about 70 percent in No. 1 Market and 60 percent in 
No. 2 Market. There are many Punjabis among the new shopkeepers, though 
there are some Bengalis.23
What happened with the residential plots happened in market redevelopment too. 
As a result of the rapid rise in property prices, the percentage of original Bengali 
displaced persons shopkeepers has declined.
Concluding remarks
This chapter described how the urban neighbourhood is formed under the 
process of rapid urbanisation in Delhi. The case study of Durga Puja celebrated 
in Chittaranjan Park has shown that the residents of the colony hold a sense of 
spatial neighbourhood. Once they feel the scale of the neighbourhood has 
exceeded their permissible range, they try to adjust its size until it meets their 
sense of neighbourhood.
 The case study of Chittaranjan Park has explored the fact that ethnic diversity 
is a remarkable aspect of urban space in Delhi. As the Anthropological Survey 
of India identified, 147 communities have settled in Delhi (Ghosh & Nath 1996: 
xxii), which, as in other megacities in India, maintains its ethnic diversity.
 Chittaranjan Park represents an ethnic community of Bengalis. However, it is 
neither a primordial nor a traditional community. It is one of the new residential 
areas developed in the suburbs after independence. While its residents are eager 
to maintain their Bengali culture, their identities are not confined to ethnicity. 
Rather, they are heavily influenced by educational qualifications, occupation and 
being part of the urban middle class. A statement made by the former president 
of EPDPA in the early 2000s clearly shows this:
Most residents of this colony belong to middle class or lower middle class. 
There are some scheduled castes in this colony, though they do not disclose 
it. But, we do not care whether someone belongs to schedule caste. We 
are all Bengalis. It is enough. Rather we find our respective identity on 
occupation.24
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The activities in various cultural organisations and religious festivals in the 
colony are based on Bengali culture, but they are not maintained on the conven-
tional relationships of caste, family and gender. The organisations are run by 
volunteers, and the board members are elected. The temple priests are recruited 
through newspaper advertisements. This means that although ‘community’ 
belongs to the realm of culture, it is managed not through traditional social rela-
tions but through the meeting of the contemporary urban environment and the 
sense its members have of being urban dwellers.
 Neighbourhood is not a cultural concept like community, but a spatial one. 
When the construction of houses in Chittaranjan Park started in the late 
1960s, the colony held a single neighbourhood. As the number of houses 
increased, a single neighbourhood became several neighbourhoods in the 
context of ritual organisations for Durga Puja. Simultaneously, the neighbour-
hoods in the colony have been sites of political struggle for colony acquisi-
tion, struggle between old residents and newcomers – namely the 714 Group 
– and the intervention of business enterprise and market, commercialism and 
globalisation. The drainage of Bengalis from the colony also illustrates how 
the neighbourhood has been affected by urban environment through rapid 
urbanisation and redevelopment. The case study of the colony has thus clearly 
illustrated that the urban neighbourhood is a space that is always being nego-
tiated and reproduced.
 Durga Pujas have shown an interesting aspect of locality in Delhi. The local-
ity, defined by Appadurai as a structure of feeling, has been shared by the resi-
dents of the colony through the organisation of Durga Pujas in neighbourhoods. 
It is also widely shared among Bengalis in Delhi as a whole. However, the case 
in Kashimiri Gate and Timarpur has shown a relationship between locality and 
neighbourhood where the locality or a local subject remained even after the 
neighbourhood had dissolved or even disappeared.
 While cities in India are increasingly affected by the impact of economic 
growth and globalisation, it is necessary to combine cultural and ethnic, and 
political and economic perspectives. Focusing on neighbourhood as locales in 
which both cultural and economic negotiations take place would greatly benefit 
research on urban life in India.
Notes
 1 Standard Note issued by the Department of Rehabilitation: Chittaranjan Park (for-
merly known as EPDP Colony) near Kalkaji, New Delhi – Development and Allot-
ment of Plots to Displaced Persons from former East Pakistan, 31 March 1980.
 2 Lok Sabha Debates, Written Answers, 27 August 1970, Vol. XLIV, p. 104.
 3 ‘Appeal’, a mimeograph issued by the Association of Displaced Persons from East 
Pakistan Declared Eligible for Allotment of Plots in Delhi, 23 May 1978.
 4 A letter from Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, Sport and Works & Housing, 4 June 
1984.
 5 As discussed later, today there are quite a few non- Bengalis in Chittaranjan Park. 
However, this section deals with only Bengalis to outline the sociological background 
of the colony.
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 6 Between 1947 and 1949, 13.5 per cent of the allottees migrated to Delhi, and 64.4 per 
cent migrated in the 1950s and 1960s. This fact is not strange because the eligibility 
for application was defined in the first Press Note issued by the government as appli-
cants having been continuously in residence therein from a date prior to 31 March 
1958. The second Press Note further relaxed the date and included those who had 
lived in Delhi for a total period of at least four years after partition up to 31 March 
1966 (Standard Note issued by the Department of Rehabilitation, 1980).
 7 It is said that the migrants between 1946 and 1949 were old migrants who had pre- 
partition ties of occupation or kinship with West Bengal, belonged to upper and 
middle castes and tended to gravitate to urban areas. Following the outbreak of com-
munal conflict in Khulna in December 1949, migrants from East Pakistan were chiefly 
rural – peasant proprietors, traders and artisans (Chatterjee 1990: 72–73).
 8 The author conducted fieldwork on Durga Puja in Chittaranjan Park and some other 
places in October 2008. Other related data on Chittaranjan Park were mostly collected 
from November 2001 to September 2002.
 9 ‘Delhi Durga Puja Samiti 1910–2009’, a leaflet, Bengali Club, Kashmere Gate, Delhi, 
2008.
10 The estimate of Durga Pujas being carried out in 250 places in Delhi is not exagger-
ated. There had been only one immersion committee in Delhi before, which arranged 
the immersion of Durga’s idol in the river on the last day of the puja celebrations. As 
the number of Durga Puja increased, the committee was separated into two, South and 
North in Delhi. According to an interview with the committee officials in the southern 
part on 9 October 2008, the registered number of Durga Puja in the south part was 
125 in 2008, and there were also non- registered pujas. South Delhi has over 125 
Durga Pujas, so the north has the same or more. Thus, Delhi has more than 250 Durga 
Pujas today.
11 Interview with a member of the Mela Ground committee on 7 October 2008.
12 Interview with a member of the Cooperative Ground committee on 4 October 2008.
13 Interview with a member of the Mela Ground committee on 7 October 2008.
14 Interview with a member of the D Block committee on 4 October 2008.
15 Interview with the president of the Milan Samiti committee on 7 October 2008.
16 Interview with a household head and Durga Puja organiser in B Block on 7 October 
2008.
17 Interview with a member of the Timarpur committee on 4 October 2008.
18 Since the 1990s it has become possible for allottees to change the land status from 
leasehold to freehold if they apply with certain fees to the government.
19 Interview with a local real- estate dealer in No. 1 Market, Chittaranjan Park, on 31 
August 2007.
20 A document issued by the Land and Development Office, Ministry of Urban Develop-
ment, Government of India on 16 July 2001.
21 The list of shopkeepers the author obtained in No. 1 Market shows from the names on 
it that most of the people who were declared non- eligible were also Bengalis. 
However, they were not displaced persons; they were Bengalis from West Bengal and 
other places.
22 An article in the magazine issued by EPDPA in 2005 reported that No. 1 Market was 
already completed and No. 2 Market would be completed soon (Purbbacaler Katha, 
2005). When the author visited in September 2006, No. 2 Market was already 
completed.
23 Interview with a local real- estate dealer in No. 1 Market, Chittaranjan Park, on 9 Sep-
tember 2007.
24 Interviewed on 15 December 2001.
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11 Urban thresholds
Crevices, crossroads and magic 
remainders
Parvis Ghassem- Fachandi
A series of contradictions mark the urban experience of Ahmedabad. The city is 
one of India’s major commercial centres and the largest in the province of 
Gujarat, with an official and fast- growing population of over five million resi-
dents. It is generally felt to be safer than most metropolitan Indian cities; resi-
dents are proud to point out that instances of rape, murder and robbery are much 
more frequent in Bombay, Bangalore or Delhi. Yet, there is something conser-
vative and staid about its cultural scene. Notwithstanding the general perception 
of safety, many of its younger residents – across class divisions – aspire to move 
to other large urban centres in India, or even to international destinations such as 
London or New York. I was often asked ‘Why did you come here?’, as if the 
place from which I came – wherever it was – must be better.1
 Despite the fact that Ahmedabad has witnessed calamitous events like floods, 
earthquakes, pogroms and communal riots, it is also, for many of its residents, a 
city of calm and prosperity. In quieter times the city busies itself with infrastruc-
tural improvements in an atmosphere of endless growth. Its entrepreneurial class 
has proved capable, to a large extent, of insulating the local economy from the 
devastating ups and downs of international capital markets. Ahmedabad consists 
of three distinct urban spaces, relating uneasily to one another, each one con-
nected to a specific urban imaginary as well as to concrete facts on the ground: 
the walled city, the eastern periphery and new Ahmedabad on the western river 
shore (Nandy et al. 1995: 110–123; Yagnik and Sheth 2005: 229–230). The city 
is strongly divided along class, caste and communal lines, but remains integrated 
through community borders, the cyclical occurrence of violence and an eco-
nomic division of labour (Breman 2004: 31–39, Rajagopal 2010: 529–556).
 Divisions of the city fall into relief during times of violence or in its after-
math, when one difference is able to bridge all others and becomes more promi-
nent. In recent decades the Hindu–Muslim divide has been the default mode of 
all divisions. In periods of violence, the city behaves like a massive organism, 
closing the many interfaces between areas and communities as if it were a giant 
cell reacting against chemical intrusion: bridges become structures of confine-
ment; permanent police posts define community borders, which in turn become 
spaces for provocation and violent performance; sacred structures become sites 
of conversion, identity assertion and injury. Thus, at such times any traversing of 
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urban space is fraught with immense psychological stress and incalculable risk. 
This chapter describes experiences of separation and how they come to be 
expressed with reference to two specific elements in the city’s hardware: road-
side temples and the use of interstitial space for urban expiation rituals.2
Mushroom temples
If bridges link an urban expanse that remains psychologically divided, and per-
manent police posts configure a split intimate space that is physically shared, 
then street temples and shrines cluster within the matrix of these existing fault 
lines. And yet, these miniature city constructions frequently seem to have a will 
of their own. The ubiquitous miniature structures chaotically expand into the 
middle of roads and onto street corners, only to be ruled in by city officials or 
disappear out of sight. They either grow larger and impede traffic or recede back 
to the margins at the side of the street.
 Urban micro- politics determine the spatial growth, expansion and shift of 
these structures. Small- scale religious entrepreneurs compete with residents, city 
officials, extremist organisations or the police, who are charged with regulating 
traffic or controlling unauthorised building in the city. Although these structures 
increasingly flag city corners as belonging to one particular religious community, 
their spread and growth are not reducible to political or communal machinations. 
Much of their will to live has to do with the indifferent flow of money and traffic 
through the city.
 There are many religious sites in Ahmedabad. While large historical temples 
and shrines, or modern prestigious edifices, are depicted on city maps and tourist 
guides, the more dynamic minor structures are not. Counterintuitively, the 
slighter and more insignificant a temple or shrine, the more it connects the resid-
ential contiguity to its spatial signification. The reason behind this is simple and 
has to do with the social background of the clientele that makes use of the struc-
ture. If a temple grows large and becomes well known, it will attract a different 
set of visitors from all over the city; if it remains small it will draw mainly those 
who are residents of its immediate vicinity.
 In extreme cases, such as the fancy Akshardham temple on the Ahmedabad–
Gandhinagar highway, or the series of wealthy ISKON temples, visitors often 
include middle- class Muslims and Christians who want to see spectacles of the 
divine during Sunday picnics. Likewise, the Usmanpura Dargah, the fourteenth- 
century tomb of Sayid Usman, located in a middle- class Hindu neighbourhood, 
attracts many Hindu visitors in search of a cure for possession by spirits, broken 
hearts or disease. By becoming tied to diverse categories of visitors, the more 
developed edifices escape the immediateness of their surroundings, overcoming 
boundaries of class, caste or religious composition within a respective neighbour-
hood. In other words, the physical growth of religious structures encourages tran-
scendence of the sociological make- up of the surrounding space, and although 
physical size makes a structure more visibly present in the urban landscape, its vis-
itors tend to be much more transient and less tied to its physical location.
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 Successful sacred places become the site of inner- city pilgrimage and official 
recognition, patronage and, finally, protection by the city police. An attack on 
such a structure will lead to investigations, arrests and trouble with the authori-
ties (this in no way excludes their destruction during extraordinary events such 
as pogroms in which violent unanimity can reign supreme). In contradistinction, 
minor improvised structures are more dependent on their immediate surround-
ings, supportive neighbours or the demographic dominance of a particular com-
munity. When the air is filled with communal posturing they inadvertently 
become, or are turned into, community markers.
 Small structures often make it big. Bulging constructions on major traffic 
arteries frequently expand to fill what was earlier an empty traffic island. Several 
of these can be found on Ashram Road and other major traffic routes in the city. 
In one case, an adolescent street temple grew into a place for street worship for 
middle- to lower middle- class commuters. The success of such structures is pre-
dicated on the creative ability to attract passing residents into short- lived eco-
nomic and spiritual transactions during their daily journey to work and back 
home. Some temples emerge near bus stops or other sites where a potential spir-
itual client is likely to pause or slow her movement in urban space.
 Most miniature street temples or shrines have doors that can be closed, and 
even if they do not, their walls create an enclosed space, protected from the outside 
and framing and symbolically demarcating the inside. Usually, but not always, the 
walls and doors, as well as the cement platforms on which they are frequently 
erected, are added later, after the structure has become economically viable or 
some patron has offered a religious gift to improve it. The platforms create an open 
space that is kept clean and serves as a seat for neighbours on the street. The 
edifice is elevated above the dust of the road and hence set part.
 On occasion the entrance of the structure is positioned so that it angles 
towards the street in such a way that passing drivers feel compelled to look into 
the temple when its tiny gates are open, lights are lit and deities are present. 
Conversely, some doors face away from the traffic to allow visitors to stay safely 
off the road when performing darshan, the visual exchange with the divine. As 
they grow, temples in particular have a tendency to gravitate sideways towards 
the centre of roads; in some cases they balance on slim road dividers or traffic 
islands. All such growth invites congestion and even accidents at times, but 
although commuters often express annoyance, the general atmosphere is one of 
great tolerance. This tendency to encroach imperceptibly onto the road tenta-
tively reverses the rationale of enclosed space. The protected inside of the temple 
is brought into direct contact with the roiling vitality outside, placing itself 
directly in the way of passing movement.
 The impulse of small religious structures to expand, slide sideways, encroach 
and insert themselves into the busiest of urban flows is constantly perceptible. 
Methodologically, one can best take account of such shifts when visiting specific 
sites in the city frequently over a longer period of time, equipped with a camera 
to document these movements, and then discussing the matter with local resi-
dents and shop owners.
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 The hierarchical distinctions of social distance in city space, expressed most 
pointedly through guards, gates, and bridges, are supplemented through these 
structures, which introduce a more encompassing verticality of the sacred: in 
relation to invisible forces – gods, goddesses, ghosts, demons or, for that matter, 
the distribution of destiny and bad luck – all city residents are truly equal. And 
where are these uncontrollable forces more palpable than in the interminable 
commuter traffic?
 Traffic, by connecting all unequal places, leaving no one unaffected or iso-
lated, is a collective phenomenon that, like the circulation of money, defines the 
experience of modernity. While it always implies the danger of misfortune 
through accidents, road travel becomes restricted during violence, constituting 
one important element of the peculiar atmosphere that pervades during violent 
conflagrations. During such periods, devices that minimise distance – vehicles 
such as cars, scooters and motorbikes – are removed from the street; and if not, 
they are frequently destroyed (usually burnt). If the transience of space is inter-
rupted when the city engages in violence, in peaceful times it is not hampered 
but tapped strategically by improvised religious structures. Without crossroads 
and traffic circles where passage axes interlock, these structures would never 
multiply in this way.
 The smaller concrete temples, round or rectangular, are usually decorated inside 
with convenient white or coloured bathroom tiles, and on the outside even more 
colourful deities are depicted. The Muslim version of the small street structure is a 
shrine, a dargah, painted in green and with the grave of a saint or two. Sometimes 
small street structures mark a particularly busy corner, or a large tree where cows 
gather, producing a localised charm that residents enjoy and often attribute to the 
supernatural powers of the divinity or saint in question; this is sometimes tongue- 
in-cheek. The aesthetic value of such sacred assemblages is appreciated across 
religious lines, as both Hindus and Muslims hold similar ideas about where in this 
dusty city one can comfortably sit and share a cup of tea.
 Since the BJP took power in central Gujarat in the 1990s miniature temples 
have progressively been springing up everywhere, not just in urban Ahmedabad. 
Recently, in the eastern expanses of the city, a series of identical Hindu struc-
tures – always rectangular – have been placed strategically in communal border 
areas one after the other in quick succession. Many of these structures were pat-
ronised by the Vishva Hindu Parishad, in line with its purported goal to further 
‘Hindu culture’. They are frequently built with walls and doors, grills and plat-
forms all at once, displaying a more aggressive, colourful presence. They seldom 
impede traffic by horizontal shift or displacement.
 Although erected by local neighbours from specific castes and communities, 
these square structures signal a generalised ‘Hindu’ presence in urban space. 
During the 2002 violence such structures on Gita Mandir road became gathering 
places for armed killers who stopped Muslim ambulances or individual vehicles 
on the major east–west city axis. Another strategy, visible in front of 
PRASHANT – a Jesuit Centre for Human Rights, Justice and Peace in west 
Ahmedabad – is to erect such structures immediately in front of peace activist or 
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NGO buildings that are considered to be in opposition to the chauvinist goals of 
Hindu organisations. It is dangerous to oppose such planned and wilful construc-
tion as it can invite conspiracy theories and unpleasant accusations of anti- Hindu 
bias. Ultimately, however, while initially easily recognisable because they 
resemble one another in size, height, material and overall monotonous appear-
ance, the city soon swallows these structures, and they become part of the usual 
urban hardware.
 For the author of this chapter, most of the miniature structures in the city 
offered wonderful opportunities to sit, drink tea and ask locals about their Gods 
and beliefs in an informal setting. My questions about the age of the temple and 
the actual context of its erection were, however, generally considered intrusive; 
most street temples were erected illegally. Once a temple is erected, it is very 
difficult to demolish, since followers insist that no human agency was involved 
in its emergence. It is claimed instead that the deity or saint in question ‘chose’ 
the place of its appearance and magically surfaced in some form, usually through 
an idol or image growing out of the ground beneath the asphalt. Something 
amorphous was taken to be a sign of a divinity, which was then given form 
through human agency. In fact, bubbles and lumps in the asphalt due to over-
heating and heavy vehicular traffic are often interpreted as signs of sacred inter-
vention. This source of authority joins humble structures in kinship to larger and 
more successful structures in the city. The Gods can appear to the poor as well 
as to the better off, and once a divinity makes its presence felt all that is left to 
do is to erect the structure.
 The social lives of bathroom- tile temples track the intersection of religious 
interest with small- scale economic entrepreneurship in contested urban space. If 
there is enough room, small temples invariably grow into big ones within a few 
years. And the larger they become, the older they are claimed to be. When traffic 
flows past, riders on two- wheelers greet the deities with a nod or the brief 
placing of a hand on the heart, risking accident, but amazingly optimistic that 
nothing will harm them at that very moment. Often a paan or teashop, or both, 
quickly arises next to them. Ultimately, most religious entrepreneurs seek to pro-
nounce themselves as sadhu (one who renounces the world). Then they and their 
followers tell elaborate stories and draw pictures of their spiritual predecessors 
and of the ancient origin of the temple, even when residents of the locality know 
very well that five years prior there was only a traffic island poured in concrete 
in the place where the temple now stands, on which traffic police smoked their 
bidis, spat their paan and wielded their lathis.
 One such sadhu now runs a former street temple the size of a small truck off 
a busy commercial road. He told me that the biggest reward for him after all 
these years is to see people greeting the Goddess when they drive by. A congen-
ial elderly man, he felt proud to participate in the road traffic on a lifeline of the 
city. He had become part of what rolled by and used to ignore him: the people 
with work, with jobs, with families, on their way to the west and back. He speaks 
to them and he feels acknowledged. As he explained, he is with but not of them: 
a true world renouncer.
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 This particular man had managed to eke out a living by inhibiting traffic, 
slowing down time and providing an increasingly hurried clientele with the 
means to worship on their way to work. Around his structure, a minuscule and 
bare bazaar area has grown, inclusive of a street barbershop, a Muslim garage 
repair station, a teashop and a humble fruit- juice vendor. Through the attraction 
of the Goddess Chamunda Mata, he has provided work for members of the city’s 
informal economic sector.
 The final sign of the upward integration of street temples into urban public 
life occurs at the moment when not only neighbours but city residents from far- 
off places come to visit during religious temple festivals. The temple then 
becomes their central place of worship. Electricity lines or prestigious telephone 
lines are suddenly provided, although the latter are in fast decline due to the 
spread of mobile phones. Neighbours ‘offer’ electricity, allowing a connection 
from their houses to the temple. The supply of electricity to a temple becomes a 
religious gift and a sure sign of patronage and status. Those who openly disagree 
with this practice do sometimes accuse the temple entrepreneur of power theft.
 Once the temple is large enough, it is often protected by a ceiling and encir-
cled by a large red grill to keep out thieves, monkeys, dogs – and stray cows. 
During ‘riots’, the grill also protects from vandals, Muslims and Molotov cock-
tails, which people, in street- fighting jargon, call ‘petrol bombs’. If a stone lands 
on a temple during collective violence, newspapers report ‘Hindu temple 
stoned.’
 At some spots small Islamic structures attempt to rival the mushrooming 
Hindu temples. But, given the demographic dominance of Hindus and the finan-
cial patronage of the VHP, the territorial competition in Ahmedabad has so far 
obviously been one- sided. In the end, there are always many more Hindu deities 
than there can ever be Muslim holy men for whom it would be suitable to build 
shrines. There is also a pronounced and openly acknowledged bias in the city 
municipal authority itself against small Muslim structures. Also, Muslims lack a 
powerful and feared organisation such as the VHP to seriously challenge and 
pressure the city administration on urban religious matters.
 The distribution of shrines compared to temples reflects the general configu-
ration of city space. Muslim community presence is concentrated in delimited 
zones, while Hindu markers spread and mushroom all over. In many regions of 
Gujarat, a Muslim shrine defines a marked sacred space that signifies a sphere 
symbolically separate from society, external to caste, identity and community 
division. In Ahmedabad, however, Muslim shrines increasingly signify the same 
thing that mosques do: Islam and a local Islamic population which stands apart 
from other communities.
 In areas formerly inhabited by Muslims, local Jain and Hindu proprietors 
often still tend to older shrines if they have not been converted into temples. The 
reverse can equally be true, but is more atypical and increasingly rare. I have 
discovered former temples used as storage space in what are today Muslim 
neighbourhoods, but never one that has been transformed into a Muslim place of 
worship. While these urban transformations have much to do with inner- city 
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migration, especially from the old city, which left Muslim and Hindu religious 
structures abandoned, they also indicate a shift in worship styles.
 Since the 1990s Muslim shrines have become primary targets of violence 
(Nandy et al. 1995: 104). In the 2002 pogrom, many smaller urban shrines 
simply disappeared; some were destroyed, others converted into Hindu temples. 
Some of the converted structures were referred to as ‘Hulladia Hanuman’ – 
angry, riotous, Hanuman.3 The marked tendency to destroy and convert Muslim 
shrines has much to do with eliminating sites where religious boundaries were 
transcended. Muslim shrines have tended to be places that attract people from all 
social or religious backgrounds.
 As spoils of urban warfare, converted structures loudly proclaim Hindu- ness. 
Aesthetically, the religious iconography, especially the idols dwelling inside, 
lacks the individualist creativity and inventiveness of other, smaller improvised 
Hindu religious sites. The retainers at these temples prohibit photography within 
the sanctum; this is in opposition to most other street temples, where visitors are 
usually strongly encouraged to take a photo. Ironically, the prohibition is most 
acute where there is no need for a photo anyway since the representations 
offered are rarely particularly original and can be acquired in shops that 
specialise in religious paraphernalia. While small Muslim shrines provided an 
easy target during violence, in the pogrom even large historical edifices were 
attacked and partly destroyed with the help of the city administration.
 These developments correlate with larger social shifts. In a curious way, the 
ideologies of Muslim reform movements concur with the ideas of Hindu nation-
alism. Whereas for the former, traditional worship practices at Muslim shrines 
are a symbol for a false or anachronistic Islam that is too ‘Hindu’ to be accept-
able today, for the latter the very fact that Hindus visit Muslim places of worship 
for supernatural help renders them formally ‘Hindu’ in the first place, and hence 
places that have been forcibly converted. The frequent correspondence in reli-
gious conception and practice between Hindus and Muslims – the product of a 
long history of religious synthesis and mutual cultural imbrication – does not 
vitiate claims to irreconcilable differences. Rather, today such correspondences 
often provoke negative responses as part of a psychological process that con-
tinues to produce what it claims to only describe.
 Perhaps most significantly, a fundamental asymmetry structures the relation 
between religious locations in space and their alleged emergence in time. While 
every Muslim sacred spot is easily believed to hover over an older destroyed or 
abandoned Hindu or Jain site, the reverse claim is never deemed possible. 
Although recently, as well as in former decades, a series of Muslim shrines have 
actually been violently ‘reconverted’ to Hindu sites, Muslims rarely claim tem-
poral prior- ness for any of their sacred sites, even when historical priority is highly 
likely. Reacting to this asymmetry, Muslims will sometimes self- importantly claim 
that this is so because their shrines are actually of ‘historical’ and not ‘mythical’ 
origin. In regard to smaller and more insignificant Muslim urban structures, 
however, this certainly cannot be affirmed since small- scale Muslim religious 
entrepreneurs, too, are constructing new miniature structures whenever they can.
Urban thresholds  187
Remainders of urban magic
Temples, shrines and police posts visibly delineate inner- city space. As central 
markers or sites of worship placed to the side, in the middle and between 
things, they separate what is otherwise locked together through the use of 
doors, platforms, gates and projected dangers. But it is not only deities and 
policemen that dwell in the open city. There are also structures such as bird-
feeders (chabutaro) – often hailed as symbols of non- violence – animals such 
as cows, goats, pigs and dogs, and humans, including beggars, saints and 
migrant workers. And finally, there are elemental beings, such as ghosts, who 
inhabit the in- between crevices of the city.
 There is something transient about these interstitial places where one can be 
invisible without disappearing. This transience is heightened when traffic rolls 
by and the street is busy. The space between divergent roadways, the centre of a 
road crossing or intersection, the centre of four- ways or six- ways (chhar- and 
chho- rasta in local idiom), in which all directions meet, where everything begins 
and everything ends, are also the preferred site for remainders of urban magic. 
These in- between spaces are not only inhabited by benign beings but also by an 
evil that is to be avoided at all cost. In fact, a popular superstition, often dis-
avowed but never disappearing, haunts street crossings. The evidence consists of 
magical waste that has been left behind, the stuff of bhutprêt (ghosts), often flat-
tened by the rolling traffic.
 If an evil spirit is identified and held responsible for some misfortune or 
disease, residents of the city perform an exorcism in a quick ritual called utar – a 
word denoting a ford or threshold. The remainders of that ritual become potent 
magical waste that must somehow be gotten rid of. In the case of such remains, 
the usual means of garbage disposal will not do. In the residential areas in which 
I lived, which were all middle- to lower-middle- class housing societies, normal 
garbage was either picked up at the door by garbage workers or thrown out of 
balconies onto the street itself, where it was scavenged by the very poorest of the 
poor, and animals such as dogs and sometimes – in Hindu areas – pigs. What 
remained after this was burned, lending a peculiar tangy smell to many residen-
tial neighbourhoods in the mornings. But it is more difficult to get rid of magical 
remains, as they may contain possible evil that does not lend itself easily to elim-
ination without some form of concerted action. The remains after puja worship 
are called prasad, the food remains of the Gods, and they are a form of blessing. 
But the magical remainders of small exorcism rituals are a dangerous pollution, 
the symmetrical opposite of prasad, and a form of the impure sacred.
 The small exorcism ritual, sometimes also performed merely pro- forma, con-
sists of placing several objects such as red thread, red powder, red or green chilli, 
limes and a coconut onto a metal plate. The plate is then waved or circled around 
the afflicted person seven times in order to confuse and constrict the evil element 
within him or her. That element, usually a prêt, becomes entangled in the thread 
and enclosed in the objects on the plate. The remainders then have to be dis-
posed of at road crossings.
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 Josephbhai, a converted Catholic from a scheduled caste background, who 
lives in Navrangpura, calls coconuts or other remainders left on the streets ‘cast 
down evil spirits’ that were taken from a family member or from the dark 
corners of a house. The term utar, a masculine term, was translated by Joseph as 
‘I cast down, descending, the evil spirited material.’ The evil substance is then 
caught in various items, which become the carriers of the evil spirit: magical 
remains. ‘No one will even touch it,’ Joseph warned. The ghost becomes caught 
in the coconut, and this is utar. In a way, the coconut is now possessed. ‘One 
goes away from it, one does not touch it.’
 At the end of the ritual it is absolutely incumbent to leave the object demon-
strably behind. The physical movement away represents the symbolic departure 
from the ghost’s location. Preferably, the possessed substances are placed at road 
crossings, traffic junctions from which everyone is moving away, where diver-
gent directions lead away from a single centre.4 According to Joseph, the prac-
tice is particularly prevalent at certain times of the year, for example during 
Diwali, the Indian festival of lights.
 Salim, a Muslim in his late thirties, and Matuben, in her mid- forties and a 
member of a scheduled caste, discussed with me the practice of utar. Both have 
performed the ritual several times. In the morning one has to circulate the chil-
lies, limes and an earthen vessel (matlo) over the head of the person afflicted by 
disease or misfortune. The substances that cause harm through disease or from 
the evil eye (najar) are thus captured in the objects and the ware, but not the 
ghost itself. According to Matu and Salim, the ghost is still haunting the road. 
Only the effects of the evil spirit are confined into the earthen vessel or the 
coconut, which is thus called ‘utaro’, which they described as an evil remainder. 
As in the case of Joseph, they stressed that the pollutants of the purification ritual 
have to be left behind demonstrably, acting out a definite departure from them, 
by placing them where others pass by: in- between roadways, or in the middle of 
squares or intersections.
 The former president of the city’s Muslim butcher community similarly 
explained to me his views on these common practices of urban magic. He made 
a distinction between visiting specific religious sites and roadside rituals, 
although both are comparable in that they relate to an urban threshold. During 
the college examination period, for example, business and health problems are 
particularly prevalent in the city. Therefore, some residents of the city visited 
places of worship, while others sought help by performing the ritual of utar. He 
explained:
They give some donation, sometimes only stone of green and red, and then 
they wish for something: If God gives me success, I promise to come [to 
worship] every day until my death. I will give my presence every Thursday 
there [in the shrine or temple] until my death and by the will of God, if he 
gives me success, then I will have to fulfill [that promise].
 It is some element we can’t see, like horror, like shaitan (satan), invisible 
powers. If they [the forces] are harassing me, someone will suggest to me to 
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take one coconut, circle it seven times around [my] body, and then keep it in 
a four corner [a cloverleaf road junction].
This is done in order ‘to escape from that element who is punishing me’. Butch-
ers perform the same practice with the remainders of animal slaughter. An 
animal liver is circled seven times around an afflicted person’s head and then left 
at the junction. ‘The vultures will eat it.’ Thus the evil is carried away. I asked if 
one could touch the remainder; he responded, ‘It is indeed dangerous. . . . If you 
enter or touch these spaces where this is kept, you will become patient of that 
tatvo [that is, you will be the victim of that element, that elemental force].’
 The magical remainders of misfortune and disease are placed on unoccupied 
traffic circles, at crossroads or in the middle of a square, between at least two 
roads and four directions, and with at least a coconut or some red powder to 
symbolise blood, and a lime, or both, which carries the evil pollutant that was 
extracted from the person. Sometimes there is an unbroken coconut, sometimes 
a broken earthen vessel. Sometimes, but not always, the substances are con-
cealed in a black, red or green bag.
 Other residents told me that, formerly, live chickens were slaughtered at four- 
ways, meaning intersections, and the blood was spilled about. I was unable to 
witness such a practice, and the residents claimed that this was no longer per-
formed. Today all the chickens have been replaced with coconuts, but blood is 
still indicated by the red colour of the thread and powder. As with so many 
things in Gujarat today, exorcism has largely become a vegetarian affair, with 
the exception of the butcher’s reference to liver.
 These small rituals are practised by all groups within Ahmedabad’s diverse 
society. Although one might expect that members of the middle class would 
perform them less frequently, these practices are prevalent across caste, religious 
and even class divisions. There is no group or community that can convincingly 
claim not to be harmed by misfortune or to be immune to the attraction of such 
convenient ritual solutions. There is, however, a stronger tendency to deny 
engagement in such practices among the urban middle- and upper- class.
 Threshold offerings do not require an expert specialist and can be performed 
by anybody at any time. Accordingly, magical waste from these offerings can be 
found in all parts of the city. It does not accumulate necessarily only among spe-
cific social status groups, but instead in neighbourhoods where street dividers 
and traffic islands abound, the in- between spaces of the city, where all directions 
begin or end. City crevices, mostly poured in asphalt and concrete, thus have a 
unique role to play for residents. If such raised circles and pavement structures 
are absent, the magical remainders are also sometimes placed simply in the 
middle or on the side of a road, always halfway off it, but never completely out 
of the way.
 In a society concerned with distinctions in worship and religious practice, the 
universality of this behaviour is unusual. The reason behind it is that these acts are 
not exactly based on a particular positive belief- system, but rather constitute the 
underbelly of all existing forms of ‘religious’ belief. It is difficult to substantiate 
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and describe in detail the procedures at hand and their rationalisations as they vary 
and somehow demand to remain hidden or obscured. They have a decidedly neg-
ative core; this was expressed by all interlocutors in one way or another.
 People will speak about these practices in different ways. When speaking 
English, many a city resident will use the word ‘doubt’ where a native English 
speaker might have used the word ‘belief ’ to describe this sort of urban ritual 
behaviour. For example, the speaker might say, confusingly, ‘Yes, he is doubt-
ing’ (in English), when he means to indicate that someone believes in, say, a 
ghost or an attack by an evil spirit or element and engages in the practice of utar. 
Here, the statement ‘he is doubting’ does not mean that the person in questions 
doubts whether there are ghosts, but that he is in doubt of the assertion that there 
is no such thing as ghosts. In other words, he is entertaining a doubt (vahemavu, 
to entertain a doubt, to be suspicious).
 This ‘doubt’ is not to say that he positively affirms a belief in ghosts either. 
The speaker is not affirming the existence independently, as if a ghost were a 
car, a house or an elephant. The person in question is not thought to be delu-
sional, but rather, despite having been unable to see a ghost so far, he doubts the 
fact that they are consequently not there. In relation to such harmful forces, 
caution is in order. Since ghosts cannot be seen anyway, there are other indic-
ators that can perhaps provide evidence of their presence, such as repeated and 
inexplicable misfortune. That evidence is the stuff of everyday personal lives 
and varies from case to case. In other words, even when people claim that they 
do not believe in ‘it’, this is merely to say that their belief is not of it. To believe 
in something means to draw closer, constituting access and proximity, and at 
times forcing an obligation. To perceive is to be perceived, as is the case in the 
mutuality of darshan. Stating ‘hu manto j nathi’ (I do not believe in this or that) 
can therefore imply a suspicion, or a doubt, indicated by the Gujarati term vahem 
(suspicion, superstition).
 In Ahmedabad, most religiously inclined individuals are acutely aware of the 
fact that the divine is a Vorstellung (a re- presentation, an imagination), repre-
senting the truth of the one engaged in the particular act of imagining. There is a 
certain inbuilt reflexivity at work where the believer is related to his or her 
manner of belief. Many competitive caste, religious and sectarian divisions are 
motivated by claims to a privileged access to divinities, or to a better cognitive 
or emotional method of comprehending the divine or the supernatural. That is 
why members of higher castes will often refer to deities associated with and pro-
pitiated by lower castes, for example those demanding blood offerings, as 
‘superstitions’. But when prompted, they will not claim that these propitiated 
entities do not exist as such, but rather, that their particular form (including the 
forbidden objects they demand as offerings) reveals the nature or qualities of 
those propitiating them. Thus, to say one does not believe in ghosts is often 
merely meant to indicate that one does not consider oneself associated with such 
a dark belief, and by extension, the practices involved. This is not to suggest that 
invisible and malevolent forces are complete humbug or that such procedures 
might not sometimes be absolutely necessary. Belief and doubt are contingent 
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upon one another in what constitutes Aberglaube (a faith in the register of a 
‘however’, a super- stitio).
 In short, Ahmedabad’s inner- city superstition is not simply a ‘belief ’ that one 
can assume, openly affirm and believe in, or choose to dismiss. It is not a 
positive assertion of a presence, but rather a negative reversal of the given, a 
possibility which logically can never disappear. One can always be suspicious of 
the given, and fear its reversal. To be superstitious is to be credulous that things 
are connected in ways that are not obvious. Accordingly, someone behaving 
superstitiously is someone who is fundamentally in doubt, suspicious of the 
normal order of things. It would make sense if this stance were more prevalent 
among desperate sections of society, but it seems that there is considerable 
qualm among members of the middle classes too.
 The other word often used locally for superstition is of Sanskrit origin, the 
term andhshraddha (superstition) and andhshraddhalu, denoting ‘superstitious’ 
and ‘false worship’. It is the opposite of shraddha, the proper ceremony or ritual. 
Denoting the proper ritual in reverse, the term does not indicate an absence of 
ritual acts as such. Superstition can never cease because it is the logical under-
side of belief, a belief in the register of an endless ‘however’.
 Why is it so important to place magical remains at a crossroads? These inter-
stitial spaces, ubiquitous urban fords and thresholds, it is said, confuse the evil 
spirits and ghosts, and they cannot find their way back to their bearer. Here an 
urban landscape of dust, cement and asphalt provides a solution to the problem 
of how to eliminate malignant material. In fact, Ranjitbhai explained to me, if 
done properly, one has to bring the evil remains to the road crossing by walking 
backwards (although I have never seen anyone actually do so). Walking back-
wards confuses the evil spirits about where one originally came from. Others 
claim that after one has positioned the remainders on the crossway, one has to 
walk away backwards – again to confuse the spirits.5
 The beginning or end of street tracks and the centre of crossways are loca-
tions characterised by their relations to spatial directionality. At the interface of 
different directions, the spirit – and the affliction it causes – can better jump onto 
other people who are passing by. In this sinister theory, placing the remains of 
exorcised misfortune on road dividers and traffic islands serves the function of 
distributing and displacing the evil one has been able to get rid of onto others. 
As in comparable conceptions elsewhere, here another person’s affliction helps 
remove one’s own, especially if that person swallows it whole.
 I had one such encounter with concentrated evil of the urban kind. Driving 
my scooter down the busy Gita Mandir road in the hot afternoon sun in east–
west traffic, I came across a red cloth bag in the middle of the road. It had obvi-
ously fallen down from a traffic divider and rolled onto the street. It presented 
itself suddenly in front of my moving vehicle. In a moment of absentminded-
ness, and because the dense traffic allowed little room for evasion, I tried to 
drive over the bag, realising too late that something was inside of it. My front 
wheel slid sideways and came under the large tyres of a bus to the left of me. By 
chance, and because I had been driving slowly, I was able to jump off the scooter 
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before my legs went under the moving bus. I landed on the pavement while the 
bus’s rear wheels, almost in slow motion, crushed the front tyre of my vehicle. 
The bus paused for a moment with a dramatic screech of its brakes as the driver 
made sure he had crushed the scooter and not me. The passengers in the bus 
stared at me in frozen postures from their open windows while swerving gently 
in unison with the vehicle. Then the bus, which had almost killed me, moved on.
Figure 11.1  Utar in urban Ahmedabad, 2013.
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 Recovering from my minor injuries at the side of the road, I was offered 
water by a friendly garage owner, who introduced himself as Ramesh, a man in 
his twenties whose repair shop was located close to the place of the accident. He 
was able to replace my squashed front wheel quickly and thus restore my pre-
cious vehicle, surprisingly, within a few hours. While recovering from the shock 
of the accident, I complained about the custom of placing coconuts in bags that 
roll in front of moving wheels. Ramesh listened silently. He agreed and nodded 
while competently repairing the squashed wheel. It was not the first accident he 
had seen at the traffic divider right in front of his garage. He finally spoke, with 
great confidence and authority.
 Ramesh did not think my accident was a coincidence. He did not actually see 
the incident, as the bus had blocked his vision, but he vowed that he would never 
dare to go and clear the road divider of utar. No sane person would. The remain-
ders rot, large vehicles crush them and animals eat them, he explained. To try 
and come close to them would be looking for trouble. I had tried to ignore that 
which had left the divider (the space where there is no clear directionality) and 
which had placed itself directly in front me. Thus it saw my direction; that is, the 
evil saw me.
 I objected to this explanation of intent, but Ramesh remained unimpressed by 
my objections. I had dared to touch the magical remains of an exorcism. They 
had been placed on the road divider a few days earlier, and had rolled off into 
the road. They had been placed there, between where four roads meet, precisely 
in order to step away from them, to get rid of them. The only way to avoid the 
evil would have been to slow down and steer clear of the remainder, drive away 
from it. The concentrated evil contained in the coconut had immediately 
assumed a new victim and almost killed me, he was sure. From the moment my 
front wheel touched the coconut I had been incredibly lucky. I knew he was 
right, at least about my luck. Unnerved about a custom that places objects in 
one’s way and then defines the dangerous outcome as wilful misfortune, I drove 
off. It was this incident that led me to investigate further into the phenomenon of 
utar, which had strangely remained invisible to me until then.
Urban crevices
Utar, an evil harvested from a person, cannot look back once it is correctly 
placed on the road divider. Not interrupting traffic, it seeks to be carried away 
and disappears into an anonymous city. Consequently, one can easily overlook 
these remainders, placed where others pass by. The ritual of utar is a ubiquitous 
practice that, if made explicit, remains embarrassing to many. Miniature reli-
gious structures, by contrast, loudly address the incessantly moving traffic by 
slowing it down and at times boldly blocking it. Their purveyors are not shy but 
affirmative in bringing themselves into urban presence. De- emphasising their 
own agency, they stress the attendance of gods, goddesses and saints in their 
humble constructions. Both utar and mushrooming structures make use of urban 
space by inserting themselves into the many crevices left behind after traffic has 
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become regulated, real- estate property has become fixed, earth has become 
asphalt, and municipal schemes have been implemented. In essence, they address 
the distance felt to an urban other and hence are part of how the city experiences 
itself: the immediate neighbour, the transient road traveller, the abstract other 
community or any other city dweller.
Notes
1 The research for this chapter is based on field stays in 2001–03, 2005 and 2008–09. I 
want to thank the Social Science Research Council and the Wenner Gren Foundation 
for generous financial support when I needed it.
2 For a more detailed exploration of the city and the configuration of bridges and police 
posts in relation to the experience of division, see Ghassem- Fachandi (2012).
3 The monkey- faced Hanuman, an important divinity in India and character of the 
Ramayan epic, is traditionally invoked in the struggle against evil.
4 In rural areas, such ritual acts are also common, but usually the remainders are buried 
outside of the village compound, or poignantly, within the confines of a neighbouring 
village, thus displacing the evil.
5 It is perhaps interesting to note in this context that the chudel, a particularly fearsome 
female ghost, is described as having its feet and head twisted so that they face the 
wrong direction.
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Part IV
Lived cities
Views of cities from the ground

12 ‘Fight the Filth’
Civic sense and middle- class activism 
in Mumbai*
Yoko Taguchi
In his portrait of Mumbai, Maximum City, Suketu Mehta describes the familiar 
characteristics of Indian cities:
Indians do not have the same kind of civic sense as, say, Scandinavians. The 
boundary of the space you keep clean is marked at the end of the space you 
call your own. The flats in my building are spotlessly clean inside; they are 
swept and mopped every day, or twice every day. The public spaces – hall-
ways, stairs, lobby, the building compound – are stained with betel spit; the 
ground is littered with congealed wet garbage, plastic bags, and dirt of human 
and animal origin. It is the same all over Bombay, in rich and poor areas alike.
 This absence of civic sense is something that everyone from the British 
to the Hindu nationalists of the RSS have drawn attention to, the national 
defect in the Indian character.
(Mehta 2005: 128)
The filthiness of public space is often a cause of great distress for India’s ‘con-
cerned citizens’, who blame a lack of civic sense for this nationwide problem. 
An article in the Times of India analysing the results of their ‘Quality of Life 
Survey’1 showed the close association between ‘civic sense and cleanliness’, 
which were combined as one criterion in their chart. Mumbai’s ‘civic sense and 
cleanliness’ scored 2.2 on a scale of one to five. The article began by emphasis-
ing Mumbai’s lack of civic sense: ‘If there is one thing that both the BMC2 and a 
huge number of Mumbaikars3 can be faulted for, it’s a lack of civic sense. 
Garbage, spit and other forms of filth litter this city’ (Sen 2011: 4). A quote from 
the convener of the NGO, Clean Sweep Forum, revealed another interesting 
component of Indian civic sense: ‘Civic sense comes when the authorities flood 
the masses with info and make them feel part of a larger goal. . . . This is not the 
case today’ (Sen 2011: 4). Educating ‘the masses’ is identified as the most 
important project for middle- class activists. The widespread conviction of the 
need to ‘flood the masses with info’ and ‘create awareness’ demonstrates the 
pedagogical responsibility of Indian civil society.
 This chapter offers a new perspective on these controversial movements 
which have multiplied in urban India since economic liberalisation in the 1990s. 
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It will discuss the rise of middle- class aesthetics and the history of civic activ-
ism, before investigating the attempts of the middle class to engender civic 
responsibility through the ‘Fight the Filth’ campaign in Mumbai.
The aesthetics of middle- class activism
Partha Chatterjee expresses concern about the recent trend of ‘cleaning up’ 
Indian cities by reclaiming public spaces for ‘proper citizens’ and expelling 
squatters and encroachers (Chatterjee 2004). The urban middle class plays the 
central role in these movements, and the politics of the contemporary middle 
class are often criticised as hypocritical, even schizophrenic. Amita Baviskar 
(2011), for instance, exposes the hubris of civic activists, whom she labels ‘bour-
geois environmentalists’, who campaign to clean up the city by driving out cows, 
cycle- rickshaws and rickshaw- pullers, but ignore the pollution and congestion 
caused by their own use of private cars. The conventional diagnosis of the post-
colonial middle class is that they are ‘split between a commitment to liberal pro-
gress and a phobic relation to the subalterns’ (Mazzarella 2011: 355; see also 
Varma 2007).
 In order to explain the contradictory tendencies of the middle class, scholars 
have employed the term ‘aesthetics’ in varying senses (Fernandes 2006, Ghert-
ner 2011, Mazzarella 2006, Rajagopal 2001). Leela Fernandes (2006) states that 
the new aesthetics represents the desire of the middle class for the control of 
urban space. D. Asher Ghertner, on the other hand, criticises the presumption 
that ‘a bourgeois, consumerist and globalist aesthetics is responsible for the 
rapid remaking of the Indian urban’. The formation of ‘the new Indian middle 
class’, he argues, is not sufficient to explain ‘the consolidation of such a “world-
 class” aesthetics’ (Ghertner 2011, 47).4 Yet both Fernandes and Ghertner seem 
to use ‘aesthetics’ to address the intentionality of the people: either in terms of 
desire and preference (Fernandes 2006), or of a ‘subjective view’ rather than ‘a 
sound calculative basis’ (Ghertner 2011: 45). Aesthetics as a sensuous and cor-
poreal experience5 is, however, considered to go beyond the control of one’s 
political desire, strategy and subjectivity (Mazzarella 2006, Rajagopal 2001).6 
For anthropological inquiry, Annelise Riles suggests that form is ‘a self- 
contextualizing entity’ and proposes giving ‘empathetic accounts of the 
aesthetic qualities of the form and its effects’ (Riles 2006: 20). Focusing on 
form and aesthetics helps us to remain cautious about bringing to bear 
established external analytical frameworks (for example, modernity, gender and 
class) and to consider a different reality in a given situation. Therefore, in 
attempting to understand the nature of civic sense, it is important to avoid 
directly applying the middle- class aesthetics to the framework of politics. 
Rather, this chapter will examine closely its forms, investigating what kinds of 
forms are used in a specific case and how they invoke certain actions in civic 
activism.
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The pedagogy of civil society
As shown by phrases such as ‘flood the masses with info’, the pedagogical role 
of civil society, which is rooted in the era of colonial elites, remains crucial in 
recent activism. Civil society in India comprises a small number of urban elites, 
and many inhabitants of India are not considered ‘proper citizens’ by middle- 
class members (Chatterjee 2004). J.S. Anjaria illustrates this point in his 
ethnography of civic activism in Mumbai, recalling how a group of activists 
targeted a street vendor, exclaiming, ‘We are citizens, who are you?’ (Anjaria 
2009: 402). Although the Indian population was legally entitled as citizens of the 
nation state through universal adult suffrage, the average Indian was and remains 
‘the peasant’,7 someone who needs to be educated to become a real citizen. The 
conflict between this historicism (‘the peasant is still being educated and 
developed into the citizen’) and universalism (‘Indians, literate or illiterate, were 
always suited for self- rule’) characterises the ambiguous situation of civil society 
in contemporary India (Chakrabarty 2008: 10). The aspirant middle class 
increasingly feels responsible for educating ‘the peasants’ and engendering civil 
society. Contemporary India might have shifted from state- led developmentalism 
to neo- liberalism, yet the role of civil society as educators remains, and this 
forms the basis of the duality of middle- class activists. The form of pedagogical 
civil society retains a strong influence on activists and on their ‘world- class’ 
aesthetics.
Culture and the boundaries of filth
Against the predominant account of a ‘lack of civic sense’ being the cause of 
dirty public spaces, scholars of South Asia have attempted to provide an 
alternative explanation by using the spatial distinction of ‘ghare/baire’ (inside 
the house/outside) (Kaviraj 1997) or ‘the inside and the outside’ (Chakrabarty 
1992), which is not equivalent to ‘the private’ and ‘the public’. The inside is not 
only clean but also auspicious, ‘a realm of security: stable and patterned 
relationships’ (Kaviraj 1997: 94). On the other hand, the outside is dangerous 
because it ‘always carries “substances” that threaten one’s well- being’ 
(Chakrabarty 1992: 542). Moreover, the outside is also considered ‘merely a 
conceptually insignificant negative of the inside’ (Kaviraj 1997: 98) and not 
‘one’s own’ (Kaviraj 1997; Chakrabarty 1992).
 Sudipta Kaviraj explains the difference between ‘public’ and ‘outside’ with 
the example of the transformation of Calcutta’s parks, which were first created 
as British- style public spaces but became plebeianised or democratised by the 
1960s. Parks crowded with vendors and homeless people are now filled with 
‘filth’ (Kaviraj 1997: 107). Kaviraj suggests that this filth and disorder works as 
a symbolic barrier and keeps the middle class away, establishing control by the 
poor inside; furthermore, he argues, this ‘culture of poverty’ forms the resistance 
of the poor and is an integral factor in Indian democracy and modernity. The 
discourse of celebrating filth as the strategic resistance of the poor is not 
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uncommon. Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay also argues that the urban poor’s ‘public 
display of filth’ can be read as ‘metonymic of a different constitution of the civic 
as such’ (2006: 226, original emphasis). This set of research has played an 
important role in relativising western ideas by emphasising the distinctiveness of 
South Asian culture. There is a danger, however, of romanticising an abstract 
urban poor, approved by the ‘culture of poverty’ on the grounds of the traditional 
spatial recognition of Hindu society. These relativist positions lend support to 
those who criticise the hypocrisy of contemporary middle- class activism. Yet at 
the same time, in understanding filth and the subaltern as one body, they echo the 
rhetoric of civil society (c.f. Ghertner 2011). Chakrabarty complicates these 
mirrored stances towards the urban poor and their association with filth by starkly 
addressing the dilemma: ‘Should the “non- moderns” have the freedom to die in 
their “ignorance” or should we intervene with our “knowledge” and the police?’ 
He then suggests that the more interesting question is ‘Through what historical 
process of subject- formation did “long life,” “good health,” . . . and “modern 
science” come to appear so natural and god- given?’ (Chakrabarty 1992: 545), 
since this allows us to inquire into the values on which we stand and also helps us 
recognise more ambiguous relationships with filth.
Eating a bit of the street
In everyday life, the urban middle class interacts with various kinds of filth and 
outside substances. The outside, as the ‘meeting point of several communities’ 
(Chakrabarty 1992: 543) and ‘the juxtaposition of pleasure and danger’ 
(Chakrabarty 1992: 544), is an inescapable part of the city. The English media 
and activists see street vendors as the cause of significant problems: they 
illegally occupy public space in their private interest, sell unhygienic food and 
create litter; moreover, vendors prevent citizens from taking leisurely walks, ruin 
the scenery and provide a breeding ground for disease and terrorism (the 
congestion of public space helps terrorists conceal bombs). Activists claim that 
vendors are the main obstacles to Mumbai becoming a world- class city. Yet at 
the same time, the media also provides fun and exciting images of street stalls. 
Street food, especially, is a preferred topic, precisely because it is a dangerous 
act to take parts of the street into one’s body. An article on street food in the 
popular newsmagazine Outlook demonstrates its mongrel charm.
What’s street food without a bit of the street in it, they [street food fans] ask 
in one voice. . . . Batata vada without a few micro- milligrams of Mumbai’s 
road dust, or Calcutta’s famous phuchkas minus the excitement of guessing 
the water source, or Delhi’s mouth- watering paranthas without auto fumes, 
they say, is merely food; not street food.
(Koppikar 2011)
 High- caste Hindus traditionally avoid outside food to protect themselves from 
impurity, since the impure food, cook and server all affect the body and 
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personhood of those who eat the food. Although in contemporary society the 
terms purity/impurity are often replaced by the more ‘scientific’ terms hygienic/
unhygienic, the risk of taking in outside food is still commonly recognised. 
Nevertheless, many people cannot resist eating street food. Activists often 
criticise middle- class patrons of street vendors as selfish and irresponsible (see 
Anjaria 2009). However, whether it appears as the idealised subaltern or as 
irresistible street food, ‘filth’ appears to hold an ambiguous appeal. In hyper- 
dense cities, the middle class take care not to expose their bodies to filth or 
transgress boundaries, but simultaneously cannot avoid filth and other outside 
substances altogether. ‘Filth’, here, denotes physical garbage and dirt, but it also 
connotes the aesthetically immoral, danger and disgust. Both interpretations 
influence the actions of middle- class activists in their attempts to ‘clean up’ the 
city, as will be demonstrated through an analysis of the ‘Fight the Filth’ 
campaign in Mumbai.
The ‘Fight the Filth’ campaign8
Tabloids and citizens
The ‘Fight the Filth’ campaign, launched by the Mumbai Mirror, a local English 
daily tabloid,9 was one of several ‘clean up’ campaigns organised in recent years. 
Pavan K. Varma (2007), in his pioneering work on the new middle class, 
strongly criticises the social insensitivity of contemporary middle- class activism 
as the direct opposite of M.K. Gandhi’s ideology. Varma himself wrote a 
fortnightly column called ‘People Like Us’ for the Hindustan Times to educate 
the middle class to become concerned citizens. And since economic 
liberalisation, English newspapers and magazines, such as the Times of India, 
Hindustan Times and India Today, have inspired ‘bourgeois environmentalists’, 
‘endorsing and celebrating this group’s sense of itself as the guardian of “public 
interest” ’ (Baviskar 2011: 406). This hints at how intellectuals’ criticism of the 
middle class is entangled in newspaper discourse, setting moral benchmarks for 
middle- class activism. In Mumbai, local English tabloids are especially proactive 
in inciting and endorsing middle- class activism, by publishing big, colourful 
pictures, attractive headlines and sensational articles. Civil society activists also 
highly regard newspapers, displaying article clippings about their activities in 
their offices and sharing articles among members.
 A few months before the ‘Fight the Filth’ campaign, the Mirror reported on a 
series of events triggered by a 19-year- old female student’s video of a street 
vendor urinating into a food utensil in Thane, in suburban Mumbai. The vendor 
was beaten up by local residents before being taken to the police station and 
fined Rs. 1200 (Moghul 2011).10 This news was followed by familiar reports of 
street stalls being demolished both by the local nativist party, the Maharashtra 
Navnirman Sena (MNS), and then the Thane Municipal Corporation. The 
purpose of these reports was to create awareness about the filthy condition of 
street food, and several readers, disgusted by the incident, left comments on the 
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Mirror’s website to honour the student as a citizen journalist. This story once 
again painted a picture of at- risk citizens fighting against the filth. Just as 
newspapers in the cosmopolitan city of Bombay once invoked the ‘people’ and 
triggered the development of populist politics in the 1960s (Prakash 2010: 
158–203), tabloids today continue to stimulate the imaginations of their readers 
by invoking the idea of ‘the citizen’ in contemporary Mumbai.
Citizen, target and method
‘City’s Biggest Clean- Up Drive’, declared the centrepiece of the Mumbai Mirror 
on 27 June 2011. The front- page article introduced the campaign ‘Fight the 
Filth’, while adding at the bottom of the page ‘(And You Can Be a Part of It)’. 
The article inaugurating the campaign began:
There was nothing unusual about the scene. After wiping clean her dabba, a 
local train commuter readied to chuck a mass of plastic and paper out of the 
train window. When a journalist from this paper requested her not to litter 
the tracks, she looked at her curiously and asked if she suffered from any 
psychological disorder.
 Our lady in the local is not alone. Anyone who has ever tried to stop 
people littering the city will be met with cynicism, mistrust and disbelief. In 
the financial capital of the country, it is alright if you spit, litter and throw 
garbage wherever you fancy. Mumbai is after all an open dumping ground.
 It is not enough to blame the civic body for the cesspool the city has 
turned into. We as citizens have a role to play. Mumbai Mirror strongly 
feels that a city teeming with the world’s most talented, most beautiful and 
most charismatic people deserves to be clean, free of litter.
(Menon & Pawa 2011: 1)
The authors began the article by showing the great divide between the journalist 
(we) and the littering person (they). Praise for the city (‘the financial capital of 
the country’ and home to ‘the world’s most talented, most beautiful and most 
charismatic people’) followed, with a hint of disgust towards the things that do 
not match ‘our’ aesthetics. The article continued that the Mumbai Mirror and the 
BMC, along with seven ‘top educational institutions’, had stood up to clean their 
‘beloved city’. The Mirror also called the readers to action: ‘Most importantly, 
the campaign will have to be driven by you, dear reader, as we embark on what 
we believe will be the biggest- ever citizen initiative’ (8). It then presented an 
outline of the campaign: the newspaper chose seven colleges and seven ‘filthy 
spots’ and created student groups as the main actors in the campaign. In the first 
phase of the campaign, the students would physically clean the filthy spots with 
BMC staff. In the second phase they would ‘create awareness against littering’, 
which was presented as the most important activity.
 The Mumbai Mirror called for reader participation, invoking the second- 
person ‘you’ as ‘citizens’. However, it is unclear who the actual addressees were. 
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It dubbed the campaign a ‘citizen initiative’, but on the front- page the implica-
tion for citizens’ participation is only modestly added in brackets: ‘(and you can 
be a part of it)’. A similar statement is found after the plan’s description: ‘During 
the camp, residents of the neighbourhood are also welcome to join in’ (8). This 
wording shows that readers were not the core members; rather, the campaign 
was to be conducted by the tabloid, colleges and BMC. In fact, very few readers 
responded to the interpellation, ‘you’, by joining the campaign individually. 
Published reader comments typically praised the campaign’s efforts and agreed 
that a lack of civic sense was the most critical issue, and hence awareness the 
key solution. These voices, however, did not always share the spirit that might 
be expected of a ‘citizen’s initiative’. Several people requested that the campaign 
team come and clean their neighbourhood. Others thought it was wrong to have 
students clean filthy places created by the BMC. These reader reactions suggest 
that there was no consensus on the identity of the ‘citizens’ who would take the 
initiative. The citizen’s opposite, however, was clearly identified from the begin-
ning of the campaign: the ‘targets’ of the campaign, consisting of slum dwellers, 
hawkers and vegetable market vendors, were considered not to be part of civil 
society. The aim of the campaign, as a representative of the citizens and with the 
official help of the municipality, was to educate and ‘create awareness’ among 
its targets. Creating awareness represented the most important mission of the 
campaign.
 The method that campaigners adopted to create awareness was the ‘survey’. 
In these surveys, groups of students visited houses in slum areas or small street 
shops and asked questions such as ‘Do you use a dust bin?’ or ‘Where do you 
dump your garbage?’ When the targets answered that they were using dust bins, 
the students thanked them and requested that they keep doing so and spread 
awareness by telling other people. There was no questionnaire or firm structure 
in these surveys, and no notes or recordings were taken. The survey worked 
under the premise that the fundamental problem was the ignorance, or lack of 
civic sense, of the people (targets) – once they became aware, the problem would 
be solved. The ideal scenario often presented in the tabloid was as follows: stu-
dents educated people about the health hazards of littering; after listening to the 
students, slum residents and hawkers realised the importance of hygiene; they 
would now be more careful about their behaviour, and thus, the city would 
become clean. In contrast to this ideal, the lack of basic facilities and public ser-
vices, such as toilets in slum areas and daily garbage collection, were often 
observed. The targets clearly could not improve the situation without such 
fundamental amenities. Nevertheless, these issues were not the focus of the cam-
paign. The ideal scenario and its aesthetics were instead circulated as an artefact 
by being repeatedly expounded in the Mirror’s reporting of the campaign.
The students’ campaign
The original seven ‘filthy spots’, located around the city centre of South Mumbai 
and the posh suburbs in northern Mumbai (Churchgate, Dadar, Matunga, Bandra, 
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Juhu, Andheri, Chembur), were chosen arbitrarily by the reporters: places near 
their houses or near the campuses of the colleges that the participants attended 
and places known from previous work. When asked about the criteria of 
selection, a Mirror reporter put it simply: ‘Anywhere dirty. There is no shortage 
of dirty places in Mumbai.’ Convenience and dirtiness were the only factors for 
selection, in notable contrast to Hindu nationalist parties’ targeting of ‘Muslim 
immigrants from Bangladesh’ under the name of clean- up campaigns (Fernandes 
2006).
 During the campaign, college student clubs became the main actors in 
conducting the drives, and the areas of activity were expanded beyond the 
original spots. Of the ten spots in which I participated, six were managed by 
Rotaract Clubs (the youth branch of the Rotary Club), three by NSS groups 
(National Service Scheme, a college- based national programme) and one by a 
non- affiliated group of students with two professors. At each drive, one or two 
Mirror reporters and a few municipal officers met the club members and carried 
out the campaign activities, typically for about an hour. The students were from 
mixed religious backgrounds, and Muslim and Christian students acted as 
leaders in several groups.
 Importantly, the term ‘civil society’ was not familiar to many of the students 
of these English- medium colleges. When I explained that my study was about 
‘civil society in India’, one student talked about traditional festivals and another 
brought me to a crematorium in the neighbourhood to help me understand their 
civil society. The salient recipients of students’ service were ‘community’, 
‘society’ and ‘country’. Students often described their motivation for joining the 
campaign in terms of national service. One NSS student explained, ‘We feel 
very nice serving the nation. We can’t help the people working on the border, 
but we are just doing what we can do.’ The BMC was understood to be the 
closest and most concrete entity through which students could serve the nation, 
and they sincerely tried to help the BMC. They relied on BMC officers and often 
preferred that municipal representatives accompanied them when conducting the 
surveys. They explained: ‘If we go by ourselves, they [the vendors] will take us 
lightly.’ Students were afraid that the targets would ‘argue back’ and ‘abuse’ 
them.
 At one of the review visits at a vegetable market, two BMC officers and a 
Rotaract member marched together around the market, the officers overbearingly 
scolding the vendors when they found messy spots and demanding that the 
vendors collect littered cabbage- leaves and squashed tomatoes with their bare 
hands. Because the treatment of street vendors during this procession was quite 
uncomfortable to watch, I asked one of the Rotaract members about the differ-
ence in roles between the club and the BMC, and if he was not worried about 
giving the vendors the wrong impression about the club being with the BMC. He 
replied,
Unlike the BMC, we can’t work every day and we don’t get paid. We just 
want to do something good and feel happy at the end of the day. . . . It’s the 
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same as with the police: we can’t catch a thief ourselves, but we report it to 
the police when we see one – just helping them. So, if we see a person who 
is littering, we try to report it to the BMC.
(2 August 2011)
In this manner, many participants understood their role to be the BMC’s volun-
tary helpers, who thereby work for the improvement of the nation. In practice, 
this zeal sometimes carried them beyond a mere helping role; some students 
even playfully improvised steep fines as warnings designed to inspire fearful 
compliance. The Mirror and the students accepted without difficulty the idea of 
the ‘target’ to be surveyed and educated. Among hawkers, paan- wallahs 
(tobacco sellers) were a favourite target. Sometimes the campaign turned into a 
paan- wallah-finding game, with excited students shouting ‘Target!’ and pointing 
their fingers when they found one. However, due to the self- sufficient capacity 
of the ‘survey’, awareness- building was surprisingly easily ‘achieved’. This 
made the position of the target somewhat elusive. In a second- round drive at 
another market, a Rotaract leader commented that ‘the vendors are much more 
aware now’, and suggested spreading awareness among the customers as a next 
step.
 On 5 September, the Mirror announced the end of the campaign with a cheer-
ful and triumphant picture of the students on its cover page. The article praised 
the enthusiasm of the students, citing a conversation from the campaign: students 
‘very hesitantly’ requested shopkeepers ‘to use dustbins and ask their customers 
to use them. One of them shot back, “kiske liye kar rahe ho yeh? [For whom 
are you doing this?]” The eager students were quick to reply, “Bharat ke liye 
[For India]” ’ (Chandrasekharan 2011: 8). Here, the students’ activities and 
organisational characteristics were summarised and portrayed as Hindu- 
nationalistic heroes rather than as the representative citizens that the tabloid had 
first tried to invoke. In this article, two reviewers were also introduced for the 
first time in the campaign. They had not participated in the campaign, but were 
deemed to have the authority to provide an evaluation of it because they were 
eminent activists. One of the reviewers repeated the importance of the survey: 
‘Understanding the demographics and lifestyle of the slum dwellers is important. 
The college students should conduct a survey, understand the lifestyle of the 
people, and work with the residents of the slum to come up with a solution’ (8). 
In this way, the appropriateness of the survey was reiterated. The sudden appear-
ance of outside experts at the campaign’s climax also seemed a necessary form, 
making it clear that the position of civil society is a privileged one, and that 
common readers need to work more to become true citizens.
Forms and aesthetics
Arjun Appadurai applauds the self- surveying used by Mumbai’s civic 
organisations working with slum dwellers as an example of ‘governmentality 
from below’, or ‘governmentality turned against itself ’ (Appadurai 2001: 35). In 
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the ‘Fight the Filth’ campaign, however, the ‘survey’ did not seem to 
represent either side (the above or the below) of governmentality, as it was 
invoked in the abstract as the proper form. As the reviewer pointed out, the 
survey was an appropriate form of civic movement that guaranteed interaction 
and understanding among different social groups, which promoted the goal of 
awareness- building. Similarly, the term ‘service’, the translation of the Hindu 
concept of seva, meaning devotion to a deity or guru, was a vital form of the 
campaign. The concept has been widely mobilised by social movements, 
including associational activities in the colonial era, the independence 
struggle and Hindu nationalist movements, each changing the recipient of the 
service (Watt 2005). The term and attached practice had positive but vague 
connotations for the students, whose affiliation was neither exclusively with 
nationalists nor right- wing parties, but with civil society organisations. Using 
these familiar and available forms, new ways of serving, and of becoming a 
citizen, were attempted.
 Several other important forms were used in the campaign. The certificate 
issued for each participant, along with the group photo shoot for the final cover, 
represented the end of the campaign and thus enabled it to emerge as a complete 
achievement. Planting saplings after removing garbage was another material aes-
thetic performance that presented the image of final accomplishment, even if in 
many cases the saplings were eaten by cows and goats within a week. Photo 
shoots were conducted at each drive, and big pictures of students wearing rubber 
gloves and masks or talking to slum dwellers appeared in the next day’s news-
paper. These forms were not merely tools or symbols, but composed the 
campaign itself. Wearing gloves was cleaning, even without touching actual 
filth, and pictures became the proof of this action. Just as they kept planting 
saplings even after they were eaten by goats, the importance of surveying was 
continually invoked: forms were repeatedly used regardless of the effectiveness 
of their outcomes.
Conclusions
Middle- class activists have been criticised for their neoliberal logic in reducing 
social and administrative problems to the value or ‘awareness’ of individuals and 
for their exacerbation of the oppression of poor and marginal groups. This 
chapter, however, has examined the forms and aesthetics of this activism rather 
than interpreting the politics of the middle class. The forms used in the campaign 
– ‘awareness’, ‘survey’, ‘service’ – produced a coherent pattern for action. 
Although contemporary activists do not hesitate to pursue pleasure and self- 
achievement, at the same time, no matter how much they represent themselves 
as ‘the common man’, they must accept this pattern of pedagogy and self- 
sacrifice to be a member of civil society, which is responsible for society at 
large. The newspaper articles and the campaign framework examined in this 
chapter revealed the expectations for the middle class in public culture, and the 
students’ descriptions illustrated their experiments and different interpretations 
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concerning what was presented as the proper citizen. People without civic sense 
are conjured to represent filth and serve as the targets of civic movements. 
However, the middle class has a more ambiguous relationship with filth than 
what is represented in the media. The target itself eludes the activists as the 
campaign proceeds and awareness- building is achieved, much as the position of 
the citizen escapes when one attempts to pin it down.
 Kaviraj criticises social scientists’ ‘transition narratives’ for creating 
‘illusions’ such as that ‘Calcutta would turn into London, and the Bengali rich 
and poor would “understand” the principles of being private and public in the 
right ways’. He suggests that we should instead look at ‘the shapes and forms 
our modernity is taking’ (Kaviraj 1997: 113). As shown above, the campaign to 
create awareness and make Mumbai a world- class city is increasingly based on 
this ‘transition narrative’, applied by both the media and activists. Social 
scientists’ narratives are not transcendent descriptions or diagnoses of the world, 
but shape Indian modernity by influencing people’s practices and by providing 
new forms for analysing and perceiving the world. ‘Transition narratives’ are, 
thus, not something we should abandon; it is more important to look at the forms 
of Indian modernity by examining these illusory ‘transition narratives’.
Notes
* The research for this chapter was funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of 
Science (2010–2011). I am grateful for the generous assistance of the Mumbai Mirror 
reporters and campaign participants.
 1 This survey was an opinion poll conducted by the market research firm IMRB. They 
first published the results on 11 December 2011.
 2 Mumbai city’s local government, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation.
 3 Who is included in ‘Mumbaikars’ or ‘Mumbaites’ is flexible and highly contextual. 
Despite its cosmopolitan appearance, in the case of English newspapers such as in 
this quote, Mumbaikar could be read as synonymous with ‘citizen’, that is, the edu-
cated urban middle class, and thus as excluding the poor immigrants and their 
descendants.
 4 Through a discourse analysis of court orders and judgments and civic petitions, Ghert-
ner delineates the process by which ‘nuisance’ as an aesthetic category is applied to 
the very existence of slums, such that the term has become a legal basis for slum dem-
olition (Ghertner 2011).
 5 Birgit Meyer suggests returning to the older and more encompassing notion of aesthe-
sis, that is, ‘our total sensory experience of the world and our sensitive knowledge of 
it’ (Meyer 2009: 6).
 6 William Mazzarella states that aesthetics always ‘appeal[s] to a basic and universal 
capacity for sensuous experience, a capacity which . . . will never be reducible to 
authoritative formulae’. Thus, aesthetics is both a ‘resource for hegemony but also . . . 
resistant to all reifying agendas’ (Mazzarella 2006: 104). Since consumerism is based 
on a sensuous language of the body, even the ‘illiterate’ are potential fluent speakers. 
For this, Rajagopal (2001) suggests its democratising possibility of encompassing for-
merly marginalised social groups. But Mazzarella (2011: 341–342) observes that lib-
erals and cultural conservatives, antagonists within censorship debates, have been in 
perfect agreement on averting this radically democratic possibility.
 7 Chakrabarty (2008: 11) clarifies the meaning of ‘peasant’ as ‘a shorthand for all the 
seemingly nonmodern, rural, nonsecular relationships and life practices that constantly 
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leave their imprint on the lives of even the elites in India and on their institutions of 
government’.
 8 The Mumbai Mirror reported on the campaign 33 times from 27 June to 5 September 
in 2011. I joined the clean- up and awareness drives 11 times and later conducted 
interviews with participants and activists.
 9 The Mumbai Mirror, published by the Times of India Group, is packaged with the 
Times of India in Mumbai. The Indian Readership Survey (Media Research Users 
Council 2011) shows that the Times of India was the most read among English dailies 
at the national level, and the Mumbai Mirror was seventh.
10 This case might remind us of the man who was beaten to death by local residents and 
police constables after using a park as a bathroom (Baviskar 2003) or of the movie A 
Wednesday, in which ‘the common man’ punishes terrorism suspects. The relation-
ship between the rise of civil society and vigilantism needs to be further explored.
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13 Community of retrospect
Spirit cults and locality in an old city 
of Rajasthan1
Minoru Mio
Since its construction as the capital of the Mewar kingdom in the sixteenth 
century, Udaipur, an old city in the south- eastern part of Rajasthan, has 
developed as the political, economic and cultural centre of this region.2 The 
population was about 550,000 (Census of India 2001) in 2001 and it ranks as the 
fourth largest city in Rajasthan today. It is not a metropolis like Mumbai and 
Delhi, but, like other cities in India, it is transforming rapidly under the influence 
of economic development and globalisation.
 A large yield of minerals such as marble and zinc around Udaipur has attracted 
buyers from abroad. Further, palaces, gardens and artificial lakes constructed by 
kings and feudal lords have become an important heritage resource, attracting 
foreign as well as domestic tourists. Following the relatively early example of 
royal properties, the palaces of many Rajput lords have been converted into tourist 
hotels. What was once the location of vassals’ palaces is now a busy street domi-
nated by foreign tourists. Places of royal life have become objects for the romantic 
aspirations of the new Indian middle class, and the palace hotels are often used as 
venues for their luxurious, fashionable wedding receptions (Mio 2005: 30–31). In 
the suburbs, large shopping complexes, symbolic of the consumption culture of 
this class, have sprung up one after another (Mio 2007a: 24).
 On the other hand, a spirit cult centred around the medium of a deified Rajput 
hero of the medieval period has rapidly become popular among people in 
Udaipur. The spirit possession of this medium, a tribal woman, only began in the 
autumn of 2006, but according to the medium and believers, the spirit is a Rajput 
warrior who was killed in battle in the fifteenth century, before Udaipur was 
founded. There were various interferences against this medium’s activities in its 
initial stage, and some dwellers still doubt its authenticity. But now, in the 
evenings when sessions for curing sickness and solving the problems of various 
believers take place in front of the statue of this hero situated in a room of the 
medium’s house, those who seek solutions to their problems queue up in front of 
the house, and the session often lasts until midnight. Most believers are relat-
ively poor but highly educated, and wealthy merchants are not rare among the 
earnest followers of the medium. Other similar newly founded spirit possession 
cults can be found in Udaipur; these kinds of cults cannot be considered excep-
tional cases or examples of archaic traditions failing to modernise.
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 This chapter aims to analyse the factors concerning the reconstruction of 
locality in the traditional city of Rajasthan through examination of the formation 
process of the Rajput spirit cults. These cults have developed on the fault line 
where local sites, loaded with the unique memories and traditional meanings of 
the old capital city, have been incorporated into the space of the modern nation 
state. The cults are tracing the practice of the traditional spirit possession cult of 
the Rajput lords and warriors, but they show certain features that deviate from 
the traditional pattern. This deviation reflects the social situation of con-
temporary Indian cities; the cults based on the habitus of the traditional relation-
ship between lords and subjects become the basis for forming a local agency in 
contemporary Indian urban society where neighbourhood communities are 
rapidly disappearing.
 In his study of the production of locality in the modern world, Appadurai 
grasps the locality ‘as primarily relational and contextual rather than as scalar or 
spatial’ (Appadurai 1996: 178). He also sees it ‘as a complex phenomenological 
quality, constituted by a series of links between the sense of social immediacy, 
the technologies of interactivity, and the relativity of contexts’ (Appadurai 1996: 
178). According to him, local subjects are actors who properly belong to a situ-
ated community of kin, neighbours, friends and enemies, and they are con-
structed by the inscription of locality onto bodies through ritual actions 
(Appadurai 1996: 179). On the other hand, neighbourhoods are defined as ‘the 
actually existing social forms in which locality, as a dimension or value, is vari-
ably realized’, and as ‘situated communities characterised by their actuality, 
whether spatial or virtual, and their potential for social reproduction’ (Appadurai 
1996: 178–179). Appadurai also points out that traditionally locality has been 
produced in the spatially limited neighbourhood, and that locality and neigh-
bourhood stood in a dialectic relationship as the local subject which was first 
produced in the neighbourhood then actively produced the neighbourhood 
(Appadurai 1996: 184–185). But in the modern globalising world, nation state 
projects, diasporic flows and electronic and virtual communities mean that the 
neighbourhood cannot be produced as a spatially limited place loaded with 
locally specific meaning, so local subjects or the production of localities them-
selves are now facing an ‘immense new set of challenges’ (Appadurai 1996: 
188–198).
 Appadurai’s discussion is still stimulating for its consideration of the con-
temporary Indian urban situation. This chapter therefore basically follows his 
definition of locality and neighbourhood. However, even when the effects of glo-
balisation penetrate into every corner of the world, global flows of people, com-
modities and information do not necessarily appear or bring about the same 
effect in every sphere of society or the life- world of every person. Appadurai 
pays much attention to those who move (or are forced to move) globally or dex-
terously handle electronic media to transcend the traditional neighbourhood and 
interact with each other. But local Indian cities do not consist only of this kind of 
subject. This chapter pays attention instead to those who do not or cannot move 
or handle electronic devices and considers how they try to make their local lives 
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meaningful in the context of the contemporary situation, which has been more or 
less influenced by nation state projects and/or globalisation.
 In this sense, this chapter shares the perspective of Donner and De Neve 
(2006). In the introduction to a set of essays exploring the meaning of the local 
in Indian cities in the 2000s, they deplore the situation of the local, claiming that 
it ‘increasingly derives its meaning from its juxtaposition to the global while the 
latter is privileged in the writings about globalization’ (Donner & De Neve 2006: 
2). They try to reorient our attention to the urban people’s ways of ‘place- 
making, and the role that locality plays in the construction of social relations 
against the background of changed global–local connections’ (Donner & De 
Neve 2006: 3). Their emphasis on the study of the meaning of the local is under-
standable when one considers the above- mentioned situation of urban Indian 
people. However, they point out that neighbourhood is still maintaining its social 
reality in Indian cities, and even where there is little interaction among neigh-
bours, the neighbourhood retains its institutional and administrative role. They 
also try to clarify the meaning of the local, focusing on the neighbourhood 
(Donner & De Neve 2006: 10–11). The strength of the social reality of neigh-
bourhood may differ from one city to another or from the position of one subject 
position to another; however, as described below, the neighbourhood has lost its 
traditional form and plays limited roles in making the locality that produces local 
subjects in Udaipur, even in its old town. Besides, as Appadurai pointed out, and 
as can be discerned by the case study of Udaipur used here, the administrative 
power in the nation state tends to exert itself to deprive the indigenousness of the 
neighbourhood that produces the locality (Appadurai, 1996: 189–192). So it is 
important to be wary of the perspective of Donner and De Neve, which sees the 
relationship between the neighbourhood and administrative power as somewhat 
affinitive.
 Through the examination of the practices of mediums and followers in the 
possession cults of the old city, this chapter considers how the local can be con-
structed in situations in which the neighbourhood cannot remain as a spatially 
limited community. As Appadurai suggests, locality can be produced and main-
tained without being based on people’s physical contiguity. Social contexts 
where the immediacy of people’s everyday lives can be maintained are important 
for the existence of locality. The possession cults provide their members with 
such contexts even though they are not living in physical contiguity because they 
can meet with each other regularly at the time of spirit possessions and other 
ritual occasions, and intimacy among them can be nurtured through sharing their 
pains. They do not belong to neighbourhood, but form a community based on 
network relationships. Ritual practices are important for the embodiment of 
community feeling in members of these cults. At the same time, sharing mythi-
cal stories about local Mewari heroes is also important in forming this posses-
sion cult. The formation of this kind of cult and the means of inheriting the story 
of the heroes at its core strongly reflect the contemporary condition of locality in 
a local Indian city.
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‘Colonisation’ of mohalla: transformation of Udaipur
Like most other northern and western Indian cities which have existed since pre-
colonial times, Udaipur is divided by its rampart into the walled old town and 
the new town, which was developed after the colonial period. The two parts 
show a clear contrast both in the constitution of their populations and in the 
social relationships in their neighbourhoods. After its foundation by Maharana 
Udai Singh in the middle of the sixteenth century, the ramparts were expanded 
several times. The current rampart is said to have been completed in the middle 
of the nineteenth century.3 Prior to independence, the residential and commercial 
area is supposed to have been confined in the walled town, except for the resid-
ential area for British residents. However, after independence, lots of residential 
areas and shopping streets were constructed outside the rampart. The rapid 
growth of the new town area after the late 1980s is particularly remarkable. It is 
in this new town that numerous shopping complexes and condominiums have 
been constructed in the past 15 years.
 The new town is characterised by planned residential areas which are con-
nected by broad roads. These are developed by public housing corporations and 
private real- estate developers. A newly developed residential area is named with 
a suffix such as ‘pura’, ‘nagar’ or ‘colony’.4 Though the demarcation method of 
plots and the style of houses show similarities in a developed area, and appar-
ently the area constitutes a unit as a physical space, its inhabitants are hetero-
geneous as their castes, occupations and native places are different. Public 
administrations and policy making are carried out by a ward panchayat, set up in 
a ward unifying several residential areas. Its members and a leader (ward panch) 
are chosen by election, but the new town dwellers often know their ward panch 
only indirectly.
 On the other hand, various life rituals connecting neighbourhood with locality 
were traditionally carried out by each family in the new town area, and other 
religious festivals were rarely celebrated in the neighbourhood collectively. As I 
have described elsewhere (Mio 2007b, 2009), new types of religious festivals 
suddenly became popular in Udaipur. In the new town, these festivals are organ-
ised by voluntary associations of the young males of a ward or a ‘colony’, but 
the contents of these festivals are adaptations of the traditions of other regions. 
Besides, these festivals have become similarly popular in other north- western 
Indian cities and tend to be organised by young people who sympathise with 
Hindu nationalism. The fashionable religious festivals in the new town of 
Udaipur connect its neighbourhood not with the locality but with the imagina-
tion of the nation.
 While the new town can be described as the space of ‘colony’, the old town 
can be said to be the space of ‘mohalla’. Small alleys form an intricate maze 
inside the walled town. Relatively large streets are the domain of animated com-
mercial activities, but relatively quiet residential areas stretch back from them. 
Residential buildings of four or five storeys line up on both sides of narrow 
alleys, and the living areas are divided into neighbourhood units called mohallas. 
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The mohallas are often named after jati. Even today, the traditional occupational 
activities of a jati still sometimes take place in a mohalla with that jati’s name. 
There is a Charbhuja temple in almost every mohalla, which is worshipped as a 
guardian deity of that mohalla’s jati, and shrines and temples of Hanuman and 
Behru, which protect the borders of a mohalla, can also be found. The living 
expenses of the priests and mediums of the shrines and temples were borne by 
residents of the mohalla, who used to celebrate the yearly festivals of these 
temples and shrines cooperatively. These temples and shrines were also places 
for life rituals such as hair cutting rituals for children, which used to be held as a 
community event. The bheru is a god which possesses a medium, and the mohal-
la’s people used to complain of and seek solutions to their hardships and troubles 
at their mohalla’s bheru shrine. The inhabitants of one mohalla were also 
believed to share the pollution that arose from births and deaths in that mohalla.
 Buildings stand in an unbroken row in the old town, but for the dwellers the 
borders were clearly demarcated by these temples and shrines, and their neigh-
bourhood area used to be constructed as a meaningful life space by these reli-
gious sites. These life spaces were sites for the creation and inheritance of the 
habitus of everyday lives, and functioned as neighbourhood- formulating local 
subjects. There was another kind of living space, the haveli, peculiar to the castle 
towns in Udaipur. A haveli is a palace where buildings of several storeys sur-
round a large courtyard from every direction; such palaces were used as the 
residences of Rajput lords in the capital. Later, wealthy merchants also built this 
type of house in the city. A haveli was equipped with the facilities necessary for 
everyday life and also contained shrines for the life and yearly rituals of its 
inhabitants. Thus the lives of the inhabitants tended to be enclosed within its 
boundaries, but they obtained various services from other jatis who lived sepa-
rately in the town in mohallas. The relationship between the Rajput lord and 
various jatis, and the demarcations of the living places of the jatis are said to be 
features of the traditional Hindu villages of north- western India. The same fea-
tures can also be clearly found in the old town in the capital city.
 The basic structure of life space in the old town is disappearing rapidly. First, 
havelis have ceased to function as a unit of living space for Rajputs. Most Rajput 
lords have sold theirs because of land reforms and changes in their lifestyles. As 
a result, the haveli, which used to house only members of a single jati with blood 
or marital relationships, is now sold or leased to many owners or borrowers, and 
various families of different jatis come to live in a single haveli. It is not uncom-
mon to find havelis that have been wholly or partially converted into public insti-
tutes such as schools and post offices. Most of the havelis that are still owned by 
Rajputs have been reconstructed into tourist hotels since the latter half of the 
1990s.
 On the other hand, remarkable changes are occurring among mohalla dwell-
ers, and in many mohallas more than half of the population belong to jatis other 
than that after which the mohalla is named. The idea of sharing the pollution of 
births and deaths is disappearing as the heterogeneity of the inhabitants increases. 
The yearly festivals of Charbhuja are still celebrated, as former dwellers come 
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back to their original mohalla at festival times, but some Charbhuja temples have 
already lost their priests. In many Hanuman and bheru temples and shrines, the 
number of people who come to worship and seek solutions to the troubles of 
their daily lives has decreased.
 Wards have come to take over the public functions of mohallas in the old 
town. In other words, wards are set up in both the old and the new town, and 
modern administrative logic and technology cover the entire city. The border of 
a ward does not overlap with the border of a mohalla. Rather, it is changed at the 
time of the ward panchayat election according to changes in the population, so it 
is difficult for the dwellers of a ward to engender a sense of community. The 
ward panches hold a seat in the municipal assembly, and through assembly activ-
ities they try to provide similar administrative services in every ward, such as 
road cleaning and the implementation of water tanks. As the heterogeneity of the 
inhabitants of mohallas increases, the homogeneity of administrative services 
and the physical characteristics of the old town’s streets are also increasing. 
Further, the new type of religious festival has rapidly become popular since the 
mid- 1990s, even in the old town.
 In the old town, living places such as mohallas and havelis used to be the 
exclusive spaces of homogeneous inhabitants and these spaces were the neigh-
bourhood that became the basis for the construction of locality. Such closed 
homogeneous neighbourhoods cannot exist once the inhabitants of mohallas and 
havelis have become heterogeneous. Wards have been set up as substitute organ-
isations by the nation state, and they carry out a part of the public function of the 
mohalla of olden times. Through the functions of the wards, modern administra-
tive services and ideas penetrate into every corner of the old town, and the views 
and characteristics of the old town’s streets show a certain similarity. Accord-
ingly, religious places have lost their functions as places for traditional religious 
practices, and new religious festivals connected with the imagination of the 
nation have rapidly become popular.
 Neighbourhoods in the old town are transforming into neighbourhoods with 
the character of the new town. In other words, the ‘mohalla’ has become the 
‘colony’. Such social change causes the loss of memory and practice of the 
place, which are rooted in the past of the inhabitants of the mohallas and havelis. 
The transformation and destruction of havelis and the changes of religious prac-
tices in mohallas are clear evidence of such a loss of memory and practice.
 The revival of the Rajput warrior’s spirit and its increase in popularity among 
the city dwellers occur against the background of this transformation of neigh-
bourhood. What kind of divine spirits and people are the agents of these phe-
nomena? And what does the revival of its popularity mean against the backdrop 
of these social changes?
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Sagasji: a contemporary meaning of the community of 
retrospect
Features of the sagasji as a god
A sagasji (or sagasji bavji), which possesses a medium who has become popular 
in the old town of Udaipur, is the spirit of a Rajput male who died a tragic death, 
for example on a battlefield, in a struggle or by poisoning (Harlan 2003: 71–87). 
The spirits of warriors who died on a battlefield are worshipped as jhunjarji 
among Rajputs, and they are distinguished from sagasji who died a different 
kind of death. In particular, the spirits of those who were beheaded by the enemy 
on the battlefield and continued to fight without their head until they fell down 
are believed to be jhunjarji (Harlan 2003: 14–16). But the distinction tends to be 
vague among other people, and even the spirits of those who died on the battle-
field are worshiped as sagasjis, as described later.
 Sagasjis do not possess Rajputs, except on rare occasions. Among Rajputs, a 
stone or clay image of a sagasji is enshrined at the place of death and worshipped 
at times of family or clan rituals. The spiritual power of those who died a heroic 
death in fights for justice is believed to be particularly strong, and, if properly 
worshipped, it is said to provide happiness to its descendants. When the spiritual 
power is especially strong, its boon is supposed to extend to all those who come 
to seek its protection, not only its descendants. In this case the image is enshrined 
in a special altar or temple and served by a priest. The sagasji enshrined at Sarv 
Ritu Vilas in the old city area is one of the most popular such examples.
 Sagasjis often also possess people from other jatis. In this case, the possessed 
spirits have a conversation with followers and grant their wishes through the 
medium. Such sagasjis often clarify their own identity and talk about their 
history through their medium at the time of possession. These sagasjis were 
royal family members or warrior landlords, and when possessed, the mediums 
speak and behave like these ruling nobles. Visitors also attend to mediums just 
like they would to nobles. Usually the sagasji possession takes place every 
Friday evening in every shrine. Visitors at this occasion talk about their prob-
lems in front of the medium and other followers and seek solutions from the 
spirit. This occasion is called chauki in the Mewari language.
 The troubles brought to the chauki are various and include troubles in the 
family, educational problems, success in business, wanting to have a baby, 
various diseases and the extermination of various kinds of demons. As everyone 
who wants to may visit a sagasji shrine, an exclusive group of followers cannot 
be formed. If one cannot solve one’s trouble in one shrine, one often visits 
another. But when one’s wish is granted in a shrine, one tends to visit that shrine 
constantly and entrust it with the solutions to all of one’s troubles. This kind of 
follower becomes a regular visitor to the shrine even when he/she does not have 
any specific troubles, and takes care of the personal life of the medium and, in 
the case of major festivals of the shrine, comes to play a central role in its 
celebration.
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 In Mewar there are various kinds of spirits that possess persons in order to 
communicate with people and intervene in the events of this world. One of them 
is the mataji. Rajputs worship matajis as their kul devis (clan goddesses), which 
are enshrined in specific temples, and they believe these goddesses to be the 
most powerful deity. An image of the mataji is always enshrined in sagasji 
temples and shrines, and people pay respects to the mataji before the sagasji in 
everyday worship. In this sense, the sagasji is subordinate to the mataji (Harlan 
2003: 124–135). There are numerous mataji shrines in Mewar, and they have 
been the focus of Navrattri festivals.5 At the time of this festival, matajis possess 
male mediums, known as bhopa, demand sacrifices of goats or buffaloes6 and 
grant the wishes of people after chaukis.7 In the case of matajis, however, 
chaukis do not necessarily take place at their shrines on a weekly basis.
 The bheru has been the most popular possessing god in Mewar. The bheru is 
said to be the divinised form of the god Shiv’s rage and is believed to destroy 
demons and obstacles, heal illness and sterility and grant wishes through bhopa. 
The bheru is also believed to protect the borders of certain areas (see also Harlan 
2003: 135). The bheru is also believed to be a god who serves the mataji, and its 
role as a harbinger of the mataji to sweep away demons is often represented 
iconographically and sung about in folk songs. In the shrine of a mataji, a bheru 
is often set up at its border or at the place for the mataji’s attendants. In this 
regard, there is similarity between the bheru and the sagasji. Chaukis are often 
held weekly (usually on Sunday mornings) at Behru shrines, which are at the 
border of villages and mohallas. On such occasions local dwellers are the main 
visitors to the shrine, but some shrines which are especially famous for their 
powers to grant children, or antidotal boons against dog and snake bites are 
visited by people from distant places. When their illness is healed or wishes are 
realised, they become frequent visitors to the shrine and sometimes build 
intimate relationships with the bhopa. Therefore the followers of a bheru shrine 
cannot be said to be a totally exclusive localised group.
 Another important possessing deity is the ancestral spirit generally known as 
the purvaj. Persons who died an extraordinary death are believed to keep deep 
attachments to this world and appear as spirits. If they are not worshipped prop-
erly, they bring evil events upon their family and descendants, but when wor-
shipped properly, following the advice of mediums, they come to possess one of 
their family members and give boons to them. A purvaj is said to show the tastes 
and habits it had during its lifetime through its medium. In many cases a purvaj 
possesses a newly married bride of the family. In other words, unlike the cases 
of the mataji and bheru, purvajs’ mediums are often women. However, they are 
not known as bhopa nor are their boons extended outside of their family and 
descendants. Further, their possession usually takes place only twice a year.8
 There are some similarities in the features of the sagasji and the purvaj as far 
as the sagasji is also worshipped among Rajputs. A sagasji, however, does not 
possess a Rajput. However, when a sagasji possesses a medium its spiritual 
power extends to the general populace without being limited by jati or neigh-
bourhood. The origin of the spiritual power of a sagasji is not rooted in any 
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deity, as in the case of the mataji and bheru, but in human beings, yet its range of 
power is as large as those of other deities. Like the mediums of matajis and 
bherus, the sagasji’s medium is known as a bhopa.
 A sagasji retains the name it had during its lifetime, and each sagasji’s tastes 
and events from its life are revealed by its bhopa, with followers trying to give 
gifts that their beloved sagasji will like and to memorise episodes from its life. 
Though some especially strong mataji or bheruji are named after the location of 
their shrine, the forms of the images of these deities are stereotypical. In con-
trast, in the sagasji’s shrine a portrait from its lifetime is often displayed. In other 
words, a sagasji keeps the individual characteristics from its lifetime while 
behaving like a deity, granting boons to general followers. The sagasji also 
shares some similarities with the bheru in that these two deities are characterised 
as servants of the mataji and periodically hold chauki for their followers. 
However, in the case of a bheru, the bhopa retains his ordinary appearance when 
he is possessed, while in the case of a sagasji, the bhopa takes on the appearance 
of a Rajput prince during the chauki. A bheru’s bhopa holds a stick made from 
peacock feathers as a symbol of dignity and uses it to sweep evils out of his fol-
lowers, while a sagasji’s bhopa holds a sword. In sagasji shrines, items and 
clothes symbolising Rajput princes are always used.
 Among Mewar’s spiritual deities, the sagasji’s features are ambiguous. It is 
similar to the bheru in its relation with the mataji and in its powers, but, like the 
purvaj, it retains its distinctive character from when it was alive. The sagasji is 
also peculiar in the sense that although it is a Rajput ancestor spirit, it possesses 
a medium who is not a Rajput. The episodes of its lifetime are co- memorised 
among non- Rajput followers, and its lifetime behaviour as a lord is retrospec-
tively represented and worshipped. The sagasji is a spiritual deity whose life is 
preserved in people’s retrospect on Rajput lords.
 Through the precolonial and colonial past, and even in the postcolonial period 
(Harlan 1992), Rajputs have played central roles in Mewar society. They were 
rulers and warriors, and they have been the hub of gift exchanges of castes. They 
have also played central roles in several local festivals, such as Navrattri. The activ-
ities of Rajput kings and landlords have been the focus of the interests of lay 
persons, and their histories have been well- known to lay persons in Mewar. In other 
words, Rajputs have occupied the focal point of people’s co- memory of their past. 
In the case of the extraordinary deaths of lineage ancestors, they touch upon their 
descendants’ lament and become the focal point of its lineage’s co- memory. In the 
case of Rajputs, their acts and extraordinary deaths were nodes of co- memory for 
Mewaris generally, transcending the boundaries of lineages, clans and castes. This 
is the reason why spirits that are revived from the heroic deaths of Rajputs alone 
can be the core of possession cults that involve a wide range of Mewaris.
The sagasji of Kothari Gali
Let us consider the case mentioned in the introduction, of the spirit that pos-
sesses the tribal woman. The spirit is enshrined in a room in the medium’s home 
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in the mohalla of Kothari Gali, which is in the central part of the old town. The 
medium and her family live in rented quarters in an old haveli that was once 
owned by a wealthy Jain merchant but was later divided and sold off. The 
medium, in her mid- thirties, is a Bhil, which is the largest tribal group in the 
Mewar region. She had been working as a peon in an elementary school in an 
adjacent region of Mewar, but was transferred to a girls’ school in Udaipur and 
moved into this residence with her husband, who is a painter, and their four chil-
dren.9 An old haveli which had been owned by a Rajput family was reformed 
into the girls’ school and is very near to the medium’s residence. A statue 
without any clear identity was enshrined inside the school and, though no one 
knew its identity, the school’s peons had been serving it every day. The medium 
took over this role in early 2006 and continued serving the shrine devotedly, 
until one day, in autumn of that year, the spirit of the statue suddenly possessed 
her while she was performing the serving ritual.
 After the possession, the spirit identified itself as Dhan Singh, who was killed 
in a battle at an old well in the castle of Chittorgarh, the old capital of Mewar, 
about 600 years ago, and declared it would come to this world through this 
woman from that time on. At first many people denied the possession’s authen-
ticity, claiming that it was impossible for the spirit of a Rajput warrior to possess 
a tribal woman. Some of them strongly opposed the creation of an active reli-
gious place in the government public school.10 For the medium and her family 
and close acquaintances, the possession was unquestionably real, even though it 
happened without any premonitory symptoms. They believed they had to pay 
attention to the will of the possessing spirit and thus moved the shrine from the 
school to her residence. The medium made an artist draw a portrait of the spirit 
during its lifetime, based on the figure that had appeared in her dream, and put it 
up in a room in her residence. The spirit possessed her again to declare that it 
would possess her on the evening of every Tuesday, Friday and full moon day to 
preside over a chauki.
 No one had previously heard the spirit’s name or the place of its death. 
However, when the medium and her followers visited the castle of Chittorgarh 
after the foundation of the new shrine, the spirit possessed her and told them the 
place he had been killed, where they found a small rock pillar carved with his 
name. The spirit also told them that in his last battle against a Muslim army he 
had been beheaded but had fought without a head until he fell.11 The spirit claims 
that his family was related to the Mewar king’s clan. But his name does not 
appear in the historical record of the Mewar kings and nobles, and nor can his 
‘last battle’ be confirmed by historical records. There is indeed an old rock pillar 
carved with his name, but there are no legends about him other than the tale that 
the spirit itself told to the followers.
 For the followers, the fact that possession actually takes place and their 
wishes are granted by the spirit is itself the basis for the authenticity of this spir-
it’s power and story. At the time of chauki they talk with each other about the 
miracles that occurred to them and convince one another of the reality of the 
spirit’s power. During chauki, the medium answers the visitors’ wishes and 
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troubles one after another decisively in the language of men, addressing the visi-
tors as bheta (children), seated on the throne with a sword in her right hand and 
headgear peculiar to Rajput lords on her head. For the followers, this is ideal 
behaviour for a feudal lord. The followers address the medium as raja (king) and 
show the highest respect to her, revering her words and saying ‘kanma gani’ 
(long live the king). The pronounced efficacy of this shrine in solving various 
wishes and troubles is being spread by word of mouth throughout Mewar, and 
the number of visitors to the shrine is increasing rapidly.
 The woman stresses that she did not become a medium of her own will; she is 
a mere servant of the spirit and accepted the destiny decided by the spirit as her 
lord. As for the feature of belief concerning this shrine, it is clear that the authen-
ticity of the spirit possession is mutually constructed through the performative 
actions and words of the medium and the followers, and this performance further 
enhances the popularity of the shrine. This accords well with a feature of other 
spirit possession cults in Rajasthan described by Gold (2008: 85–86). The mode 
of relationship between the deity and the medium is also very similar to the case 
of an urban shrine in Chennai, analysed by Hancock (1999: 202–205). The 
behaviour of the medium of Kothari Gali is deeply rooted in features of Hindu 
religious practice. In the case examined by Hancock, the woman also denies her 
own will to be a medium of a shrine, emphasising instead the will of the deity. In 
both cases, mediums undertake their own roles as servants of gods by order of 
the deity. But they are not mere subjects of destiny. After undertaking their roles, 
they show initiative in leading the followers. In the case used in this chapter, the 
tribal woman adamantly resists the oppositional group and tries to keep her 
shrine intact. Still, she keeps her position as the servant of the spiritual deity. 
She is not a self- directive independent subject in the sense of the western modern 
conception, but an agent who feels that she is made to live her life by some 
being. We should also note that her position as medium is not only directed by 
the deity, but also constructed by the attitude and expectations of followers. She 
is exercising her agency amidst the spirit’s will and its followers’ desires for 
miraculous solutions to their troubles delivered by a legendary heroic spirit 
revived from the local past.
 The main assistant to the medium at the time of chauki, called the hanjaria, is 
a male colleague from the Kartik jati, who had been an eager follower of another 
sagasji. He was one of the medium’s first followers and happened to see the first 
possession of this spirit. He manages the whole process of the chauki as he is 
well versed in chauki procedures, having attended chaukis in another shrine for a 
long time. He controls the order of consultations by visitors while preparing 
various items necessary for the chauki in response to the demands of the spirit.
 Another female colleague is also among the regular followers of this shrine. 
She always says ‘Kanma gani’ during the chauki, in response to the words of the 
spirit, and mediates between the visitor and the medium, saying ‘Please grant 
this person’s wish, oh raja.’ She also advises newcomers to the shrine about the 
proper behaviour before the medium. Other regular and new visitors spend time 
in the courtyard of the haveli, talking about their present condition and interpreting 
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the words of the spirit before going back to their homes. When a chauki is over, 
the medium’s family serves tea to regular followers and chats for a while. 
Though the medium and other followers belong to different jatis with different 
social backgrounds, they talk with each other quite intimately on such occasions. 
They have even come to support each other during times of hardship or family 
events, so social networks of followers and the medium have been formed based 
on belief in the shrine.
Community of practice based on ‘the retrospect’
There are several features of the relationship between the medium and followers 
of the shrine. First, it is based on the traditionally constructed habitus concerning 
the belief in the possessing spirit. Second, this habitus is inherited and produced 
through the mutual relationship between the medium and the followers, as well 
as relationships among the followers. The newcomers to the shrine learn and 
master the habitus and worldview of regular followers through ‘legitimate 
peripheral participation’ (Lave & Wenger 1991: 1–18) and deepen their faith for 
the sagasji. In the learning process, however, not only verbal communication but 
also physical action and experience, such as behaviour in front of the medium, 
are important. Third, there is a vague hierarchy of the medium, the regular fol-
lowers, and the newcomers. Fourth, participation in and withdrawal from the fol-
lowers’ group is done at one’s free will. Finally, there is an intimate relationship 
among the regular followers who take care of each other, which transcends their 
differing social backgrounds. These features accord with Tanabe’s concept of 
the community of practice, which was proposed through revisions of the original 
concept of Lave and Wenger (Tanabe 2003, 2005).12
 Such communities of practice can be found among the followers of shrines of 
possessing deities in Mewar. Though the followers of a bheru shrine tend to be 
exclusively local persons, the membership of a sagasji’s following is not con-
fined to a specific neighbourhood. This difference is based on the character of 
each deity. While a bheru is basically believed to be the guardian deity of a 
certain area, in the case of a sagasji, belief is rooted in the retrospect for the 
Rajput who died an extraordinary death. In other words, anyone who sympa-
thises with the story of the sagasji and is willing to take part in a hierarchical 
relationship with the deity and its medium can be a follower of a specific sagasji. 
The sagasji stories may not be acceptable outside of Mewar, but in Mewar they 
are quite understandable to everyone who is born in this region against the back-
ground of a long history of Rajput dominance.
 Though the religious practices of Kothari Gali’s shrine show similarities with 
those of other shrines, there are also certain differences. The attribution of the 
medium is remarkable; the origin and story of the sagasji itself can also be said 
to be extraordinary. Among the 21 sagasji shrines in Udaipur that could be iden-
tified during the research,13 spirit possessions take place in 13. In these 13 places, 
only two, including Kothari Gali’s, became active after the 1990s. In other 
shrines, the current mediums have been active for more than 30 years, and in 
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some there have been several generations of mediums. Also, in these two new 
shrines, women have become mediums.
 The enshrined spirits also share a similarity in these two shrines. In the other 
11 shrines, the lives of the spirits can be confirmed by historical books or clan 
genealogies of Rajputs. The stories of the spirits’ lifetimes are also well known 
to those who are familiar with the history and legends of Mewar. In other words 
the spirits’ origins are rooted in legends outside the community of practice of the 
medium and the followers. However, in the two new shrines no one had heard of 
the names or their stories before the possession actually took place. Salumbar 
Haveli, where another new spirit is enshrined, had been owned by the Rajput 
lords who had been granted their estate in the Salumbar region, which lies in the 
southern part of Mewar, but it was divided and sold off to other owners. The 
medium of this shrine is the widow of a craftsman from the Suthar jati. Her 
family bought a part of this haveli in which to live in the late 1980s, but since 
then she and other family members had been afflicted with various sicknesses. 
She visited several deities’ shrines, seeking their solutions, and a spirit suddenly 
possessed her at a bheru shrine. The spirit identified itself as a Rajput named 
Bhim Singh Chunderwat who was killed in battle in the mid- eighteenth century 
and demanded proper worship. She and her family discovered a stone statue 
abandoned in the backyard of the haveli while following the directions of the 
spirit to set up the shrine. Since then the spirit has periodically possessed this 
medium to preside over chaukis. Neither the medium nor her family knew any-
thing about this Rajput or the stone statue before this event. They are trying to 
confirm the spirit’s story through other sources but cannot find any clues for its 
identification. The uncertain situation surrounding the identity of the original 
statue of Kothari Gali’s sagasji was similar to the case of the Salumbar Haveli. 
Further, here too the spirit of the statue appeared to this world through a 
woman’s body, seemingly opposing the oblivion of the memory concerning this 
haveli or the warrior.
 As mentioned above, lots of neighbours had strong doubts about the authen-
ticity of Kothari Gali’s spirit and its medium. The ward panch and his brother 
were among the leaders of these neighbours. They were also opposing another 
sagasji’s shrine in a different school, just in front of the school where the ori-
ginal statue of Kothari Gali was enshrined. This sagasji, known as the sagasji of 
the Kanwar Pada School, is the spirit of a Rajput noble named Bhaktawar Singh 
who was drawn into a dispute over succession in the king’s family and was slain 
there in the eighteenth century. The Kanwar Pada School was originally a haveli 
of a branch of the royal family, but was transformed into a school for the chil-
dren of Rajput nobles in the colonial period. After independence it became a 
public school, but the shrine of Bhaktawar Singh remained and its medium con-
tinued chaukis at this shrine. When the medium died in the 1990s, however, a 
dispute arose over the shrine. One of the persons concerned in this dispute is a 
Brahman priest. He was serving the medium as the chauki assistant. After the 
medium died, the possession ceased to happen, so the chauki in this shrine 
stopped. However, this priest still serves the shrine and assists people who come 
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to worship there, saying that he was asked to do so by the medium during his 
lifetime. He is trying to maintain the shrine’s traditional religious practice.14
 The group led by the ward panch and his brother takes a different, negative 
attitude towards the shrine in the public school, and opposes at least the con-
tinuation of the ritual presided over by the priest. They are trying instead to make 
the shrine a new centre of festive activity for the whole ward. In the 1990s they 
organised a youth group to renovate the traditional Navrattri into a new event- 
like dance festival, following the trend among Udaipur city dwellers at that time. 
Though they did not deny the religious festival itself, they intended to organise a 
new festival which newcomers to the ward could easily participate in. As an 
expansion of this idea, they are now organising another youth group to hold an 
event- like festival at the time of the annual ritual of Bhaktawar Singh’s shrine. 
At the same time, they criticise the activities of the priest, saying that he is only 
trying to misappropriate the shrine’s property, and demanding his dismissal. For 
this group, the appearance of a new sagasji shrine in another public school in the 
same ward is a backlash to the newly introduced festival. They denied the exist-
ence of the spirit, claiming that an old Rajput spirit could not reappear into this 
world in this modern age. They went on to criticise the tribal woman, saying that 
she is just swindling people out of what little money they have by pretending to 
be possessed by a spirit. They were also strongly opposed to the practice of 
chaukis in the school, saying that this kind of religious activity should not take 
place in a public facility.
 Around this time, the medium was troubled by various physical ailments and 
a muddling of consciousness that could only be explained by the possession of 
some evil spirits. The medium and her followers interpreted this event as the 
result of sorcery15 and suspected that the ward panch employed the sorcerer 
responsible. For the priest of the Bhaktawar Singh shrine, this attack by the ward 
panch and his group on the newly appeared sagasji shrine was the same kind of 
attack as was carried out on his own shrine. He set out for the shrine in the other 
public school immediately after hearing about the predicament of the tribal 
woman medium to save her by taking her to the nearest mataji shrine, which is 
famous for its strong powers of exorcism.
 Behind this event, conflict can be discerned between those who wish to make all 
spaces in the ward rational and modern, and those who are trying to maintain local 
and traditional spaces in their life- world. The ward panch acts as the local agent of 
the modern Indian state, and, as is clear from his eager promotion of the new event- 
like festival,16 he also supports Hindu nationalism. He can be interpreted as the 
agent of the power that transforms the neighbourhood from the space in which the 
local subject is produced into the space of the production of the national subject. 
This power, correlating with the dynamism of globalisation, erases the memories of 
the past which have been harboured in the neighbourhood and transforms people’s 
life space into a modern, flat space that is suitable for the base of modern nation- 
building. This power concurs with the ‘colonisation’ of mohallas.
 The new sagasji shrine is formed as a place of memory against this power. 
Though the locality backed by the neighbourhood is disappearing, people still 
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long for some kind of locality as the basis of their social existence. One way to 
reconstruct the locality is to form a community of practice based on sharing their 
traditional memory of familiar Rajput heroes. In order to do this, it is necessary 
to recall some new but more- or-less familiar legend and the medium who under-
takes the agency to perform the leading role of this community of practice. But 
this rediscovered memory cannot help but be considerably deprived of concrete 
episodes by the effect of the modernising power mentioned above. Even then, 
the frame of ‘legend’ is indispensable in forming this kind of community. The 
deviational features of the episodes of the newly appeared sagasjis can be 
explained as the result of actions that make up for the emptied local space with 
the repertory of collective memory. Corresponding to these deviational features, 
the mediums who undertake their agency in responding to people’s expectations 
are recalled from relatively peripheral positions in society, namely tribal or 
widowed women.
 At the location of the new sagasji shrines, the memories of Rajputs, through 
which sagasjis can reappear in the religious practices of Udaipur citizens, are 
just coming to the edge of oblivion. Therefore, the stories of new sagasjis lack 
concrete episodes and become stereotypical, tracing the common legends of 
beheaded fighting warriors shared by citizens of Udaipur. The behaviour of 
mediums, too, becomes a patchwork of various habitus concerning faith in pos-
sessing spirits and gods.17 The religious practices of the community of retrospect 
have been fragmented and patched together, reflecting the fragmentation of 
memories of sagasji and Rajput warriors.
Conclusion
The community of practice that is centred on the newly revived sagasji is the 
result of people in a traditional regional Indian city searching for communal ties 
in a locality when the traditional neighbourhood is dissolving because of social 
change.
 The new festivals organised by neighbourhood youth associations, which are 
popular among citizens in Udaipur, can also be interpreted as attempts to recon-
struct communal ties corresponding to the transformation of the neighbourhood 
(Mio 2007b, 2009). Some organisers clearly state the purpose of these festivals 
as nurturing familiarity among rapidly changing neighbourhoods. The festival 
participants actually find opportunities to make the acquaintance of their neigh-
bours through taking part in the events of the festivals. However, the communal 
feeling that they experience in these events tends to be temporary and cannot 
grow into the intimacy through which one can share with other persons the 
darker aspects of everyday life, such as troubles and pain.
 These ‘traditional’ festivals newly reinvented as dance festivals in Udaipur, 
such as Ganesh Utsav and Navrattri, are becoming popular in other major Indian 
cities, so participation in these festivals enables people to partake in the ima-
gined national community. Several youth organisations for these festivals have 
developed from temporary and purpose- specific organisations into permanent 
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associations engaged in various public activities. Thus some youths have estab-
lished continuous social relationships with others through participating in the 
organisation of festivals. However, as described elsewhere (Mio 2009), most of 
these associations have been affiliated with Hindu nationalist organisations. The 
invented ‘traditional’ festivals related to the imagination of nation may make 
participants experience temporary communal ties, but cannot be the basis of a 
community rooted in local memories and habitus.
 In contrast, in the case of the community practising sagasji worship, the fol-
lowers share the sufferings that arise from everyday life, so the group can be the 
basis for the experience of deep communal ties. Although a bheru is also a deity 
that may form the centre of this kind of ‘community of suffering’, since it is the 
deity of the boundary of a certain social space, it cannot be the core of such a 
community in the contemporary social situation of Udaipur. In the case of the 
sagasji, everybody in the region can become a member of such a community as 
far as they are able to share the retrospect of Rajput lords or warriors, which is 
one of the master narratives peculiar to this region.
 The sagasji is revived from the depths of the collective memory of Mewar 
and gains a new life- force as a spirit that responds to the demands of people who 
are searching for local and deep communal ties when the neighbourhood in this 
region is transforming rapidly. The followers of the newly revived sagasji cult 
recall the local collective memory by taking part in the practice of this cult and, 
based on the communal ties experienced within it, gain the power to survive the 
rapidly changing, unstable social life of today. The vitality of this possession cult 
lies in the strength of collective memory. When the memory is completely con-
signed to oblivion, this cult will also disappear. The social and cultural situation 
surrounding the sagasji is now forcing this memory to transform radically or face 
extinction. The warrior’s spirit, which has appeared to this world after 600 years 
of solitude, is an agent that lives in and sheds light on the front line, where local 
cultural practice is resisting the forces of nation building and globalisation.
Notes
 1 The majority of the field research for this article was carried out with a grant from the 
Japan Society of Scientific Research from 2006–10. I also went to Mewar in 2010 to 
do complementary research granted by the National Institute of Humanities.
 2 The Mewar kingdom was founded in the eighth century by the Rajput. The kingdom 
is famous for its stubborn resistance against the invasions of the Muslim kingdoms, 
but its old capital, Chittorgarh, was captured by the Mogul Empire in the sixteenth 
century. As a result, the new capital, Udaipur, was constructed in the western hill area 
of the Mewar kingdom at the time of Maharana Udai Singh.
 3 The details of the development process of Udaipur are not clear. This information is 
based on an interview with an aged intellectual Brahman who is well- versed in the 
history of Udaipur city.
 4 Even in the case of a north Indian town described by Jeffery et al., the new town area 
consists of ‘colonies’ (Jeffery et al. 2006: 118–119).
 5 These days the Navrattri festival of Mewar has been transformed from one which 
centred on the mother goddesses’s shrines and sacrificial rituals into one which 
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centres on a street dance dedicated to the statue of the mother goddesses erected on 
the street, influenced by the style of Gujarat (Mio 1994, 2007b, 2009). The dance at 
the time of Navrattri is a typical example of the new festivals recently introduced into 
Udaipur. However, possession at the mother goddesses’s shrines and sacrificial rituals 
are still important, especially in rural parts of Mewar.
 6 Rajputs who were killed on the battlefield are believed to dedicate themselves to the 
mother goddess. The sacrifice of oneself is thought to be more valuable than the sacri-
fice of animals as the substitute of oneself. Indeed, it is believed to be the highest 
form of sacrifice. Jhunjarji and sagasji are believed to acquire the status of a deity 
because of the commitment of this highest form of sacrifice (Harlan 2003: 125).
 7 In principle, every male can become the bhopa of a mataji. However, neither a female 
nor a Rajput becomes the bhopa of a mataji. In the case of the bherujis described 
below, it is quite common for male members of certain specific castes (especially the 
Gujars) or tribal groups (especially the Bhils) to be the bhopas of bherujis. In the case 
of bhopas of mataji, we cannot find any such clear tendency of the caste or tribal 
affiliation.
 8 These two occasions fall on both the full- moon day of the Vaishakh and the Kartika 
month of the Hindu solar–lunar calendar of northern India.
 9 One of the only two rooms of their residence has become the shrine. I did participant 
observations of the interviews in this shrine in November 2007, July 2008 and January 
2010.
10 In the next section I will consider further this opposition to making shrines in the 
school.
11 This rock pillar is now ensconced near the old well.
12 Though Tanabe recognises that Lave and Wenger presented for the first time the 
concept of the community of practice where the habitus is produced and succeeded 
through the transactions among participants of this community, he points out that their 
concept overlooked the importance of non- verbal communication in the legitimate 
peripheral communication, the internal power relationship in the community and the 
relationship between the community and the political power from outside, and he 
reformulates the concept of the community of practice.
13 Shrines were located by newspaper articles, interviews with old Udaipur city  dwellers 
and interviews with visitors of these shrines. Out of 21 shrines, 19 are located in the 
old town. One of the other two is on the street just outside of the old town, and the 
final one has been relocated to the new town’s colony from the original one enshrined 
in the old town. Sagasji shrines can be said to be peculiar to the old town.
14 He always invites the descendants of Bhaktawar Singh at the time of the annual festi-
val of this shrine to do the necessary rituals. On one occasion at this annual festival, 
the spirit of Bhaktawar Singh suddenly possessed one of the descendants, and from 
then on, Bhaktawar Singh possessed this Rajput male only at the time of the annual 
festival. The spirit possession of a Rajput is quite extraordinary. A further examina-
tion of the meaning of this case should be carried out.
15 An evil spirit of this kind is known as muth in Mewar.
16 He stood for and was elected as the ward panch from BJP.
17 The reason why the chauki is also held on Tuesdays at this shrine may be related to 
the fact that Tuesday is thought to be a good day for rituals for Hanuman. Hanuman is 
believed to be the god who saves people from troubles and is one of the popular 
deities which possess mediums in Rajasthan (Kakar 1982: 53).
References
Appadurai, A. (1996) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minne-
apolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press.
Community of retrospect  227
Donner, H. and G. De Neve (2006) The Meaning of the Local: Politics of Place in Urban 
India. London and New York: Routledge.
Gold, A.G. (2008) ‘Showing Miracles in Rajasthan: Proof and Grace’, in C.G. Dempsey 
& S.J. Ray (eds), Miracle as Modern Conundrum in South Asian Religious Traditions. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Government of India (2001) Census of India 2001 Cities and Towns, Office of the 
Register General, GOI. www.censusindia.net/results/town.php?stad=A&state5=999 
(accessed 20 July 2010).
Hancock, M.E. (1999) Womanhood in the Making: Domestic Ritual and Public Culture 
in Urban South India. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Harlan, L. (1992) Religion and Rajput Women: The Ethic of Protection in Contemporary 
Narratives. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Harlan, L. (2003) The Goddesses’ Henchmen: Gender in Indian Hero Worship. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Jeffery, R., P. Jeffery, and C. Jeffery (2006) ‘Parhai ka Mahal? An Educational Environ-
ment in Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh’, in H. Donner and G. De Neve (eds), The Meaning of 
the Local: Politics of Place in Urban India. London and New York: Routledge.
Kakar, S. (1982) Shamans, Mystics & Doctors: A Psychological Inquiry into India and its 
Healing Traditions. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Lave, J. and E. Wenger (1991) Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mio, M. (1994) ‘Transformation of the Goddess Ritual: A Case of Mewar of Rajasthan, 
India’. The Journal of the Japanese Society of Ethnology 58 (4): 334–355.
Mio, M. (2005) ‘The Consumers of the Indian Fashion’, in Y. Sugimoto & M. Mio (eds), 
Fashioning India: The World of Indian Saris. Suita: Senri Cultural Foundation.
Mio, M. (2007a) ‘Arrivals of New Shopping Malls to the Suburbs of Indian Cities’. Eth-
nology Quarterly 120 (20).
Mio, M. (2007b) ‘Public Space, Voluntary Associations, and Hindu Nationalism: Chang-
ing Urban Festivals in Udaipur, Rajasthan’, in I. Hiroshi & K. Nawa et al. (eds), Polit-
ical and Social Transformations in North India and Nepal. New Delhi: Manohar.
Mio, M. (2009) ‘Young Men’s Public Activities and Hindu Nationalism: Naviyuvak 
Mandals and the Sangh Parivar in a Western Indian Town’, in D.N. Gellner (ed.), 
Ethnic Activism and Civil Society in South Asia. New Delhi: Sage.
Tanabe, S. (2003) Anthropology of the Way of Life: The Meaning of Practice. Tokyo: 
Kodansha.
Tanabe, S. (2005) ‘Reconsidering Community: From the Viewpoint of Practice and Gov-
ernance’. Annual Report of Social Anthropology 31: 1–29.
14 Solving family problems
The role of religious practices for the 
Indian middle class
Mizuho Matsuo
On a Marathi TV talk show discussing the necessity for the state law to ban 
superstitious practices, a well- known Pune- based anti- superstition activist argued 
that superstitious practices are not undertaken by only uneducated, illiterate 
people, as commonly expected, but also by the well- educated.1 He gave as an 
example Hindu rituals that are aimed at getting rid of misfortunes and erasing 
sins. Another panellist, a Brahmin priest who conducts these rites, opposed him 
on the grounds that is ‘our culture’ and that it is essential for people to have 
faith. Later, when I was with the priest, he told me that despite opposition from 
anti- superstition activists in the media, the number of educated, middle- class 
people who come to him has increased in the last 20 years.
 The debate surrounding whether some Hindu rituals are ‘superstitious’ or 
‘cultural/traditional’ is a further point of interest, but this chapter will limit itself 
to asking why certain religious practices have become so popular among middle-
 class Indians in recent years. It seeks to understand the meanings and roles of 
religious practices for the urban middle class by focusing on one particular ritual, 
called Narayan Nāgbali. This ritual is believed to solve family misfortunes such 
as infertility, the lack of a male child and other domestic conflicts caused by the 
curse of restless ancestors or the sin of killing a cobra (nāg). It begins with an 
astrological diagnosis by a local astrologist (jyōtiṣī), which is followed by three 
days of mourning rituals and various other procedures. The ritual is mainly con-
ducted by certain Brahmin priest groups at Trimbakeshwar, a small pilgrim 
centre in Maharashtra, India. Although owing to time and cost this is not access-
ible to everyone, it has become popular with the middle class. Through a detailed 
analysis of the Narayan Nāgbali and the people gathering there, this chapter 
demonstrates that the growing popularity of these religious practices can be 
understood as a reflection of rapid changes in the lifestyles and values of the 
middle class seen in contemporary Indian society.2
 First, it is necessary to note the categories of the urban middle class in India. 
Discussions of the growing middle class usually assume that it is a group which 
prospered as a result of the economic liberalisation in the 1990s and subsequent 
globalisation. However, it was in fact a ‘new’ middle class that came on the 
scene and benefited most from economic liberalisation and globalisation. 
Members of this class are now ‘the powering of the engine of economic growth, 
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empowered as they have been by economic liberalisation, fanned by MNC oper-
ations, newer job options and an unprecedented boom in the service sector of the 
economy’ (quote from CNN Magazine 2005, Ganguly- Scrase & Scrase 2009: 2). 
Leela Fernandes points to the internal stratification within the ‘Middle Classes’ 
(emphasis by the author) and says the middle class itself is never new in terms of 
its social and economic structure (Fernandes 2006: xi). Rather, its ‘newness’ is 
within a new culture which is characterised by certain tastes, the consumption of 
commodities and an identity constructed through the sharing of certain values 
and habitus.
 The typical image of this new middle class, who represent ‘India shining’,3 
ranges, for example, from the young male college graduate who works in the 
business process outsourcing (BPO) of a US- based multinational insurance cor-
poration to the senior IT engineer who graduated from a top engineering college 
such as IIT (Indian Institute of Technology) and works in Bangalore. It has been 
emphasised that the new middle class, whose members symbolise the globalised 
economy, have different social, as well as cultural, values and habits from their 
parents’ generations, such as drinking alcohol, eating non- vegetarian foods, 
smoking and pre- marital sexual relations; this has been frequently featured in the 
media. If the new middle class is constructed by sharing a certain lifestyle and 
habitus based on the specific value and practice of consumption, there are 
possibilities for the sons of the working class and lower middle class to adopt a 
‘credentialing strategy’ to incorporate themselves into that category (Fernandes 
2006: xi).
 To take one example, Mr Gadgil is a 56-year- old Chitpavan Brahmin who has 
a Master’s in Engineering and has worked at a big automobile manufacturing 
company for the last 30 years. His monthly salary of 20,000 rupees at retirement 
age was the same as the starting salary of his 22-year- old nephew who works in 
the BPO sector in Pune, Maharashtra. A monthly salary of 20,000 rupees is not 
classified as being in the ‘low income’ group in India, but when compared to the 
pay- scale of multinational companies, it seems relatively low to people such as 
Mr Gadgil. Commodities such as cars, luxurious flats and overseas travel are 
beyond his reach. However, his nephew, who appears to be benefiting from glo-
balisation, also feels uncertain about his future career, as it is difficult to make 
out a clear career path in the BPO sector. This uncertainty forces him to carry on 
studying for an MBA for the sake of future career security. Thus, the middle 
class are a broad social group, which includes both old and new categories even 
within the same family. After the economic liberalisation and globalisation, the 
fluctuation in the relative positions within the middle class is striking. That is 
why middle- class parents invest so heavily in their children’s education: they 
expect their children to improve their position within this group.
 While the spotlight is on the new middle class and new consumer cultures, 
the exclusive Hindu nationalism of Hindu nationalist parties such as the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and regionalist parties such as Maharashtra- based 
Shiv Sena, which are strongly supported by the lower- middle and middle- middle 
classes, is also notable. The increasing scarcity of secure jobs and dissatisfaction 
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with modern urban life are key factors in mobilising people in support of these 
movements, which incite violence against minority groups. Previous studies 
have placed significant focus on the religious- political phenomena that aim to 
reconstruct India as a nation consisting solely of ‘Hindus’ and to reaffirm the 
sense of identity among the lower middle class (van deer Veer 1994, Hansen 
1999, Fernandes 2006). However, the reaction of the middle class to modernisa-
tion and globalisation is not limited to violent religious nationalism. Maya 
Warrier discusses the increasing popularity in recent years of gurus and charis-
matic religious teachers among the urban middle class (Warrier 2005). Devotion 
to the spiritual leader enables individuals to harmonise the self with modernity: 
modern guru faith emphasises personal choice and individualisation. Unlike the 
construction of a violent self- identity against a Muslim ‘enemy’ among Hindu 
nationalists, faith in the popular guru creates the identity of a ‘modern Hindu’ 
for the urban middle class in the post- modern world.
 In considering the religious practices of the urban middle class, the Narayan 
Nāgbali rituals discussed in this chapter seem to be rather traditional and 
orthodox Hindu religious practices in comparison with such distinctive phe-
nomena as immersion in Hindu nationalism or self- formation through personal 
devotion to a modern guru. Ancestor worship and funeral rites among families 
have occupied an important place in Hindu religious life since the Vedic era. In 
contrast with previous works on the religious practices of the urban middle class, 
which discuss either collectivisation or personalisation of the self, this chapter 
tries to show a family- oriented lived experience of social transformations for the 
urban middle class in contemporary India.
 First, this chapter will look briefly at Trimbakeshwar and the Narayan Nāgbali 
ritual performed there. Trimbakeshwar is a Hindu holy site located around 30 km 
away from Nashik (see Figure 14.1). Nashik has become a commercial city and 
its outskirts have expanded in recent years, as it can be reached from India’s 
biggest industrial city, Mumbai, within 3–4 hours. It was, however, originally 
famous as a religious centre that was home to a Ramkund, a holy bathing tank, in 
which, according to the ancient Hindu mythology of the Ramayana, it was 
believed Rama had bathed. The Ramkund has been known since medieval times 
as a high- rank place for performing ablutions to purify the sins of contact or 
sharing foods with lower castes (Kotani 2008). Nashik and Trimbakeshwar also 
constitute one of the sites for the Kumbhamēḷā festival – others include Hardwar 
and Allahabad – and once every 12 years, millions of devotees visit there.
 Trimbakeshwar, despite being a small town with fewer than 10,000 inhabit-
ants, has various features that mark it as a sacred place. According to Hindu cos-
mology, the place where two rivers cross, called a saṅgama, is holy; there is a 
saṅgama of the sacred Godavari River, the so- called ‘Ganga of the West’, and 
the Mahilya River in Trimbakeshwar. Kuśvarta-Tīrtha,4 a bathing tank in the 
centre of the town, is believed to be the source of the Godavari River. In addition 
to bathing at Kuśvarta-Tīrtha, pilgrims visit in order to go to one of the 12 jyotir-
linga, Trimbak Temple. The deity of the temple is rare as it has the three faces of 
Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva. There are also many institutions (gurukulu) where 
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sons of Brahmin families from all over the Maharashtra come to stay for several 
years from childhood in order to learn Vedic rituals and prayers. As such, 
socially as well as economically, Trimbakeshwar largely depends on the ‘reli-
gious industry’, consisting of 300 Brahmin families and many other groups 
related to the performance of the rituals. Trimbakeshwar has gained particular 
importance in relation to the Narayan Nāgbali as it is thought that performing it 
here renders it more authentic and effective in comparison with other areas. 
Thus, aside from occasions when pilgrims visit for an important event such as 
Kumbhamēḷā, Trimbakeshwar has recently become widely recognised as the 
principal place for performing Narayan Nāgbali and related ancestral rites.
Narayan Nāgbali and priest groups
In this section a brief explanation of the procedure of Narayan Nāgbali will be 
given. This ritual originated in Vedic times, and two different rituals (Narayan-
bali and Nāgbali) became one, known as Narayan Nāgbali. In summary, Naray-
anbali is a short version of the funeral rite, in which the usual 13-day funeral is 
held over three days for the ancestors, and the Nāgbali is performed as an expia-
tory rite for cobras.5 Five rituals (viddhi) are offered to Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva, 
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Yama and Preta during the three days. But the ritual for Brahma is now hardly 
seen outside of Trimbakeshwar, and few priests know about it. Therefore, people 
think it is most authentic and desirable to perform this ritual in Trimbakeshwar.
 People who perform the ritual are known as yajamāna (a patron) or bhakta (a 
devotee), and they visit Trimbakeshwar as a couple or as a family and stay at the 
priest’s house for three or four days. In light of this it is becoming common now-
adays for priests to renovate their houses in order to have independent rooms 
and modern bath facilities to meet the needs of their visitors. The basic cost of 
Narayan Nāgbali ranges from 4,000 to 5,000 rupees, but the total cost would be 
more than 10,000 rupees, as new cloths, a small golden idol of a snake, and per-
sonal gifts (dān) for the priests are also required.
 About 300 Brahmin families engage in this ritual in Trimbakeshwar, and they 
constitute highly exclusive professional groups.6 In Hindu society, priests who 
engage in funeral rites are called mahābrahmin and are generally seen as much 
lower and more inauspicious than priests (purōhita) who are only involved in 
auspicious events (Fuller 2002). In fact, one village purōhita during my field 
research in Maharashtra told me that he cannot perform Narayan Nāgbali as it is 
associated with the inauspicious. According to him, the relation of a purōhita to 
a mahābrahmin (funeral priest) is equivalent to ‘a family doctor and a specialist’. 
The family doctor gives a diagnosis, writes a medical certificate and sends 
patients to a specialist if necessary. An apparent difference here is that the hier-
archical relations between a family doctor and a specialist are contradictive in 
the case of a purōhita and a funeral priest. Marriage between them is strongly 
prohibited. However, the situation is quite different in Trimbakeshwar. The 
exclusive, highly professionalised Brahmin priest community forms almost 30 
per cent of the population of Trimbakeshwar and is economically as well as 
politically quite dominant. They do not conduct actual funeral rites and mostly 
concentrate on performing Narayan Nāgbali and other rites such as Kālsarpa. 
After all, in such a unique place, where there are 300 priest families and most of 
the inhabitants other than Brahmin are also involved in the ‘religious industry’, 
to be a priest conducting ancestral funeral rites and removing sins from people 
does not have negative connotations and is not considered inauspicious at all by 
other social groups.
Characteristic features of devotees
This section briefly describes the characteristics of the devotees using the case 
study of the A priest family, more than nine generations of whom have worked 
in this profession. The current A family consists of nine members, including the 
father and his three sons, aged 35–45, and their wives and children. The father 
and his sons work as priests, and the elder son has a reputation in the community 
for being a knowledgeable and innovative priest. According to the records of the 
A family, 110 families asked them to perform the Narayan Nāgbali ritual in 
the 33 days from 20 June to 22 July 2009 – an average of 3–4 families per day. 
The family charges around 4,000 rupees for performing the ritual, and in addition 
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to this they also receive donations (dān), so during the peak season they earn 
approximately 400,000 rupees per month.
 From this it becomes clear that the priesthood in the ‘religious industry’ in Trim-
bakeshwar is very lucrative now. However, this happened only after the 1990s. 
People recall that there were at most 1–2 Narayan Nāgbali rituals in a month before 
that and it was very hard to continue the priesthood for many families. Most of the 
families used to keep only one son to succeed in the priesthood in Trimbakeshwar, 
and let other sons work outside the town for their livelihood. But now, all sons tend 
to remain and work as priests as it has become a good business.
 Let us now try to understand who the devotees are. Through a brief look at 
where the devotees come from, the geographical spread of the people gathering 
at Trimbakeshwar becomes clear. Table 14.1 shows their residential area by state 
and country.
 The table shows that almost half of the families are from Maharashtra. After 
Maharashtra comes Chhattisgarh, a newly formed state created from Madhya 
Pradesh in 2000 and which thus shares a lot of similarities with Maharashtra. 
Also, because Trimbakeshwar is located on the north- west side of Maharashtra, 
which is near to Gujarat, there are many devotees from Gujarat. Therefore Trim-
bakeshwar attracts devotees not only from Maharashtra, but also from North and 
Central India. This is reinforced by the fact that, excluding Andhra Pradesh, 
there are no devotees from southern states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Among 
the devotee families, there are two NRI (non- residential Indian) families who 
live in Dubai and the United States, but both belong to the Vaisha (trading or 
merchant caste) and are originally from Gujarat. Therefore the geographic reach 
of the sacred place, Trimbakeshwar, extends from Maharashtra to North Central 
India, and to overseas Indians who originate from these areas.
Table 14.1  Residential state of devotees
















Source: data collected by author.
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 Figure 14.2 shows the population size of the cities where the 108 families 
reside, excluding those from the United States and Dubai.
 What is most striking here is that many families – 48 in total – reside in big 
cities with populations of more than one million. The megacity of Mumbai, with 
a population of 14 million, is at the top of the list, which also includes such 
capital cities as Delhi, Kolkata, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad and other metropolitan 
cities like Pune, Nagpur, Indor, Bhopal and Jaipur. Thirty- three families came 
from cities with relatively small populations, ranging from 110,000 to 500,000. 
This is because multiple families came from the same city; for example, 13 fam-
ilies came from Gondiya (Maharashtra, population of 120,000) and five families 
from Anand (Gujarat, population of 130,000) in those particular two months.
 As for the caste composition of the devotees, during my fieldwork at Trim-
bakeshwar there was a majority of Brahmin families, but families of the Vaisha 
caste were also prominent in the data collected by the A family. Although the 
caste identification shown in Table 14.2 is vague and remains inadequate, it 
gives a rough idea of the nature of the caste groupings of the devotees.
 The families included in the Vaisha category, such as Agarwar, Thakkar and 
Gandhi, are traditionally associated with business and trading. The Irani7 and 
Jewish8 families are identified according to their origin for the sake of conven-
ience in Table 14.2, but as their communities are usually involved in business, it 
can be said that they also belong to a business community, similar to the Vaisha 
and Jain. In terms of their social character, families from the business com-
munity formed almost half of the devotees of the A family during the research 
period. Brahmin families are also dominant, and it is reasonable to suppose that 



















































Figure 14.2  Population size of cities where devotees reside (source: GOI 2001).
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Brahmin priests. Therefore they are more likely to visit Trimbakeshwar for 
Narayana Nāgbali, which is deeply rooted in Sanskrit culture. The relatively 
high percentage from the business community can be said to be unique to the A 
family, compared with other priestly families. As mentioned before, the eldest 
son is known as an innovative priest, and he works on ‘business strategies’ with 
a view to expanding his ‘market’ to non- Marathi people. Thus, compared with 
other priests, he attracts more devotees from Hindi- and Gujarati- speaking busi-
ness communities.
 Although to an extent the appeal to business communities is particular to the 
A priestly family, there is a significant point of similarity between the Brahmin 
and business communities: ‘urban- ness’. They are groups engaged in ‘urban’ 
professions which are not directly connected with agriculture, such as trading, 
merchandise, finance and white- collar jobs, particularly since the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. The majority of devotees coming for Narayan Nāgbali 
are Brahmin, Vaisha or from other business communities, including the 
Kshatriya (Maratha Deshmukh and Rajput). This shows that it is only people 
from upper to higher- middle castes who become devotees. According to priests, 
all types of people from all over India come to Trimbakeshwar, but in fact, the 
data collected reveal that villagers and low- caste people hardly ever participate 
in this ritual. It is illuminating that the Kunabi, who are the dominant agricultural 
jāti in Maharashtra, rarely feature in the data. Thus two important characteristics 
of the devotees are established: first, that they come mainly from Maharashtra 
and north central India; and second, that they are characterised socially as urban- 
based high castes. The next question, then, is what motivates these devotees to 
practise Narayan Nāgbali.
Table 14.2  Caste identity of devotees













Source: data collected by the author.
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The motives of the devotees and new developments in the 
ritual
The lack of a male child
As the booklet sold in Trimbakeshwar clearly states, Narayan Nāgbali is ‘the 
ritual for ancestors’ souls’ satisfaction and prosperity of the family’, so the prac-
tice is very much tied to the notion of the family and family issues. The most 
important issue regarding the prosperity of the family in India is often the dis-
continuity of the family line; that is to say the failure to produce children, espe-
cially a son. The Narayan Nāgbali is therefore mostly associated with the birth 
of a child, and priests from Trimbakeshwar have stated that two- thirds of the 
devotees who practise this ritual do so to cure infertility. Those who have had 
their wish fulfilled are expected to revisit Trimbakeshwar to perform the ancestor 
rites again. Thus priests believe that the number of repeat visitors indicates the 
effectiveness of the Narayan Nāgbali ritual.
 Letters from devotees to the A family also show the news of the birth of a son 
in the family and gratitude towards the priests and the ritual itself. For instance, 
one letter from a Brahmin of Uttar Pradesh, dated 14 March 2006, says that he is 
very happy to revisit Trimbakeshwar with his newborn son, expressing his grati-
tude towards Narayan Nāgbali and thanking the priest for performing the rituals 
with sincerity. The next letter, written by a Maratha Deshmukh of Pune, says 
that he is writing this letter 15 days after the birth of the child for whom he had 
been waiting for the last seven years since performing Narayan Nāgbali. He 
writes ‘he is the prasād 9 of God Shiva (shri shiva śhakti chā prasād). As guruji 
told, I wish to visit Trimbakeshwar again with my son.’ Furthermore, a Deshasta 
Brahmin of Maharashtra wrote a letter to the priest the very day after the birth of 
his first son, on 24 August 2000.
 Two brothers from the Maratha Deshmukh family, who live in a traditional, 
affluent neighbourhood in Pune, have failed to produce sons. The 38-year- old 
elder brother lost his first wife in childbirth and has a two- year-old daughter with 
his second wife. The 37-year- old younger brother has two daughters, three and 
seven years old. The elder brother of the family was pressured to have a son as 
his younger brother and his wife were reluctant to have another child. Then the 
family performed Narayan Nāgbali with their 67-year- old father as the chief 
mourner, in line with advice given by the family astrologist. The Chitpavan 
Brahmin family from Nashik also consists of parents in their seventies and two 
brothers in their thirties and forties. The elder brother and his family live in Kar-
nataka, from where their family originates, and the parents live with their 
younger son and his family. The younger son works at the local bank in Nashik, 
and his wife works at the post office; they have two daughters. The elder son and 
his wife lost their son to cancer at the age of three and have a 17-year- old daugh-
ter. The younger couple are reluctant to have more children as they already have 
two daughters, but they were requested to visit Trimbakeshwar by their parents 
who strongly wish to have a male descendant.
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 It is interesting to note that if neither of the brothers have male children, pres-
sure is put on the couple with the youngest wife to try to have a male child, 
regardless of whether her husband is the elder or younger brother. Furthermore, 
in addition to not having any male children, both the Maratha Deshmukh and 
Chitpavan Brahmin families also share the experience of losing a family 
member. Experiencing such a family tragedy probably provides the families with 
a particularly strong motive to perform Narayan Nāgbali and to reject the idea 
that childlessness is simply a medical predicament to be treated in a hospital.
Conflicts and problems in the family
Although Narayan Nāgbali is well known for curing the lack of a male child, 
devotees also visit Trimbakeshwar for a variety of other reasons, most notably 
wider family issues such as conflicts and friction among family members, and 
difficulties in the marriage or employment of children.
 A family from Kolhapur, Maharashtra, who run a jewellery shop, were 
worried for several years about the unsuccessful marriage of their college- 
educated daughter. They performed Narayan Nāgbali upon the advice of their 
local priest and immediately got a ‘good result’. Not only that, but they received 
unexpected benefits such as improvement in their business, and they also 
observed that the head of the family, who had previously had a bad temper, 
became quieter and calmer. After five years they revisited the priest to perform 
the ancestral rituals.
 In the case of the Maratha Deshmukh family, the husband worked in the state 
government office and had experienced difficulties at work for more than ten 
years. He worked in Aurangabad, but his wife and daughter lived in Pune for the 
sake of his daughter’s education. The wife explained that the reason for perform-
ing Narayan Nāgbali was to alleviate their anxieties regarding the husband’s 
work difficulties and their daughter’s education.
 It is evident from these examples that issues ranging from a daughter’s mar-
riage, which is traditionally of the utmost importance for Indian parents, to more 
contemporary issues such as education and employment, place a great deal of 
pressure on the parents of today. It is these practical problems which have come 
to be the objects of Narayan Nāgbali in the present day.
Other reasons
As well as practical issues, there are people who visit Trimbakeshwar in order to 
try to solve superstitious issues, such as possession by spirits and poltergeists. 
For instance, a family from Mumbai came to Trimbakeshwar to consult with the 
priest about their ten- year-old daughter’s ‘disordered behaviour’; they described 
how she would shake her body suddenly and give out a strange sound. The 
mother’s sister, an ardent devotee of the God Shiva, who went on pilgrimage to 
Trimbakeshwar every year, introduced the priest to the parents. Then the family, 
including the grandfather of the girl – the head of the family – performed 
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Narayan Nāgbali. The grandfather, describing the first day of rituals that 
evening, said, ‘I was filled with purified feelings during performing the ritual 
today. The confidence grew in my mind that the situation of the family will 
surely change for the better soon and something good will happen to us.’
 As shown above, people gather in Trimbakeshwar to conduct Narayan 
Nāgbali to resolve various anxieties and uncertainties concerning issues such as 
childlessness, marriage, employment and so on. Such anxieties, however, do not 
extend across the wider social realm of caste, community and kinship group. 
They are rather seen as much more personal issues. They are limited and 
expected to be solved within the ‘family’, which here usually indicates the 
household. It can also be said that the anxieties and problems behind the motiva-
tion for performing Narayan Nāgbali reflect the lifestyle and priorities of the 
urban middle class in contemporary India.
The new role of priests
It is the Brahmin priests in Trimbakeshwar who, as specialists, help to remove 
the misfortunes and sins of devotees. Most of them learned prayers and rituals 
from childhood and succeeded their fathers in the family business. As mentioned 
before, this ‘religious industry’ in Trimbakeshwar creates a monopolistic busi-
ness market and brings a relatively high income and status for these priests. This 
popularity is also one of the outcomes of patient efforts undertaken by priests to 
expand their business. It is common practice for them to prepare their own busi-
ness cards and distribute them to everyone who visits. I have several business 
cards that were given to me by village priests with whom I worked at my 
research site before going to Trimbakeshwar. Many of the devotees who come to 
Trimbakeshwar have also received such business cards from their family priests 
or astrologists in their home towns. There are wide networks of local astrologists 
and priests from all over the various regions, connecting them to the priests in 
Trimbakeshwar and consequently making it possible for the people of these 
regions to contact the recommended priests with ease. Furthermore, some priests 
have even set up their own websites and started online booking systems for 
Narayan Nāgbali. These ‘management efforts’ are certainly designed to target 
the main customer of this ritual – that is, the urban middle class.
 Some of the priests have expanded their ‘business market’ beyond Maharash-
tra by taking note of regional variations, as the auspicious timing for ancestral 
rites differs according to different regions and communities. They sometimes 
also provide the service of conducting the rituals in Hindi. Therefore during 
seasons when there is a lull in custom from the Marathi people, priests can fill 
the gap by performing rituals for other communities. By appealing to devotees 
from different regions, priests try to secure a stable number of visitors through-
out the year.
 Recently there has been a further attempt by the young generation of priests, 
aged in their thirties and forties, to modernise their role by becoming counsellors 
of a sort to the devotees. Mr Dixit, for example, is a learned astrologist as well 
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as a priest, but his role is not limited to consulting the constellations (patrika) of 
the devotees; he himself studies infertility and reproductive disorders, checks the 
medical reports of the devotees, gives advice on medical treatments rather than 
rituals, and even arranges for a doctor to give their diagnosis if it seems neces-
sary. In terms of devotees seeking to practice Narayan Nāgbali because of their 
childlessness, Mr Dixit believes that both medicine and astrology are ‘sciences’ 
that work in different fields and that it is important to use both complementarily 
to solve infertility. If there are any special medical disorders, Mr Dixit thinks 
that it is important to listen to people’s anxieties and suffering with care and give 
guiding principles to them using the science of astrology. He says:
the role of astrologists and religious specialists should be modified accord-
ing to the times. People especially need good astrologists in these times. To 
have a good astrologist for them is to get a good friend who gives you 
advice and to get a family doctor and family counsellor who gives you 
guidelines. And astrologists can become counsellors to show the appropriate 
way forward in such uncertain times. So now it is very crucial to have a 
good astrologist in one’s life.
 He studies the results achieved through medicine and psychology and, as a 
local specialist, is interested in the relation between infertility and astrology. 
Such innovative priests are not yet common, but his practices have enabled him 
to expand his business. There is the possibility that devotees from the urban 
middle class are more likely to accept his modern understanding of religion and 
science. The practices of Mr. Dixit described here are quite indicative of the 
modern role of local religious specialists in contemporary India, which goes 
beyond that of charismatic religious teachers such as gurus.
Conclusion
This chapter examines the people who gather for Narayan Nāgbali in Trimbake-
shwar and shows that they are mostly from the urban- based, high- caste middle 
class. It also reports that, although this ritual originates from Vedic times, the 
role of the priests varies according to the transformation of society and the times.
 Three concluding observations are significant. First, the hierarchy and stratifi-
cation within the middle- class category, as described in the introduction, is also 
recognised among devotees in this study. People gathering for Narayan Nāgbali 
certainly belong to the urban middle class, but most of them are from the so- 
called ‘traditional’ middle class. Many are engaged in small- scale business or 
have relatively conservative professions such as school teachers, bank employees 
and government officers. It can be said that they belong to the groups that have 
experienced a decline rather than an improvement in their economic position as 
a result of the rapid economic growth after economic liberalisation.
 The most frequently heard motivation behind performing Narayan Nāgbali is 
to have a male child, and this seems natural as this ritual is well- known for 
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solving male childlessness. Regardless of caste, class, religion and locality, for 
most Indian people it is hard to imagine spending married life without having 
any children. However, the meaning of having a child has changed for the 
middle class. The relatively new expectations surrounding children’s education 
increases the financial burden for middle- class parents but, on the other hand, 
children are expected to use this investment in their education to improve the 
social situation of the family. The fact that many devotees in Trimbakeshwar 
were worried about their children’s marriages, education or job opportunities 
may reflect the uncertain social situation surrounding the urban middle class who 
are anxious about maintaining their former status.
 Second, in understanding the desires and aims of middle- class devotees and 
their motivations for achieving these through religious practice, it is important 
not to underestimate the significance of the family. As already mentioned, 
previous studies of the religious practices of the contemporary urban middle 
class have focused, on the one hand, on self- identification, with the collective 
and the fictional category appearing in Hindu nationalism movements, and, on 
the other, on self- formation as a modern Hindu through devoting themselves to a 
certain guru. In this chapter, however, Narayan Nāgbali puts the family at the 
forefront, the smallest social group, which connects the self and society. Many 
devotees live in extended family units, and it is the head of the patrilineal family 
who is expected to perform the rituals as the chief mourner, even if his sons are 
middle- aged. Thus, through participating in this ritual, people reconfirm their 
family ancestors and definitise the boundary of the ‘family’ to include them. 
This reinforcement of such family ties through ancestral rites, based on the patri-
lineal family, indicates that there is a social tendency to consider religious prac-
tices in terms of the common man, and not in terms of the collectivisation of the 
self into larger categories such as ‘Indian’ and ‘Hindu’ or individualisation, 
which have been examined in previous studies. However, at the same time this 
also suggests that the issues of childlessness and spirit possession are perceived 
as being limited to the category of ‘family’ matters and thus as not having any 
connection with wider social relations any more. People are expected to solve 
such problems within the ‘family’, especially when this means only the limited 
household. Even among brothers, if they are not sharing a residence together, 
they are usually not deeply involved in such personal issues. On the contrary, in 
the village where I work in Maharashtra, for example, childlessness is never seen 
as merely a ‘family’ problem; rather, it is feared as the curse of an angry goddess 
upon women or the black magic of kinship members. So such misfortune 
involves various actors and social groups, and creates several patterns of stories 
in the community (Matsuo 2010). This wider circle of involvement is not seen in 
the practices of urban middle- class devotees, as described in this chapter. This 
reflects the mixed situation of modern and traditional social relations in which 
the urban middle class now live.
 Lastly, traditional religious specialists, such as priests in a small pilgrim town, 
have also changed their practices according to the needs and social aspects of 
their ‘customers’. The transformations of religious practices are not only caused 
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by the urban middle class. From environmental improvements such as distrib-
uting the business cards of priests, renovating accommodation facilities and 
advertising through the internet, to content enrichment such as marketing strat-
egies to attract new devotees and additional services for consultation using the 
knowledge of astrology and medicine, the efforts of priests also work towards 
adjusting the Narayan Nāgbali ritual to fit in with contemporary Indian society. 
As seen from the case of Mr Dixit, the new role of a modern counsellor who 
gives advice to people can be well accepted by the urban middle class in such a 
period of instability.
 As discussed in this chapter, Narayan Nāgbali, ancestral and funeral rites, 
which are believed to solve family problems, and their transformation to fit the 
modern world, can be understood as one response to the dilemmas, struggles and 
anxieties faced by the urban middle class in their day- to-day lives.
Notes
1 The law was finally promulgated as the Maharashtra Prevention and Eradication of 
Human Sacrifice and Other Inhuman, Evil and Aghori Practices and Black Magic Bill 
on 24 August 2013, after the anti- superstition activist Narendra Dabholkar was assas-
sinated in Pune.
2 This chapter is based on my periodic fieldwork in Trimbakeshwar from 2005.
3 This was the campaign slogan of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the general elec-
tion of 2004.
4 Tirtha literally means ‘ford’ and ‘crossing place’. It refers to riversides and crossing 
rivers where not only Trimbakeshwar, but also Varanasi and many pilgrimage sites are 
located. In addition to that, this word implies the halfway point between this world and 
a different world (Fuller 2002: 207).
5 Regarding Hindu funeral rites, see Parry (1982), Gold (1988), Fillippi (2005). Gold’s 
ethnography Fruitful Journey is especially insightful on the practices and experiences 
of pilgrims.
6 Only families that inherit and possess records of the details of all past devotees, called 
namavali, from previous generations are permitted to perform Narayan Nāgbali and be 
recognised as members of the priest association (tīrtha purōhita sangha) in Trimbake-
shwar. There are 42 clans in the 300 families, known as Godavari’s original priest 
(Godavariche muḷ upādhyāya), which consist of Yajurvedi and Rigvedi.
7 The Irani group migrated to Peshawar from Iran (Persia) about 500 years ago and 
spread into western India, especially western Maharashtra (Singh 2004: 821).
8 Jews here refers to Bene Israel, who migrated from Persia to Konkan region, western 
Maharashtra. They are culturally familiar with Maratha and speak Marathi as their 
mother tongue (Singh 2004: 840).
9 Prasād is ‘food returned by a deity to his or her worshippers’ (Feldhaus 1995: 86).
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Part V
Subaltern practices and 
discourses in urban 
situations

15 News, gossip and humour
Street perspectives from colonial 
Calcutta
Anindita Ghosh
The history of nineteenth- century Calcutta is usually identified with a concurrent 
history of the bhadralok. And yet it was peopled by a whole host of other 
groups: migrant workers, shopkeepers, labourers and an army of clerks. What 
were their experiences? As a huge low- to-middling workforce arrived in the city, 
they constituted a significant layer in the urban experience, even self- consciously 
acknowledging the tremendous role that the city played in their everyday lives. 
Contemporary street songs on Calcutta, which this chapter studies, provide 
important entry- points into this mental world of the city’s lower social orders. 
Popular street and print culture, particularly songs, consistently foreground the 
city as a site for discussions on social and topical themes. While offering quoti-
dian images of city life, they also constituted vital social commentaries on mod-
ernity, colonialism and urbanism. In addition, they acted as crucial circuits of 
information and gossip, news and rumour that constantly shaped and reassured 
their moral and mental worlds.
 Calcutta’s prominence as a colonial metropolis for British India in the nine-
teenth century cannot be overstated. Originally starting out as a small trading 
outpost in the late seventeenth century, Calcutta grew in size and impact after 
the East India Company captured power in the region. With its spacious Euro-
pean classical- style villas lining the eastern and southern reaches, and official 
buildings along the Esplanade marking the nerve- centre of British trade and 
administration, it was a place that evoked a sense of grandeur and elegance, 
giving rise to the expression ‘City of Palaces’ in the eighteenth century. The 
rapid growth of Calcutta that followed, stretching longitudinally along the banks 
of the Hooghly, also saw segregation in the residential settlement pattern – with 
a White Town with largely European inhabitants populating the area surround-
ing the fort, and a teeming Black Town peopled by Indians squeezed into the 
northern part of the city.1
 Visual and textual representations of the city produced by Europeans in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are remarkable in how they completely shut 
out the presence of the indigenous populations except by way of foil for 
the White Town. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the figure of the 
lone Indian servant hovering over the British master had come to be replaced 
by the images of the brash irreverence of the jubilant crowds attending the 
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hook- swinging festival, or filthy and chaotic masses in bazaars and streets. The 
Black Town in such narratives was ‘a sprawling appendage that only survived 
because of the white town and remained the great defect in this capital of 
empire’ (Chattopadhyay 2005: 29).
 From the nineteenth century onwards we have educated Indians offering their 
own perspectives on the urban experience that was Calcutta, but even these 
remained largely negative. The bhadralok, we know, were never at home in the 
city. The city was not worth habitation because of the pollution, dirt and disease 
that was rampant within its limits. Despite the novelty of the metropolitan 
experience, the city was looked upon as a place of ruin and corruption, decay 
and deprivation. The countryside was fresher, purer and idyllic in contrast 
(Sarkar 1999: 176–177, Chattopadhyay 2005: 32). Not surprisingly, one would 
think, given that the metropolis symbolised, among other things, the material 
and political triumph of the Raj and the concurrent enslavement of the educated 
Bengali, whose sole reason of existence in the city, ironically, was service to the 
colonial state. What is missing from this spectrum of representations, however, 
is the experience of the lower social tiers. While undoubtedly some views were 
shared vertically across the layers – such as those on women, migrants etc. – 
other, more specifically socially ordered perspectives, were an inherent part of 
the city’s long- standing traditions of popular street cultures.
 Traditional musical performances, entertainment in the form of jhumurs and 
khemtas (rhythmic sensual dances) and panchalis (couplets based on mythologi-
cal themes), had been around for a while, but there emerged new urban variants 
in Calcutta at this time in the form of kobi- songs, with their strong abusive ele-
ments in the form of kheud. While often simply sharply observant and amusing 
accounts of city life, the songs could turn loudly and unambiguously critical, 
packed with pungent hatred of the wealthier residents, and not surprisingly, 
erring women. A strong culture of humour overlapped with these performative 
cultures which allowed the airing of critical opinions on the city and found 
effective expression in irreverent couplets and verses circulating in the streets.
 There was yet another category of songs on the city that developed independ-
ently of this performative tradition from the late nineteenth century onwards and 
was shared by reading/singing and listening groups. Printed as short pamphlets 
and composed in sometimes stylised and sometimes rudimentary, colloquial 
Bengali, such songs offered perspectives and comments on dramatic happenings 
or major developments that presumably affected all city dwellers. Despite anxi-
eties about surviving in a harsh environment, Calcutta’s material munificence 
and technological marvels provoked awe and admiration. As bridges spanned 
mighty rivers, and electricity dispelled evening darkness, people were awestruck 
by these events and wrote prolifically about them. Unlike the educated middle 
classes lamenting the passing of old days,2 there was a joyous celebration of city 
life. Poems and songs composed in the traditional style of rhymed couplets 
marked the construction of the Pontoon bridge over the Ganges in 1874,3 the 
illumination of the same bridge in 1879, the laying of the tramway in the city in 
1880, and even the municipal drains in Calcutta (Drener Panchali) in 1874. But 
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frailty in the face of natural disasters, disease and death also drove home the 
ephemeral nature of modern civilisation. The cyclones of 1867 and 1877, the 
scare of worms in edible fish in 1875 and the spread of dengue fever in 1872/74 
fanned fears of an impending apocalyptic doom in which the city’s residents 
would have to pay for their sins. There was also the sharing of everyday news – 
often sensational – like the explosion at the Colvin Ghat in 1876 and the Sona-
gatchi murder in 1875.
 This chapter studies such songs from this period, exploring the interstices 
between a largely pre- modern, pastoral and deeply indigenous sensibility and the 
onset of a rushed modernity and urbanity in nineteenth- century Calcutta, the 
consequences of living and working in a harsh colonial environment, and their 
wider significance for the newly emergent public sphere in the city. There are 
two characteristics of the songs that I wish to emphasise here: one, that the songs 
were vital bearers of ‘news’ and gossip, and acted as circulating newspapers for 
a population living outside or marginally within the limits of literacy; and two, 
how these were interwoven with discursive layers on social themes and debates 
relating to urban life.
 A broader meta- language underlying the songs, I would like to argue, is that of 
‘knowingness’, as Peter Bailey suggests in the context of the nineteenth- century 
music hall songs of the working classes in England. In Bailey’s study, ‘knowing-
ness’ represented a new alertness that was part of the cosmopolitan urban sensibil-
ity, which had to ‘know’ its world in order to survive. The ‘knowing intimacy’ 
displayed in popular song motifs and tropes with urban themes thus enabled size-
able constituencies to collectively identify with the songsters and song writers. In 
nineteenth- century Calcutta, as I show, the knowingness did not just translate into 
being canny in a new urban environment, it also invited thought and reflection on 
that experience – prodding at the boundaries of urban social hierarchies, airing the 
debate between the right to sexual freedom and conjugal obligations, and question-
ing the legitimacy of municipal and taxation regimes.
 The educated Bengali, too, wrote about Calcutta, but their concerns were very 
dissimilar. Their acknowledgement of the technological marvels of the British 
empire was indifferent, at best tardy. When they did speak about these it was to 
complain about the inconvenience caused by the city being dug up all over or the 
lack of clean water supply (Tagore 1930: 81–82). Registering mixed feelings 
about Calcutta, with its abundant wealth and opportunity, and an alien lifestyle 
rivalling one that was habitual and sanctified by custom, bhadralok writings 
closely interrogated their own social and cultural investment in the city. One 
such literary response, the Kalikata Kamalalaya, recorded the changing times as 
indexed in contemporary popular perception.4 Set up as a dialogue between a 
city dweller and a villager, with the latter confronting the former as his alter- ego, 
the work posed the author’s own self- doubts to a wider readership. Under the 
onslaught of the countryman’s impeccable reasoning, the city man puts up a 
tough but spirited defence of his city, but the response is riddled with ambiguity.
 Such divided selves were to form an endemic feature of educated writings in 
the times to come.5 There is a constant dialectic of identity and alienation for the 
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bhadralok within the colonial urban space. Anxiety persisted particularly on the 
upsetting of Hindu ways of life and codes (Dutta 1981: 127–153). In Kantalaler 
Kolikata Darshan (Kantalal Vists Calcutta) the author, an academic and 
novelist, presents mixed messages. When Kantalal, a young man, visits Calcutta 
from a neighbouring village, he is swept inadvertently into a circle of intrigue 
and crime (Chaudhuri n.d.). Even as he manages to escape, slowly adapting and 
learning to survive under harsh conditions, Kantalal’s seeming inexperience is 
replaced by canny urban sense. As a friend remarks on meeting Kanta sometime 
later, ‘the Calcutta wind has got you’, the metaphor summing up pithily all that 
the city was capable of inflicting on the outsider – corruption of the moral fibre, 
stripping of innocence and a hardening of the soul (Chaudhuri n.d.: vol. 1, 91).
 Kantalal in his pristine days is the epitome of Arcadian virtues. On his arrival 
he is shocked to find the city abounding in cheats and swindlers – from the fake 
blind and lame beggars to embracing strangers who steal all his worldly posses-
sions. He witnesses the avarice of lawyers and the illicit trade in girls (Chaudhuri 
n.d.: 11–12, 20–21, 41–42). But in the end, he emerges unscathed, albeit wiser.
 Despite his eventual adaptation to city life, Kantalal is amazed by what he 
sees in Calcutta, his heightened appreciation of the view from the top of the 
Ochterlony Monument being aestheticised by the author thus:
What he saw transformed him into a state of stupor. The golden rays of the 
sun setting over the Ganges in the west had lit up the distant red clouds in 
the horizon filling it up with an enchanting glow. There were hundreds of 
ships visible on the river, while the countryboats with their white sails dis-
appeared slowly and gracefully like white birds into the tree line. Millions 
of buildings all around him stood tall and proud testimony to centuries of 
industrial success. . . . Down below one could see numerous small hackney- 
carriages and electric vehicles, and thousands of people on the move resem-
bling armies of ants. A grand, dazzling scene! Kantalal remembered the 
proverb that did its rounds in the mofussil, and marvelled at its aptness: ‘if 
one has not seen Calcutta, one literally remains unborn’.
(Chaudhuri n.d.: vol. 1, 22)
 The sight of technological wonders like trams and aeroplanes fill Kantalal with 
fear and amazement. But modernity is crippling, encourages laziness and drains 
one of vital energies. Kantalal witnesses the sad plight of worried clerks trudging 
to work during a tram strike, anxious to make it to the office on time, and yet 
without either the vitality to undertake the short journey at a brisk pace or the 
means to hire a cab. As a posed critique of a Marwari businessman points out, ease 
of living had made the Bengalis lazy, and unfit for the delivery of self- rule prom-
ised every day in their fiery public speeches (Chaudhuri n.d.: vol. 1, 36).
 Not just the physical and material, but the social and cultural topography of 
the city was also fast altering. The increasingly visible and disturbing presence 
of women in public spaces triggered images of a world turned upside down in 
contemporary popular art and literature. It seemed indicative of the moral decay 
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of the new urban world. Migrants, in the shape of up- country labour and numer-
ous menial servicemen and women in the city, constituted another source of 
anxiety. Most importantly, the opening up of urban space as a sphere of arguably 
freer circulation and exchange, not bound by caste and ritual restrictions, and 
subject to the same municipal regime, inserted new aspirants into the scene who 
challenged the comfortable boundaries of the educated and propertied classes.
Street performances as social critique: humour and the city
Sumanta Banerjee’s seminal work has highlighted a world of pungent lower- 
order hatred of the urban successful in the street cultures of Calcutta (Banerjee 
1989). The target of attack was the perceived lifestyle of luxury and hypocrisy of 
the nouveau riche fops and dandies of the city, who came to be described as 
babus. The constant ribald and derisive references to the human body expressed 
irreverence towards the refined and successful urban world. The patrons of such 
street cultures were the first generation of the rich in Calcutta – old landed aristo-
cracy, East India Company compradors and commercial barons of the city, who 
still strongly identified themselves with country life.6 They were also a means of 
consolidating social networks and patronage, as we shall see.
 Doggerels and street humour on the city were unrelenting and acrid in their 
critique of the overflowing wealth and corruption among some residents. What 
was involved was a zealous policing of its moral economy. Thus: ‘Jal, juyochuri, 
mithye kotha, Ei tin niye Kolikata’, i.e. ‘forgery, cheating and lies, these three 
together make up Calcutta’ (Seth 1934: 314). Banerjee notes the resentful 
mockery of the lavish lifestyles paraded by Calcutta’s rich in the street songs of 
the time (Banerjee 1989: 87):7
Belgachhiar bagane hoy chhuri- kantar jhonjhonani
Khana khawar koto moja
Amra tar ki jani?
Jane Thakur Company.
(‘What do we know of the fun and food at the Belgatchia house, where 
knives and forks clang in merriment? It is but an affair of the Tagore 
Company’ – referring to the sumptuous garden parties hosted by Dwar-
kanath Tagore on behalf of Carr, Tagore and Company, his mercantile firm, 
at his Belgatchia villa.)
 Contemporaries noted in particular the power of street musicians and singers to 
hurl abuse in the rudest colloquial on perceived wrong- doers, ranging from parsi-
monious patrons8 to wealthy cheats, even reflecting the personal rivalries between 
different aristocratic patron groups or dals.9 Thus when Raja Nubkissen Deb, mer-
chant and top servant to the East India Company, lost a court case against another 
landed notable, Chudamani Dutta, drummers paraded triumphantly in front of the 
Deb residence with the corpse of the latter, beating to the rhythm of a verse that 
congratulated Chudamani even in his death (Mullick 1935: 59):
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Yam jinte yayre Chuda, Yam jinte yay;
Japtap karaki, marte janle hoy.
(‘Chuda thus goes on to win against Yama, the God of Death; even daily 
worship and ritual is not enough to guarantee a death as glorious as this.’)
 But the critical net could also be cast further afield, in highlighting the evils 
widespread in the larger society and government (Mullick 1935: 83). When the 
Insolvency Act was passed in 1830, in pursuit of the self- aggrandising policy of 
the East India Company, an appropriate verse circulated in the city to express the 
scepticism of its inhabitants (Mullick 1935: 167).
 Sawng or pantomime tableaux performances emerging from darjipara (tailor 
colony) and jelepara (fishermen’s colony) during the gajan (hook swinging) fes-
tival, alongside those of prominent aristocrats, offered bold social commentaries 
(Sur 1988: 67, 77). Mocking representations of priests/holy men, meditating and 
counting beads while eyeing the women lining the balconies of overlooking 
houses, were among the themes that were on display.10 The sawngs were far 
from benign in their representations of contemporary city life, and instead 
‘specialised in throwing the spotlight on social, administrative, municipal cor-
ruption and wrongdoings in religion and education, the sharp wit of the songs 
lashing mercilessly at their targets’ (Sur 1988: 77). A contemporary recalls one 
such procession emerging from the Bowbazar jelepara area, with a participant 
performing as a female sweeper or mehtrani and singing a song aimed at the 
Calcutta Municipality:
My name is Hari Mehtrani
I am the grandma of the Municipality
If anyone accuses us of chhota zubaan
We quit work in unison11
Our caste is very well bonded.
But the babus are different.
They shamelessly lick the half- eaten plates (of sahibs)
Despite their gratuitous kicks.
And then they say ‘do not touch us mehtrani’,
Sprinkling cowdung water on us . . . (for ritual purification).
Oh, we will wed Brahmin priests
And marry off the Sens with the Deys (signalling caste disharmony).
(Sur 1988: 77)
The female sweeper had an analogous presence in other contemporary popular folk 
forms as well, such as Bengali indigenous theatre or jatra, where the play would 
invariably begin with her farcical appearance on stage (alongside sometimes other 
such characters performing menial jobs such as the water seller, coachman, etc.), 
upbraiding the establishment and singing parody songs using a peculiar pidgin 
Hindi- mixed Bengali12 and full of swagger and commonsensical social wisdom.
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Sin and depravity in street songs: women and the city
Kobi songs formed an integral part of the vibrant street scene described above. 
With their antecedents rooted in communal festivities at the end of the harvest 
season in rural Bengal,13 kobi songs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
came to be sponsored by nouveau riche patrons in Calcutta and the surrounding 
area and were usually performed on the occasions of prominent festivals and 
feasts. Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, the venues shifted 
from the more private domain of influential families to that of market places, 
riversides, temple courtyards, and even burning- ghats, giving the genre a more 
decidedly ‘street’ character (Sinha 1993: 65, 71, 84, 87, 100).
 Itinerant folk poets/songsters or kobis who had travelled to the city in search 
of better fortunes performed before large – often similarly uprooted – urban 
audiences and were immensely popular for their ready wit, lyrical prowess and 
song and dance routines.14 An added- on aspect to the songs that the street audi-
ence particularly enjoyed was a piece called kheud, usually sung extempore, 
which allowed space for abusive verbal duels between rival poets. The songs 
were rendered to a background of rhythmic music, using a combination of tradi-
tional folk percussion and metal instruments, as well as the violin (Sinha 1993: 
61). A related genre was the pnachali, also pastoral and devotional in origin and 
similarly adapted to reflect more contemporary concerns in the nineteenth 
century.
 While still faithful to the conventional formats of the Radha- Krishna and 
Agamani (invoking Durga) themes from Hindu Pauranic legends, kobis made 
use of tongue- in-cheek allusions and telling imagery to offer cheeky commentar-
ies on the city’s social scene. The insertion of more earthly, mundane and con-
temporary subject matter into the songs from this period onwards was to prove 
an enduring feature, thriving well into the twentieth century (Sinha 1993: ch. 4; 
also see Pal 1994: 48–53). Thus the illicit love affair between Krishna and Radha 
(married to Ayan Ghose) was repeatedly invoked to offer veiled illustrations of 
real- life clandestine relationships. Far away from the sobering influences of 
domesticity, it was not unusual for petty service men to fall prey to the attrac-
tions that the red-light area of the city had to offer (see Raychaudhuri 1975: 23). 
Radha thus complains in a song:
So here you are Shyam! Having spent the night elsewhere,
You return with an empty soulless body;
Who have you entrusted your heart to?
What reminded you of Radha, why have you come here,
Now that your dawn was spent with someone else?
. . . Oh, I can’t bear to look at your face.15
 The imagery of the housewife alone in the family household while the 
husband was elsewhere – presumably Calcutta – for the purposes of work, was 
also distinctly palpable in such motifs. A large service population from the city’s 
252  A. Ghosh
hinterland travelled to Calcutta every day, leaving their families back in their 
village and suburban homes. The possibility of their wives losing their honour in 
their absence was a constant and gnawing fear. In fact, many believed that thus 
uncared for, some of the more daring women found solace in clandestine sexual 
relationships with other men.16 The kobi Ram Basu also warns his audience of 
‘bad things happen(ing)’ when women past the age of puberty are seen by men 
other than from their own family (Pal 1994: 44).
 With the audience increasingly seeking instantaneous pleasure and bodily 
excitement in the songs, kobis turned to the sensational and erotic themes in Pau-
ranic tales, usually involving double entendres (Sinha 1993: 74–77). The 
description of biraha, or Radha’s agony and physical desire at separation from 
her beloved, could be both poetic and erotic (Pal 1994: 313, 337). A deserted 
wife in the guise of Radha thus sings:
My ripe sixteen- year-old body perishes like the waning moon,
While the rightful owner of this treasure has deserted me.
And guards someone else’s riches without looking after his own.
Leaving his woman behind to pine for him, he shamelessly cohabits with 
someone else . . .
Tell him dear friend that my youth decays with each passing day . . .
While the monthly flower blooms, I hope it does not run astray.
It is a shame that I, a sati, have to live through this agony, when my husband 
is alive and hearty.17
Another song referred to Krishna – using a clearly phallic innuendo – as a crafty 
thief, wielding his flute like the trusted tool used for cutting a passage into an 
earthen house, and similarly robbing women of their virginity.18 But the kobis 
quite clearly blame the men for the plight brought upon their married 
womenfolk.
 An aspect of the songs that the audience particularly enjoyed, as explained 
earlier, was the kheud. Songsters made use of this opportunity to attack and 
abuse their rivals – often in a very personal way – loudly encouraged by their 
supporters. These were also occasions where patrons and social superiors were 
criticised, with poets publicly – and with evident relish – denouncing their 
authority and showcasing their weaknesses.19 On one such occasion, Ram Basu 
attacked his opponent, Ramprasad, who had recently taken charge of the singing 
troupe upon the death of his brother, Nilu:
Oh, Ramprasad is nothing but a tin can in Nilu’s ensemble;
Like the small drum slung along the left side of a drummer, which never 
gets played.
Like the religious mendicant’s attendant or bowl bearer;
Who never chants the name of Hari [Vishnu] but is more keen to pick up 
the rice grains thrown at them by people.
He is a good for nothing, that Ramprasad Sharma,
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Struts about with airs though absolutely worthless,
Just as futile as a dhobi’s [washerman’s] Vishvakarma [patron god of 
craftsmen].
(Pal 1994: 37)
 The standard literary tropes in topical print and song for talking about the 
times were those of rot – moral and material – some of which we have encoun-
tered above. An added dimension to the flamboyance and corruption created by 
wealth was the corrosive effect of women of easy virtue on the moral fibre of its 
male residents. Calcutta in the nineteenth century seemed to offer endless attrac-
tions to young men. Night- life in the city sizzled with opium dens and shops 
selling alcohol, and the vigorous business generated by the red- light district.
 A 16-page pamphlet outlined the typical nightly delights of the metropolis on 
a Saturday in 1863.20 It paints a picture of roving bands of youths indulging in 
drunken and disorderly behaviour, courting prostitutes and being generally dis-
solute. The cartography of the city’s entertainment district comes alive in the 
vivid descriptions – the alcohol shops of Mechhuabazar and Radhabazar, the 
prostitute quarters of Sonagatchi, the busy streets of Harkata and Siddheswari.
Saturday has arrived to quell all despair,
The alcoholic is steeped in sweet delights.
The banner of the bottle is fluttering happily
Abuse and merry- making, oh what fun!
. . . only the night is beautiful, the day stinks!21
The opportunities provided by the city in the evening are not socially restrictive. 
The author notes with evident disdain the day- labourer in the city sprucing up in 
elegant clothes at night.22 While providing a graphic account of urban revelry, 
however, he barely attempts to hide his own contempt for such light- headed fun. 
In his model world – outlined in the second part of the work – the working man 
returns to his home in the village loaded with grocery and merchandise from the 
city, to be lovingly waited upon by his devoted wife.
 Calcutta in the nineteenth century was fearful of its women, and young men 
were constantly warned of the dangers posed by prostitutes adept at baiting the 
likes of them. The figure of the enticing and wily prostitute, who lurks in the 
city’s red- light districts waiting for the earliest opportunity to deprive men of 
their hard- earned money, is a recurrent motif in contemporary street literature. 
Dasarathi Ray, the pnachali composer, thus sings:
When I was in Calcutta recently one evening
I saw [prostitutes] sitting in the verandahs on both sides of the streets; Like 
lightning they were!
Covered in jewellery, they were singing tappas.
While the babus tried hard to win their hearts in a manner most servile.
(Dasarthi Rayer Pnachali 1899: 90)
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The day their pockets are dry, the brainless babus end up being struck by the 
prostitute’s chastising broom. For Dasarathi, these men are better off hanging 
themselves (Dasarthi Rayer Pnachali 1899: 81–82). A typical example of 
banter, full of sexual innuendo, between two singers posing respectively as the 
male and female partners in such a relationship ran thus in a kobi song, echoing 
Dasu Ray’s sentiments:
The moon shines and flowers bloom in the sky so blue
O chokori- bird, come and drink the sweet moonbeam that is meant for you.
The woman adds:
Oh my black bee, do come and drink my honey so sweet.
The man retorts:
It is a shame that other stray bees too get this treat.
(Pal 1994: 40)23
One of the chief efforts of the Contagious Diseases Act, passed in 1868, to protect 
the health of European soldiers needing access to local prostitutes was the restric-
tion of the prostitutes’ visibility. Confining them to licensed quarters and Lock 
hospitals in specific areas where they could be put under strict surveillance and 
their movements controlled seemed to ease the official Victorian mind, faced with 
the unsettling prospect of the growing sexual powers of the lowly prostitute. The 
bhadralok, too, despite frequenting these quarters openly themselves, backed such 
official perceptions, to keep their fears of social disorder at bay. In the cheap racy 
literature circulating in the city, however, the representations were more ambigu-
ous. The overt and rampant sexuality of these women, their firm control of the 
streets in the evenings, and their proverbial witty abuse – all constitute a powerful 
counter- discourse to the bhadralok’s gentility and challenge his access to certain 
social spaces within the city (Ray 2008: 150–152).
 The general import of the songs was very conservative: the values that were 
constantly driven home were those of marital fidelity and honesty, filial love and 
domesticity. They seemed to provide succour to the audience in a rocky social 
environment. Singers routinely mobilised the collective interests of the listening 
public playing to different sub- sets at different points of the performance – 
women, lovers, office workers and the socially less privileged. For people caught 
up in the social and geographical upheavals of agrarian disorder and urban 
migration, the words of the songs could provide a direct link with their past, 
access to and knowledge of a new social world, and visions of a more egalitarian 
social order. In an analogous study of Calcutta’s street songs of lower- caste sects 
of Bauls, Kartabhajas and Sahebdhanis, Hugh Urban, too, has observed the 
evocation of community identity and a certain moral economy in the face of 
material adversity.
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 The songs did not just reflect on core social discourses, they were also a 
means for the circulation of news in the city. Kobis thus reported natural dis-
asters such as floods and cyclones, describing the havoc caused, sympathising 
with the predicament of the victims and appealing to the Gods to show mercy.24 
The songs acted as conduits for channelling collective expressions of wonder at 
the technological achievements executed by the British rulers, commenting on 
the telegraph, trains, steamer and other motor- driven machinery.25 The financial 
burdens of urbanisation on the residents, as evident in the string of taxes they 
were subject to – income tax, licence tax, residential tax, motor vehicle tax and 
chowkidari tax – were also bitterly protested, symbolising the increasing pres-
sure on lower- income groups in cities.26 As we shall see below, the trend was 
simultaneous to and extended in contemporary topical print literature as kobi 
songs were prosecuted for being ‘obscene’, lost out to theatre in the city and 
migrated to east Bengal in the early twentieth century.27
News, gossip and the everyday: knowing the city
Trying to make sense of the new city, there emerged a flood of cheap printed 
literature in Calcutta towards the end of the nineteenth century, recording the 
dramatically transformed social, material and technological realities in metropol-
itan life. The literary genres in which this found expression were various, from 
novels, dramas, satires and songs to periodical pamphlet literature. Of these, by 
far the most articulate and emblematic were the songs in rhymed couplets based 
on contemporary events and themes, which had visibly impacted on city life. 
Authors were invariably among the better known who had made a name for 
themselves in the writing trade, moving seamlessly between songs, dramas, 
novellas and trivia. The language is stylised but with a tendency to slip into 
coarse imagery and vocabulary, racy alliteration, as well as sensationalised rhet-
oric – all suggestive of a non- serious, superficial readership.28
 Small pamphlets of no more than 15–20 pages, they gave shape to the emo-
tions, anxieties and concerns of residents during catastrophic events or spectacular 
occasions, and through familiar idioms translated for them their own lived experi-
ences. Although locating the specific readership(s) for this genre is difficult, it is 
possible to infer from their considerable print- runs of 2,000–3,000 the prevalence 
of well- known authors of the popular press, as well as evidence of wide readership 
of such ephemeral vernacular literature in contemporary Bengal, that they reached 
a substantial audience of not very well educated, marginally literate readers.29 
These were literate and semi- literate groups operating below the level of educated 
literary associations and newspapers, and positioning themselves quite clearly in 
that social bracket. Their concerns were not with the high arts, literatures and sci-
ences that constituted ‘useful knowledge’ for the many bhadralok societies crowd-
ing the frontal stage of the public sphere, but more with aspects of day- to-day 
living. Alongside mainstream newspapers, I would like to argue, these pamphlets 
also circulated select news from the city, acting as equally valid, if more expres-
sive, emotive registers of urban experiences and events.
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 Events that dominated the local news found ready representation in these 
quick- selling pamphlets, bringing together both factual information and views 
on the topic at hand. The inadvertent explosion at the Colvin Ghat in 1876, 
which resulted in the death and injury of innocent sailors, boatmen and passers-
 by, is an incident recorded in great detail and with the greatest sympathy. On an 
autumn afternoon in 1876, there thus occurred perhaps one of the greatest 
mishaps recorded in Calcutta’s municipal history. When attempting to remove 
the wreck of a sunken ship in the Hooghly River off the Colvin Ghat (also 
known as the Police Ghat) with the help of explosives, the operation got out of 
hand. A tremendous blast resulted, blowing up not only the adjoining boat from 
which the manoeuvre was being conducted, but also a great number of vessels 
and boats nearby. In fact, so great was the explosion that glass windows and 
facades of structures lining the riverfront were shattered to bits and cracks 
appeared in mighty buildings like the Metcalfe Hall. Charred and disfigured 
bodies of the dead and injured were strewn all along the adjoining street and 
floated on the river (Shil 1876, Dasi 1876). While one pamphlet described the 
incident as ‘The Fire at the Police Ghat’, another was quite outspoken in its posi-
tion, calling the event ‘Murder at the Police Ghat’. We thus get two factually 
comparable accounts, but with two distinctly different viewpoints.
 The ‘Fire’ song, penned by a well- known contemporary song writer, recorded 
this as an unfortunate event, blaming it on the mysterious workings of fate (Shil 
1876: 4). The ‘Murder’ song, however, was more unequivocal in its claims. 
Authored by a relatively low- profile, apparently female songster, it accuses the 
British of wanton carnage and destruction. The song builds up a narrative of the 
devastating power of gunpowder, which had allowed the people of Britain to 
conquer India by slaughtering the ‘Muslims’ (Mughals) with cannons and supe-
rior firepower. It also underlines its use in the relentless destruction of and pene-
tration of the native landscape to facilitate technology and exploitation, including 
the blasting of tunnels through mighty mountains for railways. The author asserts 
that the recent killing of innocents is testament to the blazing trail of wreckage 
that gunpowder leaves behind wherever it goes (Dasi 1876: 5–6).
 The works present graphic details of headless and limbless corpses within a 
stylised format to heighten the elements of both sensation and pathos. Empathy 
with the victims – most of whom, in these versions, were petty office workers 
returning to work after the annual Durga Puja (autumn festival) holidays and 
who probably represented the biggest constituency of readers of this genre – and 
their families are made evident in messages of deepest condolence and sorrow:
It breaks my heart to think of the unfortunates
Who lost their lives in the blast.
Is this what Fate had written out for them?
Alas! Alas! It is like being struck with sudden lightning.
. . . Leaving family, friends and relatives behind forever
They did not get a chance to say their goodbyes.
Nor did their loved ones manage to see them.
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When they hear the news, will they be able to take the shock?
Who would have dreamt of losing their husband, son, father or brother?
Having left after their morning meals, everyone expected them to return
After five o’clock (in the evening).
Who would have known that they would be seeing them for the last time?
That they would be killed today?
(Shil 1876: 8)
Heart- rending images of women and children left behind, and loving families ripped 
apart by the explosion are generously sprinkled all over the works. Such personal-
ised messages from the authors drew readers together within a tight community, 
engendering fellow- feeling and support for those affected, and must have reached 
out to the audience in a way that dry reportage in newspapers could not. There are 
other indices of solidarity. Both works are quick to report the high- handed nature of 
police intervention following the incident, where police appear to have terrorised 
relatives and onlookers, driving them out forcibly from the scene with loud cries 
(Dasi 1876: 10, Shil 1876: 7). The unpopularity of the police, reported in other 
songs and contemporary memoirs, was beyond doubt.30 By reaching out to readers 
with common referential frameworks of bereavement and bewilderment, wrong- 
doing and suffering at the hands of colonial administration, the pamphlets were 
prising open private experiences and turning them into matters of public debate and 
reflection. As such, they carried currency beyond the realm of just news, acting as 
valuable registers of the emotions and sentiments of the residents of the city.
 As demonstrated by Tanika Sarkar, social scandals, emerging more publicly 
than ever before in the city’s law courts, gripped the imagination and worked 
collective anxieties on women, Hindu conjugality and its Other – adultery and 
rape – to a feverish pitch (see Sarkar 2001: ch. 2). Contemporary scandals 
involving transgression of normative sexual boundaries were reported with alac-
rity and sensation in the journalistic and commercial print world. The well- 
studied Elokeshi–mohanta scandal of 1873 powerfully fed into such 
anxieties – as did the murder in the red- light area of Sonagatchi in 1875.31 Both 
involved the brutal murders of disloyal or apathetic women by their partners in a 
fit of rage. In the previous case, a young, married woman by the name of 
Elokeshi was beheaded by her husband, Nabin, on suspicions of adultery. The 
priest, or mohanta, of the temple at Tarakeshwar was later convicted of seducing 
Elokeshi. In the second case Golap, a prostitute, was hacked to death in broad 
daylight by her paramour, Kali Rakshit, for refusing to entertain him.
 Out of the two, the Sonagatchi case has received less attention. And yet for its 
sheer audacity, raw brutality and the passionate nature of the crime, the murder 
of Golap too created considerable ripples. One local press commissioned two 
pamphlets – one on the murder itself, and another on the trial and conviction, 
both written by the same author and published in 1875 (Datta 1875). While 
detailing the horrific nature of the murder and chiding the perpetrator for attack-
ing a ‘weak and defenceless woman’, the author in the end makes use of the 
opportunity to present a very conservative message to young men:
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All of you out there, do remember
How the woman bewitches by weakening your mind.
This is the price of abandoning your family and loved ones.
Coming in contact with a prostitute is a sin;
. . . You lose both your present and your future.
And are in grave danger of losing your life.
(Datta 1875: 11)
The account of the coroner’s inquiry and the trial is incredibly detailed, citing 
penal codes and names of individual judges, doctors and lawyers involved, and 
trial dates. While the case against Rakshit is outlined in great detail – including 
post- mortem reports, witness statements and the confession of the accused – his 
defence is summarised in a few lines. Rakshit is apparently unrepentant, even on 
hearing his sentence of death by hanging, and mutters mockingly in approval 
‘Good, good, good!’ (Datta 1875: 12).
 The reportage on the Sonagatchi case in the pamphlets is intriguing. To begin 
with, compared to the Elokeshi case the commentary is reduced, almost non- 
existent. While Nabin, the murderer and husband of Elokeshi, was acquitted of 
his crime in the public mind, the stance is not so clear in the case of Rakshit. 
Nabin was to be exonerated as he was acting in defence of Hindu conjugality 
and fighting the corruption among certain sections of the contemporary priest-
hood. But Rakshit was sinful of cohabiting with a prostitute outside wedlock and 
therefore less worthy of sympathy. And yet, even here it is possible to trace a 
hint of sympathy for him as the author makes a direct connection between the 
killing and Golap’s betrayal, suggesting ‘there must have been a reason’ (thakibe 
kono karon), almost justifying the act (Datta 1875: 5). In particular, the reporting 
of the arrogance with which Rakshit greeted his sentence seems to betray a 
certain admiration for the accused.
 Cases such as these helped police the boundaries of normative conjugality, 
sending out clear warnings to errant men and women. It specifically addressed 
the problem of young men wasting themselves in the red- light district. Rakshit 
was a case in point. A son of a wealthy man, he inherited part of the estate when 
his father died in 1872. Since then he had allegedly led ‘a riotous and dissipated 
life’, and at some point must have arrived in Calcutta to pursue his pleasures.32 
This was one of the most recurrent and dominant themes of street and reformist 
literature of the period.33 Also, extended beyond the realms of family and home, 
it seemed to transmit a message, especially to women, about loyalty and fidelity 
to sexual partners. In Sonagatchi it came perilously close to imposing the conju-
gal framework on a libertine profession.
 The city is also celebrated. Thus the arrival of the Prince of Wales in Calcutta 
in 1875 and the illumination of Calcutta on that occasion were enthusiastically 
recorded in a commentary on ‘Extravagant Lighting’ in the city (Das De 1875). 
It describes Calcutta being lit up under the orders of the local municipal govern-
ment. It is a grand occasion and, fittingly, all around the Lal Dighi resembles 
Lord Indra’s splendid celestial palace (Das De 1875: 5). The principal landmarks 
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– the General Post Office, Wilson Hotel, Medical College Hospital, Sanskrit and 
Presidency Colleges and the Beadon Square – have all been illuminated. The 
commentary also reports twinkling electric star lights on terraces, lotus- shaped 
illuminations, stars and crowns, and Queen Victoria Regina’s name being lit up.
 The wry critique apparent in the title, however, hides mixed messages behind the 
apparent enthusiasm. Householders have been asked to light up their homes, and 
notices to that end have been pinned up all over the city. All residents – from carters 
and labourers, pigeon- sellers and prostitutes to the much better- off citizens – 
comply. Earthen lamps and expensive chandeliers are used alike. But it has driven 
up the price of bottles (most commonly used for lamps) and oil (Das De 1875: 6). 
There is also a strong military presence in the city that seems to frighten the author 
(Das De 1875: 5, 7–8). The disjuncture between metropolitan civic celebrations and 
the lives of ordinary residents can be read in the forced participation of Calcutta’s 
residents. Sudipta Kaviraj has commented on the ‘regimentation of conduct’ 
imposed by modern municipal regimes in colonial cities to produce order out of 
chaos, and obedient subjects out of potential recalcitrants (Kaviraj 1997). The light-
ing of lamps to welcome the Prince in Calcutta must have acted as one such test of 
loyalty to the regime, with public buildings taking the lead on this occasion.
Changing nature of the urban public sphere in colonial 
Calcutta
Urban social space in Calcutta in the nineteenth century was a contested terrain. 
With huge influxes of immigrants to the city, the new organisation of work 
schedules, restrictive laws regulating movements in certain areas under the 
pretext of policing, the thriving sex industry and its attendant opium dens and 
alcohol shops, and the increased visibility of women, Calcutta seemed a discon-
certing place. The forceful entry of such diverse social constituencies, each with 
different claims to social and political authority, into a fractured, heterogeneous 
public sphere signalled turmoil and struggle.
 Writing in the mid- nineteenth century, Kaliprasanna Sinha described the city 
during the Chadak Puja (hook swinging festival):
The church bells chimed for seven o’clock (in the morning). The city had 
started getting incredibly noisy. The streets were filled with people. The 
drums could be heard everywhere; the smoke from the burning incense and 
the stench of alcohol filled the air. The sannyasis carrying spears, snakes, 
split bamboos and other iron tools were approaching from the Kalighat side, 
dancing in frenzy. The verandahs of the prostitutes’ houses had filled up 
with bhadralok viewers and pnachali and half- akhdai singers . . . who had 
been coming in since early morning to catch a good view of the procession.
(Nag 1990: 43)
The dense urban experience is something that finds repeated literary representa-
tion in Bengali writings, and not just in official discourse. The comfortable and 
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assuring social boundaries regulating caste and community identities in the vil-
lages had broken down on account of the forced proximity of the urban spatial 
ordering. Marginal social groups repeatedly spilled over and out of their ascribed 
roles and locales into the public streets. As Swati Chattopadhyay comments in 
her recent study of architecture in colonial Calcutta, the densely linked urban 
form had become too easy for the lower- class culture to infiltrate through the 
many interstices of the urban fabric (Chattopadhyay 2005: 259). In addition, the 
blurring of distinctions between the chhotolok (lower classes) and bhadralok 
(respectable classes) haunted the social imagination of the prosperous. The 
seeming social anarchy and commotion prevailing in the streets did not help.
 So visible and disruptive was their presence that the bhadralok, together with 
the colonial administration, was forced to act. The Society for the Suppression of 
Obscenity set up in 1873 thus played a significant role in initiating a strict sur-
veillance of the popular cultural traditions. It coordinated its own efforts with 
those of the government for bringing to task primarily publications that were 
deemed ‘obscene’. Laws prohibiting lampooning carnivalesque processions of 
sawngs or pantomimes were introduced which stifled the exercise of ritual social 
disaffection. Along with these, songs and street performances came under 
trenchant attack and gradually disappeared around the turn of the century.34
 The bhadralok experience, however, was not shared by all other social con-
stituencies in Calcutta. The city as represented in the songs studied here celeb-
rates the arrival of technological marvels in the colonial metropolis and strikes 
an entirely different note. While sharing with the bhadralok some gendered anxi-
eties of social disorder, they are full of contempt for their profligate and decadent 
patron class, as well as the lowlier, dissolute prostitute- courting and housewife- 
luring babus. The songs are very petty bourgeois in their sensibility, sharing 
concerns about oppressive police and taxes, rising prices of essentials, vulner-
ability to natural disasters and the daily toil of office workers. And they are 
deeply involved in the local and the everyday, as opposed to grand views on 
society, history and culture like the bhadralok.
Conclusion
This chapter shows how, contrary to the urban experience of the educated middle 
classes, the city afforded opportunities to other social groups to claim a space for 
themselves in a very public manner. The same textual evidence of the widening 
participation in public spaces can also be read as testimony to a widening of the 
public sphere. By the end of the nineteenth century a vibrant street presence and 
increasing visibility in print of marginal social groups matched the growing 
social and economic opportunities presented by the colonial metropolis of Cal-
cutta. And there was no doubt about the way in which the new urban regime 
fundamentally dominated, reconfigured and regulated the lives of its residents.
 In an illuminating essay, Sumit Sarkar is quite right in dismissing the central 
position that has been accorded to the supposed Renaissance in nineteenth- 
century Calcutta. One result of the ‘persistent elitism’, he points out, has been an 
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explicit dichotomy in history- writing about Calcutta, between intellectual or cul-
tural studies, on the one hand, and social and urban history, on the other:
The renaissance . . . floating more or less in a social vacuum, constitutes the 
central assumption or debating point in the first. High culture in sharp con-
trast is marginalized or all but omitted in the second, where the thrust is 
towards aggregates – ‘hard’ census or other statistics, ‘objective’ 
tendencies.
(Sarkar 1999: 161)
Departing from these straight- jacketed dominant representations of Calcutta and 
its inhabitants, and steering a mid- course between these two extremes, I hope 
this chapter demonstrates how the city was imagined by different social groups 
in different ways in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Notes
 1 Although it should be said that the distinction did not ultimately survive as strongly as 
perhaps intended. The areas ran into each other in the east, where, as Pradip Sinha 
describes it, an ‘intermediate’ zone thrived, peopled by mixed race and diverse mer-
cantile populations such as Armenians and Greeks, as well as those offering menial 
labour, like servants, milkmen and washermen. See Sinha (1978: 7–8).
 2 See e.g. Bose (1874), and Dutta (1981), originally serialised in Navyabharat between 
1901 and 1903.
 3 Ekei Bole Pol (Only This Can Be Called a Bridge); Poler Kobi (The Poet of the 
Bridge); Poler Panchali; Poler Toppa. All published in 1874.
 4 Bandyopadhyay (1823), reprinted in Gupta (1987).
 5 For a useful discussion on this, see Chatterjee (1994).
 6 A contemporary observer, Bholanath Chunder, recalls: ‘It was in these days, the inno-
cent diversion of the rich Hindoos to listen to witty sayings, to laugh at antics of buf-
foons, to hear ventriloquists, story- tellers, and songsters, for relaxation after the 
serious business of the day’. Bholanath Chunder, Travels of a Hindoo, quoted in 
Chaudhury (1982).
 7 He cites from Soudamini Devi, ‘Pitrismriti’, Prabasi, Calcutta 1319 BS, p. 232.
 8 On one such occasion phallic innuendos were used to describe the meagre offerings 
made to departing Brahmins and pundits by the host, Raja Nabakrishna Deb (Mullick 
1935: 13).
 9 Social and intellectual life in early nineteenth- century Calcutta was dominated by a 
Hindu brahmanical culture of aristocratic families. They were almost invariably mer-
chants, bankers, banians and landowners from high- caste groups, and served as 
leaders or dalapatis of local caste societies or dals. They built palatial residences and 
lived opulent lifestyles, acting like miniature feudal chiefs and providing patronage 
and protection to their caste members. As de facto units of social and political import-
ance, the government recognised the dals and consulted them on important matters. 
See Mukherjee (1970: 33–78). Also see Mukherjee (1987: 39–58).
10 Jnananvesan, 27 April 1833, cited in Sur (1988: 77).
11 The threat represented here was more than dramatic. Sweepers in colonial Calcutta 
were in constant conflict with the municipal administration, struck work repeatedly 
and were notorious for bringing the city to a standstill. See, e.g. Administrative Report 
of the Calcutta Municipality for 1867, Appendix VIII, p. 5; Administrative report of 
262  A. Ghosh
the Municipality of the Suburbs of Calcutta, 1873–4, pp. 22–23. Vijay Prashad (2001) 
discusses colonial Delhi Municipality’s similar dependence on manual labour when it 
came to the organisation of sanitation.
12 This was probably to authenticate the figure of the mehtrani, who in real life would 
usually be an up- country Hindi- speaking migrant from Bihar and the United 
Provinces.
13 See Sinha (1993: 54) and Pal (1994: 7–10).
14 For a useful account of the historical evolution of kobi songs, see Pal (1994) and 
Sinha (1993), the latter particularly focusing on the living traditions of kobigaan in 
eastern Bengal, present- day Bangladesh.
15 Song by Horu Thakur. See Pal (1994: 91).
16 This was not entirely unfounded. Surveys in Bengal in the early 1870s showed a large 
influx of rural women in Calcutta’s brothels, not all of whom had been forced into the 
profession by economic distress, intimidation or treachery. A number of upper- caste 
Hindu women, usually widows, are reported to have strayed from their families of 
their own volition. WBSA Report, Judicial Department, no. 76, 1872, p. 73, cited in 
Chattopadhyay (1992: 53). A contemporary, Shib Chunder Bose, also mentions this 
development. See Bose (1881: 35).
17 Song by Ram Basu. See Pal (1994: 226–227). The reference to the ‘monthly flower’ 
or the menstrual cycle, and the dangers that desertion can bring in connection with it, 
is a recurrent feature in the songs.
18 ‘Nabadvarer kopat kete, kon ramanir joubon lute, bnodhu chhute ele probhate? 
Tomar bnashiti jeno shnidheler kati, kate onayashe shnidher mati, jana ache.’ Song 
by Horu Thakur. See Pal (1994: 92–93).
19 Thus Bhola Moira, a famous songster, took little care to disguise his contempt for 
‘Lalababu’ (real name Krishna Chandra Singha), wealthy descendant of a prominent 
aristocratic family, for his alleged miserly habits. And on another occasion, Ram Basu 
reminded the ageing Horu Thakur of his imminent death when the latter pronounced 
Basu’s rival the winner in a song competition. See Pal (1994: 38, 34).
20 Chandrakanta Sikdar, Ki Mojar Shonibar (What a Fun Saturday), 1863.
21 Sikdar, Ki Mojar Shonibar, p. 2.
22 Sikdar, Ki Mojar Shonibar, p. 5.
23 Chokori is a mythical bird said to delight in drinking moonbeams.
24 Thus one kobi song reports a great flood. Manuscript of poet Nabinchand, 1886. See 
Sinha (1993: 116).
25 Manuscript of poet Ramkamal, 1889; Sinha (1993: 117).
26 Cited from a manuscript (probably late nineteenth century) in Sinha (1993: 115).
27 Saurav, vol. 2 (7), Baisakh, 1321 B.S. (1914), cited in Sinha (1993: 81).
28 Isvarchandra Sarkar, Kartike Jhoder Pnachali [The Song of the Autumn Storm], Cal-
cutta, 1867, pp. 4, 14.
29 Typical print- runs were between 2,000 and 3,000. See, e.g. Quarterly Reports of the 
Bengal Library for 1874, 1879. For a detailed discussion of readership of cheap 
ephemeral Bengali tracts in late- nineteenth-century Bengal, see Ghosh (2006, ch. 4).
30 See, e.g. Amritalal Basu’s memoirs, in Amritalal Basu Racanasamagra (n.d.), p. 342; 
Giris Chandra Basu, Sekaler Daroga Kahini, Calcutta; Anon. Great Barber’s Drama: 
Napiteswar Natak (n.d) [possibly, 1873].
31 Apart from Sarkar (2001), this has also been studied by Sripantha (1984).
32 Report of the State of the Police of the Town of Calcutta, 1875, p. 4.
33 See Goswami (1974) for numerous examples of this genre.
34 See Banerjee (1989) for an account of this process.
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16 The postcolonial street
Patterns, modes and forms
Ajay Gandhi
The streets of Old Delhi are not places of restraint. They are not even simply 
places of passage. On arrival there, the street may seem incomplete or spoiled; it 
is less a smooth asphalt carpet and more a misshapen organism. But it may be 
that this limitation is ours, not that of the street. If we examine its genealogy and 
enduring logic, especially in residual urban spaces, the street might make sense. 
The problem at the outset is that we are used to thinking of the city street, 
through time and space, in limited ways. Often, the street is understood merely 
as a functional conduit, intended for movement between one bounded place of 
sociality and another. Therefore, the street is relegated to a mere aside to where 
things are really happening: home and office, factory and field, temple and park. 
The street is a place to tune out, a necessary banality that we endure.
 That streets should not be positive spaces but places leached of sociality is 
given impetus by the city map. This representation of the city streets does not 
change, whether we unfold the paper map or jab at a smartphone’s Google Map. 
Stranded on a concrete pavement, we ceaselessly scan, in our mind’s eye, 
seeking the panorama that gives comfort. To the modern person, trained to see 
from above, what is most comforting is that, on a map, streets always look the 
same. Two lines going left and right, up and down, the blankness within remind-
ing us that the street is ideally vacant. This is the planner’s street, overseen by 
the ‘citizen’s gaze’ (Chakrabarty 2002). No wonder they have long been used to 
enforce strict segmentation: ‘people here, traffic there; work here, homes there; 
rich here, poor there’ (Berman 1982: 168).
 Another, more romantic view of the street is based on the flâneur, who first 
emerged in the Parisian arcades of the nineteenth century: a bohemian who wan-
dered the European street, both aloof from and immersed in the crowd. He 
specialised in roaming, avoiding a predetermined route or final destination. The 
street was the feedstock of this urban intellectual, a ceaseless source of 
inspiration.
 Flânerie was of course not a democratic right; the street required, as for the 
planner, a cultivated manner. As the flâneurs’ foremost exponent, Charles 
Baudelaire, wrote, ‘Not everyone is capable of taking a bath of multitude: enjoy-
ing crowds is an art’ (1997: 21). The flâneur turned the street, that seemingly 
equalising backdrop, into a high- brow text, legible only to those with a subscription. 
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This snobbishness could only preclude empathy with those at the same altitude. 
The bohemian wanderer was intoxicated, yes – but also, inevitably, alienated 
(Benjamin 1983 [1973]: 50).
 The flâneur – though rooted in a particular time and place – nevertheless 
found his way into the street at large. In the 1960s, the situationists of Paris, self- 
styled radicals, amplified the flâneurs’ aloofness with their notion of dérive or 
drift (McDonough 2009). The one who drifted, the dériviste, also specialised in 
aimless walking, certain that state control was shaken with every step (no word 
on whether French authorities were commensurably troubled).
 Other twentieth- century thinkers took up the mantle of the flâneur and dériv-
iste, divining radical possibility in the humble street. The walker on Manhattan’s 
streets, for example, was said to practice a ‘delinquent narrativity’, defying 
larger imperatives (de Certeau 1988 [1984]: 130). Walking in the city, with 
‘tactile apprehension and kinaesthetic appropriation’, was a radical statement (de 
Certeau 1988 [1984]: 97).
 Prevailing notions of the street, then, encompass the citizen’s gaze and the 
planner’s inscription. We also remain in thrall to the flâneur’s wanderings and 
dériviste’s hubris. These ideas have found periodic popularity far afield, in 
places such as India. In the mid- 1970s, during what came to be termed ‘The 
Emergency’, democratic rights were suspended. Fetishists of civic sense and 
rational planning in Delhi used the opportunity to carry out an extreme make-
over: its streets became laboratories for a high- modernist vision borrowed, pre-
dictably, from Paris’s facelift after the French Revolution. Nexuses and mafias 
were to be smashed, the streets fastidiously scrubbed. The planners’s zeal under-
wrote, in the form of demolition squads and police arrests, the erasure of tens of 
thousands of members of the streets’ underclass (Tarlo 2003).
 If this was a ruthlessly efficient vision of the street, there was also its self- 
conscious romantic. So it is that observers of Kolkata note how its rooftops, 
parks and streets host adda, a genteel form of gossip and debate (Chakrabarty 
2000: 201). Just as proponents of flânerie saw themselves as superior to capital-
ists, adda ideologues give it an anti- teleological aura. The practice is ‘opposed to 
the idea of achieving any definite outcome’ and stalls the march of progress 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 204). The adda and the street, in this view, belong to a high- 
minded class coeval with, if ambivalent about, urban modernity.
 On closer inspection, these become celebrations of privileged outlook, not 
descriptions of commonplace experience. They universalise a certain kind of 
bourgeois, modernist city, even where art- deco arcades are absent and sidewalks 
are chewed up. Imagine if citizen and planner, flâneur and habitué of adda, were 
dropped onto the streets of Old Delhi. Their turf would be unrecognisable. The 
planner, anticipating a linear, functional void, would see instead, on Lal Kuan 
Bazaar Road, a space used for card- playing, slogan- raising, cow- grazing, 
procession- conveying, and tooth- brushing. Far from being an innocuous and 
aseptic space, the street would be abundant and multifarious.
 On Ballimaran Road, the flâneur, determined to stay removed from the crowd, 
would be accosted for money, jostled by hand- carts and rickshaws, assaulted by 
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fumes, and overcome by honking. Rather than extricating himself from the 
crowd, he would be assailed, drawn helplessly into the vortex of the street. On 
Fasil Road, the adda- seeking poet, in search of bourgeois company, would find a 
different scene: workers from the countryside congregating in ganja addas, 
huddled circles of hashish smokers. Capitalism, no doubt, would be deficiently 
realised – and the canon of verse may not extend to Bengali poets. Adda in Old 
Delhi is a male activity associated with unemployment and undesirables. At the 
tea stall or crouched at a traffic junction, high on various stimulants, men ver-
bally joust, taunt women and horse around (Jeffrey 2010, Mehta 1997: 226). 
That other admirer of the street, the dériviste, might find it less conceivable to 
drift on the streets bordering the Meena Bazaar, should a political jaloos or pro-
cession, with thousands waving placards and shouting slogans, impede his 
passage. All these icons of the street, after visiting such an area, would need to 
go back to their blueprints and notebooks, and re- imagine the street on its own 
terms.
 How can we make sense of these features of the postcolonial street? This 
chapter employs concepts that may help to revise this ubiquitous feature of urban 
life. Any visitor to the Indian city will know how distinct the street is as a social 
space. It is perpetually charged and potentially dangerous; it contains the 
ordinary friction of difference and desire, which can suddenly mutate into a 
malevolent crowd. Yet we lack a vocabulary for understanding how sociality 
unfolds – in aggressive, organic and disorienting ways – on the street.
 Instead, writers often revert to the notions advanced above, the stern gaze and 
romantic musings of those who objectify the street but rarely dwell on it. Based 
on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 2007–09 in Old Delhi, this chapter tries 
to sketch some of the street’s defining features. These reflections are packaged 
with some rubrics for conceptualising the street. The following terms are sugges-
tive of recurring patterns, modes and forms that define an Old Delhi street, and 
likely other postcolonial streets as well: abundance and plasticity, osmosis and 
porosity, and altitude and adjustment.
Generic and specific streets, material and spectral streets
When I began my fieldwork, I did not plan to spend much time on the street. The 
street, if ever I thought about it, was the mere in- between: from home to shop to 
bazaar, and back to home. Over time, however, I realised that I was sometimes 
spending hours on the street. It was to me what an interior space, the living room 
or factory floor, would have been to another anthropologist. My fieldwork was 
concentrated in two markets, Meena Bazaar and Khari Baoli, and nearby mandis, 
or congregations of construction labourers. It was on the streets that day- 
labourers sat while they waited for work. It was there that religious processions 
or political demonstrations unfolded. It was there that the euphemism of urban 
rationalisation came alive as police charges and municipal seals.
 To subsume these material–psychic dynamics under the rubric of a generic 
street is to gloss over subtle distinctions. Just as circumpolar peoples have an 
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intricate taxonomy for snow, Delhi’s residents possess various names for the 
street. There are galis or lanes, usually no more than a few feet wide, found 
within dense mohallas or residential clusters; the lane is not simply a cramped 
space, but a sociological marking: this extended family, those sect members, live 
in that lane. Related are kuchas, usually referring to slightly longer lanes, still 
horizontally compressed, but extending further than a mere lane.
 Kuchas and galis were the most distinctive features of medieval urban plan-
ning. Originally they were clay and dirt; they are now covered with an ever- 
vanishing veneer of asphalt. They lack separate spaces for vehicles and 
pedestrians, and they do not possess the right- angled corners and straight lines of 
this- or-that road, place or circus, names which mark the colonial and postcolo-
nial street (Vidal & Gupta 1999). Galis are perhaps the best evidence of how 
state power was not definitively inscribed into the functioning of the street. 
Rather, lanes are known by several names simultaneously, referring to long- 
disappeared objects or residents, as well as newer structures and nationalist 
heroes (Oldenburg 1976: 30–31).
 After galis, there are larger, more prominent streets in the old city; these are 
sadaks, literally streets, or chowks, referring to prominent commercial avenues. 
These are of precolonial or postcolonial vintage, and are usually wider and more 
congested. Nai Sadak, for example, literally, New Street, was a straight line built 
by the British in the late nineteenth century; it now houses a textbook and garment 
bazaar. Chandni Chowk, the main commercial thoroughfare of the old city, was 
constructed by Mughal planners as a canal- lined promenade. It is now an exhaust- 
and-people filled avenue packed with religious institutions and cloth shops.1
 One could think of these various street as different formats, as a techno- 
material substrate which catalyses expression. Urban scholars often use the 
metaphor of city as text; yet if its constituent spaces are thought of as legible, 
they cannot be read with the comfort of linear pagination or an actual text. Their 
constitution and makeup demand reading between the lines, dispensing with the 
notion that they are singly inscribed. Nor do such places have a single author. 
This is the perennial problem for Indian planners: there are too many encroach-
ers, too many loafers, who write themselves into the city, contributing towards 
‘unauthorised’ hawking and dwelling. A more enduring analogy for the street 
may be provided by other techno- material formats. The streets of the old city 
were overwritten many times, like a re- writable tape, scratched and grooved by 
its many handlers. Indeed, the street groaned under such intense activity. Broken 
and potholed through overuse, hissing and crackling, overrun by its many 
encroachers- cum-unauthorised- authors, the street was a form that nevertheless 
hummed the city’s tune.
Sheer abundance
In the circular whorls of the old city lane or the straightness of the street, there 
was no segregation of activities. Rather, the street was a place of sheer abun-
dance; there was hardly a financial deal, political statement or bodily activity 
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that did not occur there (Chakrabarty 2002: 73). For example, on Chandni 
Chowk, my path was frequently interrupted by political rallies. Local parties 
would set up a tent and dais on this street, in front of a municipal office. Where 
vehicles ordinarily skirmished, hundreds of the faithful sat, becoming animated 
when speeches were given. They became even more animated when food was 
served afterwards. Speeches were to be endured; at least one got some food out 
of it (chalo, kuch khane tho mila). At such moments, the street easily became a 
place for political spectacle.
 This abundance was also evident on Gali Mata Wali, where men rolled carts 
loaded with kerosene burners, chickpeas and potatoes. Thick smoke blew over 
hungry passers- by, and they doled out some local culinary favourites, such as 
tikkis – fried vegetable discs containing potatoes and peas, served with a tama-
rind sauce or ketchup. The street was, with little contradiction, kitchen and 
dining room. Indeed, the thrill of eating on the street was part of the seduction of 
the old city; to consume street food was to ingest something true about the place. 
Another facet of the street’s abundance could be seen at night. As the sun set and 
the old city, unevenly lit, became dark, Urdu Road, bordering the Meena Bazaar, 
became dotted with prostitutes. This was no red- light area, just a regular street, 
used to drive and hawk and beg during the day, where single women with bright 
makeup and bold stares stood at night. The street was, thus, also a boudoir.
 In these ways, the street’s florescence, on mere grey asphalt, was somehow 
hum- drum: a low- level volatility rendered ordinary. But its kinetic energy could 
be amped up, punctuating the entire area. When a religious procession moved 
through or when rumours emerged of a municipal raid, the streets of Old Delhi 
became an ordinary space where extraordinary tensions could suddenly swirl. It 
was on the old city’s streets, for example, where hours after Indira Gandhi’s 
assassination in 1984, crowds stoned, stabbed and bludgeoned Sikhs.2 The 
street’s abundance overrode original design. It was overwritten and over- 
brimming.3
Too close for comfort
The old city’s streets – its intimate alleys and appropriated sidewalks – were 
radically unlike the roads and flyovers of New Delhi. Like its prosperous classes, 
the new city had ever- enlarged and ever- clogged arteries. These diseases of pros-
perity required multi- lane bypasses and flyovers, emergency measures in a 
wheezing megalopolis. The grey totems of progress were much- heralded in 
Delhi’s newspapers: finally there would be clear flow. But often the opposite 
occurred: more sclerotic jams and road rage. These streets nevertheless sug-
gested a single- minded competition to get ahead, to keep ahead of the scrum. On 
the flyover, the sheer volume of metal and exhausts arcing through the air blotted 
out human presence, save for the beggars at stop- lights.
 In contrast, what was undeniable about the old city’s streets were the breathing, 
sneezing, laughing and sweating others, the pushing, elbowing and spitting evid-
ence of humanity. One could, without much effort, go sideways and backwards, 
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pause and listen, feel and touch. Intimacy mingled, in such places, with prosaic 
routine, and bodies with snippets of devotion. On streets such as Malliwara, jewel-
lery merchants made orders on their mobile phones, their chatter mingling with 
devotional songs from speakers. On Tilak Bazaar Road, migrant labourers had 
their ears cleaned and stubble trimmed over the sidewalk drain, alongside com-
muters haggling with bicycle- rickshaw drivers. The street was replete with many 
such instances of ‘wild connectivity’ (Hansen & Verkaaik 2009: 21).
 What about the relationship of the subject to his peers in the crowd? In the 
old city, the street was not a place, as with the flâneur, where the pedestrian 
could mentally retreat from the crowd, gazing undisturbed at the arcade. The 
daydreamer, both lost in and aloof from the crowd, gave way to the self- 
conscious and ever- vigilant walker. In my experience, the streets of Old Delhi 
were the venue for endless, often involuntary, negotiation. Dalals or brokers 
hashed out deals and filled in paperwork for railway tickets and government cer-
tificates on the kerb. Touts exhorted passers- by to purchase things they might 
not need: sex, dried fruits, a four- pack of underwear.
 For women especially, the street was suffused by the male gaze, and often a 
place of unwanted advances. Women were loudly compared to buttery sweets 
and fried snacks, gastronomic and sensual pleasures. The inability to conceptual-
ise the female street- walker except in pejorative terms is not surprising. The 
imagination of urban India – in films, gossip and innuendo – often focuses on a 
male protagonist. The women of Delhi were not neutral wanderers on its streets. 
Their mere presence on the street made them fair game for grabbing and glaring, 
fondling and cat- calling.
 A similar discomfort in being the watched, not the watcher, was evident 
amongst the street’s underclass. For migrant workers, thinking of the street as a 
distanced muse, as it was for Parisian bohemians and Kolkata’s poets, made no 
sense. The street involved involuntary intimacy and exchange, a perpetual jost-
ling where one could not, like the flâneur, forget oneself. One was in the thick 
of, not removed from, the street and its gossip, deals and threats. And being of 
the street meant that one could not have a bourgeois propriety over it. Those 
deemed to have a proletarian disposition – of a particular complexion, with a 
scrawny build, often wearing plastic sandals – were frequently targets of interro-
gation: for sleeping on the streets, for not possessing valid identification and for 
simply being in Delhi.
An equal altitude
However unequally they were experienced, these streets could be considered the 
most democratic in the city. They were open to all comers: educated and impov-
erished, engineers and junkies. In the old city the street functioned, as the ‘Arab 
street’ did in a different context, as a shorthand for authenticity, for the pulse of 
the polis. Old Delhi’s streets were the parts of the city where adventurous 
citizens got their dose of culture (consuming potentially lethal street food), and 
the popular classes gravitated for work (minus life- saving safety equipment). 
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Migrant labourers, for example, avoided New Delhi, which sprawled in all direc-
tions away from the walled city. Befitting its colonial origins, the new city was 
defined by gates and chowkidars (night- watchmen). Police posts and concrete 
walls frosted with shards of broken glass separated out the right and wrong kinds 
of people.
 In contrast, if there is a singular feature that connects Indian streets, it is their 
startling heterogeneity. In this respect, my disorientation in comprehending Old 
Delhi echoed the seeming mutual unintelligibility of its residents. On the streets 
of Old Lucknow, ‘people do not conform to any single social system, tradition, 
or standard of public conduct through which their diverse identities can be mutu-
ally understood’ (Hjortshoj 1979: 35). This state of enduring disinterest shown 
by myriad kinds of people to one another on the street offered, especially for the 
urban proletariat, some entertainment and a resting place, a conduit of news and 
opportunity.
Eyes on you
The abundance and indifference of the street did not preclude individual focus. 
People on Indian streets seem to possess innate noise- cancelling capabilities, 
dulling the roar of the crowd. Indian leaders and intellectuals have long argued 
that denizens of the Indian city are selfish or un- self aware (Chakrabarty 2002). 
But it may be that those on the street are simply determined, despite its distrac-
tions and threats, to get their work done. I found it common, for example, to 
have conversations with arhatiyas and banias (commission agents) on the streets 
of the Khari Baoli spice bazaar. I had trouble keeping up with our conversation; 
they had no trouble, on the other hand, conducting an interview, negotiating on 
multiple mobile phones, dealing with the packaging of various goods, calling out 
for tea, directing palledars or loaders to move things here or there, with cease-
less honking and bartering all around. This watchfulness was also evident when 
I habitually returned to a few chai stalls squatting on the street, prime venues for 
gossip and rest. More than two dozen mobile and stationary tea- sellers dotted the 
vicinity of the bazaars and labour mandis where I conducted fieldwork, selling 
tea to labourers, brokers and merchants.
 Shortly into my time there, it emerged that two of the tea- sellers I frequented 
were khabaris, or police informers. They mastered the quotient of milk, carda-
mom, tea leaves and water, while keeping in mind the squat clay or plastic cups 
doled out here and there. Alongside these banal tasks they mastered and kept 
mental track of the street’s coming and goings. Listening in on conversations, 
knowing who was doing what, they were conduits of khabar, or news. As such, 
they were indispensable to Delhi Police constables, whose beat mostly consisted 
of sitting in the dark, cool chowkis nearby. It was through the tea- sellers’ eyes 
and ears that the volatility of the street was regulated. By dispensing khabar, 
officially notified BCs – Bad Characters – were tracked, and hafta – protection 
money – levels regulated. The chai- wallahs-cum- khabaris were not simply the 
eyes of the state, outsourced panoptic functionaries. These same men were put to 
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use by traders in the old city’s bazaars, tipping them off when municipal raids 
occurred. It made little sense to think of the citizen’s gaze on the street as hege-
monic; the man of the street had dispersed loyalties. Therefore, the street planner 
never subdued his target; people simply stared back.
Liquidity
It was striking, during my time in the old city, to see which street presences 
endured or disappeared. However useful the tea- seller was, the informer’s hold 
over the street was not to be taken for granted. The tea- seller-cum- informer, too, 
had a tenuous claim on the street, at once indispensable and interchangeable. 
They were kept on edge by their uniformed protectors and invariably embroiled 
in contentious negotiations with their neighbours on the street. Months passed 
and more than one such stall, overseen by men who doggedly returned to the 
same spot over time, vanished. When I asked around, people seemed hardly to 
notice. It seemed to be a matter of course that the street could take on one avatar 
and then another. There were other tea stalls at which to congregate, different 
informers that the police could cultivate.
 This fluidity inflected the legitimacy of the street’s persons and buildings. 
Bicycle- rickshaws, repeatedly outlawed by the Delhi courts, nevertheless prolif-
erated in the old city. According to the law courts, they were gone, a menace 
erased; but hundreds nevertheless remained. Elsewhere, in the Meena Bazaar, 
around the Delhi Junction railway station, and all around Chandni Chowk, many 
hawkers sold their wares. Singularly powerless, they were expressions of the 
power of local patrons, facts on the ground that affirmed the sway of big men. 
Despite the rising temperature of Delhi’s High Court justices, it seemed that the 
logic of the street, not legal prescription, was sovereign. Landlords and business-
men I met were guilty of ‘encroachment’, the official term for improvised build-
ing. Their hotels, now three storeys instead of two, their shops jutting past their 
legal perimeter were, nevertheless, here to stay. When faced with official pres-
sure, the owners would ‘regularise’ them by paying a fee and obeisance to 
officialdom.
Street as adjustment
We have seen how the Indian street is not the same symbolic ground on which 
the storied flâneur of nineteenth- century Paris roamed. There was, in western 
cities, a clear distinction between the pavement and arcade, and vehicular and 
pedestrian traffic. For Delhi’s officials, too, the pedestrian pavement, clear and 
clearly demarcated from the vehicular road, residential colony and commercial 
arcade, was an abstract ideal. The street, after all, was the circulatory system of 
the city, critical to its productive momentum.
 We might imagine the flâneur in the old city, falling into open sewer drains, 
shoes covered in the excrement of goats and cows, twisting an ankle on the side-
walk’s abrupt holes and jagged crevices. The street of the old city, in physical 
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and social form, was not so much imperfectly realised as differently enacted. 
Ending abruptly, colonised by entrepreneurs, uneven and broken, Old Delhi’s 
residents traced an unpredictable route through crowds, vehicles, stray animals 
and other obstacles. All of this is why the Indian street seems so untamed in the 
scholarly imagination. The men invariably urinating on Indian streets are 
paraded as examples of defiant unruliness (Khilnani 1999: 124, Chakrabarty 
2002: 68). Yet, despite the appearance of chaos, the longer I spent in Delhi’s old 
city, the more the street’s internal logic became evident. As in many Indian black 
towns, this most undifferentiated of urban spaces was precisely allocated and 
occupied: to a cigarette seller here, to a public- phone vendor there and every-
where to the enterprising and strong- armed.4
 In this milieu, the Indian street was governed by the metaphysics of adjust-
ment. One of the chai- wallahs mentioned earlier, whose stall I habituated and 
who later vanished, told me about his observations of the Biharis and Rajastha-
nis and Jharkhandis who worked in the old city’s bazaars. Yes, he said, there is 
tension, and regular sorts of panga, scuffling. Moreover, on streets, one’s nerves 
frayed and one wearied from dhakka- mukki, being tossed to and fro in the crowd. 
But on the street, he said, ‘sab adjust karna padta hain’: ‘They all have to 
adjust.’ The planner has to adjust and realise that the master plan for the city will 
never be realised; the home- owner has to adjust and share his alleyway with 
workers and encroachers; the police have to adjust and accept a certain unruli-
ness and opacity. And of course the chai- wallah, elaborating this theory to me, 
had to adjust to the fact that he was then on the street but might soon disappear. 
Adjust karna – to adjust oneself – means that one cannot reliably control the 
claims of others on your space. It also means accepting that your own claim to 
that space can be solid today, and melt tomorrow.
Porosity and osmosis
On the street where one had to adjust, no enduring division could be made 
between public and private activities (Appadurai 1987: 17, Chakrabarty 2002: 
66). Yet public and private seem to be inapt categories for what happened on the 
streets of Old Delhi. Better terms for street life might be osmosis and porosity. 
Certain things we think of as private or intimate, done out of compulsion or 
habit, crossed the permeable barrier of comfort or shame from one domain to the 
other. For example, on Sita Ram Bazaar Road, merchants of nearby iron- wares 
stores soldered and assembled goods in the middle of the street. Like other 
bazaars in the old city, resembling closets that had burst, goods were invariably 
scattered in the street, to be processed and shipped in due course. No conscious 
decision had been made, nor official sanction given; imperceptibly, as if by 
osmosis, things moved from one place to another. The streets of the old city 
were simply full of stuff, which was moved from godown (storehouse) to pave-
ment, from trader’s desk to kerb, from basement workshop to goods carrier.
 This is not to say simply that things moved from a clean, private domain, to 
an unruly, public one. The street has been described as ‘the outside, the space for 
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which one did not have responsibility’ (Kaviraj 1997: 98). Against the home, a 
seeming sanctuary, the street has been seen as a place of moral impurity and 
strangeness (Chakrabarty 2002). But these distinctions confuse the gaze of the 
citizen with the street’s autonomous ethos. Both people and things on the street 
belong to someone, and are subject to overlapping claims. The circulation of 
everything from hazardous chemicals to Nepali prostitutes from interior to exte-
rior does not mean order becomes disorder. If anything, the old city’s street 
allows a different kind of public, one unimaginable on the flyovers of New 
Delhi. A writer discussing similar streets, the galis or lanes of Banaras, notes 
that residents ‘always treat the lanes outside their house as truly public space, as 
belonging to them. There is no clear or closed boundary between house and 
outside. Almost all recreations – sitting and relaxing, drinking tea or having pan 
– take place in the galis’ (Kumar 1988: 77).
The street’s avatars
If this is correct, Old Delhi’s street can be considered a set of disguises or masks. 
The Indian street does not revert to a ‘normal status’ or ‘normal function’ 
(Kaviraj 1997: 106). When one looks at photos of Old Delhi’s street life over 
decades, it is difficult to ascertain when they were taken. It is not as if the street 
has become more or less frenzied, with more or fewer people. Looking at a street 
scene over time, no one configuration of stalls, hawkers and encroachments can 
be considered the true or lasting one.
 Old Delhi’s streets may have had different material incarnations – from clay 
and dirt in the nineteenth century to metallised asphalt in the twentieth – but 
temporally no predestination. The municipality’s reiterated promise to clean up 
the street was itself a kind of disguise, a contrivance which held that its real face, 
underneath all of the handbills and wires, was obscured by illegitimate improvi-
sations. If one took the streets surrounding the Jama Masjid and Meena Bazaar, 
for example, there was neither a strict daily routine nor seasonal rhythm to street 
life. I initially noticed a division of labour that matched this space: during the 
day, these streets were occupied by hawkers, visitors and beggars; at night, they 
were taken over by prostitutes, migrant labourers and junkies who slept in the 
open. What the streets were meant for, driving and walking, were merely two 
things happening on them. During religious festivals such as Eid, or national 
holidays such as Republic Day, the temporality of these streets changed once 
more; families could be found strolling and snacking at night, or the entire area 
shut down and darkened because of police curfew. There was no normal or 
default in such streets, simply accretions and deletions, one visage superimposed 
on another.
 The shifting avatars of the street were most clearly visible in the Lego- brick-
like additions and subtractions to kerbs in the old city. I heard shopkeepers and 
residents narrate how tiny religious idols, placed next to an electricity trans-
former, evolved into a tiny shrine, and then, years later, a hulking temple. As in 
other Indian cities, the street could be imprinted with religious posturing. A good 
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example was near the Kashmiri Gate auto- parts bazaar, where I often passed a 
roadside agglomeration of Hindu deities. Nested into a sparklingly white- tiled 
frame, about waist- high, were statues of Ram and Sita. I had done some inter-
views with Punjabi traders nearby. A group of them had pooled some money – 
no one could precisely remember when – to build this edifice. What was 
intriguing, though, was that this hijacking of the kerbside was not just an exer-
cise in piety. Several of the traders had been threatened by various archaeolo-
gical and municipal authorities with the closure of their storage and commercial 
premises. Much of this was because their bazaar – widely known to recycle auto-
 parts from cars stolen and stripped in Delhi and Uttar Pradesh – had appropriated 
swatches of a heritage zone, awash with Mughal and British colonial buildings.
 In cities, what reigns in the present may sideline the past. The trader’s shrine 
was modest in comparison with the towering churches and 100–300-year- old 
walls nearby. But their humble agglomeration of deities made municipal action 
against traders inconvenient. Those traders were the ones, after all, who held 
sway over the authorities. And even if the street- side shrine was a fig leaf that 
they were holding in front of naked commercialisation, a municipal demolition 
of their premises would have been less an act of authority than of callousness. 
An analogous process occurred elsewhere on India’s urban streets. In Bangalore, 
the profusion of shrines gobbling up its streets was met with municipal silence; 
so as not to tramp on religious sentiments, and to keep order, the law was over-
looked and sidestepped (Nair 2005: 154). Seen in this light, the Kashmiri Gate 
street temple, at one level an illicit appropriation of public space, was on another 
a down- payment on the future presence of the traders. It created facts on the 
ground, material evidence of the wilfulness of certain parties.
 All such material manifestations in the city, of course, are expressions of 
power. Good examples could be found near the auto- parts bazaar. The old city’s 
imposing Jama Masjid was built on elevated ground by Mughal emperor Shah 
Jahan in the late seventeenth century; a similar desire to awe supplicants under-
wrote the British- built Parliament complex in New Delhi. One hundred years 
hence, writers of Old Delhi might see its heritage in terms of the street improvi-
sations of the present. The humble white- tiled clumping of Hindu deities, located 
in a near- forgotten side street near Kashmiri Gate, would perhaps by then have 
grown from waist- high sapling into something much grander. For now, though, 
the temple was simply another brushstroke on the street’s crowded facade.
The street as shauk
The pressures of the street – open to all takers, yet claimed by few – were made 
further visible by the old city’s migrant workers. Consider the case of Rahul. A 
mistri, or construction labourer, who assisted a mason, I met him at Haus Qazi 
Chowk, close to the Meena Bazaar, along with dozens of fellow migrant labour-
ers, their tools and paintbrushes arranged before them. As the old city came to 
life, cows, rickshaws and cars circumnavigated this roundabout, where several 
wholesale bazaars – selling paper, iron, kites and tools – converged. The men, 
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almost all of them migrants from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan, were 
usually between their early twenties and late forties. As day labourers, they were 
entirely at the mercy of contractors who inconsistently offered painting, plumb-
ing or masonry work. The men began their vigil early in the morning, by 7 a.m. 
By 1 p.m. whatever work that was to arrive had come. On many days, the 
numbers of men remaining at Haus Qazi Chowk testified to the lack of work, at 
least of the consistent kind.
 The street, more by default than proprietary claim, belonged to them. Only 
for the richer and more productive was it a conduit to more pressing business. 
For the workers at Haus Khazi Chowk, the street itself was where they were 
coming from and going to. Others in the old city, traders and brokers and tour-
ists, went to and fro. Their physical posture and mechanical accompaniments 
suggested people already somewhere else: sitting on rickshaws and in cars, a 
mobile pressed to their ear, wearing ironed, brand- name clothes.
 Meanwhile, a few dozen of the labourers at Haus Khazi Chowk sat, crouched 
and lay down on the street. For them, the street to somewhere was too often a 
way- station to nowhere. Still, when the street did not serve as an avenue to work, 
it allowed one to do activities that disguised how stuck one really was. On the 
Chowk itself, workers had a number of options: playing cards (tash khelna), 
drinking country- liquor (daru peena), reading the newspaper (khabar parna) and 
following the numbers game (satta- bazzi karna). These were activities that com-
prised the long- standing economy of shauk, enjoyment and effervescence 
(Kumar 1988).
 A special taxonomy of activities comprised language games. Among men 
who may not have work and were wandering in situ, verbal jousting substituted 
for action. There was everyday gossiping (gup- shup marna) and simple chit- chat 
(baat- chit karna). When talk of one another or families had run its course, things 
got silly: the time for idle or nonsense talk, so pointless it was termed ‘the 
fucking of words’ (bakchodi or muhchodi). Restlessness and masculine one- 
upmanship led to teasing. A whole afternoon could be passed by pulling one 
another’s legs (ek dusre ko lena/ek dusre ko chedna). Usually these were accom-
panied by a barrage of galiyen or abuses. A similar need spawned a vast corpus 
of mazaak, homoerotic puns or pranks (cf. Ramaswami 2007). The more crea-
tive of the men at Haus Khazi Chowk would recite famous filmo ka dialogue, or 
lines from Bollywood films. Some rehearsed sher- o-shayaris – rhyming couplets 
about love and loss. Sometimes these were subtle and chaste; at other times they 
veered towards the vulgar and irreverent, putting them in the category of sala-
cious stories (mazedar kahaniyan).
Time- pass
When I met him, Rahul was a young man in his early twenties, not yet suffi-
ciently skilled at his work to become an ustad or guru – a master who would 
train others. Like the other young men at his mandi, by midday, if no work was 
to be had, he started ghumna- phirna, or roaming Old Delhi’s streets. Rahul 
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usually had very little money in his pockets; his aim was hardly ever to buy 
something or fulfil a task. But this roaming was not done with the flâneur’s con-
quering passion or superior lording over the crowd. For the migrants of Haus 
Khazi Chowk, whatever pleasure there was to be had was in time- pass, referring 
to the state in which someone could be doing something better or productive but 
was condemned otherwise. A middling 1980s Bollywood film, watched at the 
nearby Excelsior cinema, was time- pass. In a similarly unenthusiastic way, 
squatting with friends on the street, listening to a qissa, a meandering historic 
tale, was time- pass. Sitting with an anthropologist, who asked unnecessary ques-
tions over and over again? A quite unsatisfactory form of time- pass.
 Time- pass was not simply an adjective referring to an activity done in down- 
time. It could encompass the condition of an entire class of underemployed and 
frustrated men. Shopkeepers at Haus Qazi Chowk, for example, termed young 
men like Rahul sadak- chhap admi. To be chhap was to be stamped or moulded, 
in this case by the sadak or street. The sadak- chhap admi were not just men who 
happened to be on the street, but men who were rather stamped by and melded 
with the street. A similar conflation of locale and person was found when I inter-
viewed police about law and order problems. For them, crimes were mainly 
caused by the footpath log or pavement log, literally, sidewalk or pavement 
people. Moderately educated or skilled, but lacking job opportunities in govern-
ment service or the private sector, tens of millions of men like Rahul were to be 
found on the streets of Indian cities. Loitering at traffic intersections, clustered 
around chai stalls, they are among many considered to be ‘ “wanderers”, “useless 
men” or people engaged only in “timepass” ’ (Jeffrey et al. 2008: 169). Added to 
their numbers are the drivers, cleaners, street performers and beggars who phys-
ically overwhelm the street but are absent from its consciousness.
 I heard Rahul sometimes refer to his life and that of his friends in the same 
pejorative vocabulary hurled at them by their social betters. Describing himself 
as illiterate (anparh) and careless, he spoke with irreverence – as if he did not 
care – and bleak self- assessment. Usually in debt, hobbled by illness and insec-
urity, Rahul’s fellow workers also talked of their doomed fate and wasted lives. 
Here time- pass was not simply a few transitory hours or months, but a default 
state of being.
Pathway to somewhere
This immobility did not mean that Rahul retreated from the streets. For him and 
his friends on Haus Khazi Chowk, the street was the only guaranteed place to 
rest one’s head, while away the time, and find an opportunity. It was most obvi-
ously a place for ghumna- phirna, wandering or roaming about (Kumar 1988). 
Ghumna was an ambivalently undertaken ethos that pointed to the street’s simul-
taneous flux and immobility. On the one hand, it was an aspect of city life that 
cost nothing, and so precluded workers’ discomfort at being in other spaces. 
Simply to be a migrant to the city, to have the dubious privilege of sleeping on 
Delhi’s streets, was an outcome of being a ghumnewale.
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 Rahul and his friends, most of them from eastern Uttar Pradesh and western 
Bihar, were in their twenties. This was the time when, back at home, in their vil-
lages and towns, it was normal for a man to wander about. The ghumnewale was 
the one who wandered from the streets of their smaller, less promising village or 
town, and headed for the promise of the metropolis. This implied not a local 
walkabout, but a metaphysical transformation; such men were expected to go to 
bigger cities and higher pay- cheques. Rahul himself had spent time in other 
major Indian cities, working on construction projects in Meerut and Nagpur, 
after which he ended up in Delhi’s old city.
 For workers in the city, ghumna- phirna, on a local scale, was the one thing 
that was in their control. Indeed, from the vantage point of the ghumnewale, the 
streets of Old Delhi were qualified places of pleasure. If someone like Rahul had 
tried to enter a middle- class temple complex, he might be shouted at by its care-
taker, based on his tatty plastic slippers. He told me about walking in the posh 
shopping arcade south of the old city, Connaught Place, known as CP. He did 
not like how he was stared at and made to feel ajib, strange and uncomfortable. 
Chastened by the memory of being amidst the middle- class people who strolled 
there, he would not contemplate a return visit: ‘accha nahin lagega’ – ‘I won’t 
feel good’. Seen in this way, the streets of Old Delhi precluded being under 
control, and also allowed for certain small pleasures, unlike in the regulated 
colonies of the new city. Despite worries about money and work, the men of 
Haus Khazi Chowk seemed by and large to prefer their casual, freelance lives. I 
was told that unlike salaried work, which made one a slave (gulami) to time and 
vertical pressure, the intermittent nature of construction work made them free 
birds (azad panchi).
 Seen from this perspective, the ability of men such as Rahul to piss where 
they liked – on a shuttered storefront at night, against the compound wall of a 
government building during the day – reflected a relaxed disposition towards the 
city (Kumar 1988: 79). For such men, the street was a place relaxed enough to 
let one’s bladder and sphincter slacken at will, without shame or discomfort. 
(Conversely, for women in Delhi, the tension with which they experienced the 
street was reflected in the consequences of holding things in.)5
 The Indian street, in the enabling ways of the ghumnewale, has long been over-
whelmingly male and popular. In nineteenth- century Banares, in Uttar Pradesh, 
‘recreation for lower- class males frequently consisted of simply “roaming” the 
streets of the mohalla’ (Freitag 1989: 123). In Bombay, mill workers in the early 
twentieth century also used the street for roaming, pausing to congregate in front 
of liquor shops or street entertainers (Chandavarkar 1998: 103–104). Historically 
in Lucknow’s old city, ‘the street itself was a destination and an event’, a place to 
gossip, mingle, and barter (Oldenburg 2001 [1984]: viii).
Treadmill to nowhere
Yet there is another association to the street. For, despite these men talking and 
dreaming on the streets, they could not completely disguise their inactivity. Once 
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in the city, the migrant who engaged in ghumna- phirna could become stuck. The 
city’s promise could be illusory; the big payday deferred once again, over and 
over. Thus the other meaning deriving from ghumna – against the romance of a 
young man wandering cities for a time, before heading home triumphal – was of 
the ghumte phirte admi. This was a pejorative term applied to migrants, wander-
ers with a lack of employment and status.
 Rahul’s relationship to the street differed in this sense from that of the flâneur. 
The bohemian was supremely confident, at all moments superior to the crowd; 
the migrant labourer might enjoy the street too, but this was tempered by pathos. 
The same freedom that the street brought to plumbers and masons could become 
a millstone around their neck. Consider the language used to describe such men 
in Delhi: bekaar, useless and idle; or lafanga, an idle and useless wanderer 
(Jeffrey et al. 2008). The lack of a formal work contract that the workers saw as 
making them free birds was at other moments seen as a cause of shame. Rahul, 
for example, admitted that his inability to save a significant sum for the marriage 
of his siblings had ruined (barbad) his family relations and led to him drinking 
more and more.
 Indeed, the terminology for forward momentum on the street could come to 
mean thwarted fate. Rahul’s colleagues sometimes had trouble collecting their 
payment from contractors. Often, when they demanded their due, they were told 
excuses: come back tomorrow, there is a delay, you will get it next time. 
‘Ghumate rathe hain’, they said – ‘They simply turn you round and round.’ In 
the old city, these men had imagined their life going forward, like the long, 
straight street; but often they spun in circles, their paths blocked. The street 
could take on a darker tone, where one was not simply immobile, but obsolete. 
Indeed, like other members of the old city’s underclass, such as drug addicts, the 
workers at Haus Khazi were not briskly walking on the street, but stuck sitting 
on it. Baithne or sitting allowed for entertainment, like the reciting of sher- o-
shayaris, as mentioned above. It was a creative posture, one that was in some 
ways productive of dialogue and exchange. But it was also one that indicated 
one’s idleness and immobility (cf. Dhand 2006). ‘Hum log bas baithe rathe hai’, 
the workers would say in frustration: ‘We are doing nothing but sitting.’
 The street, for such migrant workers, was both pathway and trap; the latter 
valence was evident in the use of the term lawaris. Monthly, migrants who had 
become destitute or addicts, were found dead on Old Delhi’s streets. The police 
would post notices in front of stations or in newspapers; the men, usually lacking 
identification, were termed ‘unclaimed’ or ‘lawaris’. The old city’s police also 
sprung into action when forgotten objects were left on the street, such as large 
parcels or suitcases (lawaris vastu). But most of all, lawaris was applied by 
migrants to one another, in jokes that carried an undertone of anxiety. To be 
lawaris was to be a bastard, lacking clear parentage, like the dogs that slept 
alongside the men at Haus Khazi Chowk. Metaphorically, though, it denoted a 
certain type of unrooted person in the city, the migrant labourer most of all. The 
street contained the freedom of ghumna- phirna, or wandering, and the danger of 
becoming lawaris: unrooted, forgotten and unclaimed.
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The stubborn street
The citizen did sometimes show up on Old Delhi’s streets. The monument- 
visitor, bazaar- shopper and atmosphere- seeker, though, came with numerous 
injunctions, orders and recommendations. Behaviour was scrutinised and con-
doned or condemned in a capitalised officiousness. The municipal signboard, 
suitably vague and terse (‘commit no nuisance’) to encompass almost anything, 
was the best example of the ‘standardising techniques’ of the Indian city (Kaviraj 
1997: 85).
 Outside of the street, these were urban instructions for mis- use or non- use. The 
visitor arriving at the Delhi Junction Railway station encountered this sign: 
PUBLIC NOTICE: STOP PUBLIC FEEDING OF MONKEYS. At the Golcha 
and Excelsior cinemas in the old city, signboards and tickets noted a long series of 
items under the heading: FOLLOWING ITEMS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. At 
the Delhi Metro stops located at Chandni Chowk and Chawri Bazaar, the two old 
city stations, there was a long list of Dos and Don’ts, of Dangerous Materials and 
Offensive Articles. At the Mahatma Gandhi park, located near the old city’s Katra 
Neel textile bazaar, a hand- written sign stood in one section that was closed off 
with a chain and lock. It read, without further explanation, ‘No Entry: By Order’.
 Within the Meena Bazaar, numerous Delhi Police signs could be found: 
Sandict Vykation Evam Vaston Se Shavdhan Rehein (Be aware of suspicious 
people and objects); Bhagdhar naa Machayein (Don’t rush/crowd); Bhid- bhad 
wale ilakon mein Vishish Dhyan Rakhein (Pay special attention to crowded 
localities). In the Town Hall, a municipal building thronged by citizens complet-
ing paperwork, one found this notice: Sediyon ke Kono Mein Na Thu Kein 
(Please do not spit in the corner of staircases). At the Red Fort, the most promi-
nent heritage building in Old Delhi, a loudspeaker at a police checkpoint played 
an endlessly looping tape, with exhortations including: Kisi aanjan vyakti se 
dosti naa karein (Please do not befriend any unknown person). At the Moti 
Cinema Hall, a popular cinema off Chandni Chowk, which often played Bho-
jpuri films for labourers, there was a huge placard outside the ticket line, listing 
the hypothetical possibilities and non- possibilities for cinema- goers. A list of 
things proscribed, ‘Don’t’, Na Kare, and a list of things allowed, ‘Do’, Kare, 
stood in front of the ticket queue.
 In the parks, cinema halls and government offices of the old city, ‘spatial eti-
quette’ was demanded (Srivastava 2007: 185). In Delhi’s other spaces – the res-
idential colony, the private club – there were ‘instructions for use’ (Khilnani 
1999). In contrast, it was hard to imagine that any rule could be enforced on the 
street. The impossibility of reform of the street tells us something of its stubborn 
implacability.
The street: hypertexts and hyperactivity
In part, it is the street’s porosity and stubbornness that has allowed a wider 
public culture to circulate. I write ‘circulate’ instead of ‘view’ or ‘see’, because 
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writers invariably refer to the optic metaphor when thinking of the street. The 
citizen’s gaze over the street, in this telling, demands ‘a particular way of 
seeing’, a requirement of orderly urban space (Chakrabarty 2002: 66).
 A good example of the failure of such vision had to do with attempts to stand-
ardise storefront fonts. In the Khari Baoli bazaar I learned that municipal offi-
cials, as part of their move to beautify the area, demanded that the signs in front 
of stores be taken down and made uniform. Looking at the bazaar, it was clear 
that this effort had failed: there were signs in modern, twentieth- century Helvet-
ica; but there were far more that competed frenetically in older, outdated fonts, 
such as Times and Arial. Indeed, the boards in front of stores were emblems of 
the individual will of storekeepers rather than impositions of uniformity. Boards 
overlapped, many tilted precariously and not a few were obscured by handbills 
or stickers.
 Clearly, the planners’s desire for soothing uniformity was unfulfilled on the 
streets of Old Delhi. In other areas, municipal ordinances were pasted over with 
adverts for aphrodisiacs; modest doorways barely hinted at the frayed courtyards 
lying beyond them; the jumble of merchants’ signboards and plethora of fonts 
denied easy orientation. Perhaps most importantly, one’s vision was constantly 
overruled by other senses: odorous waves from gutters and railway tracks that 
make one double over, or inviting scents from kebab sellers; the tinny fragment 
of film music from a passing bus, or the over- long mobile phone conversation 
foisted upon you. To reduce the street to a space of middle- class surveillance is 
an act of impoverishment; there is much happening alongside the citizen’s gaze.
 The sensory overload of the street is long- standing. In the 1960s, in Agra’s old 
city, the radio was the primary conduit for news, as well as the ‘nationalized cult 
of the popular movie song’ (Lynch 1969: 168). In the 1980s and 1990s, the tele-
vision, attached to the tea stall or a shopkeeper’s shelf, became the venue around 
which the masses huddled to compulsively watch television serials. During my 
time in Old Delhi, the primary medium for communication and entertainment had 
shifted to the mobile phone. Even men of humble means, such as Rahul, had, or 
shared, a mobile phone, on which they rang distant relatives, downloaded ring-
tones and listened to cricket matches. The acoustic cacophony of the old city’s 
street was thus given added dimension by this conduit to elsewhere.
 Visually, the old city’s street was similarly fecund. Sensational murder stories in 
Hindi newspapers and gossip magazines could be found in front of sidewalk 
vendors. They focused on lurid scandals of the present: politicians caught with pros-
titutes, murders by and of servants, internet videos of teenagers having sex. These 
topics provided the feedstock for taaza khabar, or salacious news, or chatpati baat, 
literally spicy talk, the currency of exchange between the city’s residents. Adver-
tisements for English classes and sexologists were plastered on urinals and walls, 
both offering self- improvement of a kind. They reaffirmed, if only in their conjunc-
tion, the male and vernacular character of the street (Srivastava 2007).
 In these ways, Old Delhi’s streets were emphatically physical spaces; their churn 
left its mark on one’s clothes and eardrums. But they were also dream- worlds to 
elsewhere. Keyboard- clicks allow one entry into parallel experiences. Similarly, 
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standing on the city’s streets, listening to the conversations and music nearby, 
looking at the posters and billboards, ‘pockets of space are experienced like hyper-
texts: omnipresent but not always clicked into activation’ (Varzi 2006: 128). We 
could extend this insight further, because the streets of Old Delhi are not just full of 
hypertexts; the barrage of visual and audio stimuli results in hyperactivity. A good 
amount of that churn has, of course, to do with film. Even before the urban dweller 
sees a Bollywood film, or one from smaller film industries in different states, they 
are floating in its posters and coasting along to its playback music.6
 Standing in its midst, the street is like facing a desktop with many browser 
windows open simultaneously, or a TV show overwhelmed by competing 
adverts and news banners that frame the screen. On those mediated screens, as 
on the mediated street, there is no main or true or normative street activity. 
Think of the links you can follow when you surf the internet; do they not make 
you forget what you were supposed to be doing, constitute a parallel universe, 
easy to delve into? On the street, one has selective focus, as from a website with 
too many links, or a TV programme with scrolling news bites. Fragments of 
information on the street compete for and exhaust one’s attention span, deaden-
ing as well as enhancing one’s senses. This is central to the modern condition of 
‘anaesthetics’, where the shock of work and exhaustion of consumption results 
in sense- deadening (Buck- Morss 1995).
 The workers at Haus Khazi Chowk, dealing with muscle aches, seeking a 
reprieve from ordinary dullness, imbibed nashas or intoxicants: desi daru or desi 
sharab (country liquor), as well as tobacco- related products such as beedis, 
paan, gutka and soorti. The men knew, like most addicts, that these intoxicants 
accelerated their physical decline. But they felt them necessary, to gain the 
energy to work, or to receive some peace of mind (aram) and retreat into oneself. 
The street offered dreamworlds to elsewhere, but its sheer abundance, its endless 
proliferating desires offered in advertisements and bazaars, deadened one’s capa-
city to domesticate. The mind lit up when men ingested stimulants on the street; 
the body powered- down through the taking of depressants. The street, as conduit 
for movement and self- transformation, and site of debasement and anomie, 
embodied the modern condition. One had to ingest stimulants to work the 
inhuman hours demanded by the city, building the new emblems of the urban; 
but they resulted in a subject too wasted to work, staring out, eyes glazed, both 
distant from, and intertwined with, the street.
Urban beautification and urban ugliness
I have argued for the street’s association with the ‘floating population’ or popular 
masses. This relation is pervasive, as the streets of Old Delhi show, but not abso-
lute. A contrast is provided by the middle- class addas of Kolkata, a defining 
feature of twentieth- century urban modernity in that city. They were, and in a 
more modest way still are, congregations of friendly gossip between city- 
dwellers, often conducted on the street (Chakrabarty 2000). In a more general 
way, the iconography of the Indian street – with billboards for the affluent and 
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storefronts for the middle class – presume a stratified population, able to imbibe 
the deluxe creams and foreign cola advertised (Appadurai 1987: 19). Neverthe-
less, the altitude of commercial sentiments – always located above the sleeping 
homeless or hunched- over day labourers – tells us something about the street’s 
symbolic gradient. Moreover, in recent years, as the underclass ethos of the 
black town has seeped into other parts of the Indian city – through slums on 
public land, for example – elites have become more wary of the street, retreating 
into their drawing rooms (Mazumdar 2008).
 In colonial and post- independence India, the street – a space of bazaar 
rumours, delinquent youth and subversive nationalists – was an official obses-
sion. The history of Indian cities is often written as a fall from grace, such that 
the ‘plebianisation of public space appears irreversible’ (Kaviraj 1997: 108). But 
looked at over the long term, the Indian street has always been for the plebes; 
their appearance is not novel, but long- standing.
 Nineteenth- century regulations against gambling, for example, targeted the 
street and other popular gathering spots, but left such practices alone when they 
were carried out in the private homes of the gentry (Birla 2009: 154). In colonial 
and postcolonial Calcutta, halla, ‘sudden, violent police action aimed at clearing 
streets of hawkers and vendors’ was widespread (Chakrabarty 2002: 77). In the 
early twentieth century, state planners, elite reformers in Uttar Pradesh’s large 
cities, targeted ‘the immorality and vulgarity of plebeian and street culture’ 
(Gooptu 2001: 240). This anxiety about the street’s underclass ethos emerged 
during the Emergency of 1975–77. At that time, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
suspended democracy, and bureaucrats effected the ‘beautification’ of Delhi’s 
streets, through the removal of slums and pavement dwellers (Tarlo 2003).
 To return to Delhi’s old city, municipal authorities, when performing their 
role as the guardians of law and order, often turned to its street to demonstrate 
their vigilance. Very Important Persons, or VIPs, constitute an important polit-
ical caste in India’s capital. Still, they are not so valued as to deserve one further 
adverb; that is the preserve of the handful within the category Very, Very 
Important Persons – VVIPs. When members of either exalted category toured 
the old city, to announce their interest in the nation’s heritage, for example, 
Rahul and his ilk were cleared beforehand by the police. Such performances 
were mutually deceptive. Politicians and elite VIPs and VVIPs pretended that 
their presence was not the cause of the street’s strange emptiness. Subsidiary 
officials and police pretended that they did not aid and abet the kinds of street 
hawking and encroachment that lined their pockets. The street was here a par-
ticularly self- conscious theatre. As soon as the VIPs and VVIPs left the streets of 
the old city, their official ambassadors snaking away in a coordinated series of 
blinking rooftop lights, the street returned to its occupied, unkempt frenzy.
 For the men of the street, for workers such as those at Haus Khazi Chowk, 
urban cleansing of this type was a familiar pattern. It was like a rhythmic flooding 
of the plains that could, as with seasonal cycles, be plotted temporally. Other 
causus belli were possible, beyond the presence of the very important. Prior to 
national holidays and election polls, for example, the workers of Haus Qazi Chowk 
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were shunted into spartan concrete shells, charitably termed rehan basaras, or 
night shelters. Another category of urban beautification reached Rahul and his 
fellow workers more prosaically. After shopkeepers complained to the police 
about pavement encroachment the labourers grudgingly retreated to nearby parks.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to identify some features that define the street in Old 
Delhi, and, by extension, other postcolonial streets. It has emphasised how ple-
beian and performative streets are, and how, for the proletarian masses, the street 
is both a window of opportunity and sinkhole of failure. It has put forward an 
analytical vocabulary for revising how the postcolonial street is conceived; abun-
dance and plasticity, osmosis and porosity, and altitude and adjustment allow us 
to apprehend the street’s circulatory and shape- shifting nature. In this process, 
this chapter has highlighted a central tension exemplified by the streets of Old 
Delhi. On the one hand, they are, as in many modern cities, a source of enormous 
anxiety: governments, in 1857, 1947, 1976 and 2010, made serious attempts to 
reform the streets of the old city. Yet, on the other, the street is a terminally 
unkempt but vital entity. The Indian street has repeatedly been a target of official 
rationalisation, yet it has retained its own durable character.
 Like an ingeniously moulded toy, which can weather numerous blows only to 
return to its original shape, the street, having endured thousands of police and 
municipal raids, invariably returns to an enduring, autonomous shape. The plas-
ticity of the street, its ability to persist while facing enormous, countervailing 
pressures, is a metaphor for the Indian old city. It lingers not out of subaltern 
resistance, or indigenous continuity: none of the workers at Haus Khazi Chowk, 
in Delhi’s old city, celebrate the fact that they eat, defecate, shower and entertain 
each other on the street. In all of its unruliness, lacking the prescriptions under-
girding other urban spaces, the street remains the defining haunt of the male, 
popular masses.
Notes
1 Oldenburg (1976: 63) discusses how the chowk, broader and busier than the lane, pro-
duces a distinct urban public. Chowks are where politicians become visible by stroll-
ing; passers- by converge there at tea and tobacco stands; and newspapers are placed on 
street platforms and read communally.
2 Indeed, the Indian street is far from neutral, public territory; the long history of reli-
gious processions, rampaging mobs and jeering crowds on the street show it can be 
potentially malevolent: ‘during periods of riot in Hyderabad’s walled city, an innocu-
ous strip of road often becomes enemy territory. A person may well find crossing that 
strip of road to get to the safety of his home a terrifying experience’ (Naidu 1990: 44).
3 Clearly, many postcolonial streets outside of India exhibit such features. For an ana-
logous example from Africa, one could look to Lagos. There, on a map, expressways 
still looked like channels. Actually,
Lagos has no streets; instead it has curbs and gates, barriers and hustlers that 
control separate landscapes. Some areas might look like streets; they might even 
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look like superhighways. But even the Lagos superhighway has bus stops on it, 
mosques under it, markets in it and buildingless factories throughout it. Lagos is 
as much a system of circulation as it is any particular place . . . Its roads are not 
plan lines between points, but perhaps its most elastic and variable scapes, made 
more enabling by local modifications which deny the road’s insistent linearity – 
guardrails are removed, jersey barriers put aside. At all bottlenecks, the road is 
converted to allow movement in a maximum number of directions.
(Koolhas et al. 2000: 686)
4 See Coelho (2006) for an analogous study of urban infrastructure in Chennai. Under-
ground water distribution is theoretically channelled through a formal grid and preor-
dained supply levels. Actually it is subject to innumerable compromises. These 
provisional but actually widespread and therefore constitutive forms include bypass 
connections, illegal siphoning and temporary compromises.
5 In a city with nearly 3,200 public urinals in 2007, only 132 were for women. These 
public toilets are widely considered unsanitary, and surrounded by fears of sexual 
assault, resulting in recalcitrance in using them. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
health problems such as constipation, piles and urinary tract infection are more pre-
valent amongst urban women than men. See Aastha Atray Banan’s ‘Why Women 
Should Not Hold On’, Tehelka, 24 July 2010: 56–57.
6 An observer of Tamil cinema in the south Indian city of Madurai notes:
In the city of Madurai, cinema is everywhere. Glittering billboards advertise the 
latest films, and smaller posters are slapped on to spare inches of wall space. 
Movie songs blare from horn speakers and cassette players at weddings, puberty 
rites, and temple and shrine festivals. Tapes of movie dialogues play at coffee 
stalls, while patrons join in reciting them. Rickshaws and shop boards are painted 
with movie stars’ pictures. . . . Fan- club members meet in the streets to boast about 
their star and make fun of his rivals.
(Dickey 1993: 3)
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17 Life stories of the urban poor in 
Chittagong, Bangladesh
Mineo Takada
Chittagong is the second largest city in Bangladesh, after the capital, Dhaka, and 
has a population of several million. As a port city, Chittagong has vast numbers 
of lower- strata labourers. They and their families support the city from below, 
and in this sense they are among the most typical city dwellers.1 This chapter 
deals with cases of people who live and work in this city. All the interviewees 
are migrants from rural villages, and have thus experienced both rural and urban 
life. Therefore, images of the city and urban life can be expected to emerge from 
such narratives, particularly from those who have experienced life in the city.2 
Further, their views reflect the comparative perspective that contrasts the urban 
(life) against the rural (life). The urban ‘lower strata’ in this chapter is generally 
composed of people living in a Bangladeshi city – in this case Chittagong – and 
working in jobs typically belonging to the informal sector.
 The author conducted interviews with many people, but this chapter presents 
mainly excerpts from the narratives of three individuals. They are Haydar, 
Hakim and Khokon, all of whom are Muslim men. Haydar (aged about 50) is a 
riksa (rickshaw) painter, and Hakim (aged about 60) is the owner of a riksa 
garage – he owns many riksas and a private riksa company. Hakim was origin-
ally a riksa painter, and Haydar was his apprentice. By contrast, Khokon (in his 
mid- forties) is a cook who prepares dishes ordered by his clients for parties. He 
has no relationship to the other two men.3 Complimenting these accounts, some 
narratives from other interviewees will also be presented. The ‘oral history’ 
method is employed in this chapter in order to allow the voice of the person con-
cerned to be heard.4 Broadly speaking, many urban studies tend to pay attention 
to those people whose voices are loudest, and to ignore or under- estimate the 
voices, feelings or thoughts of the people who belong to what might be called 
the lower strata of society, or to the silent majority. For various reasons, their 
voices struggle to reach the ear of the hearer. By contrast, those studies that use 
the oral history method are exemplary in setting out to hear the voices of the 
people and to correct the bias of previous studies.5
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From ‘runaway child’ to urban resident
Running away from home
It is remarkable that the topic of running away from home often arises in conver-
sations with people belonging to the lower strata of a Bangladeshi city: ‘I left 
home’; ‘I ran away from home.’ They talk about this topic plainly, as if they are 
just talking about leaving home and going to school in the morning. Let us con-
sider one of the most typical examples.
When I first ran away from home, I got some money from my father. I said, 
‘Dad, I want to do something. Give me money.’ He gave me twenty taka. At 
that time, [the bus fare from the home village] to Dhaka was nine- and-a half 
taka. I remember it clearly, even now. Of course, I never said that I intended 
to go to Dhaka. If I had said so, he would not have given me money. I left 
home just like that.
Khokon told me this. He was only about ten years old. No father would suspect 
a little boy of intending to run away from home simply because he said ‘[I] want 
to do something.’ It did not seem to be out of the ordinary. Certainly his father 
had married a second time, but this cannot be labelled the decisive factor. 
Instead, many factors came together: leaving school because he did not like the 
studies; caring for cows instead, but finding it hard work and not liking it; his 
father’s second marriage; longing for the unseen urban life; and so forth, These 
factors came together, and he seemed to decide to run away from home.
 The case of Haydar is a similar example. He also ‘ran away from home’ at 
the age of 14 or so. He had simply thought that, by going to Dhaka, he would 
somehow manage to live. In the case of Hakim it was not a case of ‘running 
away from home’; he left his cousin’s house and tried to set up his own business, 
regardless of how feasible it was.
 Clearly the boys chose to run away simply as an extension of their everyday 
life. Moreover, as we saw in the typical case of Khokon, they did it deliberately 
to some degree, although they were children.
Harsh everyday life: the background to ‘running away from home’
Needless to say, attention must be paid to the fact that the everyday life of the 
runaways had been harsh and, some might say, inhumane.6 Khokon had been 
forced to take care of cows as a result of not going to school; Haydar, though he 
stayed at home, could not go to school and endured days of living on the edge of 
starvation.7 Although he did not ‘run away from home’, Hakim had to work as 
an apprentice in his cousin’s house during his mid- teens. For them, everyday life 
was full of hard events and experiences, although none of them were particularly 
unusual in this regard. Given this situation, it is easy to imagine that they were 
inclined to expect something good in the city, about which they had obtained 
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only fragmentary, secondhand information. It is significant that each of them had 
such a harsh everyday life, and that such a life is not exceptional. Broadly similar 
situations can be found in all the poor rural areas of Bangladesh.
 Attention should also be paid to the fact that there are many kinds of violence 
in the ‘harshness’ of the everyday lives of these men. For example, in Hakim’s 
case his cousin invited him to work in his house, but the cousin broke the 
promise to teach him how to repair and maintain riksa. Instead, his cousin forced 
him to work as a domestic servant. However, Hakim could not go back home, as 
the economic conditions there were so severe. In the case of Khokon, his experi-
ence of violence was less visible. He related the following:
[As I stopped going to Madrasa] my father introduced to me the work of 
caring for cows for the payment of 600 taka per year. That was pitiful work. 
However, we did not have money because of the payment for my mother’s 
medical care, and we were [in the condition that we] scarcely had a meal 
once in a day or so. I was just six or seven years old. It was hell, but I con-
tinued working for a year, even though I hated the work. The job was taking 
care of cows, but the cows would never do as I said and the work was very 
hard for a little boy such as I was at that time.
Khokon experienced days of ‘scarcely eating a meal once in a day or so’, at 
just six or seven years old. Moreover, suffering from malnutrition, children of 
rural Bangladesh generally have a very small build relative to their age. Still, a 
boy of such small build was forced to take care of big cows all day long. That 
kind of labour is not housework, but a job with payment, i.e. one with respons-
ibility. He could not flee, but instead tried desperately to drive the cows, 
working all day. It is a form of invisible violence. It was somewhat similar to 
the case of Haydar.
As [my] father was so poor, he could not feed us. I endured the days of 
being living on the edge of starvation.
Days of starvation constitutes a kind of torture for a small boy. This torture 
endures for a long time and affects not only the child’s body, but also his mental 
health. It is so severe that it leads the boy to decide to run away from home. A 
riksa- repairing mechanic, Manir, who is a close friend of Khokon, related a 
similar experience of his own more succinctly:
I was really hungry! I was really hungry! Therefore I left home.
 Conticini and Hulme (2006) point out that visible forms of violence, such as 
beatings and abuse, are the greatest factor in the trend of Bangladeshi children 
who run away from home. We may further safely conclude that various kinds of 
violence, regardless of whether they are visible or invisible, are closely related to 
the decision of children to ‘run away from home’. However, it is too simplistic 
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to conclude that violence is the only factor in creating the phenomenon of 
runaway children; various other contributing factors must also be investigated.8
A society in which ‘running away from home’ is a common 
occurrence
It is strongly suspected that Bangladesh is a society in which running away from 
home is a commonplace occurrence. Unfortunately, there is no rigid population 
registration system by which to measure it; the population census is conducted 
every decade, but its capture ratio yields less than ideal accuracy. Additionally, 
although the cities of Bangladesh have large populations of slum- dwellers and 
people who live on the streets, it is not possible to estimate a reasonable figure 
based on the limited number of sample surveys. It is important to know that 
these are the figures of those who ‘exist’ and that there are no statistics regarding 
the figures of those who ‘do not exist’, such as runaway children.9
 In spite of the above, based on the collateral evidence collected, the author 
suspects there have been and are many cases of running away from home in 
Bangladesh. For example, Hara (1972) reported many cases of runaway boys 
following his field survey conducted in the 1960s in rural areas near to Chit-
tagong city. Though there has been no subsequent study on this matter, mentions 
of this topic can be found in studies on street children and related themes (Blan-
chet 1996, Conticini & Hulme 2006, Giani 2006). Moreover, the interviews the 
author conducted with persons of the lower strata in Chittagong suggest that one 
out of every five or six interviewees (mainly adult men) had experienced running 
away from home. These studies largely suggest the state of affairs in which 
running away from home is a prevalent phenomenon in Bangladesh, particularly 
in the case of boys, and it can be traced back to the Pakistan era at least. If there 
really are so many runaway cases, as indicated by the above method of calcula-
tion, all the processes that lead to running away can be understood without 
making a direct connection between running away and violence. The explanation 
will follow below and is confined to the case of boys only, as the majority of the 
runaway children are boys.
 First, if many boys really try to run away, then younger boys will naturally 
hear of many examples in their immediate circle. This will lead to a state in 
which boys are readily able to think about running away as a means of leaving 
behind their frustrations. And, because they are well acquainted with previous 
examples of running away, the mental barrier against it will be lower, and they 
will easily be able to do the same. Moreover, as they hear about the many exam-
ples of other runaway boys, they come to have a rough knowledge of such facts 
as who tried and how they did it. In other words, it is highly probable that they 
possess the ‘know- how’ for running away. For example, responding to the 
author’s question on this topic, Manir recounted:
I heard about runaway cases so much, so much! Where they went, how they 
did it. All! Therefore, I thought [decided], ‘OK, I will do it, too.’
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Khokon nodded his agreement to these words.
 An additional factor is brought to this situation. It is possible for boys to ‘run 
away from home’ at a very low cost. The author has observed the following 
examples: when travelling in the rural area of Bangladesh by local bus, it is 
common to see little children boarding unaccompanied. In many cases, such a 
child will carry a water pot made of aluminium, or a small plastic bag stuffed 
with candy, and will start to sell water or candy to the passengers. The child will 
continue selling until the next stop or until the nearby local bus terminal, where 
they will disembark and catch the bus travelling in the opposite direction, resum-
ing the business until it arrives at the stop where they first got on board. Among 
such children, however, there are also some empty- handed boys, who board 
alone and slump silently into a corner of the bus. These boys continue travelling 
to the terminal, whereupon they disappear into some unknown place. They have 
the following aspects in common: they are nearly all boys, ranging from six or 
seven years of age to their early teens. They are empty- handed, board the bus 
alone, sit in a corner on the floor without speaking and continue travelling to the 
terminal. Furthermore, they are nearly always seen on buses going uptown. After 
seeing several such boys, the author realised that they must be runaway boys. 
When explaining his own experience of running away from home, Habib, a car-
penter repairing old furniture in a dark and narrow backstreet of Kursi, a housing 
area in Chittagong, simply said:
I climbed aboard a bus and came here [in Chittagong]; board a bus. Just 
that.
In the case of trains, it is much easier to ‘run away from home’. If a boy hops 
aboard a train while it is travelling at reduced speed just outside a station or 
moving through a curve, and then gets off the train just before it reaches its 
destination, no one will interfere with him. This is exactly what Haydar did:
I ran away alone. Climbed aboard a train. I thought that, if I went to Dhaka, 
if I went to the big city, I would find a job.
It is easy to understand this when one sees the train moving along with its 
rooftops full of people. These examples tell us that it is possible to ‘run away 
from home’ with no money or at a very low cost.
 Consequently, because there are so many cases of ‘running away from home’, 
there is a likelihood that boys come up with ‘running away’ as a simple means to 
escape their frustration. The mental barrier against running away is lower, it is 
easy to obtain the know- how of ‘running away’ and ‘running away’ can be done 
at very low cost. If these conditions are taken into account, the possibility of 
actually ‘running away’ will be much greater. Manir’s narrative tells us that this 
is the case. We must also consider the fact that, as a reality, everyday life will be 
harsh in almost all rural areas. Moreover, in Bangladesh people share ‘insh 
Allah’ as a kind of sentiment. Originally, this term equated to ‘God willing’ in 
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English, the literal translation being ‘God knows’. In reality, however, Bangla-
deshi Muslims tends to use this term with the attitude that ‘you never know 
unless you try’. Here the sentiment of ‘insh Allah’ signifies a highly optimistic 
outlook. Once this optimistic ‘insh Allah’ sentiment is combined with the factors 
mentioned above, it becomes apparent that boys show little hesitation about 
running away.10
To be street children, and then to be city dwellers
If a very young boy climbs aboard a bus or a train, it will not be difficult to reach 
a destination. In many cases that destination will be a big city such as Dhaka or 
Chittagong. However, the boy has no leads in the city, nor does he have a way of 
getting in touch with a person upon whom he can rely; he has very little money, 
if any, at hand. At this point the consequences of the act are as clear as day:
When I stayed at home, I had no money and it was difficult to obtain food. 
Then, I came to Dhaka. Once I came to Dhaka, many people told me, ‘Chit-
tagong is a better place.’ So, I came here. Then, [I spent a lot of time won-
dering about] where should I go and where should I stay. I slept on the street 
for three days.
Haydar’s story, as told above, is similar to the case of Khokon, who had this to 
say.
You ask me about my first time [‘running away’]? Ah, I got twenty taka 
from my father and used the money to go [to Dhaka]. By bus. Alone, totally 
alone. When I got off the bus, I had only ten taka or so, and I used it up. Ate 
food and so forth. Acquaintances? No. None whatsoever.
Thus they became street children. Many street children can be found around the 
bus terminals, train stations or boat terminals. This is partly because those are 
the places where the children are able to make small sums of money by picking 
rags or carrying passengers’ luggage. Moreover, it is because these are their 
points of arrival in the city where, after leaving their villages, they arrive by bus, 
train or boat and disembark. In fact, in the case of Khokon, he started his street- 
child life as a ‘tokai’ in the bus terminal where he had first arrived from his 
home village.11 One might assume that runaway children can return home if they 
want, but actually it is very difficult to do so. First of all, a child will usually 
know only the name of their home villages, but as the destination screen of a bus 
or train just shows the name of a local town or bazaar, the name of the home 
village is seldom listed. Additionally, there are many villages or towns with 
similar names. Therefore, if a child really wants to go back, it is very difficult to 
find which bus, train or boat he should board. In fact, there are many reports in 
the local paper about street children who want to return home but do not know 
where to go.12 Furthermore, because many of the children run away from home 
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out of hatred for their life there, they would not want to go back even if they 
knew how to get there.
 It is obvious that there are many street children in Bangladesh, especially in 
big cities such as Dhaka or Chittagong, but it is very difficult to estimate an 
accurate number. This is partly because there are few reliable studies about 
them, although rough numbers are given in news reports. Moreover, because 
they are dispersed throughout the city area and usually walk about during the 
daytime, it is difficult to pinpoint where they are. This matter will not be 
expanded upon any further here. There is, however, a completely different factor 
that is closely related to the current discussion. The street ‘children’ will not be 
children eternally. Generally they are seen strolling around separately in the 
daytime in search of money or food, but at night they stay together in groups in a 
fixed location. The group usually consists of 5–20 children, aged from 4–5 to 
about 14–15. It is very rare to see children older than that. In other words, they 
somehow get out of the condition of being street children by the age of 14 or 15. 
The next question, thus, is how they achieve this. The narratives instruct us on 
this point in vivid detail.
How did I find that first job? I just entered a restaurant and said [to the 
owner], ‘I’ve come from a village. Will you give me a job?’ I tried like this 
ten times or so, and at last [a man said to me], ‘Okay, do it.’ That was the 
first.
Khokon explained the situation thus. In his case, as he was working as a ‘tokai’ 
in his street- child period, he gradually became well informed about city life. 
Gradually, however, he started to think about finding a way out of his street- 
child condition. Eventually, he took action and asked around for a job. He met a 
man who said, ‘Okay, do it.’ This was the first step in escaping his street life. 
Haydar, however, was much luckier. Just a few days after arriving at Chittagong, 
he met Hakim and got out of the street life by becoming Hakim’s apprentice.
[Arriving at Chittagong, I was hanging around and] accidentally came upon 
Hakim’s garage. He had five or six riksas at that time. . . . There, in his 
garage. I explained that I had come here this way [and in my present situ-
ation had no place to go]. He said, ‘Okay, stay here. Will you work? I will 
teach you how to do it. As you practice a trade, you will be needed [i.e. you 
will be a needed person].’ At first, I pulled a riksa for two days, and then I 
started the job [i.e. painting work].
It seems that such cases are not rare. For example, in Rubel (2009), a verbatim 
transcript of talks with a street vendor of Chotpoti (a kind of snack food) in the 
area of Mirpur, a northern part of Dhaka, there is an episode in which the vendor 
employs a boy on a probationary basis as a helper. The boy had initially come to 
him as a beggar, but because the boy seemed somewhat promising, he employed 
him instead of simply giving him money. Many similar examples can be found 
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if we carefully read news stories based on interviews (generally they are written 
in Bangla instead of English).
 Although street children somehow initially find a job and get out of their 
street- child situation, they rarely continue with it. Instead, they usually try to 
seek a job that seems more suitable for them. Khokon told us this:
[After finding a first job,] then, I changed jobs several times and I met a nice 
man. . . . When I was at the age of sixteen or seventeen, a person asked me, 
‘Will you help with my work?’ That was ‘sardari kaj’ [in this case, catering 
work for wedding ceremonies and other types of gatherings]. [I] learned 
about the work gradually, on the job. . . . When I was about eighteen years of 
age, I was told, ‘You have become a man and should start sardari kaj inde-
pendently.’ Then, I started my own job and employed others.
In this case, Khokon started his career as a helper in a restaurant and changed 
jobs several times, before finding a job, sardari kaj, that he found preferable.
I started to work as helper [for a riksa mechanic] and changed [work] places 
several times. At last, I got [found] an ustad [literally a ‘master’ or ‘expert’, 
but in this case, a man of a good riksa repairing skill] and became his 
apprentice.
This is Manir’s story. Though he first started work as an assistant to a riksa 
mechanic and continued in this line, he changed workplace several times and 
found a boss he preferred.
 Such a process of ‘running away from home → flowing into the city → street 
children → helper → skill acquisition → settling down in the city’ is emerging 
from the narratives as a path by which one can become an urban resident.13
 Many scholars have admitted that in Bangladesh the following factors trigger 
the movement from rural areas to cities: the search for an opportunity to obtain 
higher education or to get a better job, which is the most general course of action; 
changing one’s status from a migrant worker in order to settle down in the city; 
fleeing homelessness caused by land erosion or by the over- fragmentation of prop-
erty as a result of gavelkind (equal division of the land among sons, as set forth by 
the Islamic law on inheritance); and escaping homelessness resulting from the loss 
of opportunities for wage labour in rural areas, and so forth. However, as far as the 
author knows, no one has discussed running away from home and being a street 
child as a factor in becoming an urban resident. The narratives discussed here 
confirm, however, that such a course has considerable importance, at least in the 
case of people who belong to the urban lower strata of Bangladesh.
 Additionally, although they are not urban residents in the true sense, there are 
many people who left their villages in order to live around the city or local trans-
port  terminals. For example, boys called ‘helpers’, who usually ride on tempo 
(three- wheelers for multiple riders) are toll- collectors-cum- pullers-in for attract-
ing customers. It is widely known that many such boys are former street children 
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or boys who have grown up in slum areas. Also, many bus conductors and the 
above- mentioned bus ‘helpers’ or truck ‘helpers’, who help to pile goods onto 
the loading platform and take other goods off, are said to be from a similar social 
background. Most of them spend the entire day in a car (or tempo/bus/truck) and 
often sleep there too. Despite the absence of a study written about them, many 
news articles or reports published in Bangla newspapers mention their personal 
social background. As far as we know from those reports, it is safe to say that 
this is an accurate representation of the situation. Based on these facts, it is easy 
to understand why bus conductors or helpers often ignore fare- cheating boys, as 
they themselves are from a similar social background.
Many hidden people cannot become urban residents
Needless to say, it is unrealistic to think that all street children make a safe trans-
ition to the status of urban resident. Attention must be paid to the other routes by 
which many of them simply ‘get out’ of the street life situation. Of course, some 
of them are fortunate enough to return to their native villages by taking 
advantage of certain events, but it is unlikely that the percentage of such events 
is high. Rather, other outcomes must be considered, such as dying while a street 
child, growing up and continuing street life as a squatter or some other part of a 
floating population or descending into the ranks of petty criminals, drug dealers, 
drug addicts or, in the case of girls, prostitutes.14 Concerning the street children, 
Tahamina (2001) reports their miserable situation of sexual abuse and exploita-
tion; additionally Tito (2009) also reports that they are subjected to many kinds 
of violence – physical, mental or social – and are severely affected by those 
things. As a result, the sad fact is that in cities many children are dealt with as a 
kind of consumable good.15
 Unfortunately, these examples do not appear in the narratives of the people 
who belong to the lower strata in cities. Moreover, those who relayed their life 
stories to the author were men who had already (and successfully in some sense) 
become urban residents. Those who do not become urban residents never have 
the opportunity to tell us about their lives. Considering the situation on a macro 
scale, this phenomenon may be explained by the ‘theory of a city as a doodle-
bug’s pit’.16 It is hardly possible to determine which is more common: those who 
become urban residents or those who disappear. However, attention must be paid 
to the fact that there are people whose lives cannot even appear in the narratives 
of the lower- strata men, because cities in Bangladesh have the pitiless and rough 
character of swallowing people up like ‘consumable goods’. This is one aspect 
of the nature of cities in Bangladesh.
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Urban human relationships
(Mutual) aid
If someone successfully becomes an urban resident, what kind of a world awaits 
him? People who have made this transition are able to inform us about the very 
interesting reality of their human relationships. For example, Khokon had the 
following to say:
Looking around us, [those people there] are not my brothers or my old 
friends. Still, I gained many things from them. . . . For example, his home 
[that of Manir, a riksa mechanic working beside him] is about 40 km or 
more away from my village home. I’ve never visited his home, and he has 
never visited my home either. I just became acquainted with him here. He 
helps me in many ways, and I also help him.
Responding to this, Manir said,
Hah [yes], I did not know him before. We met here [this place]. But, I 
believe him [Khokon] and we help each other.
These are narratives of individuals helping each other as neighbours in a city 
despite not knowing each other well, and this aid is part of their everyday life. 
Such help is not necessarily mutual, but rather is often unilateral and voluntary. 
This is obvious in the situation mentioned above, in which street children gain 
the opportunity to get out of their street life. When they ask the owners of shops 
or restaurants to give them jobs, some of the owners make them an offer like 
‘Okay, do it’ (in the case of Khokon) or ‘Okay, stay here. Will you work? I will 
teach you how to do it’ (in the case of Haydar). The children are complete 
strangers to the owners; if the owners employ street children, they will get 
almost nothing, or it may even be to their detriment. Even so, they offer some 
jobs to the children. This is nothing but a form of unilateral ‘aid’.
 This kind of unilateral aid plays a significant role in turning around a person’s 
life. For example, Hakim tried to work independently. However, he had no clear 
plan then; he had almost no income in the first day of his independence, nor did 
he have any money for his dinner that day. He had no choice but to visit a res-
taurant with whose owner he was at least slightly acquainted, and, with a laugh 
as if to joke, spoke to him. This was because he thought that his proposal would 
almost certainly be refused. Still, he used it as a trial.
‘Bhai [brother], I have no money. Serve me a meal. I will pay you once I get 
some money tomorrow.’ He did not know me well. . . . He had no relation-
ship with me in terms of work, and he had no reason to serve me a meal. 
Then, he ordered an employee, ‘Hey, serve Hakim a meal. Meat dishes, 
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vegetable dishes or anything he wants. Serve him anything.’ . . . As I heard 
that he was saying, ‘Serve Hakim a meal’, I was really grateful to him.
Having eaten sufficient food and recovered his physical and mental energy, 
Hakim had at last achieved the independence of work. Interestingly, not only in 
the cases of Khokon or of Hakim, those who describe experiences like these 
invariably emphasise that it is nearly impossible to find such a relationship in the 
villages. In that sense, this kind of (mutual) aid is a form of human relationship, 
or an aspect of human relationships at least, in the city in Bangladesh.
Indifference and tension
Although they help each other, the human relationship in city life is accom-
panied by a characteristic sense of distance. The words of Khokon, who said, 
‘I’ve never visited his home, and he has never visited my home either. [I] am 
just acquainted [with him] here’, clearly express this kind of distance, as they do 
not stick closely to one another. It is not accurate to say that this sense of dis-
tance is found only in relationships among unrelated persons. Earlier, using data 
gathered through a field study conducted in a slum area of Chittagong, the author 
pointed out the fact that the frequent recombination of relationships was 
observed among the urban poor, even among kinsmen such as siblings or close 
relatives (Takada 2006: ch. 5). This sense of distance, the feeling of not being 
very closely attached to each other, is certainly characteristic of human relation-
ships in the city.
 On the other hand, this sense of distance and the disinterest with regard to 
others seem to be two sides of the same coin. For example, Hakim spoke about a 
Bihari man in the following way:17
A little later, I went to see him, but he already had moved to somewhere. It 
was not clear whether he went to Pakistan or Dhaka. I asked the neighbours 
but no one knew. As my association with him was very limited and I had no 
relationship with his family, I did not know any more.
This Bihari man was not only a person who had helped Hakim a great deal in the 
early days of becoming independent in his work, but was also a rare man who 
even lent him money without any guarantee of return. Nevertheless, Hakim’s 
association with him was limited only to the one- on-one level and, once he left, 
their relationship was terminated, as if it had vanished. This kind of human rela-
tionship is often described as ‘plain’, but instead it should be explained as ‘cool-
ness’ or ‘indifference’ to others. This is not limited to the case of Hakim. 
Khokon disappeared; the author tried to find his whereabouts and asked one of 
his former close associates, who said the following:
He [i.e. Khokon] rarely comes here anymore. I do not know exactly where 
he is on the No. 3 road area. I just heard like that from the others.
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This man, who used to chat with Khokon very intimately, just said, ‘I do not 
know’ once Khokon had left the area. His attitude told me: ‘I am not interested 
in a man who has already left here.’
 Considered in retrospect, the scenario of escape from street life, most typical 
in the case of Khokon, or that of dining in the case of Hakim, represents an 
initial approach taken by the person in question, followed by the reaction of the 
other party. Khokon asked for a job ten times or so and, at last, the other person 
(i.e. a restaurant owner) responded (gave him a job out of pity). In the case of 
Hakim, too, even though he pretended that he was joking, he asked for a meal 
first and then the other party (i.e. the restaurant owner) responded (i.e. served 
him a meal on credit). This is the kind of active ‘approach’ from one side to the 
other that is commonly needed in human relationships in cities. Of course, there 
is no guarantee that the other person will give an amicable response to this 
approach. Instead, it is more likely that such a person would give a negative or 
cold response. Even if there is little hope, a person simply continues to try, 
without quitting. Eventually, the other person might respond. This relationship is 
triggered from this kind of ‘approach’ by one side, but the relationship would 
evaporate if there was no active ‘approach’. It is mentioned above that a kind of 
‘unilateral voluntary aid’ can be observed among urban people. At the same 
time, this voluntary response seems to contain a wide range of implications, such 
as lack of reciprocity; being unable to expect the same act the next time; and 
instability. These two aspects, an initial approach taken by the person in ques-
tion, followed by the reaction of the other party, and a unilateral voluntary aid, 
seem to be two sides of a coin.
 How do people perceive this lack of stability or mutual ‘coolness’? On this 
point, Khokon appropriately said the following:
It can be said that everywhere in Bangladesh we are exposed to tremendous 
tension as we come to the city. . . . I always feel tension here, such as how I 
can get job or how I can get food. Or would someone treat me poorly? I 
have no person [to rely on].
These very simple words reveal his true feelings about human relationships in 
the city. It is nearly impossible to believe the narrative of that same man that 
emphasises mutual aid among urban residents. Even so, this seems to be his true 
inner feeling. However, it is very difficult to determine whether this kind of 
comment completely negates the positive aspect of human relationships in the 
city or not. Instead, it seems that they simultaneously appreciate and negate the 
dual aspects of the city. This is because, in referring to the city as the cause of 
their tension, many of them then went on to cite negative aspects of the village 
and villagers, for example saying that: village people are very envious; they 
often say ‘Lend me some money’; they always interfere in other people’s affairs 
and so forth.
 It is obvious here, at least, that they clearly grasp that human relationships in 
the city are different from rural ones, and that two contrasting sets of human 
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relationships are perceived through this understanding. Mutual coolness and a 
lack of stability, and the mental tension that results from these, stand at the 
centre of human relationships in cities in Bangladesh.
Are relationships changing?
Even such an unstable or shaky relationship may be transformed into a more stable 
one through the process of acquiring urban residential status and with the continua-
tion and lengthening of the relationships. For example, Haydar walked out of 
Hakim’s life because of the ill treatment he received, and he has since been 
working independently as a riksa painter. Nevertheless, as they know each other 
well and also know each other’s work behaviour, Haydar continues to receive jobs 
from Hakim and, although he also accepts jobs from other customers, he is still 
living around Hakim’s garage. In a sense, this constitutes a relationship similar to 
the patron–client relationship. Theirs, however, is a loose one. It is not clear that 
there are any strict obligations or sanctions such as would be found in the typical 
patron–client relationship. Perhaps their relationship would quickly come to an end 
if one party stood back a little. A similar relationship existed in the case of 
Khokon, when he worked with the then boss of sardari kaj.
 If the term is further prolonged and the relationship becomes more con-
tinuous, it could be transformed into one that extends beyond generations. For 
example, Hakim said that he would never forget the generous treatment of that 
restaurant owner and would continue the relationship with him until his death. 
Moreover, Hakim confided that he lent the owner a considerable amount of 
money when the owner was urgently in need and, after the owner’s death, he 
even erased the debt his sons inherited, with an expression of thanks.
 In the case of Haydar, he has a relationship not only with Hakim but also with 
Hakim’s family. Consequently, Hakim’s sons call Haidar ‘mama’. Originally, 
the word mama refers to ‘maternal uncle’, but in this case is a ‘fictive’ term of 
kinship addressed to a man who is nearly equivalent to an uncle. In Bangladesh 
the kinship terminology is widely applied to non- kin (Kotalova 1996), and ‘the 
use of fictive kin terms not only facilitates interaction, it also creates certain 
obligations and rights’ (Jansen 1987: 85). In this sense, such use of kin terms 
cannot simply be dismissed as ‘fictive’, because this use of kin terms is usually 
accompanied by a kind of mental relatedness and some kind of change of 
behaviour.18 As far as the author knows, in the city a person starts to use the term 
mama initially for a man for whom he/she feels a kind of mental closeness. At 
the same time, in addressing a man as mama, he/she reveals some expectations, 
i.e. of help or being able to rely on that man.19 Traditionally, anthropologists call 
this kind of relationship ‘joking’. But, in this case of calling a man mama, 
intimacy is found between them only superficially. There is no joking and no 
other change of behaviour. Even so, in the passing of time their relationship has 
certainly changed on a deeper level and transformed into one of intimacy that is 
similar to that of kin. In this sense, human relationships in the cities may be 
changed in the long term.20
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Wavering appreciation for the ‘city’
The city is good!
The interviewees’s narratives about the dual facets of human relationships in the 
city often reflect a perception of the dual nature of the city itself. On the one 
hand, they said the following:
I love the city. I love it very much. It is far better than the house in desh [lit-
erally, one’s own country, but in this case, a home village or a village 
home]. I have become contented, as I now live in the city. I feel restless in 
desh. The reason why I love the city is that, and it can be said of Bangladesh 
cities in general, there is little envy or jealousy or things like that. This is 
my simple reason.
This is Khokon’s narrative. He appreciates the city, since he can find positive 
aspects of human relationships there. Interestingly enough, his reason for appre-
ciating the city is the same reason he gave for the mental tension he sometimes 
felt. Namely, that a single characteristic of the city sometimes brings a person 
appreciation (positive recognition) and sometimes an affliction (negative 
recognition).
 Other narratives can also be found that mention the characteristics of the city.
I love the city. The reason? Because I have lived here since my youth, 
working here; there are many people; the city gives many people goods and 
things; and we can pass the time by working here and so forth. I love the 
city. . . . We can watch TV when we go back home; there are restaurants; I 
have my own assets here; and I earn money doing my business. These are 
the reasons I love the city.
Hakim told us the above. The image of ‘city’, in this respect, is a place full of 
goods, people, work and, generally speaking, affluence. Of course, a person’s 
evaluation of the city depends to a certain degree on his/her success there. 
Because Hakim is a successful person, in terms of the three men at least, what he 
says in this regard may be discounted to an extent. Even so, a kind of ‘place of 
affluence’ image is apparent in his narration about the city. It cannot be described 
categorically here, however, because Hakim is a successful person. For example, 
Khokon said, ‘[We] have no opportunity in the village, so I prefer the city.’ This 
will be conversely interpreted as implying that ‘the city is full of opportunities’ 
or is an ‘affluent city’, and in this sense it seems to resemble what Hakim said. 
The various kinds of affluence possessed by the city seem to project, for many 
people, the image of a place with great potential.21
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The city is not good!
At the same time, the people in my study emphasise the aspect of harshness that 
a city can have, and often convey a negative perception. For example, Haydar 
said the following, with a sigh:
The city is not good, not good. I came here to earn money. Life in the 
village is aram [comfortable, feeling good or calm]. Aram in living, aram 
in the sense of food. If I could get a job in the village, I would never have 
to come to the city. Why do I say ‘the city is not good’? There are too 
many people. Everything is expensive. The food is not good, either. We 
must pay to rent a room. To earn money, I came here to earn money. The 
village is the best place. There is nothing better than a home village.
With the exception of rare cases such as that of Hakim, for many people 
belonging to the lower strata in the city, the image of the city as an affluent 
place just seems to mean the city is a place full of jobs or opportunities. They 
seem to say, ‘Frankly speaking, I would prefer to live in a village’, or ‘If I 
could have a job in the village, it would be better to live there.’ What Khokon 
said – ‘[We] have no opportunities in the village, so I prefer the city’ – could 
be interpreted as expressing this kind of sentiment. Conversely, they perceive 
the city as a place where one must compete to get a job, or as a place full of 
competitors. For that reason, they emphasise the aspect of ‘tension’ in the 
human relationships in the city.
 Admittedly, although this aspect of the city causes them to feel tension, it 
seems too simplistic to assert that they come to the city only to seek jobs or 
opportunities, or that the city is a place that otherwise means very little to them. 
For example, Khokon left his home and stayed in the city for more than ten 
years. During all that time, he never thought about going back, even though he 
was earning sufficient money to do so if he really wanted to. The author asked 
him the reason why he would not go back; he replied simply: ‘[I do] not want to 
go back.’ That is, even after he had experienced hard times on the street and 
human relationships full of tension in the city, the village was a place to which 
he would not return. In other words, village life is so harsh that boys do not wish 
to return for many years. Likewise, Hakim did not go back home, even though 
he experienced treatment similar to torture at his cousin’s house in Chittagong. 
Moreover, talking proudly about his work, Haydar exhibited one of his paintings 
to the author and said:
Riksa in the city is beautiful, is not it? There is no riksa like this in the 
village, is not it? I like city!
This is the narrative of the same person who earlier confessed that the city is not 
good.
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Despite it all, still attracting people
In reality, such an evaluation of the city is largely dependent on one’s human 
relationships within it. This is a reflection of the fact that, for many people, the 
city as space is intricately linked with people living in the city. There is no 
abstract city, at least for the people; there is the city where they actually live and 
which they experience day by day. Certainly, the city has a severe aspect, much 
like a doodlebug’s pit. This is a fact that cannot be denied. However, people’s 
narratives reveal that the same city simultaneously has completely different 
aspects, such as the mutual aid and indifference observed in its human relation-
ships, or the harshness and expansiveness it displays as a place. In other words, 
the bivalent view that emerges from the narratives is the complex figure the city 
presents. That a city has such contradictory aspects is a characteristic often 
referred to as the ‘magical charm of the city’.
 Also, regardless of the arguments presented here, many people are heading to 
the city, even today. Of course, some of them go willingly, but some do not. 
Moreover, attracting these people and mercilessly grinding some of them down, 
the city is a place that breathes and restlessly changes its character.
Notes
 1 Some commentators may criticise this chapter as concerning only a special type of 
migration and not being a study of ‘true’ city dwellers. However, the reality in Bangla-
desh is that, roughly speaking, the population has tripled since the 1980s in the Dhaka 
metropolitan area and more than doubled in the Chittagong city area. This rapid growth 
in urban population is largely a result of an influx from rural areas. This means that the 
vast majority of ‘city’ dwellers in Bangladesh consists of first- generation migrants and 
their families, including city- born children, and many of them belong to the lower or 
lower- middle strata of city population in economic and social terms. That is, they are 
city dwellers and they formulate city and city life itself in their own way. This point 
should be emphasised. Without them, the image of the city in Bangladesh would be an 
extremely skewed and unnatural one. Understanding them, just as they are, is essential 
in describing the ‘whole image’ of the Bangladeshi city.
 2 Many studies have been done on the topic of ‘city’, from the Chicago School to 
recent, highly abstract discussions (e.g. city as a hetero- topia, etc.). The author does 
not intend to repeat these here. This chapter intends only to go back to the real place 
of ‘city’, Chittagong in this case, and try to rethink the city of Bangladesh and its 
dwellers in the present day.
 3 From an economic perspective, Hakim is not poor. His behaviour and speech, 
however, strongly evoke typical features shared among lower- strata city dwellers in 
Bangladesh. On Khokon’s narrative, see Takada (2010).
 4 On the ‘oral history’ study in general, see Thompson (2000). He points out that few 
oral- history studies in the field have been conducted with respect to South Asia. In the 
case of Bangladesh, it is exactly true. There are many so- called ‘life stories’ in the 
literature, but almost all of these are compiled and written by researchers (e.g. Khan 
& Seeley 2005). An exceptional example is that of Biswas (2007).
 5 Mamun (1999) properly expressed this point in his essay entitled ‘Gariber katha 
shudhu goribei balate pare’ (Only the poor can talk about all the things concerning the 
poor). This is true, and the author endeavoured to recount their explanations in their 
own terms.
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 6 On the recent poverty situation in rural areas, see Khan and Seeley (2005).
 7 Giani (2006) points out the possible relationship between education and migration, 
including cases of running away from home. On the general migration situation in 
Bangladesh, especially internal migration, see Afsar (2000).
 8 Islam (2008) reported that, based on his experience of work supporting street chil-
dren, there are various factors behind the phenomenon of runaway children.
 9 Census data for a village often includes children who have already run away from 
their home in the total population of the village, as the villagers tend to insist that they 
are their children. Certainly the runaway children are their children, but in reality they 
are not present, as they have already fled. In this sense, they do not exist there. As a 
result, in such cases the census figure for the village is over- reported. The author 
himself witnessed this several times in his field studies
10 However, it seems somewhat problematic to insist that running away from home is a 
corollary of the Islamic teaching (Hara 1972).
11 Tokai originally meant ‘rag- pickers’, but nowadays many people use it in reference to 
porter children in the market places, railroad/bus stations or ferry terminals. On the former 
pattern of tokai, refer to Miyake and Alam (2008); on the latter, see Blanchet (1996).
12 For example, such news reports can often be found in local Bangla newspapers with 
captions like ‘Ali wants to go back home’ or ‘Mostafa does not know where to go 
back’. In these cases, the details of the report tell an almost identical story that a street 
child has changed his mind after running away from home and wants to return, but 
does not know where to return to, so the reporter asks the reader for information.
13 Habib, the carpenter mentioned above, also followed similar steps.
14 In the case of street girls, Blanchet (1996) describes typical ‘work’ as waste picking 
with begging at first, then gradually becoming a prostitute.
15 We can find many examples of street children being treated as ‘consumer goods’ not 
only in Bangladesh, but in many places around the world, either temporally or histori-
cally. For example, Kawakita (2008) explores a similar situation found in the English 
navy in the age of the British Empire.
16 This theory makes the assertion that cities of pre- industrial societies need large 
numbers of people as ‘consumable goods’ just to keep their temporary size, and in 
this sense the cities have been a kind of ‘doodlebug’s pit’ (Hayami & Uchida 1972; 
Wrigley 1969; Saito 1989). The author once noted the possibility of applying this 
theory to urban slum areas in developing countries (Takada 2006, ch. 4).
17 ‘Bihari’ is a term originally used to indicate a person from the state of Bihar, India. 
However, in Bangladesh the term is widely used to indicate those Muslim people who 
came from the northern part of India, not strictly limited to Bihar, around the time of 
the partition of India and Pakistan, or in the former Pakistan era.
18 Related to this point, Carsten (2000), Lambert (2000) and others propose the use of 
‘relatedness’ instead of ‘kinship’. The author himself hesitates to follow this proposi-
tion, because ‘relatedness’ implies meanings and connotations that are too broad in 
comparison to ‘kinship’. For general knowledge on kinship in Bangladesh, see Aziz 
(1979), and refer to Hara (1991 [1967]) for a case study of kinship in a village near 
Chittagong.
19 Concerning this, the author’s own experience constitutes a striking example. Once the 
author caressed an infant boy on a street in Dhaka and often fed him a banana or 
biscuit. Observing this, his mother (a destitute day labourer) persuaded him to call me 
mama. To do so, she evidently intended to strengthen the bond between us, practically 
as well as mentally.
20 Certainly Hakim’s sons call Haydar mama, and express closeness, but this is just 
closeness between non- kin. In this sense, the author hesitates to equate such related-
ness with those of kin.
21 More strictly, Manir said: ‘[There] is everything here. Works, goods and things, 
people, every thing. But, [it is] unfortunate [that we] have not so much money.’
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18 Tourism, consumption and the 
transformation of Thamel, 
Kathmandu
Izumi Morimoto
From an aeroplane descending into Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu 
at night, a comparatively bright area is visible within the basin, glittering with elec-
tric lights, where old and new buildings stand alongside one another. This area is 
Thamel, at once a well- known tourist area and a town of dubious reputation for the 
locals. In the daytime, scores of cars and motorcycles squeeze their way through the 
traffic on the narrow streets, which routinely experience heavy traffic jams accom-
panied by noisy horns and foul exhaust fumes. Many buildings, including approxi-
mately 200 hotels, are concentrated in Thamel, which spreads out for about a 
kilometre in all directions. Besides the hotels, restaurants, internet cafes, travel 
agencies and shops stand side by side along the streets, and above them are electric 
wires, almost tangled down into the windows of the buildings. Wandering around 
the streets of Thamel, it is not difficult for tourists to find signboards with words 
such as ‘Shangri- La’, ‘Nirvana’ and ‘Paradise’. This tourism space has been 
developed by taking these images, which have been created in the west, as mystical 
objects that are spatiotemporally different from the real landscape of the space.
 Gathered together in the streets of Thamel are not only tourists from various 
countries, but also would- be guides hunting tenaciously for jobs, vendors selling 
fruits or cigarettes on the streets, (pseudo-)sadhus wearing saffron robes, street 
children and women holding small babies in their arms asking tourists for 
charity. Thamel is the place where, as Liechty (2010: 273) points out, there are 
not simply ‘tourists ghettoes’ if by these words we mean spaces only of, by and 
for tourists. Rather, as translocalities, these are spaces in which a variety of 
Nepalis and a variety of foreigners interact, playing roles (wittingly or other-
wise) in a space where multiple imaginations of ‘others’ meet.
 Many of those who haunt Thamel dream of getting job opportunities or 
becoming successful. On the other hand, some of them ‘pursue a dramatic public 
life- style built around entertainment, leisure, and commercialized/mediated 
images of sophistication, glamour, and sexuality’ (Liechty 2010: 300–301). 
Among these locals, who play an important role in developing the consumer 
society in Kathmandu, middle- class people have started to come to Thamel to 
enjoy the consumption of culture. This chapter describes how global tourism has 
affected and interacted with local society in Kathmandu, focusing on the trans-
formation taking place in the tourism space of Thamel.
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 The tourism space has been created through a process of uneven geographical 
development. This space is both a relative space onto which the others can 
project certain images in the context of global tourism, and a physical space in 
which the fundamental infrastructure and institutions are improved for tourists. 
The landscape of the space has been transformed through the projection of the 
identities of the tourists, and this transformed landscape has the potential to lead 
to the creation of new identities, for example, those of the new middle class. 
Thamel is a tourism space where the processes of global economic and cultural 
changes bring about and interact with local social transformation. Under such 
circumstances, local people themselves politically appropriate and objectify a 
part of their self- image and reconstruct their identities within the space.
 Since Nepal formally opened its doors to the world in the middle of the 
twentieth century, Kathmandu has become a centre of international trade, mass 
media, mass tourism, foreign aid and the global labour market. Tourism, which 
stimulates the economy, has been directly implicated in both the changing 
nature of place and shaping geographical imaginations and experiences of 
place on a global scale. Kathmandu now enjoys a full complement of mediated 
windows onto global consumer modernity, even if Nepal’s position on the 
political- economic periphery guarantees that few Nepalis ever engage the new 
cultural economy beyond the levels of image, imagination and longing 
(Liechty 2006: 4). In terms of the transnational flow of goods and people, the 
most distinctive place functioning as a mediated window onto the global con-
sumer modernity in Kathmandu is the tourism space of Thamel. Many people, 
including international tourists, come and go with money, cultures, informa-
tion and goods that attract more people both within and outside Nepal, directly 
or indirectly, and create new circumstances. In Kathmandu, how have people 
accepted, resisted or ignored such new circumstances, and how has the tourism 
space been transformed? To answer these questions is to also consider how 
local people experience the changes in Thamel, which has been situated on the 
periphery of the world system on a global scale. This chapter also tries to 
depict the ongoing process led by the interaction between global tourism and 
social changes in Thamel.1
 The following chapter briefly outlines the tourism development of Nepal in 
terms of its having been absorbed into global tourism as a peripheral destination. 
It describes how tourism spaces have been developed along with the urban 
development of Kathmandu and shows the characteristics of Thamel compared 
with other tourism spaces in the city. Then it indicates how and why this trans-
formation has occurred in Thamel, focusing on the commodification of culture 
and space not for international tourists but for the local middle class. Finally, the 
chapter concludes that interaction between global tourism and social changes has 
created, in a sense, Thamel as a space for consumption for the middle classes in 
Kathmandu.
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Outline of the development of tourism in Nepal: changes on 
geographical images
In the eighteenth century, the western imperial gaze was focused on the Himala-
yas, and the utopian image of Shangri- La that was superimposed on Tibet came 
to feed fantasies of the country (Bishop 1989: 191–239). Mystical images of the 
Himalayas have attracted many westerners, including Blavatsky, who was a 
founder of theosophy and travelled to India in search of the ancient spiritualism 
of the East. This was also the time when Alpinism, which started in Europe, 
reached the Himalayas with the arrival of those seeking to climb the highest 
mountains in the world. Thus, these mountains have been the most important 
tourism resource in Nepal. However, as a result of the military ascendancy of the 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Tibet following the founding of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, entry into the Himalayas from the Tibetan side became 
restricted, especially for western travellers. On the other hand, when Nepal, 
located mainly on the southern Himalayas, formally opened its doors to the 
world, elite climbers started to try to climb the Himalayas from the Nepali side. 
Since a British expedition successfully ‘conquered’ the summit of Mount Everest 
in 1953, the Himalayas have been attempted by a steady stream of international 
expedition teams.
 The imagined location of the utopian space of Shangri- La, which had been 
created in the western Christian view of the world, shifted from Tibet to the 
Himalayas in Nepal shortly after an uprising in Tibet. This shift came about 
because the violence contained in uprisings and massacres was not suitable for 
the utopian space, and also because the Himalayas in Nepal resemble the phys-
ical and cultural environment of Tibet (Shrestha 1998). In this way, westerners 
started to avoid Tibet, instead visiting Nepal to look for something mystical on 
the Himalayas. The image of Shangri- La, as Liechty states, helped to create the 
spatial imaginary that launched hundreds of thousands of western youth on ‘The 
Road to Kathmandu’ in the 1960s (Liechty 2005: 19). The youth, anti- 
industrialist and anti- modernist, escaped from their own societies, gathered on 
Jhochhen, located very near the centre of the ancient city of Kathmandu, and 
enjoyed hashish. The street was colonially named ‘Freak Street’ and became a 
famous paradise for hippies.
 In the 1960s, approximately 60 per cent of Nepal’s international tourists were 
from the United States. At that time Kathmandu, as described by Iyer (1988), 
was like a paradise, emanating a hippie atmosphere for visiting westerners. 
According to Liechty, 1973 was the turning point for the ‘hippie era’ in Kath-
mandu (Liechty 2005: 25): the United States began linking foreign aid to drug 
suppression programmes, and when King Mahendra died in 1972, his son, King 
Birendra, decided to take action to end the ‘hippie era’. Thus, the Nepali govern-
ment made cannabis illegal. Furthermore, the oil crises and the end of the 
Vietnam War in the 1970s brought about a new era in Nepal.
 Tourists from non- western countries, including Japan, started to visit the city 
in the 1980s (Ministry of Culture, Tourism & Civil Aviation 2010), at which 
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time the Nepali government regarded tourism as one of the most important 
industries for economic development in Nepal. After the democratisation of 
Nepal in 1990, the number of tourists increased rapidly and tourism industries 
developed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Along with democratisation, the 
government encouraged private entrepreneurs to become involved in tourism 
industries, and thus the number of private entrepreneurs increased and they 
started to struggle with intensified competition. Meanwhile, the Nepali govern-
ment began to target quality tourists, rather than the low- budget tourists who had 
previously formed the bulk of visitors, by attempting to improve the quality of 
services and trying to promote investment from the private sector in the Eighth 
Plan in 1992. As a result, not only budget tourist hotels but also luxury hotels 
began to open, one after another. In this way, the Nepali government focused on 
developing mass tourism. The year 1998 was designated as ‘Visit Nepal Year’ 
by Nepal’s tourism authority (Figure 18.1). In those days, signboards with the 
words ‘atithidevo bhawa’, literally meaning ‘guests are gods’ or ‘the customer is 
always right’, were seen in many places to raise awareness of tourism among 
local Nepalis. In the middle of the twentieth century, western people had visited 
Nepal to seek the mystical images of Shangri- La, where gods might be living; 
however, by the end of the twentieth century, people in Nepal began to call inter-
national tourists ‘gods’, as if they brought fortune, or rather, wealth.
 Despite these benefits, rapid development also brought with it serious environ-
mental degradation. In Kathmandu, as the rivers became dirty and the sky became 
cloudy with exhaust fumes, the image of Shangri- La became incompatible with 
Figure 18.1  Signboard of Visit Nepal ’98.
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the physical environment of the city (Shrestha 1998). Furthermore, because of the 
political instability arising from the Maoist movement from 1996–2006, the 
number of tourists declined drastically in the early 2000s (Ministry of Culture, 
Tourism & Civil Aviation 2010). These factors caused radical changes to tourism 
in Nepal as the focus of the Shangri- La image shifted once more from Nepal to 
Bhutan and the Shangri- La prefecture, north of Yunnan province, near ‘original 
Tibet’ in China. The Nepalese royal massacre in 2001 shocked the world and 
added to the ongoing decline of tourism in Nepal. This decline was reversed only 
recently (Figure 18.2) due to the influx of tourists from Asian countries such as 
China that have experienced economic growth.
 While environmental degradation and political instability led to a decline in 
tourists coming into Nepal, the number of Nepalis going abroad increased 
rapidly from 1996 (Figure 18.2). One of the reasons for this tendency was that 
the decline in tourism industries caused bankruptcy and unemployment, as it had 
in other industries, and the Nepali government had no choice but to encourage 
its people to work abroad,2 since the creation of job opportunities through 
domestic industries was difficult to achieve under conditions of political instab-
ility. As the number of tourists who went abroad started to increase, the number 
of tourism agencies that began to target Nepalis as customers in manpower busi-
nesses also increased rapidly, and Middle Eastern airline services were aug-
mented. Nepal has become well- known as a global periphery sending cheap 
migrant workers not only to developed countries such as the UK and United 
States, but also to newly developing countries as Qatar, UAE and Malaysia. 
Nepalis who return from working abroad and ride on the economic opportunities 
of this new business become the middle class who can afford to travel both 
inside and outside Nepal, and, as described later in this chapter, enjoy entertain-






















Figure 18.2  The number of tourists in Nepal (source: Nepal Tourism Statistics 200).
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Tourism spaces in Kathmandu: the development and spatial 
segregation
Urban development in Kathmandu
Before King Prithvi Narayan Shah conquered the Kathmandu Valley in 1768, 
the Newar3 had created a densely populated residential area and developed their 
community in the valley. To avoid the settlement of the Newar in the centre of 
Kathmandu, under the rule of the Shah dynasty, Prime Minister Rana’s family – 
who practically seized political power – constructed sprawling, luxurious 
European- style palaces with white walls, splendid gardens and roads to connect 
the palaces. In the middle of the twentieth century, the Rana elite introduced and 
imported not only European- style palaces but also European luxury goods 
(Liechty 2003: 40–46). The landscapes of the palaces featured huge compounds 
and green woods. It is possible to say that housing development by the Rana 
constituted the first urban development in Kathmandu. However, the construc-
tion of these palaces and roads led to the more recent unplanned and disordered 
urban development in Kathmandu (Gallagher 1992: 254).
 As the population became concentrated in Kathmandu, the residential area 
and commercial markets developed accordingly along its roads (Karan & Ishii 
1996: 193–194). At the time the palace complex was built, social infrastructure 
was principally developed around the palaces. Today some of those palaces 
are used as tourist hotels, shopping malls and government offices, utilising 
their magnificent appearance and evoking the luxurious life of the Rana. The 
road constructed during the Rana era is used as a main street. Urban develop-
ment planning in Kathmandu today is still based on the infrastructure con-
structed during the autocracy of the Rana, despite the fact that it was not well 
planned.
Segregation of tourism spaces in Kathmandu
Since the end of the twentieth century, the income generated by tourism in Kath-
mandu has increased rapidly, although fluctuation has been observed. Total 
foreign exchange earnings from tourism increased from Rs. 3,587.6 million 
Nepalese in 1990–91 to Rs. 27,960 million Nepalese in 2008–09 (Ministry of 
Culture, Tourism & Civil Aviation 2010). Within the tourism industry, the 
accommodation sector produces far greater earnings than other sectors. As for 
the accommodation industry, in the 1980s about 80 per cent of tourist accommo-
dation was located in Kathmandu, as the capital was Nepal’s main international 
gateway. In order to weaken this trend, the Nepali government tried to alleviate 
the overconcentration of tourism in one area. In 2009, 422 out of 736 (57 per 
cent) accommodations for tourists were concentrated in Kathmandu (Ministry of 
Culture, Tourism & Civil Aviation 2010), and even now almost all the first- class 
hotels are located in Kathmandu.4 Thus, it can still be said that the greatest influ-
ence of tourism development has been exerted on Kathmandu.
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 Figure 18.3 shows the distribution of tourist accommodation in Kathmandu 
Nagarpālikā. Although not all accommodation may be included in the Yellow 
Pages, and the phone numbers of very small and unstable accommodations are 
unrecorded, these data are likely to be much more reliable than the official gov-
ernment data, which show 422 accommodations in Kathmandu (Ministry of 
Culture, Tourism & Civil Aviation 2010), as almost all accommodations in the 
Kathmandu city area have telephone lines installed, even though they are often 
operated without being registered.
 Tourist accommodations in Kathmandu also tend to be concentrated in par-
ticular locales. Each tourist area has its own characteristics, defined by the type 
of tourists who visit and the historical background of the area. Darbar Marg 
(‘King’s Way’ in English) is the main street in Kathmandu, and since the mid- 
twentieth century has been lined with not only four- or five- star hotels, but also 
exclusive restaurants, fashionable boutiques, international financial companies 
and airline offices. The hotels along Lajimpat and Kantipat are similar. These 
areas are characterised by high- quality and large- scale hotels, some of which 
have been renovated from the old Rana’s residences, utilising their magnificent 
appearances. At the dawn of the Alpinism era in Nepal, well- known mountain-
eers and explorers who sought a Shangri- La image used to stay at such hotels, 
the courtyards of which were vast enough to use to make preparations for expe-
ditions. However, even some of those multi- starred hotels were closed when the 
stagnation of tourism intensified during the recent political instability resulting 
from the Maoist movement.
 In contrast to luxury hotels, tourist accommodation in Jhoche – the traditional 
























Figure 18.3  Map of tourist accommodation in Kathmandu Nagarpālikā (© Izumi-
Morimoto).
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era’ – is characterised by its low cost. Budget lodges – which were basically flo-
phouses – began operating in the 1960s and 1970s. They had been converted 
from spare space in the residential houses of Newars, meaning the ceilings were 
so low that westerners hit their heads on the thresholds. By 1970 there were 
about 30 shops and cafes specialising in the sale of cannabis (Liechty 2005: 24); 
almost all of them were closed down and only a few were rebuilt as budget 
lodges and restaurants, or local residences just as before. Today in Jhoche there 
are only three guesthouses listed in the Yellow Pages.5 People who remembered 
the old days of Jhoche said that nearly naked western youths used to enjoy mari-
juana and dancing in front of the temples. Even today the place retains an image 
of hippie culture, as suggested by a signboard in English with the words ‘Freak 
Street’ in Basantapur Darbār, or the words ‘Kathmandu Durbar Square’ in 
English on the road leading to Jhoche. Basantapur represents the traditional heart 
of old Kathmandu, in which there remain a lot of old temples. These temples, in 
which local people have worshipped for many years, have attracted interest 
because of their elaborate wood carvings that include erotic scenes, leading 
westerners travelling the east in search of spiritual enlightenment to refer to them 
as erotic temples. Today Jhoche’s ‘Freak Street’ – once a paradise for hippies – 
is well known as a historical holy place.
 From the end of the 1960s, low- budget lodges and guest houses started to 
open in Thamel, the northern part of Kathmandu’s downtown, where tourists 
trying to escape from the hippie atmosphere of Jhoche came to stay. As Figure 
18.3 shows, today around 200 accommodations are located in Thamel. In the 
1960s, before tourists began to visit Thamel, local people started to buy the old 
Rana palaces in the area, which they imagined as the residences of rich, modern 
and upper- class people. The palaces had beautiful chalk walls – although they 
had grown dirty – high ceilings, plenty of large rooms and beautiful courtyards 
with fine trees and fountains. Local people said that Thamel, with its large, open 
spaces, bamboo groves and woods, had been haunted by spirits before the tour-
ists came.
 Originally, Thamel was a small settlement of Newars in the north of the Kath-
mandu city area, built around a Newar Buddhist monastery named Bhagwan 
Bahal, but also known as Than Bahil in the Newari language, which means 
‘large Buddhist temple in the upper Kathmandu city area’ (Shrestha 1987: 50). 
This etymology suggests that Thamel, although outside the city, has been 
attached to the northern half of the city area. The southern part of Thamel was 
densely populated by Newars, who had been settled there for a very long time. 
In this sense, in those days Thamel marked a border between the inner core and 
the outside of the city. During the hippie boom in Jhoche, the area called Thamel 
was just a single street about 20–30 metres long. In the 1980s, when the boom in 
mass tourism brought many budget tourists and backpackers to Thamel, this 
local shift in land use from a residential area to a tourism space created various 
new opportunities for local people to participate in business activities related to 
tourism. Thus Thamel came to be known as a business district, and local entre-
preneurs started to enter into the tourism industry. Thamel is still the most 
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remarkable tourism space in Kathmandu; however, the decline in tourism 
brought many hotels to bankruptcy. While the hotels closed their business, local 
people, instead of international tourists, began to come to Thamel to enjoy con-
suming other cultures. This will be described later.
 Although tourism was generally declining, in Sundhara hotels appeared like 
mushrooms, one after another.6 As shown in Figure 18.2, from the end of the 
1990s tendencies reflecting contemporary society, such as the increase in the 
number of migrant workers, can be seen in Sundhara. Compared with Thamel, 
where most of the signboards are written in English or other foreign languages, 
tourism services in Sundhara appear to target Nepalis who go abroad or come 
back, and there, unlike in other areas, Nepali devanāgari are conspicuous on 
signboards. Walking on the streets of Sundhara, one can find many signboards 
advertising services which include assistance with visa applications, photos for 
passports, airline tickets, international phone calls/faxes, internet access and 
money transfers. Also, accommodation in Sundhara is generally of a better 
quality, with comparatively modern facilities such as TVs and telephone lines 
for each room. Also, in Sundhara various kinds of entertainments, such as dance 
restaurants7 and dohorī restaurants,8 can be found that are aimed at Nepalis who 
are able to afford to participate in the consumption of culture.
 As the biggest industry in the world today, tourism has been implicated in 
shaping geographical imaginations and experiences of place on a global scale. 
With the process of global tourism development, tourism spaces have been 
created specifically for tourist consumption through the destruction of existing 
economic and cultural orders. Thus tourism spaces all over the world have 
become similar landscapes influenced by the ‘tourist gaze’ (Urry 1990). 
Although the space itself no longer exists in its location, it appears everywhere, 
as Ritzer (2003) points out, through the concept of ‘places/non- places’ in the 
realm of social consumption. Observed as a whole, these spaces seem to be 
similar because of built environments, but each space is intrinsically different, 
because local people objectify themselves and politically appropriate a part of 
their self- image to reconstruct their identities in the space interconnected with 
global tourism. Corresponding to each phase of global tourism development in 
Nepal, tourism spaces have represented distinctive images, for example a para-
dise resembling Shangri- La or Freak Street for hippies, a budget tourist area for 
mass tourism and a centre for migrant workers. In this chapter Thamel will be 
discussed as a tourism space in the context of consumerism in the contemporary 
society of Kathmandu.
The creation of the tourism space Thamel
Since the democratisation of Nepal in 1990, Thamel has become one of the 
busiest areas in Kathmandu because of international budget tourists and local 
entrepreneurs and their employees. After that time the area expanded and some 
nearby localities were absorbed into it, so the name Thamel now refers to an area 
of approximately one square kilometre (see Figure 18.4).
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 As has been mentioned above, two magnificent old Rana Darbars, Keshar 
Mahal and Krishna Bahadur Bhawan – both of which are now used as govern-
ment offices – stand in Thamel (Figure 18.4). The latter opened in the mid- 
twentieth century as the first international hotel in Nepal, before being 
converted into the government Election Commission Office. There are other 
Rana palaces with fine botanical gardens in Thamel; however, they are signifi-
cantly smaller than these two magnificent palaces and were therefore exempt 
from confiscation by the government following the collapse of the Rana regime 
in 1951. The fact that there were many Rana palaces in Thamel shows that 
when tourists started to come to Nepal in the 1950s at least, Thamel was not as 
densely populated as it is now. Urban infrastructure such as electricity and 
telephone lines was already available there due to the presence of the palaces 
inhabited by the Ranas, who were a privileged class until the middle of the 
twentieth century. Thamel in those days was more modern in comparison with 
other areas, therefore it was not difficult to provide accommodation services in 
Thamel for international tourists who demanded modern facilities. Since the 
1980s the price of real estate has risen exponentially in Kathmandu. While 
some Ranas sold land and left the area, local people and many people from 
outside Kathmandu bought land in Thamel. Many palaces are now used as 
private residences or as hotels and restaurants for international tourists by 
people who purchased them from the Ranas.
 After 1990, entrepreneurs from various cultural backgrounds came to Thamel 
to seek opportunities in the tourism industry (Morimoto 2007). Some of these 
Figure 18.4  Map of Thamel.
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entrepreneurs started businesses in profitable new fields such as pashmina pro-
duction, trading companies and manpower businesses. Until the mid- 1990s some 
non- Nepali entrepreneurs from other countries, including Indians, set up their 
businesses in Thamel.9
 The increase in the amount of available accommodation intensified competi-
tion among the various accommodations and enhanced their quality. In propor-
tion to the increase in business experienced in Thamel, these facilities became 
insufficient. Therefore they began to prepare candles and torches, operate gener-
ators for power shortages, and dig wells and purchase water from water- supply 
wagons for the safety of the tourists. Although hotel owners now often equip 
rooms with TVs and telephone lines, with a few even providing air- conditioning 
and refrigerators, when power shortages occur these utilities become only 
display pieces. Modernising hotel management by using the internet to enable 
potential customers to book a room from anywhere in the world also entails an 
increase in the use of electricity. Since power and water shortages often occur 
even in Kathmandu, entrepreneurs in Thamel have had to develop infrastructure 
such as electricity and water supplies independently to provide the modern facil-
ities expected by international tourists. If entrepreneurs do not or cannot afford 
such investment, their only advantage will be low prices, and they will eventu-
ally be driven to close their hotels.
 Among the tourist accommodations in Thamel that still exist today, the oldest 
was opened in 1968. The owner of this guest house has remained successful despite 
the unfavourable business climate. His parents had previously bought a Rana 
palace, and he first rented out some of the unused rooms when non- hippie tourists 
began to appear in the neighbourhood; this was not unusual in the 1960s and 1970s. 
During the 1970s, there were seven hotels in Thamel. Of these, four were run by 
owners of Rana palaces who used some spare rooms for tourists (interviews in 
1996–97). Since the old Rana palaces had more than enough rooms for private 
family use and they also had beautiful large gardens suited for hotels or restaurants, 
neither a large investment nor any knowledge of hotel management was required to 
enter the hotel industry. The only thing proprietors had to do was to keep the rooms 
clean and quiet and the hippies at a distance. At this time almost all the hotels and 
restaurants were near the oldest hotel in Thamel, Kathmandu Guest House,10 which 
started with only 13 rooms and expanded to 120, making it the largest hotel in 
Thamel today (interview with the manager in 1996). The owner’s family estab-
lished three other accommodations, including a resort- type hotel, and the owner 
became a member of a decision- making organisation for tourism development at 
the national level. As tourism developed in Nepal, this family acquired new know-
ledge and business opportunities and developed their entrepreneurship; they remain 
prosperous today. They benefited from both entering business at the end of the 
1960s and already owning a Rana palace with adequate facilities for western tour-
ists. This meant that they had already accumulated enough capital and experience to 
overcome difficulties before competition intensified.
 Another local entrepreneur managed to develop his business by accumulating 
experience in accordance with tourism development. The man, whose father had 
320  I. Morimoto
run a restaurant for hippies in Jhoche, expected tourism to develop in Thamel. 
Therefore, he started a bakery and an Indian restaurant for international tourists. 
In the 1990s he opened a restaurant that served Thai food as well as developing 
a resort in southern Nepal. One of his restaurants, which had a magnificent 
appearance, was renovated from an old building built in the Rana era. In addi-
tion, before the decline of tourism in the 2000s he founded a manpower business 
to make a profit and founded a college as a social enterprise. Since demand in 
the manpower business did not decrease amid the political instability and slump 
in the tourism industry, he was able to construct business partnerships with many 
international entrepreneurs and develop new businesses in some fields.
 Since the emergence of the tourism industry in Thamel, successful local entre-
preneurs have improved their knowledge and skills in accordance with tourism 
development or capitalistic industrial development. At first, people could operate 
accommodations without knowledge and capital, because they were able to capi-
talise on the existing infrastructure from the Rana era. At that time many European 
cultural goods, such as fountains in gardens and furniture as interior decor, were 
imported from Europe by the Ranas. Compared to other areas, Thamel is brightly 
lit with electricity and images of European cultures. It was not difficult for entre-
preneurs to begin to offer services for western tourists in the 1960s when infra-
structure had not been developed well even in Kathmandu. In the 1980s, local 
entrepreneurs who had experienced various industries and learned about capitalism 
began to enter the tourism industry, leading to competition among them in Thamel. 
Thus the tourism space of Thamel not only expanded geographically, but also 
became a commercialised space, including its landscape, in the historical and 
social context of the society. In this process, Thamel has been transformed from 
the western modernity introduced by the Ranas to global modernity suitable for 
mass tourism. Because of the efforts of entrepreneurs, Thamel has been able to 
improve its infrastructure and equipment. When the government- managed electric 
power supply stops, the lights of the entrepreneurs will remain on.
Transforming Thamel: the appropriation of tourism
In Thamel and elsewhere in Nepal, the tourism industry remained weak for 
several years from 2000, and in 2002 the number of visiting tourists (including 
international tourists and Indian tourists arriving by air) was nearly half what it 
was in 1999 (Figure 18.2). Against this backdrop, while some entrepreneurs dis-
appeared along with the international tourists, other local people began to 
become much more visible in Thamel. Because of the decrease in the number of 
international tourists bringing foreign currency into Nepal, local entrepreneurs 
were obliged to either alter their businesses or leave Thamel altogether.
The decline of tourism and its influence
A brief history of a hotel which, like many others, closed in 2003 illustrates how 
entrepreneurs dealt with the situation amid the changes that occurred in the 
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tourism space of Thamel. Until 1999, the manager of the hotel in which I used to 
stay ran a hotel in the eastern part of Thamel that had many – primarily western 
– repeat guests, and was successful. Since the hotel building was rented, the 
manager had to renew the rental contract with his landlord, who owned the hotel 
building. But in 1999 he could not renew the contract because the landlord 
wanted to operate the hotel by himself in order to increase his profits. This was a 
good time for entrepreneurs in Thamel, as the number of international tourists 
was increasing. So the manager rented another hotel building in another part of 
Thamel and opened a new hotel, which he named Hotel California, heeding the 
advice of an American acquaintance. However, after 1999, the decline in tourism 
made it difficult for him to make enough profit to pay the rent. To obtain enough 
income, he sublet one room of the hotel to a massage shop where young women 
gave massages and most likely other services to male clients.11 As the number of 
clients who came to the shop increased, the shop began to take up more space in 
the hotel. In addition, the hotel manager set up a dormitory room in his hotel in 
order to attract more tourists who sought cheap accommodation. Some of the 
young tourists who came to stay were absorbed in smoking marijuana, which 
was easy to get in Thamel. Furthermore, he started to take in male guests accom-
panied by women, who asked for rooms late at night. After a while the charge 
for accommodation fell to only about 100 rupees (approximately US$1.3) per 
night, which was around one- third of the regular charge for his hotel. The rooms 
began to smell and became dilapidated, with torn curtains and broken beds and 
toilets. Also, when the water taps were turned on there was usually no water, and 
even when there was running water, it was red and harmful to touch. As a result, 
international tourists rarely stayed at Hotel California, and in 2003 the manager 
decided to close the hotel and move out of Thamel.
 In 2003 this hotel manager opened a travel agency in Sundhara where many 
hotels opened from the end of the 1990s. His wife, who had been working at 
another travel agency for a long time, managed this travel agency. When Hotel 
California was doing well, she had arranged air tickets and tours for international 
tourists at a travel agency in Thamel. However, as the number of international 
tourists decreased, local people became her clients instead. Most of them were 
migrant workers who were going to work abroad. Their numbers increased rapidly 
(Figure 18.2). Furthermore, middle- class people, who had previously tended to 
travel by land routes, started to travel by air to avoid traffic strikes caused by the 
political unrest. In response to this, she tried to shift her target clients from inter-
national tourists in Thamel to Nepali tourists in Sundhara. Unfortunately, because 
of the severe competition among the numerous travel agencies in Sundhara, they 
had to close the tourist agency operation. After a while, she managed to get her 
husband a visa to a developed country using her connections with an old client of 
the hotel, and thus he was able to go abroad to work. She began to make similar 
arrangements for others wishing to migrate to work overseas. In time such busi-
nesses became immensely popular and profitable.
 As in this case, because of the stagnation of tourism, some entrepreneurs had 
to give up their tourism- based businesses and instead work abroad or try their 
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hand at new businesses, for example, in the manpower business. The above 
example demonstrates that although entrepreneurs failed in tourism in Thamel, 
they had alternative options to which they could apply their knowledge and 
skills. Working abroad and the manpower business both represent opportunities 
that people have been eager to take up in contemporary Nepali society.
Cultural changes: from ethnic cultures to global cultures
In the 1990s, Thamel was a place that good local girls and boys avoided because 
strangers, in other words international tourists, roamed the streets. The demand 
of tourists who came to Nepal to seek ‘Nepalness’ was the main factor behind 
the transformation of the residential area of Thamel into a tourism space. But the 
number of tourists decreased, and entrepreneurs had to exploit new business 
opportunities. Among the entrepreneurs, some targeted local people as their new 
clients or exploited new demands from them. For example, now local middle- 
class people come to Thamel to enjoy the consumption of culture, such as 
‘exotic’ foods like pizzas, Chinese food, Thai food and Korean food. Foods that 
were eaten by the international tourists in their home countries are now enjoyed 
as ethnic foods by Nepalis. On the other hand, ethnic Nepali foods that had been 
cooked with catsup and fewer chillies to please international tourists have 
recently diversified into ‘Nepali ethnic foods’, and the number of restaurants like 
the Thakali12 dāl bhāt restaurants has increased, allowing local people to enjoy 
the regional and ethnic differences of Nepal. It can be said that Nepali foods are 
also recognised and recreated in the process of commodification of culture and 
space.
 During the 1990s, professional dancers in ethnic costumes performed various 
kinds of ethnic dances on the stages of dance restaurants that offered Nepali 
cuisine and drinks, and loud, live Nepali folk music. Dancers were usually 
professional and sometimes went abroad to present their cultures. More recently, 
nightly entertainments such as dohorī have become popular on the live stages at 
restaurants for local people. In these restaurants, masters of ceremonies speak to 
guests in Nepali because they do not expect their customers to be international 
tourists, even in Thamel, where the western music on the live stage once over-
flowed into the streets. When the customers are impressed by the songs sung in 
Nepali by local singers, some give 1,000 rupee (about US$13) notes as tips; such 
sums are very large relative to the GDP per capita in Nepal, which in 2008 was 
US$453.13
 Dance restaurants today are also evening entertainment venues similar to 
dohorī restaurants. Even during nights when there are power outages, such res-
taurants have bright signboards with words like Tease Me, Masha or Natasha, 
and loud music coming from inside. The dancers are not always professional. 
They sway and wind their bodies in time with the music to show them more 
closely to the clients, who seem to give them a lot of money. Today in Thamel, 
such dubious dance restaurants are much more conspicuous than those offering 
classical ethnic dances. In these restaurants, whose numbers have increased 
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rapidly, female employees usually wear sexy costumes, and sometimes prosti-
tutes stand at the back or walk around the hall and wait for someone to ask for 
their company. Under such business circumstances, one entrepreneur, who ran 
several restaurants in Thamel and disliked this moral disorder, said that he 
stopped employing female staff because people might mistake them for prosti-
tutes, and if they did, his restaurants would fall into disrepute in Thamel.
 As for sexual commodification, at the beginning of the 2000s men wearing 
women’s clothing such as tube tops and miniskirts, high- heeled shoes or saris, 
used to stand as streetwalkers along the streets of Thamel and accost men. This 
phenomenon became famous, and people began to come to see them; however, 
the area was raided repeatedly by police, and after a while these men dis-
appeared. The reason why such sexual minorities also came to look for business 
opportunities in Thamel seemed to be that their organisation was located near 
Thamel, and the high frequency of unspecified population flow made the space 
very anonymous. In such anonymous space, drug dealers also appeared, con-
ducting their business on the streets. Not only international tourists, but also, or 
rather, local youth became good customers of these drug dealers. Generally, 
local people think the reason for the rise in juvenile delinquency among the local 
population has to do with the culture that international tourists brought from 
outside Nepal.
 In the past, Thamel was a dubious place for local people, crowded with a lot 
of strangers from outside Nepal on a quest for paradise. Now it is still a dubious 
place, but for different reasons: various kinds of commodities, including shady 
ones, are becoming more prevalent, although this is attractive to some local 
people. The tourism space has been transformed into a town with bright lights 
for not only the strangers from outside Nepal but also local middle- class people 
who can afford this kind of cultural consumption.
Conclusion
This chapter focuses on how people have led their lives and reconstructed the 
tourism space of Thamel to function as a mediated window that has been periph-
eralised in the world economy. In accordance with global tourism development 
in Nepal, local entrepreneurs have enhanced their own knowledge and skills. In 
other words, they have begun to practise capitalism. At the same time, tourism 
cultures in Thamel, such as songs, dances and foods, have been created and pro-
vided for international tourists. Recently, the tourism culture that tourists have 
consumed as Nepalness has been appropriated for the consumption of culture by 
the local middle- class people. Both groups enjoy themselves in the same space, 
but the former come to consume Nepalness in the context of tourism in Nepal, 
and the latter come to consume global cultures far distant from Nepal, or some-
thing ethnic from inside Nepal. While tourism culture – including the image of 
Shangri- La and hippie paradise – has been commodified, Thamel is transforming 
as a tourism space that appropriates these historical images, although local 
people never think that Thamel is a paradise, but rather a dubious place they 
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should avoid stepping into. On the other hand, it is the place where local people 
can experience unusual excitement, in a sense, as if they were outside Nepal. 
Thamel becomes a place that, according to Ritzer (2003), is everywhere in the 
world, but no longer exists in its place.
 Thamel has been created in the context of global consumption, such as 
tourism and modernisation in Nepal, and as a space onto which people, both 
international tourists and locals, can project their own otherness, paradise, ‘for-
bidden’ excitement or dreams of success. In the process of transforming Thamel, 
local people appropriate the tourism culture to reconstruct their ethnic cultures 
as cultures to be consumed and which bring the space translocality.
Notes
 1 I began field surveys on tourism development in Thamel in 1995 and have carried out 
research in the following areas: the history of place- names in the process of regional 
formation of the tourist area Thamel (Morimoto 1999); the development of local 
entrepreneurship in accommodation industries in Thamel (Morimoto 2007); and the 
creation of a tourism space and changes in tourist images of Nepal that local people 
started to internalise as their own and utilise for themselves (Morimoto 2001, 2009). 
This chapter is based mainly on these former studies.
 2 The number of Nepalese going abroad for employment was 255,742 (43.4 per cent) of 
588,645 (Ministry of Culture, Tourism & Civil Aviation 2010).
 3 The Newar, an ethnic group of Nepal, are the indigenous people of the Kathmandu 
Valley.
 4 Ten out of the 12 hotels that have four or five stars are in Kathmandu (Ministry of 
Culture, Tourism & Civil Aviation 2010).
 5 Nepal Business Yellow Pages 2000; Nepal Business Yellow Pages 2006.
 6 In Sundhara there were six hotels in 2000 and 30 in 2006 (Nepal Business Yellow 
Pages), and the author observed around 60 hotels in 2005 and more than 100 in 2009 
(field surveys in 2005 and 2009).
 7 Dance restaurants display various dances on their stages, from traditional ones per-
formed by professional dancers in ethnic dress, to erotic ones by dancers who put on 
sexy garments, sometimes removing them.
 8 Dohorī is a type of song in which men and women exchange witty improvised verses 
back and forth. Dohorī restaurants provide dohorī service on the live stages. Usually 
guests request singers to sing their favourite songs.
 9 From 1999 to 2006 there were three Chinese, two Japanese and one South African 
who registered to operate hotels in Thamel (unpublished data from Nepal Tourism 
Board).
10 According to its home page, Kathmandu Guest House was a Rana mansion converted 
into a hotel in 1967. Starting with just 13 rooms, it has been slowly nurtured into a 
sprawling 121-room hotel with more than the required amenities. Today it is reputed 
to be an internationally acknowledged ‘best budget hotel’. It is the first hotel estab-
lished in Thamel, which is Kathmandu’s most popular tourist destination, with the 
highest concentration of tourism- based service outlets in Asia. www.ktmgh.com/kgh/
default.php.
11 This kind of shop has become more prevalent in Thamel since the end of the 1990s.
12 Thakali, whose dāl bhāt has a reputation for being delicious, is an ethnic group from 
the north- west of Nepal.
13 www.imf.org/external.
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19 ‘Time gentlemen’
Bangalore and its drinking cultures
Aya Ikegame and Crispin Bates
Probably better than anybody else, the serious pub- goers of Bangalore know 
where the current boundaries of the city lie. This rapidly growing city has been 
swallowing many surrounding villages, officially and unofficially, as its area has 
expanded. The poor residents of nearby villages are waiting for the day when 
their village is included within the Greater Bangalore area and the price of their 
not- so-productive agricultural lands suddenly shoots up. However, the serious 
pub- goers will not be so happy because the expansion of the city means they will 
possibly have to travel even further than before to satisfy their thirst. The habit 
of going outside of the city to drink began when the city authority introduced a 
series of restrictions on alcohol consumption within the city boundary. Currently 
the pubs, clubs and bars have to close at 11 p.m. sharp. Surprisingly, this rule has 
been efficiently enforced by the police. While visiting the city’s famous clubs, 
we often encountered policemen coming to make sure that the club was closing. 
Drinkers do not mind this at all; if they have the energy, they simply drive their 
cars or bikes (it is hoped that some of them are still sober) out of the city to con-
tinue drinking. There are numerous venues that have been established just 
outside the boundary for this purpose. On New Year’s Eve of 2006, the city 
authority went so far as to entirely close the city centre M.G. Road to all busi-
ness and traffic in order to prevent the recurrence of a street party that had spon-
taneously erupted there the previous year. Again, the young middle classes of 
Bangalore were well prepared: many discos outside of the city boundary offered 
attractive all- night parties and sold tickets in the city centre well in advance. 
M.G. Road was dead on that day, but there were many people enjoying them-
selves elsewhere.
 In May 2008, over 180 people lost their lives as a result of consuming illicit 
alcohol in the border areas of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. At least 80 of them 
were from slum areas of Bangalore and another 30 from rural suburbs outside of 
the city. The Congress party immediately condemned the BJP government for 
banning the legal manufacture and sale of arrack in the state, which they held to 
be the cause. The newly elected chief minister, Y.S. Yediyurappa, was the archi-
tect of this ban on arrack in July 2007. Such so- called hooch tragedies seem to 
arise regularly in India, while the number of deaths is often especially high fol-
lowing the introduction of regulations restricting drinking. Gujarat, the only 
‘Time gentlemen’  327
remaining dry state in India, has come under special criticism on these grounds, 
with the horrific casualties from illegal liquor consumption in recent years 
attracting profound criticism and the scorn of licit distillers elsewhere in India.1
 Drinking in India has always been an extremely contentious issue. Christian 
missionaries encouraged a policy of temperance, while the army in cantonment 
cities such as Bangalore fortified its troops with copious quantities of spirits. 
Giving up drinking was considered to be one of the ways in which lower castes 
could claim higher status in the varna hierarchy. Gandhi added to this ‘Sanskri-
tising’ behaviour a sense of patriotism, since alcohol was a major source of 
income for the colonial state (Carroll 1976). Unfortunately, the excise duty on 
alcohol remained an extremely important source of income for post- 
independence state governments, accounting for more than 20 per cent of tax 
revenues in most states. Inheriting as it did both the nationalist (or Gandhian) 
moral agenda and the financial structures of the colonial era, the postcolonial 
state has had to play a seemingly contradictory role.
 Some states tried to introduce a total prohibition on alcohol sales, but most of 
them failed to continue this, with the exception of Gujarat. However, adopting a 
moral stance while meeting financial demands is not necessarily a contradictory 
aim. After all, it is all about controlling people’s moral and bodily practices. The 
southern states have thus all of them now banned the sale of arrack, a typical 
working- class drink, on the grounds of health and family welfare, while encour-
aging the sale of Indian- made foreign liquor (IMFL), a more middle- class drink, 
which happens to be centrally distributed. This is a clear example of how the 
state has endeavoured to exercise moral authority while controlling and collect-
ing excise revenues more efficiently. Earlier, toddy liquor was banned for similar 
reasons.
 Studies on alcohol in general have been dominated by the disciplines of 
biology, public health, social policy and social psychology, which have tended 
to regard alcohol consumption as a question of individual pathology (addiction) 
or as a social problem leading to alcohol- related violence, family neglect and 
various other problems. Anthropological studies, especially functionalist 
approaches, on the other hand, have tended to emphasise the socially integrative 
role of drinking (Heath 1987: 105, Dietler 2006: 230). Here, drinking alcoholic 
beverages has been understood as normal social behaviour and even as crucially 
important for its socially integrative role (see, for example, Douglas 1987). 
However, anthropologists have notably neglected the political and economical 
aspects of drinking, as observed by Singer (1986), and it is only recently that 
socio- cultural anthropology has begun to examine historically sensitive issues 
concerning how alcohol is deployed within the micro- and macro- politics of 
society. It is noticeable, furthermore, that the wealth of studies on the social 
meanings of food in India (for example, Dwyer 2004, Osella 2008) have tended, 
delicately, to avoid the issue of alcohol altogether.
 There are relatively few academic studies concerning alcohol in India, but 
historians have contributed immensely. Lucy Carroll (1976) has demonstrated 
the clear connections between nineteenth- century temperance movements in the 
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west and the Gandhian agitation for prohibition, which had otherwise often been 
regarded a uniquely Indian process of ‘Sanskritisation’ or a pure product of anti- 
colonial nationalism. David Hardiman (1987), on the other hand, has shown how 
the avoidance of alcohol in India might have had an agenda of its own, entirely 
unrelated to the temperance advocacy of missionaries or that of Gandhian 
nationalists. This agenda sought to release subaltern groups from the thrall of 
exploitative liquor dealers and moneylenders, and conceived of self- improvement 
in indigenous, but neither Christian nor Sanskritic, terms. These historical con-
tributions have shown how intimately the consumption of alcohol is linked to 
power and politics, and that moralising about alcohol has commonly been 
adapted and interpreted in ways that suit purely material self- interests. This is 
perhaps most vividly illustrated by the fate of the Gandhian temperance cam-
paign of the 1930s and 1940s, which enjoyed total and complete ideological and 
political acceptance at the dawn of independence, but was almost entirely aban-
doned over the course of the subsequent three decades. However, even half a 
century after Gandhi’s death, it seems that the social and political economy of 
drink cannot escape from the rhetoric of morality and temperance, and even 
perhaps demands it in order to legitimise specific practices. Thus, as alcohol 
consumption has diversified and increased, the discourse of abstinence has been 
re- born in new forms which echo the growth in inequality, new political agendas 
and the changing class divisions within Indian society.
 The moral, economic and political tensions arising from the political economy 
of alcohol consumption are nowhere more intensely felt than within the confines 
of Indian cities. It is within Indian cities that we see most vividly the segregation of 
the drinking public in class terms being enacted within spatial terms as well. 
This is perhaps most dramatically apparent in India’s most modern metros, 
where whole zones of shopping malls, five- star hotels and nightclubs have 
become no- go areas for poorer and less prosperous city residents. This chapter 
focuses on this phenomenon specifically within the city of Bangalore, the IT 
capital of India, one of the fastest growing cities in Asia, and the capital city of 
the state of Karnataka, which has also, incidentally, become a gateway for the 
entry of the Hindu nationalist BJP into the south of India.
You are what you drink: the social stratification of alcohol in 
India
The types of alcohol that people consume and their consumption patterns are 
unique in India. Beer, for example, is the most popular alcoholic beverage in 
most parts of the world, but in India it occupied only 16 per cent in volume terms 
and 2.4 per cent in absolute alcohol terms of the total alcohol consumption in the 
early 2000s. The per capita consumption of beer is thus a mere 0.55 litres in 
India, while the world average is 23 litres (NIMHANS 2003: 22). The unpopu-
larity of beer in India is mainly due to the relatively heavy tax on beer compared 
to other types of liquor. Since the tax levies are not based on alcohol content, but 
on volume, people tend to go for ‘value for money’ drinks which contain more 
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alcohol. Recently efforts have begun to produce wine on a larger scale in India, 
but much of it is exported (e.g. Maharashtran ‘champagne’) to the Middle East. 
The amount of wine consumed in India itself is still negligible.
 One of the major categories of alcoholic beverage sold in India are the so- 
called IMFLs. This type of liquor, with its rather confusing name, is labelled and 
sold differently as whisky, rum, brandy, gin, vodka and so on, according to the 
colour, flavour and perfume artificially added to it. Despite their various labels, 
the bulk of IMFL drinks are nothing but rectified spirit distilled from molasses, a 
by- product of sugar. Situated in the middle of sugar cane cultivation with abun-
dant water from Kaveri, southern Karnataka is an ideal location and one of the 
largest centres for alcohol production in India. The other major alcohol- 
producing states are Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh (NIMHANS 
2003: 21). Punjab, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka are 
also major centres for the industrial brewing of beer: an activity commonly 
linked to the location of military cantonments.
 While IMFL is the favoured drink of the urban middle classes, the rural popu-
lation and urban working classes prefer to drink arrack (otherwise called country 
liquor). In the nineteenth century, arrack could be made from distilled toddy 
(also known as thalakka, thari, silpi, feni and kallu), which is the fermented juice 
of the Palmyra or coconut palm (NIMHANS 2003: 7). Formerly a household 
activity, legal arrack is presently distilled from molasses on an industrial scale.
 The system of centralised distillation was first introduced by the British in the 
nineteenth century. The Abkari commission of 1869 proposed a system that was 
intended to produce more spirits at a cheaper price than the village distilleries 
while simultaneously increasing the revenue from excise duties (NIMHANS 
2003: 12–13). The central distillery system was originally intended to meet the 
demands for consumption within military cantonments but gradually monopo-
lised the market in general throughout India. Under this system, pure spirit was 
distilled from sugar cane under licence. Initially the entire production process 
was handled in government- owned distilleries, but this proved unprofitable. It 
was therefore later developed into a two- tier system of distilling: the privately 
owned and licensed primary distillers who produced arrack, and the secondary 
distillers who refined arrack and turned it into different flavoured liquors. The 
major manufacture of alcohol was thus centralised, with the less refined arrack 
meeting the demands of poorer consumers, and wealthier consumers (including 
the military) imbibing the output of the secondary distillers. Many villagers and 
tribal populations continued producing their own alcoholic beverages, such as 
mahua (fermented flowers, drunk as beer or distilled), toddy and neera (extracted 
sap of palms), but this is generally discouraged as it lies outwith the government 
licensing and taxation system. To inhibit unlicensed production and sale, state 
governments have latterly introduced centralised systems for the wholesale dis-
tribution of IMFL and arrack, with only authorised retailers being permitted to 
purchase from this source and on condition that they buy nowhere else. What 
kind of alcohol a person consumes, and where, has thus become a key indicator 
of her/his social positioning in terms of class, caste, gender and occupation.
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Drinking in Bangalore
The space of IMFL
In 2007 and 2009, we conducted a number of interviews with people who were 
drinking in bars or clubs in central Bangalore. We also interviewed one of the 
IMFL makers in Karnataka and visited their factory, and interviewed sales staff 
from the leading beer producer in the city. We visited dozen of clubs, most of 
which had a restaurant area, disco or lounge- bar. This type of bar has become 
very popular in Bangalore city centre and they are often situated in shopping 
malls rather than in five- star hotels, which are more common places for drinking 
in other cities such as New Delhi or Kolkata. We also visited a couple of clubs 
in outer suburban areas, where many call centres, IT offices and BPO centres are 
located. The customers of the clubs we visited were mostly middle class, espe-
cially professionals in their twenties and thirties. Not all of them were so- called 
‘corporate types’, but the majority were wealthy enough to pay an entrance fees 
as high as Rs. 500, which (at this level) usually included a single cocktail within 
the price. We also visited slightly cheaper pubs where male university students 
shared huge pitchers of beer and sung American rock songs together, or where 
young migrants from the north- eastern states hung around together seeking 
respite from their hard working lives.
 We met a group of men in their mid- twenties who were drinking in a lounge- 
bar on M.G. Road on a Sunday. One man was from Simla, HP, and working for 
a Bangalore branch of the real- estate giant Landmark. He said that they had been 
at the same bar for four consecutive days and explained to us where he typically 
went and what kind of alcohol he drank.
(Real- estate man): In Bangalore, the happening days are Wednesday and 
Saturday. People want to have a party in mid- week [on Wednesday] and 
week- end [Saturday nights]. Sunday is rest. We can drink till 11.00 in the 
city. After that we go out of the city in order to carry on drinking. Typical 
places are one near the new airport and another one in Mysore- Bangalore 
road. It takes 30 min to get there. It is a pain, but we can then enjoy till 
morning. I normally drink brandy, vodka [although he was drinking beer at 
that time]. Beer is just for socialising. I won’t get high. To get high, I drink 
brandy or vodka. I don’t drink wine, because you have to drink it a lot to get 
high.
The pattern he described was a six- day working week, which he maintained 
could not be endured without a mid- week break. This was a common practice, 
he insisted, and this did indeed seem to be the case as the clubs were relatively 
quiet on the remaining days of the week.
 The real- estate man told us that his favourite bars were Zero G, Hint and 
Spin, where he said teenage girls hung around at the weekend. (This was prob-
ably, however, sheer bravado, as we went to Spin at the weekend but could not 
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find any such girls.) His friend was an Indian army captain from Rajasthan who 
was visiting an army base in Bangalore for a few days. They went to college 
together and had kept in touch since.
(Army man): I am just visiting my old friend working in Bangalore. I am 
going back to Delhi tomorrow. In the Army canteen, alcohol is very cheap. 
It depends on the state, but a bottle of Scotch costs only about Rs. 60. 
Outside, it will be Rs. 200. Yes, I earn less than my friend [real- estate man] 
but if you think about stability and the benefits I am receiving, it is not bad 
at all.
 Many people to whom we talked in bars and clubs were in groups of friends 
and occasionally among work colleagues. They were college classmates, flat-
mates, friends of friends and so on. It was quite surprising to see how many of 
them maintained intimate relationships outside of kin networks and in ways that 
were unrelated to their workplace. Many of them were not even from the same 
state.
 The general image of pubs in Bangalore is negative. The local newspapers 
and tabloid magazines published in Kannada regularly report awful things going 
on in pubs. The pub appears in popular discourse as a place where gangs and 
politicians organise ‘sex parties’ with call- girls (serviced apartments have 
acquired a similar reputation). The image of the pub is thus as bad as the brothel, 
if not worse. When we planned to visit The Beach, a popular club in Indiranagar, 
a middle- class residential area where many BPO and IT companies have their 
offices, it was not easy to find an auto- rickshaw driver willing to take us there. 
We finally found one, but he was still very reluctant. Even when we offered to 
raise the price significantly, he said, ‘Madame, it is a bad place. You should not 
go.’ With this reluctant driver, we eventually went to Indiranagar and asked a 
local resident for directions. We could hear this apparently middle- class gentle-
man telling our driver in Kannada not to take these people to the place. ‘It is a 
real shame we have such a place in this locality,’ he said. The driver came back 
and said, ‘See, I told you so.’ However, perhaps due to its location in a residen-
tial area, we found the club to be full of friendly, relaxed, well- behaved people, 
including many office workers. There were even several families enjoying their 
dinner in the restaurant area. From talking to the several patrons, we concluded 
that this pub was conspicuously one frequented by friends who had come from 
all over India, and who had met through flat- sharing. Almost like students. They 
only thing they had in common was that they had travelled far from home to 
Bangalore to seek work. The music was loud, but the club was too crowded for 
people to dance; instead people added to the noise through spirited and energetic 
conversation.
 The largest nightclub we visited was on Residency Road and situated on the 
top floor of an office block. In common with other larger establishments, the 
club served food (in this case not very good food) and this particular club had 
several bars, including one in an outdoor area where there was a half- empty 
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swimming pool. There was more than one group of young women from the 
north- east (chaperoned by a couple of men), who sensibly stuck together. Many 
clubs have a couples- only policy, which leads to some amusing negotiations 
outside the entrance as young men and women agree who is going to pretend to 
be with whom. This club had no such policy. It was the only club where there 
was clear evidence of drunkenness and where there was any significant number 
of foreigners. The hedonistic excesses were led by a group of American youths 
who enjoyed throwing each other into the pool. Club staff occasionally drenched 
the crowd with a fire hose. There was no dancing and the young Indian patrons 
did not stay for long.
 By contrast, clubs such as Hint, which is located on top of a major shopping 
mall just off M.G. Road, had a determined couples- only policy, the patrons were 
more mature and they were very much focused on the dance floor, which domi-
nated the establishment. Taika, located atop another eerily dark shopping mall 
on M.G. Road, similarly opened soon after the shops were closed. They had a 
bar and a small lounge area where food was served, but the club- goers were 
entirely focused on the professional- looking dance floor. Here, the young clien-
tele turned out to listen to house, trance and heavy bass dance music, played by 
guest DJs, and were serious about their business. Alcohol consumption was 
light.
 Perhaps the least hedonistic establishment of all was Fuga, which was located 
in Ashok Nagar, not far from Sacred Heart Girls’ High School, the Good Shep-
herd Convent, Bishop Cotton and other elite private schools. This was an 
extremely new, spacious, and modern nightclub, cleanly decorated and serving 
excellent food. It was decidedly quiet, however, and we noticed that the clientele 
included several groups of middle- class teenage girls, evidently out to enjoy a 
‘nightclub’ experience, who were accompanied by their fathers. Non- alcoholic 
cocktails seemed to be the order of the day here.
 We noted that in several clubs the most popular drink was the 330 ml bottle of 
Kingfisher beer, which was drunk directly from the bottle. The popularity of this 
drink was further confirmed to us by conversations with brewery sales staff. 
Drinking directly from the bottle no doubt looked cool, but as explained to us by 
the drinkers in one bar, it was also was the cheapest drink available, which you 
could easily carry around without spilling, and which could be made to last a 
long time. Often just a single bottle would be consumed per person during the 
evening, and groups commonly clubbed together to buy the round, with one or 
two men being delegated to attend the bar. Unlike a glass, no- one could see 
when the bottle was empty, and you were spared the expense of a second trip to 
the bar or (worse still) the embarrassment (for women) of having to ask a man to 
buy you another drink. In other words, the consumption of beer was a pre- 
eminently social activity. Where cocktails were consumed, this was commonly 
included in a relatively higher entrance fee for the club. Only in one bar did we 
notice any enthusiasm for people to buy a second or third cocktail, and this was 
in the centrally located 13th Floor lounge club, which was exclusively a drinking 
establishment.
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 Bars and night clubs in the centre were generally patronised by wealthier sec-
tions within the middle classes, especially young professionals working within the 
BPO and IT sectors. Lower- middle-class youth, by contrast, tend to avoid drinking 
in such establishments on a regular basis, preferring to consume alcohol in local 
bars, restaurants and dhabas, which they consider more affordable and ‘more wel-
coming’ (Nisbett 2007: 944). Below this there lies another level of drinking dens, 
including roadside liquor and arrack stalls and less salubrious backroom bars in 
poorer areas, which are clearly entirely off- limits to the middle classes of all sorts. 
Thus what you drink and where you go to drink is strongly related to social status.
The space of arrack
To find arrack shops in Bangalore in the first instance is not easy, but once you 
find one, you will see that they are everywhere. The typical arrack shop (sarai 
angadi in Kannada) in the city centre is literally a bare concrete box with an 
open window. On the window, there will be a huge stack of arrack in plastic 
sashes (paketto sarai) and a grumpy- looking man waiting for the customers. 
They are often situated on a back street in busy commercial areas. One we 
visited was in an area of town where the residents are largely artisans and either 
Muslim or Christian (hence inevitably poorer). Access was via a narrow, smelly, 
muddy street off the main road, which was used as a rubbish dump. The shop 
had a long, empty concrete counter; it was late evening and there were men 
sitting on the ground outside, presumably exhausted from their day’s work and 
the liquor they had just consumed. It was altogether an unappealing environ-
ment. Another nearby was more salubriously located on a street corner, but it 
was similarly barren. These are not social spaces, but places where people buy a 
drink, consume it quickly and leave (provided they have the strength).
 There are said to be 1,116 arrack sales points in the city.2 We were very eager 
to spend more time visiting arrack shops and talking to people there but were 
discouraged from doing so. The timing was probably too sensitive (just one 
month before the banning of the sale of arrack), and being a woman and a for-
eigner did not help either. We were fortunate though to talk to an IMFL manu-
facturer in Bangalore who did their own ‘fieldwork’ on arrack drinkers. When 
we visited their office in central Bangalore in May 2007, people were excited 
about the prospect of the ban on the sale of arrack. They were certain that the 
ban would bring more profits to the IMFL makers in the state (which it did). 
They were energetically preparing to expand their business into the ‘lower 
segment’ of the market. To research their market, they sent their ‘boys’ to arrack 
shops and invited customers to a table set up by the manufacturer where they 
were asked about their preferences regarding IMFL.
 One member of the family who owned the distillery, who joined this ‘field-
work’, enthusiastically explained to us what he found:
They [the customers at arrack shops] are mostly construction workers, drain 
cleaners, etc., who need physical strength to work. They start drinking in the 
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morning before they go to work and drink 5 or 6 times a day. They don’t 
spend any time in the shop, just ask ‘60 koDi [give me 60 ml]’ and quickly 
swallow it at one gulp. It was interesting to hear what was said when I asked 
a man about his favourite IMFL. He said he likes drinking rum during the 
summer which is quite opposite to what we conventionally think. Our sale 
of rum drops during the summer because it is considered to be a hot drink 
and makes you hot. But he said that he likes it because his body becomes 
hot and he feels all the tiredness goes away. Another interesting thing was 
that they don’t prefer gin because of its colourlessness. They are sceptical of 
liquor shopkeepers if the liquor does not have any colour, as they would not 
then notice when the shopkeepers add water to it. When they are in the shop, 
those who could not afford to buy any nuts or snack or pickles, they just 
take some salt (which is free) and lick it and leave.
He observed the arrack drinkers very carefully to the extent that he noticed one 
drinker, while licking salt, threw a glance at the poster of a sexy girl. He con-
cluded that ‘we need to have a sexy poster too’ to advertise their drink. The dis-
tillers decided also that they needed to supply IMFL in very small bottles 
(possibly PET bottles) to meet the demand from this segment of the market. This 
was because unless the drink was in a sealed container, the typical arrack drinker 
would not trust the quality (hence the popularity of plastic sashes). At the same 
time, they would only buy in one go as much as they could consume on the spot.
 Another employee of the manufacturer, who used to supply arrack, was the 
man who organised this ‘fieldwork’. He told us that arrack manufactures (first 
distillers) will not lose much money after the ban since most of them were 
already producing IMFL, while the IMFL manufacturers (second distillers) will 
profit from it because their sales will extend further into the lower segment of 
the market. However he also said:
The 99 percent of licensed arrack shop owners will suffer. Currently licence 
renewal costs 4 to 5 lakhs per year, but if it is an IMFL liquor shop, they 
have to pay nearly twice, around 8 to 9 lakhs. Also in order to get a new 
IMFL shop licence you need 15 lakhs. Most of them cannot afford. More-
over, the number and area of IMFL liquor shops are severely limited. The 
government made clear that they were not going to pay any compensation to 
the arrack shops. Most of them will have to change their job.
 Estimates of the number of people who were involved in the licensed arrack 
trade vary greatly. Prior to the ban on the sale of arrack, various organisations, 
such as the Arya Idigara Sangha (Toddy Tapper Caste Organisation) and Sarayi 
Maratagara Karmika Sangha (Union of Workers Selling Arrack), organised large 
rallies in several locations in the state. They claimed that the ban would throw 
over 500,000 (five lakh) people on the streets and would affect the livelihood of 
over one million (ten lakh) people.3 One report quoted a government officer as 
saying that around 120,000 people were in the trade and almost all of them have 
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turned to the illicit liquor business (Jayaramiah 2008). The Karnataka govern-
ment subsequently promised to rehabilitate people who were employed in the 
arrack business under various schemes of the industries’ departments.4 However, 
it is not known how effectively the government implemented these schemes for 
the rehabilitation of arrack workers and succeeded in preventing them from 
going underground.
The space of illicit alcohol
An interesting variation on the consumption of illicit alcohol is to be found in 
lower- middle-class areas of Bangalore, such as the commercial streets of 
Malleshwaram. Here, the arrack shop was not to be found, but the cost of pure 
IMFL was still prohibitive. Shops selling alcohol would commonly therefore sell 
beer and a limited variety of IMFL bottles at the front of the shop, but patrons 
would also be allowed to drink a glass on the premises. And at the back of the 
shop there was a section displaying bottles bearing the labels of imported brands 
such as ‘Johnny Walker’ and ‘Smirnoff ’. This was all arrack under another name 
and probably also included illicitly distilled alcohol. The taste was not dissimilar 
to surgical spirits. Customers here commonly drank a single glass of spirits and 
then left, or brought with them bottles which they asked to be filled, presumably 
at rock- bottom prices. It is widely known that primary sugar cane distillers 
produce spirits on the sly, in excess of the amount they declare and legally sell 
onwards to the IMFL manufacturers (who further distil, flavour and bottle it). 
This liquor is commonly described as ‘seconds’ (tax- evaded liquor) and 
amounted to almost two and half times the amount of IMFL legally sold in 
1999–2000 (Government of Karnataka, quoted in NIMHANS 2003: 2).5 It is 
presumed that this is one typical manner in which this illegal product is provided 
with an outlet.
 Entirely illicit production and the production of ‘seconds’ liquor is difficult to 
separate. Because it is not taxed, it sells for considerably less than the retail 
prices for arrack and IMFL that are set by the state. Combined, it is believed that 
‘undocumented consumption’ amounts to considerably more than 40 per cent of 
total alcohol consumption (NIMHANS 2003: 2).
 There are a variety of spaces where illicit alcohol is manufactured and con-
sumed. Toddy tapping has been banned in most parts of all four southern states 
for decades, but coconut and palm farmers insist that toddy is a traditional food 
item, nutritious and healthy and beneficial for poor farmers.6 The toddy tappers 
are often rivals to the arrack shop owners, even though they are commonly from 
the same caste, since both are competing for the same customers at the lower end 
of the market.
 The sample survey in Karnataka conducted by the National Institute of 
Mental Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS)7 shows that 34.1 per cent of 
women who drink said that their preferred place for drinking is ‘at home’ and 
22.0 per cent said ‘on the street or lonely places’ followed by ‘in a pub, bar or 
arrack shop’ (20.7 per cent). Among men who drink, 35.9 per cent said they 
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liked to drink ‘in a pub, bar or arrack shop’, 19.7 per cent preferred ‘at the 
counter of the liquor shop’, 19.4 per cent said ‘on the street or lonely places’, 
and only 5.3 per cent specified ‘at home’ as their preferred place for drinking. 
This clearly indicates that spaces for drinking are highly gendered. Although 
we observed more middle- class women drinking than ever before in public pubs 
or clubs in Bangalore, the majority still drink in private. The preference of 
women for drinking in private appears to be a reflection of both the traditional 
morality which Indian women are supposed to uphold and the anticipation of 
the possible danger that Indian women may encounter if they drink in public. 
Although the tendency to drink in private makes them vulnerable in other ways, 
for women, going to a male- dominated bar or arrack shop is still unthinkable. 
At the same time, for women, buying illicit hooch to drink at home is distinctly 
more accessible, since a large majority of the hooch sellers are women, and 
they often visit towns and villages to sell their produce during the daytime 
(NIMHANS 2003: 25).
 Consumption of illicit hooch is strongly related to poverty (Manor 1993). 
Although the manufacturing cost of arrack was cheap, the excise levied on 
arrack still made it more expensive than illicit hooch. After the banning of arrack 
in Karnataka, it is difficult to imagine that these vulnerable sections within 
society would move (as hoped) towards the consumption of more expensive 
IMFLs. They simply could not afford it.
The advertising space
The advertising of alcohol in India is extremely restricted. Pictures of bottles of 
alcohol cannot be shown on any advertising material except on the internal and 
external walls of bars, liquor shops and pubs. It is not even permitted to specify 
that what has been advertised is alcohol. Since the only thing that is allowed is 
advertisement of the brand name, alcohol ads in India often look extremely 
abstract. The Bangalore distiller with whom we conducted interviews told us 
about their efforts to increase their ‘presence’ in the market by promoting the 
names of their various brands. They once managed to persuade a Kannada film-
maker to place their whisky in one of the scenes of a film. Since they co- funded 
the film, the director agreed to do so. This rather familiar technique of product 
placement was, however, immediately noticed by the state film board of censors, 
and the filmmaker was told to remove the scene in which a whisky bottle had 
been prominently displayed. The film was a suspense thriller featuring a 
Kannada superstar Vishnuvardhan, who died in 2009 at the age of 59, but it did 
not have much success, just like the hundreds of other Kannada films that are 
shown in the theatres for a few weeks and then disappear. In the giant billboard 
of the film alongside the highways, we could recognise the small trademark of 
the whisky they were promoting, but it was probably too small for most people 
to notice.
 While small distillers are struggling to sell their brand image, India’s largest 
alcohol manufacturer, the United Breweries group (UB group), could easily fill 
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public spaces with images of their alcohol products. The United UB group owns 
the largest private airline in India, which bears the name of their best selling 
beer, Kingfisher. The chairman of the UB group, Vijay Mallaya, also owns an 
Indian Premier League cricket team based in Bangalore, called Royal Challeng-
ers, which resembles the name of their blended whiskey and lager beer, Royal 
Challenge. His lavish parties, his liveried and ‘personally selected’ airline host-
esses, his enthusiastic promotion and funding of an Indian Formula One racing 
team and occasional patriotic acts such as successfully bidding at an inter-
national auction for the sword of Tipu Sultan in 2004, and for the private belong-
ings (including spectacles) of Mahatma Gandhi in 2009, have all contributed to 
keeping his image constantly in the media. Even his political ambitions probably 
have as much to do with the selling of his products via his media presence as 
they do with a desire to influence and manipulate political situations to the 
benefit of alcohol producers. In June 2010, he was elected an MP of the Rajya 
Sabha as an independent candidate for the second time. He allegedly paid 30 or 50 
crore rupees to the JDS (Janata Dal Secular) to ensure their support (later the BJP 
decided to support him as well) despite the fact that he never attended a single dis-
cussion in parliament on the previous occasion that he was elected as an MP.
 The advertising of alcohol is largely centred around the image of a new urban 
lifestyle, and particularly emphasises its consumerist tendencies. Parties, short 
skirts, seaside beaches, sunglasses, white jackets, catchphrases like ‘the King of 
Good Times’ (a catchphrase for both Kingfisher and Vijay Mallaya himself ), all 
contribute to create the atmosphere of a relaxed but highly stylised social space. 
Even the advertisements in regional languages follow the same trend. A recent 
Kannada advertisement said ‘tenshion yaake, saakashtu stailu (Why do you feel 
tension? It is full of style)’, alongside a large picture of two popular Kannada 
film stars walking in a relaxed posture in white suits with black sunglasses. The 
image of two successful men with a hint of underground gang culture suggests 
what the Kannada- speaking lower- middle classes most associate with drinking. 
It is something they might aspire to be a part of, while at the same time they 
morally despise it.
Morality and profits
As the Gandhian/nationalist enthusiasm for the implementation of a national 
policy of total prohibition gradually faded in the mid- 1960s and slow economic 
growth pressurised government budgets, many states began to abandon their 
restrictive policies towards alcohol consumption (Reddy & Patnaik 1993: 
1060–1061). Mysore (present-day Karnataka) was the first state to give up their 
partial prohibition in 1964, and other states soon followed.
 Some scholars have cynically noted that this relaxation of prohibition may 
have been related to the growing influence of criminal elements among India’s 
political elite (Reddy & Patnaik 1993: 1062). However, the cause of prohibition 
has also been supported by criminal elements in Karnataka. The state became 
infamous for a violent attack on the Amnesia pub in Mangalore (400 km west of 
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Bangalore) in January 2009, which especially targeted women drinkers. This 
attack was organised by a supposedly hardline Hindu and local nationalist organ-
isation, the Sri Ram Sene, and was pre- advertised to the press so that journalists 
could be present to film the event. Pramod Muthalik, the national president of 
the Sri Rama Sene, a former member of the RSS and once a local leader of the 
Bajrang Dal in Mangalore, told The Indian Express:
We do not encourage pub culture. The girls were half- naked and dancing 
with the youths who were drunk. We also received information that they 
were all drug addicts. . . . Sene has respect for the women of this country. 
That is the reason we attacked the pub to save the girls from the clutches of 
bad forces.8
Pravin Valke, another founding member of the Sri Rama Sene, expressed his 
outrage in similarly misogynistic terms:
These girls come from all over India, drink, smoke, and walk around in the 
night spoiling the traditional girls of Mangalore. Why should girls go to 
pubs? Are they going to serve their future husbands alcohol? Should they 
not be learning to make chapattis? Bars and pubs should be for men only. 
We wanted to ensure that all women in Mangalore are home by 7 p.m.9
 Women wearing sleeveless kurtas in Bangalore were targeted around the 
same time, and there was talk of organised demonstrations against the celebra-
tion of Valentine’s Day. The Mangalore incident highlighted the reactionary 
shift in Karnataka politics since the BJP came to power in the state. This has 
seen a growth in support for another self- appointed guardian of the nation’s 
morals, the Bajrang Dal: the militant youth wing of the Sangh Parivar.10 Unsur-
prisingly, the state government denied any links between these events and the 
Bajrang Dal while refusing to prosecute the leadership of the Sri Rama Sene for 
their involvement. The incident, however, successfully brought to light the 
evident resentment felt by many elements in urban Karnataka, consisting prin-
cipally of young men who have failed to benefit from the rising prosperity within 
the cities and are reacting against the conspicuous consumption associated with 
it. Unfortunately, the moral stance of the Sri Rama Sene has been entirely dis-
credited by an exposé in Tehelkha magazine, which has proved that the Sri Rama 
Sene are willing to organise a violent demonstration anywhere for an appropriate 
fee, regardless of the victim or who was likely to benefit (Sanjana 2010).
 The demand for the banning of the sale of arrack was initiated on rather 
higher moral grounds by women’s movements in rural areas of south India. 
Especially in Andhra Pradesh, low- caste women, and especially Dalit women 
within villages, organised themselves with the assistance of political parties such 
as the CPI (M), CPI (ML) and Telugu Desam Party (TDP) to campaign against 
liquor drinking.11 These newly assertive and often educated low- caste women 
claimed that their communities were the constant victims of domestic violence 
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and burdened with heavy debts because of the drinking habits of their husbands. 
They considered arrack as ‘a social evil’ and campaigned to force thousands of 
arrack outlets to close (Reddy & Patnaik 1993, Sarveswara Rao & Parthasarathy 
1997). It is widely believed that the popularity of the TDP leader N.T. Rama Rao 
(NTR) was partly due to the fact that he strongly supported these women’s cause 
and promised them he would introduce prohibition in the state (Vyasulu 1998: 
877).
 To call for the banning of arrack or the introduction of prohibition is always 
extremely popular in India, where temperance is associated with respectability, 
purity, patriotism and self- improvement. In Andhra Pradesh, the cause of women 
campaigning against alcohol was strongly supported by left- wing politicians, 
campaigning ‘on behalf of ’ the poor. In Karnataka, women’s groups such as 
Stree- Shakti and other organisations demanding the banning of arrack were 
strongly supported by religious seers, powerful Lingayat mathas (monasteries) 
and Hindu nationalist politicians of the ruling Bharatiya Janata party within the 
state.
 Before the ban, arrack contributed nearly Rs. 2,000 crore to state revenues 
during the financial year 2006–07. This was second only to the income from 
commercial taxes12 and comprised 60 per cent of the entire excise revenue (a 
total of 3,414 crore rupees). It was said therefore that the introduction of the ban 
in July 2007 would cause a loss of between Rs. 1,800 crore and Rs. 1,900 crore.13 
Prior to the introduction of the ban, the then deputy- chief minister- cum-finance 
minister Yediyurappa (who went on to become chief minister in May 2008) initi-
ated various reforms in the alcohol industry. The Karnataka State Beverages 
Corporation Ltd started supplying IMFL directly to retailers and has not renewed 
the licences of wholesale dealers who were gaining a 5 per cent commission for 
providing this service.14 Simply by removing private wholesale dealers, the state 
government expected to increase excise revenues by 150 crore rupees.
 In May 2010, nearly three years after the ban on the sale of arrack, the Karna-
taka Excise Department announced that they had collected a revenue of Rs. 7,500 
crore through the sale of IMFL during 2009–10.15 This was more than twice 
what they used to collect from the sale of arrack and IMFL combined. The moral 
campaign to prevent the suffering of women and families thus brought about a 
dramatic increase in tax revenues to the state which, at the same time, has been 
able to significantly increase its control over the sale and consumption of alco-
holic beverages.
Conclusion
There are elements of counter- culture to alcohol consumption. The advertising 
of alcohol draws upon aspirational ideals associated with prosperity and wealth. 
At the same time, alcohol consumption has a macho, bad- boy image. Elements 
of this are seen at all levels of society. There is also an association between 
alcohol and a lifestyle that is independent of conventional social mores. There 
can be very positive elements to this form of self- assertion: friendship and 
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socialising outside of the usual bounds of family, gender and caste, and the 
assertion of equality and camaraderie among upwardly mobile, educated middle 
classes. Notwithstanding the modest prosperity of those involved, this could be 
described as the assertion of a new subaltern form of citizenship (Pandey 2009), 
which lies counter to the conventions of society and which resists the demands 
and regulations of the state. For this reason, the behaviour of the drinking classes 
in Bangalore does not easily fit the dualistic model of civil society that has been 
described by Partha Chatterjee (2008).
 At its extremes, one might argue that there is an IMFL drinking elite that is 
widely tolerated by society, and an arrack- consuming working class that is 
excluded, characterised as addictive and generally disparaged. This certainly is 
a feature in government legislation and a great deal of public rhetoric. 
However, there are clearly new cultures of drinking that are emerging between 
these extremes. There is also an increasing overlap between them, as new gov-
ernment regulations have restricted the sale and distribution of arrack and have 
driven working- class consumers into the IMFL segment of the market. We 
thus see in inner- city suburbs the growth of wine shops which cater both to 
lower- middle-class and working- class segments of society. At the same time, 
young middle- class elites resort to new social spaces created for late- night 
drinking beyond the boundaries of the city, in addition to consuming heavily at 
home. It may also be argued that for certain members of the IT/BPO sector, 
drinking has assumed an increased importance as a means of escaping a stress-
ful work environment, much as it does for those involved in hard, manual 
work. Yet despite these complications, there is clearly still one predominant 
trend, and that is the shrinking space that is made available to the very poorest 
consumers. On the one hand, their consumption is inhibited by low- caste 
women activists campaigning to close liquor shops. It is also severely curbed 
by politicians who seek public approval through the denunciation of alcohol 
(while carefully avoiding any mention of middle- class drinking habits). Behind 
this rhetoric lies an assumption that the middle classes are responsible and 
mature enough to ‘handle their drink’ while the masses need to be guided and 
controlled in their access to alcohol.
 Additional pressures on the lower- class drinker come from churchmen and 
religious zealots in an alliance with state governments, who are vigorously 
seeking to outlaw the manufacture and consumption of all but the highest 
quality, centrally distributed and most heavily taxed – and therefore most 
revenue lucrative – forms of alcoholic drink. Perhaps the greatest pressure of 
all, though, on the space of the working- class drinker derives from the embour-
geoisement of the Indian city (Chatterjee 2003). For the first time since inde-
pendence, Indian cities are growing beyond the role of mere marketing and 
service centres for cantonments or the headquarters of civil administration. 
They are beginning to reflect the rise of a new middle class and new white- 
collar industries and occupations that have the capital resources to transform 
the environment within which they live. Street markets, pavement dwellers and 
lower- class inner city suburbs are being bulldozed away and replaced by 
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 fly- overs, shopping malls, offices and hotels. Within this milieu, a new form of 
youthful middle-class drinking culture has clearly developed. It is predomi-
nantly, however, a culture of prosperity: the product of an expanding middle 
class. The members of labouring classes are excluded from this environment 
as they may doubtless also be excluded from the opportunity to consume either 
licit or home- produced alcohol in their native village. In the process, this 
section of society is perhaps also being transformed, to provide better, more 
efficient and disciplined workers for the burgeoning metropolis. It remains to 
be seen whether the drinking habits of the middle classes may also become 
subject to similar public regulation for the benefit of their employers, and the 
degree to which all sections of society will continue to successfully transcend 
proscriptive attempts to manage the drinking social spaces of the city.
Notes
 1 In July 2009 more than 120 people died in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, after consuming 
illicit liquor (The Hindu, 13 July 2009). For another large- scale incident in 1981 in 
Bangalore, in which more than 300 people died, see Manor (1993).
 2 There were 15,215 arrack sale points in Karnataka in total (The Times of India, 1 July 
2007).
 3 The Hindu, 19 January 2007.
 4 The Times of India, 1 July 2007.
 5 The Taxation Task Force of Karnataka estimated that in 1999–2000, while 28 million 
litres of IMFL was officially sold in the state, 67.9 million litres of IMFL was addi-
tionally sold by way of ‘seconds’ (Government of Karnataka, quoted in NIMHANS 
2003: 2).
 6 For example, in May 2010, about 6,000 farmers in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu staged a 
protest against the ban on toddy tapping. Several thousand were arrested (The Hindu, 
27 May 2010).
 7 Sample size was 21,276 individuals from 5,200 families in Karnataka. The survey 
was conducted in 2002 in four districts of Karnataka: Bangalore, Dharwad, Bidar and 
Uttara Kannada (NIMHANS 2003: 46, 48).
 8 The Indian Express, 27 January 2009.
 9 The Indian Express, 3 February 2009.
10 A report by the BBC has described the activities of gangs of Bajrang Dal vigilantes in 
Mangalore who are policing the streets and beaches to prevent what they regard as 
lewd behaviour (e.g. couples holding hands) and the ever- present threat of ‘Love 
Jihad’ (Muslim boys seducing Hindu girls). ‘Love and Morals in Mangalore’ Assign-
ment, BBC World Service broadcast on 28 March 2010.
11 Andhra Pradesh subsequently introduced a ban of the sale of arrack in October 1993 
(see also Abraham 1995).
12 The Times of India, 1 July 2007.
13 The Financial Express, 15 January 2007.
14 The Financial Express, 15 January 2007.
15 The Hindu, 15 May 2010.
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